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Suicide attacks are a complex and vexing phenomena that are appearing with greater frequency 
in the international arena.  Previous approaches to studying suicide attacks tend to examine them 
at one-level of analysis.  While helpful, the insights produced are isolated from other crucial 
factors.  This dissertation examines suicide attacks at three-levels of analysis as it investigates 
the organizational incentives, individual motivations and how the attacks achieve societal 
resonance.  As such, the dissertation asks three primary research questions: why do organizations 
adopt suicide attacks, why are individuals motivated to become suicide attackers and how do the 
attacks attain resonance? 
   The research questions are applied to four case studies selected along a conflict 
continuum where suicide attacks were used.  The cases are (a) the Japanese use of Kamikazes 
during World War II, (b) the LTTE’s use of suicide attacks during its irregular war against Sri 
Lanka, (c) Hamas’ use of suicide attacks as domestic terrorism against Israel, and (d) Al Qaeda’s 
use of suicide attacks as transnational terrorism.  The dissertation argues that organizations use 
suicide attacks out of defensive necessity and for strategic purposes, individuals are motivated to 
become suicide attackers by a religo-nationalist liberation ideology that promises the attacker 
post-mortem incentives for his or her death, and that societal resonance is achieved when the 
DELIBERATE DEATH: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE NATURE OF SUICIDE 
ATTACKS  
Michael Patrick Echemendia, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
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organization draws on religious, cultural and nationalistic narratives that enable the population to 
accept the tactic.  
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“On a huge hill, 
Cragged and steep, Truth stands, and he that will 
Reach her, about must and about must go, 
And what the hill's suddenness resists, win so. 
Yet strive so that before age, death's twilight, 
Thy soul rest, for none can work in that night.” 
-John Donne, Satire III 
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He introduced me to the enduring wisdom of the ancients who are so often forgotten in today’s 
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pursuit of excellence and virtue.  Dr. Jeffrey also taught me how to read and evaluate primary 
sources with a careful and critical eye, which has been a valuable skill especially as it pertains to 
the research done in this dissertation.   
My second debt of thanks goes to my family.  My grandfather (Dr. M.M. Echemendia) 
was the one who piqued my interest in international affairs when he gave me my first copy of 
Foreign Affairs when I was in high school.  Both my grandfather and father (Dr. Michael D. 
Echemendia) taught me diligence when it came to my studies and they showed me what it meant 
to “study, sacrifice and save.”  They also instilled in me an indefatigable work ethic that I will 
carry forever.  My grandparents, father, mother (Cary Echemendia), brother (Nick Echemendia), 
father-in-law (Michael T. Evanko) and mother-in-law (Brenda Evanko) have been instrumental 
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in supporting me from day one throughout this process.  Despite all the bumps in the road I knew 
that I could always count on my family being there for me.  This support structure and their 
many prayers were crucial as I slowly made my way through my graduate studies. 
My third debt of thanks goes to my committee members.  As far as dissertation 
committees go, I believe I have the best one available.  Dr. Phil Williams was a great advisor, 
mentor and friend.  He was an ardent supporter of this dissertation from the first time I came to 
him with it.  Since then his wisdom, guidance and patience has helped me craft something that I 
am truly proud of.  Professor Dennis Gormley and his real-world experience coupled with his 
analytical rigor was an integral part of this process.  I had Professor Gormley in a class during 
my first semester at GSPIA.  During that class, I witnessed both his breadth of knowledge and 
the amiable way he interacted with students and I knew he would be invaluable to have on my 
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Andrews where I read much of his early work on terrorism.  He is considered a ‘godfather’ of the 
terrorism studies field and it has been such an honor to have him on my committee.  His good-
natured personality, breadth of knowledge and experience has undoubtedly contributed to this 
dissertation.   
My fourth debt of thanks goes to my colleagues and friends at GSPIA.  A special and 
heartfelt thanks is owed to Beverly Brizzi and Jessica Hatherill.  Jessica recruited me to come to 
GSPIA and has helped me navigate through the often-choppy waters of the doctoral program. 
Her professionalism, kindness and willingness to help me will not be forgotten.  Similarly, 
  xvii 
Beverly Brizzi was nothing less than a surrogate mother to me.  She unflinchingly looked out for 
my best interests and was a constant source of support.  I would also like to thank Dr. Donald 
Goldstein who has been another mentor and avid supporter of mine.  Dr. Goldstein is a GSPIA 
institution and I feel fortunate to have worked with him during his final years at GSPIA.  His 
retirement from GSPIA has left a hole that will not easily be replaced.  A special thanks is also 
owed to Chad Serena and Gyldas Ofoulhast who have been my friends at GSPIA from the first 
day I arrived.  My life is indeed richer from having been able to count you as my friends.  You 
are both excellent scholars and I look forward to following your distinguished careers with 
interest and admiration.  
Finally, my last and greatest debt of thanks goes to my wife Jen.  On occasion, there were 
dark nights when I wrestled with despair doubting whether or not I could complete this degree.  
It was my wife’s love and support, which shone like a bright light during those dark times.  She 
has been with me every step of this journey.  Her willingness to listen to my ideas and read my 
many drafts has refined my thinking and writing.  The patience and innumerable sacrifices she 
has made for me so that I could do this degree will never be forgotten.  She also helped me to not 
lose sight as to why I was doing this degree.  I can say with the utmost confidence that without 
my wife I would not be who I am and where I am today.  She is my second self, my soul mate 
and my best friend and I am so blessed to have her in my life.  It is with this that I dedicate this 
dissertation to her.  I pray that we are granted many more years together and I look forward to 
the next phase of life’s journey with her by my side.   
Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam 
Michael Patrick Echemendia 
Arlington, VA 
June 20, 2010 
 
  1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“While nothing is easier to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to 
understand him.” 
-Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Devils 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.” 
-Immanuel Kant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.” 
-Polonius in William Shakespeare, Hamlet  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2 
Suicide attacks confound many observers because they defy the fundamental human desire to 
live.1  While suicide attacks are not a new phenomenon, the increase in their frequency, lethality 
and ferocity has caught the attention of many scholars.  In the last decade, suicide attacks have 
occurred in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Britain, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Uzbekistan, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.2  The seeming explosion of 
suicide attacks has created an urgent need for scholars and policymakers to understand this 
phenomenon.   
The explanations given by scholars to account for suicide attacks tend to fall into three 
areas.  At first, scholars tended to focus on the individual suicide attacker.  While political 
leaders around the world, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, portrayed those engaging in suicide 
attacks as poor, desperate and mentally unsound individuals that had been duped into carrying 
out a violent attack in exchange for money, the reality was quite different.  As researchers began 
to probe the background of suicide attackers they found that these generalizations did not hold.  
Instead, the evidence demonstrated that these assailants were more likely to be educated, 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, I use Yoram Schweitzer’s definition of a suicide attack.  He argues 
that a suicide attack is “a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) 
who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target.  The 
perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission.”  See Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide 
Bombings-The Ultimate Weapon?” (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, July 8, 2001).  Article available 
online at http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/68/currentpage/25/Default.aspx.  Accessed on 12/5/2008. 
2 Mohammed Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism,” in Ami 
Pedhazur ed., Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, (London: Routledge, 2006), 165.  
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especially in the hard sciences, and to have come from middle class backgrounds.3  The suicide 
attacker was a person who had options in life but decided that death was more important than 
living.  
Other researchers began to shift away from individual motivations for suicide attacks to 
examine the terrorist organization’s role in employing suicide attacks and the justifications for 
committing the attack.  In most cases, the terrorist organization is engaged in an asymmetric 
struggle with a more powerful enemy, and thus adopts the method that will cause the most 
damage, generate the greatest amount of publicity for the cause and send a powerful signal to the 
population as well as to the government.  Suicide attacks are best able to accomplish these goals 
because the perpetrators act as human ‘smart bombs;’ the attacker controls both the timing and 
location of the attack to produce the maximum number of casualties and damage.4  
Finally, researchers became interested in how suicide attacks resonated with their target 
population.  The question of resonance examined how a message gained acceptance with an 
audience.  This led a number of scholars to investigate how an organization presented the tactic 
to their target populations.   
While looking at the organizational incentives, individual motivations and societal 
resonance independently of one another offer many valuable insights, scholars have failed to 
                                                 
3 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” 
(Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2003), 136. 
4 Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” (Foreign Policy, September/October, 2000), 66-74.  See also 
Mohammed Hafez, "Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary 
Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study," (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006), 168 
  4 
systematically integrate each into a coherent and cogent framework.  This dissertation attempts 
to do just that. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The scholarship on suicide attacks tends to suffer from tunnel vision.  Psychologists are 
interested in the personal traits and characteristics of the individual attacker, political scientists 
are fixated with the terrorist organization’s strategic rationale for adopting the tactic, while 
sociologists and anthropologists look to religion, nationalism and culture to understand the social 
environment where suicide attacks occur.  Each approach has yielded helpful insights; however, 
engaging the problem at only one level of analysis belies the complexity of suicide attacks.   
This research adheres to a method of study advocated by Martha Crenshaw, which is 
“based on a model that integrates the individual, the group and society.”5   A model that fails to 
integrate all three levels of analysis (the individual, the organization and society) will only 
provide partial insights into the complex nature of suicide attacks.  This is not to say that a model 
that integrates all three levels of analysis will be able to predict the future occurrence of suicide 
attacks.  Indeed, social science, especially political science, has become overly fixated on a 
model’s ability to predict.6  The goal of this research is much more humble; it seeks to provide a 
                                                 
5 Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” (Political 
Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2000), 418.   
6 For a cogent critique on social science’s fixation with prediction see Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man 
Versus Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).  
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systematic framework by which the researcher will be able to observe the symbiotic relationship 
between the individual, the organization, and society as it pertains to suicide attacks.  In doing 
so, it will highlight the shortcomings of mono-causal explanations of suicide attacks and 
reinforce the notion that a more complete understanding of suicide attacks requires an 
investigation of the occurrence at multiple levels of analysis. 
 
1.2 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since the dissertation investigates suicide attacks at three-levels of analysis, it asks three central 
research questions.  First, why do organizations adopt suicide attacks?  Second, why are 
individuals motivated to become a suicide attacker?  Third, how does the attack achieve 
resonance with the target population?  
 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
Traditionally, the literature on suicide attacks is divided into analyses that focus on the strategic 
logic of suicide attacks, what motivates individuals to become suicide attackers, and how the 
attacks gain acceptance in the target society.  Each of these approaches will now be considered 
and a new framework will be presented.   
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Suicide Attacks as Strategic Logic 
 
The strategic logic approach to the study of suicide attacks explains an organization’s adoption 
of suicide attacks as a matter of rational choice.7  The core of the argument is simple and 
persuasive; an organization adopts suicide attacks as a means to an end.  Political Scientists 
Robert Pape and Mia Bloom have provided the two most definitive accounts of the strategic 
logic approach to suicide attacks.   
For Pape, the organizational driving force behind suicide attacks is coercion.  The 
organization adopts the tactic to compel an occupying power to withdraw from territory that the 
organization rightfully considers to be its own.8  As Pape argues, as “the main purpose of suicide 
terrorism is to use the threat of punishment to compel a target government to change policy, and 
most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorists perceive as 
their national homeland.”9  He goes on to say that “every group mounting a suicide campaign 
over the past two decades has had as a major objective…[which is] coercing a foreign state that 
has military forces in what the terrorists see as their homeland to take those forces out.”10  
                                                 
7 The strategic logic approach has a large following within the terrorism studies community.  Political 
Scientist Robert Pape has provided the most definitive account of this approach.  See Robert Pape Dying to Win: 
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005). 
8 Robert Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005), 
27. 
9 Ibid., 27.   
10 Ibid., 21.  
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Suicide attacks become another tool in the terrorist arsenal by which organizations can achieve 
their goals.   
With the underlying logic established, Pape goes on to describe common features of 
suicide attacks.  Not surprisingly the first point he makes is that suicide attacks are an 
asymmetric weapon that the weak use against the strong with the target usually being democratic 
regimes.11  He then enumerates the tactical advantages of suicide attacks, which are twofold.  
First, suicide attacks are a cost-effective way to achieve a high kill ratio. The tactic is brutally 
efficient, cheap and easy to organize, and accordingly represents the most ‘value for the 
money.’12  Because of their devastating effectiveness, suicide attacks have become the most 
feared weapon in the arsenal of a terrorist group.13    
Second, suicide attacks are the ultimate smart bombs.  As Pape notes, “modern suicide 
terrorism is highly lethal because the attackers’ purpose is not only to die, but to use their deaths 
to kill the maximum number of people from the opposing community.”14  They can “pinpoint 
their targets, walk into highly secure areas, make last-minute adjustments in their plans, and 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 38,  
12 Julian Madsen, "Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational," (Strategic Insights, Vol. 3, No. 8, 
August 2004), 6.  
13 Daniel Tan Kuan Wei, "The Fatal Attraction of Suicide Terrorism," (Pointer Journals, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
2003. Article available online at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2003/v29n4/features/feature7.html.  Accessed on 
12/8/08. 
14 Robert Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 8-9. 
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choose the time of detonation to inflict the greatest damages.”15  The suicide attacker serves as a 
platform carrying an explosive charge to its target.  This platform can think and adapt as it 
carries its charge to the most optimal location in order to create maximum carnage and 
destruction.16  Indeed, there is much tactical flexibility gained by sending an operative who does 
not require an escape route.  In the past, terrorist groups were constrained by the need to create 
an escape plan in order to prevent the capture of terrorist operatives, who might divulge intricate 
knowledge about the organization.  Suicide attacks effectively have eliminated this liability.  
Next, Pape discusses the ideological motivations that drive an organization to employ 
suicide attacks.  He finds that suicide attacks are an outgrowth of nationalism and that they are 
“an extreme strategy for national liberation.”17  Since the main goal of the organization is 
liberation from the occupying power, nationalism fits easily into Pape’s analytic framework.  To 
this extent, Pape believes that all organizations that use suicide attacks have nationalistic and 
hence secular goals.  He quickly moves to discount the role that religion plays in the ideological 
calculus of an organization.  Instead, Pape finds that religion is a tool used by the organization in 
recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic-nationalistic objective.18 
While Pape’s explanation of suicide attacks is persuasive, it suffers from three major 
flaws.  First, as Martha Crenshaw notes, Pape’s argument is grounded on “a rather arbitrary 
                                                 
15 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 9.  
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determination of what constitutes a [suicide attack] campaign.”19  Pape’s analysis centers on 
organizations that use suicide attacks as part of a ‘campaign,’ which is described as an organized 
and coherent effort but is not further defined.  What is problematic here is that this analysis 
ignores isolated attacks.  The limitation of Pape’s approach is especially evident in light of recent 
failed attempts by Najibullah Zazi and Umar Frouk Abdulmutallab who sought to detonate 
suicide devices on the New York subway system and an airplane respectively.  Indeed, it appears 
that there is a movement toward suicide attacks as more isolated incidents rather than part of a 
systematic campaign.   
Second, Pape lumps all organizations that use suicide attacks under the nationalism 
rubric.  He goes out of his way to discount the role that religion and religious commitments play 
in organizations that use suicide attacks.  To demonstrate support for his argument, Pape points 
to “the explicitly antireligious Tamil Tigers” who have committed more suicide attacks than any 
organization and to Al Qaeda whose goal is to compel the U.S. to leave the Middle East.20  As 
chapter 3 in this dissertation will demonstrate, the Tamil Tigers convincingly integrate both 
religion and nationalism in order to create an ideology that espouses the creation of an 
independent Tamil homeland.  Similarly, Pape’s discussion of Al Qaeda willfully ignores the 
religious roots and narrative of the organization.  His analysis of Al Qaeda is incomplete at best.  
Chapter 6 of the dissertation will demonstrate just how much Al Qaeda relies on the religious 
narrative in order to attract future suicide attackers.  Indeed, Pape treats religion and nationalism 
as mutually exclusive instead of forces that mutually reinforce and complement one another.   
                                                 
19 Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism,” (Security Studies, Issue 16, No. 1, January-March 
2007), 142.  
20 Robert Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 16. 
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Third, the forced separation of religion and nationalism in the creation of an 
organization’s ideology leads Pape to devote little time to investigating how an organization’s 
operational ideology motivates individuals to become suicide attackers.  As such, the motivations 
of the individual suicide attacker receive minimal attention in Pape’s analysis.  Even the most 
cursory glance at the final testaments from Al Qaeda or Hamas suicide attackers demonstrate that 
there is more than just nationalism that motivates individuals to become suicide attackers.  Pape 
does little to address the allure or rewards of martyrdom and the post-mortem benefits they 
provide the individual.  For Pape, these benefits are mere ploys used by the organization in order 
to entice individuals to become suicide attackers.  Indeed, this type of analysis overlooks the 
bountiful evidence found in the written letters and video testaments of those who make the 
decision to become suicide attackers.   
Mia Bloom, like Pape, focuses on the organizational reasons why groups choose to adopt 
suicide attacks.  The crux of Bloom’s argument is that suicide attacks are chosen as a way for 
terrorist groups to distinguish themselves from their competition.  This view, which Bloom calls 
‘outbidding,’ finds that when multiple organizations are in competition with one another for 
resources and recruits, they turn to dramatic tactics to enhance the organization’s prestige.21  
Suicide attacks, then, are chosen as a way to help terrorist groups survive and prosper by 
eclipsing potential rivals.  Bloom’s analysis is most convincing when she discusses the use of 
suicide attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict especially during the Second Intifada.  In her 
discussion of suicide attacks during the Second Intifada, she notes that “[w]ith the absence of 
monopoly over [the use of] force, groups compete and outbid each other with more spectacular 
                                                 
21 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Bombing, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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  11 
bombing operations and competition over claiming responsibility for them.”22  Groups such as 
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine used suicide attacks to distinguish themselves from each other in order to 
become the face of the resistance against Israel.  However, Bloom’s analysis overlooks two main 
points.  First, there are instances when Palestinian organizations cooperated with one another by 
sharing materiel and providing operational guidance when conducting suicide attacks.  While 
this does not invalidate Bloom’s outbidding theory, it demonstrates times when Palestinian terror 
organizations set differences aside in order to focus their energies on fighting Israel.  Second, the 
use of suicide attacks on their own does not automatically give an organization greater appeal 
with the public.  Instead, the appeal of suicide attacks, especially in the case of the Israel-
Palestine example, is due to how an organization presents and packages the attacks to the public.  
In this regard, Hamas emerged as the main resistance organization against Israel by the way it 
equated suicide attacks with martyrdom.  Indeed, Hamas developed a compelling martyrdom 
narrative that effectively convinced individuals to become suicide attackers, which helped create 
Palestinian popular support for Hamas over competing organizations.  This martyrdom narrative 
was presented to the Palestinian population and became the ideological driving force behind 
Hamas’ suicide campaign against Israel.     
Bloom’s analysis is less convincing when there is no clear case of organizational 
competition.  Two examples in this regard are Bloom’s discussion of the Tamil Tigers and Al 
Qaeda.  Bloom correctly indicates that the Tamils began using suicide attacks in 1987.  As 
Crenshaw astutely notes, by this time the other Tamil militant groups who should have been 
competing against the Tamil Tigers had been destroyed systematically either by the Tigers or by 
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the Sri Lankan government.23  Therefore, the Tamil Tigers really were not competing with rival 
organizations because they had already been marginalized.  Similarly, the outbidding argument is 
difficult to apply to Al Qaeda.  The main question that emerges, which Bloom’s analysis fails to 
answer, is exactly who is Al Qaeda competing against?  It is not a stretch to say that at present Al 
Qaeda is less a unitary organization and more of a conglomerate of groups that are inspired by a 
potent narrative.24  Indeed, Al Qaeda utilizes suicide attacks not because it is competing with 
other Islamic organizations, but instead as a way to pressure Western countries, especially the 
U.S., to change its policies vis-à-vis the Muslim world. 
Other scholars of the strategic logic approach find that suicide attacks act as an effective 
form of strategic communication with the targeted country, the international community, and 
other terrorist organizations operating in the same country.25  Scholars identify three strategic 
messages that suicide attacks seek to communicate. 
First, suicide attacks “send a message to the targeted country that they are so determined 
to achieve their goals that they are willing to die for the cause.”26  The willingness to sacrifice 
one’s life conveys that the suicide attacker is a fervent individual, committed to a cause and 
undeterred by the targeted nation-state.  Suicide attacks also present an enormous problem to 
                                                 
23 Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism,” 146.  
24 This is an issue found at the heart of the Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman debate in the journal 
Foreign Affairs.  See Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sagemen, “Does Osama Still Call the Shots?” (Foreign Affairs, 
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25 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," (Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 2004), 249. 
26 Mohammed, Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, 11. 
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nation-states, which must determine how to craft a counter-terrorism policy against an enemy 
who has no regard for his own life. 
Second, the suicide attack directly challenges the state’s monopoly over the use of force.  
In fact, the terrorist group wants the state to retaliate harshly thereby creating national and/or 
international sympathy for the terrorists’ cause.27  In this view, the suicide attack is intended to 
bait a government into adopting a harsh counter-terrorism policy.28  
Third, suicide attacks create powerful propaganda that enables the terrorist group to 
recruit more effectively.  Suicide attacks, by their very nature, attract national and international 
media attention because they are a display of great determination and inclination for self-
sacrifice on the part of the terrorist group.29  The sensational nature of the attack guarantees 
media coverage that helps “terrorists publicize their grievances and solicit support in the form of 
financing, political support, and volunteers.”30  Besides media coverage, the suicide attacker is a 
‘witness’ whose act challenges the larger population to join the struggle that the terrorist group is 
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fighting for.31  The message sent by the witness is that unless the population joins with the 
movement the sacrifice of the ‘hero’ or ‘martyr’ will have been in vain.  
So far, the main strength of the strategic logic approach to suicide attacks focuses on the 
benefits provided to the organization.  The reasons enumerated above help the scholar to 
understand the practical considerations behind an organization’s choice of this tactic.  Suicide 
attacks are seen as a rational choice whereby the tactic is chosen because it is the means of 
achieving a desired outcome, be it obtaining recruits, publicizing the cause, outbidding rivals, or 
tempting the nation-state to respond in a manner that contradicts its values. 
Though this approach promulgated by Pape and Bloom provides many useful 
observations it suffers from two main weaknesses.  The first is the circumstances under which an 
organization adopts suicide attacks.  For Pape the answer lies in coercing the occupier to leave 
and for Bloom it is a matter of competition with other organizations.  However, both analyses 
ignore the strategic environment that each organization finds itself in.  Simply put, the analysis 
by Pape and Bloom overlooks the fact that organizations use suicide attacks because it is an 
option of defensive necessity.  Coercing another actor or competing against another organization 
might be the aims of the organization that uses suicide attacks, but the reason why the 
organization adopts the tactic is due more to its strategic situation.  Simply put, the organization 
adopts suicide attacks because it is in a position of weakness.   
The second flaw with the strategic logic approach is that it passes over the question of 
why an individual would choose to take his life by wearing a bomb-laden explosive vest.  The 
strategic logic approach focuses too intently on the organization’s rationale for adopting suicide 
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attacks.  Little attention is paid to the fact that an organization’s goals could be different than an 
individual’s motivation to become a suicide attacker.  A suicide attack deprives the suicide 
attacker of enjoying the benefits the terrorist organization gains from the act.  Unless one 
believes, contrary to social science data, that all suicide attackers are crazy, duped, or desperate, 
then a powerful incentive must motivate the individual suicide attackers.  This incentive must 
entice the suicide attacker to exchange his life for something or else the organization will be 
without willing participants.  Indeed, the strategic logic approach ignores the fact that individual 
suicide attackers are motivated by a different set of subjective beliefs.  
 
Individual Incentives for the Suicide Attacker  
 
Early attempts at explaining an individual’s decision to become a suicide attacker used 
psychology.  Indeed, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, former Senator John Warner (R-VA) 
argued that “those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational 
and are not deterred by rational concepts.”32  Statements like these have contributed to the 
revitalization of the idea that suicide attackers are psychologically abnormal or suffer from 
mental illness.  It is tempting to label suicide attackers as psychopathic fanatics who are mentally 
ill.  Psychologist John Horgan comments that when dealing with a suicide bombing, most people 
would assume “that the person responsible is in some way special, different or perhaps even 
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abnormal.”33  When confronted with a massive tragedy perpetrated by fellow human beings, it is 
natural to want to disassociate ourselves in some way from the person, or group, committing the 
violence.  The violent narcissist and the psychoanalytic theories are psychological explanations 
as to why individuals choose to become suicide attackers.  Both theories posit that suicide 
attackers choose their fate as a result of psychological disorders.34   
Psychologist John Crayton argues that terrorism is a result of narcissistic injury sustained 
by the individual.  His theory emerges as the successor to the frustration-aggression hypothesis, 
which states that the “turn to violence [is] a result of a real or imagined underprivileged, 
disadvantaged status, and as an aggressive response from a failure to have their grievances 
resolved.”35  The frustration-aggression theory has been discounted because it fails to account for 
the lack of terrorism in nation-states with populations largely considered underprivileged and/or 
disadvantaged.  By solely focusing on privilege and advantage Crayton argues that the 
frustration-aggression theory is a “seriously limited analytical tool in the context of explaining 
terrorism, both on individual and collective bases.”36  Instead of focusing on privilege or 
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advantage, Crayton argues that the terrorist behavior is best explained by a psychology of 
narcissism.   
Narcissism is defined “as an internal, intra-psychic, regulatory tool that enables the 
individual to defend the self from damage and harm.”37  Narcissism is meant to protect the 
individual’s ego from outside harm.  To do this, the narcissist creates a grandiose sense of self, 
which is used as a buffer against the threatening external world.  The narcissist is often viewed as 
anti-social, arrogant and pompous.  The narcissist overvalues his life while devaluing the lives of 
others.  According to this theory, the turn to suicide attacks occurs when the narcissistic self is 
injured.  This injury can be the result of a traumatic event, physical abuse, or emotional 
humiliation.  When the narcissistic personality is harmed, a profound sense of fear is created, and 
an individual’s internal self-image diminishes drastically.  The grandiose self no longer provides 
a buffer between the self and the external outside world.  The injured self begins to look for a 
group or organization to provide comfort and security.  The theory posits that narcissistically 
vulnerable persons are attracted by charismatic leaders and groups that recreate feelings of self-
aggrandizement.  When the narcissistically-injured self joins a terrorist organization the potential 
terrorist “feel[s] the need to ‘kill off’ their view of themselves as victims by harming others.”38  
Psychologists argue that this creates a malignant narcissism, which “muffles [the] internal voice 
of reason and morality” and allows such individuals to commit violent acts, such as suicide 
attacks, against innocents.39 
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The psychoanalytic theory, like the narcissistic theory, finds the suicide attacker as 
psychologically damaged and that person projects his weakness onto others through violence.  
The psychoanalytic theory of terrorism has its genesis in the thought of Sigmund Freud.  Freud 
argued that “one has…to reckon with the fact that there are present in all men destructive, and 
therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends and that in a great number of people these are 
strong enough to determine their behavior in society.”40  The destructive tendencies in human 
beings arise from either the largely unconscious hostility one has toward one’s parents or are a 
product of early abuse or mistreatment.  Based on these internal psychological forces, terrorists 
form what Jerrold Post calls a ‘psycho-logic.’41  The psycho-logic is “constructed to rationalize 
acts [terrorists] are psychologically compelled to commit.”42    Moreover, it easily constructs an 
‘us versus them’ dichotomy, removing prohibitions against violently harming innocents.  Though 
both the narcissistic and psychoanalytic theories may sound compelling, there has not been 
conclusive empirical support to validate them.   
A plethora of studies conducted between 1970 and 2000 concluded that while some 
terrorists could be characterized as narcissistic or psychotic, the majority of them were 
psychological normal.43  Comparative studies on the German Baader-Meinhof group, the Italian 
Red Brigade, the IRA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, LTTE and Al Qaeda revealed that “[the terrorists] 
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tended to be normal in intelligence and mental stability, didn’t have significant psychiatric 
problems or mental illness and didn’t abuse alcohol.”44  Moreover, when convicted terrorists 
were compared with adult prison inmates, the terrorists “were more intelligent, had higher 
educational attainments, showed less evidence of early developmental problems and had fewer 
court appearances than ‘ordinary’ [prison inmates].”45   
Psychologists who study suicide attacks, such as Ariel Merari, Nasra Hassan and 
Anthony Silke, do not believe suicide attackers are insane or psychologically perturbed.  Indeed, 
Nasra Hassan when investigating Palestinian suicide attackers found that “[w]hat is frightening is 
not the abnormality of those who carry out the suicide attacks, but their sheer normality.”46  It is 
indeed a popular misconception that suicide attackers are madmen.  Much to the contrary, the 
final testaments of suicide attackers demonstrate that “they have considerable insight into their 
own actions, and often show a striking awareness of how others view them.”47  Thus, 
psychologists who study suicide attacks “have gradually been forced to accept that the 
outstanding characteristic of the terrorist is their normalcy.”48  If the suicide attacker is normal 
by psychological standards, then there must be other forces that drive a person to commit such an 
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extreme act.  Two powerful forces that continue to prompt individuals to act are found in religion 
and nationalism.   
  Religion and nationalism provide a set of belief-systems that help the adherent make 
sense of the world.  A belief system refers to "a set of related ideas (learned and shared), which 
has some permanence, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit some commitment.”49  
Belief systems direct action toward a certain end.  For this reason, religion and nationalism have 
been powerful forces that have mobilized people for centuries.  
For nationalism, the purpose of action is aligned to the maintenance of the nation-state or 
an ‘imagined community.’50  Nationalism creates a belief in the value of shared ancestry and 
kinship in which the individual is part of a sacred communion.51  The individual is bound to this 
community by sharing a similar ethnicity, language, and history.  The nation or ethnic 
community is “invested with sacred qualities that it draws from older beliefs, sentiments, and 
ideals about the nature of community, territory, history and destiny.”52  For the person motivated 
by nationalism, the giving of one’s self in service of the nation or the imagined community is the 
highest honor one can achieve.   
In much the same vein, religion presents a belief-system that offers a set of transcendent 
symbols and rules that are intended to orient human action toward a higher deity or supra-
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national power.53  Most religions use sacred texts (i.e. Hebrew Scriptures, Bible, Koran, 
Bhagavad-Gita etc) as examples of how the rightly ordered life should be lived.  These texts are 
intended to form the believer into someone who acts in accordance with a number of rules and 
precepts.  The end for the religious believer is a continual process of self-perfection in order to 
draw closer to the deity.  
This brief discussion of religious and nationalist incentives for death is not meant to be 
exhaustive, but rather to highlight the notion that to perform a suicide attack the individual must 
harbor subjective beliefs that create an incentive to perform the attack.54  The individuals who 
participate in suicide attacks are inspired by fervent beliefs in their cause that instill 
determination and absolute commitment.55  Accordingly, both the individual and the terrorist 
organization must operate within this belief system.56  The terrorist organization must foster this 
individual commitment to ensure that it maintains a cadre of individuals who are willing to die 
for the cause.  Since religion and nationalism provide a powerful set of belief-systems to the 
individual, it should come as little surprise that organizations using suicide attacks have created 
ideologies combining religion and nationalism that help motivate the individual suicide attacker.  
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Indeed, the organization must provide mechanisms, which reinforce and intensify those beliefs.  
The use of rituals, music, and final testaments are techniques in which terrorist groups cultivate 
and inculcate the individual in order to make him or her a ‘true believer.’  The suicide attacker 
who becomes a ‘true believer’ is a person of “fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for 
a holy cause.”57   
Scholars such as Mohammed Hafez and Assaf Moghadam have done excellent research 
into how religious commitments factor into an individuals commitment to become suicide 
attackers.  For Hafez and Moghadam, the critical factor at the individual level of analysis is the 
allure martyrdom.58  Both Hafez and Moghadam explore how organizations appropriate the 
language of martyrdom to present a coherent ideology to the individual.  Hafez is concerned with 
how the ideology of martyrdom manifested itself during the Iraq insurgency of 2003-2006 while 
Moghadam investigates the transnational ideology of Al Qaeda.  The major shortcoming with 
both of these works is that their cases treat only the Islamic variant of suicide attacks.  Indeed, as 
this dissertation will demonstrate, organizations like the Tamil Tigers have constructed their own 
version of martyrdom that warrants close attention.  
While individuals must hold these beliefs and terrorist organizations must promote them, 
it is crucial to know whether the target audience is amenable to such a drastic tactic.  If suicide 
attacks do not resonate in the society at large then there is a chance that the attacks could be 
counterproductive to the terrorist organization’s cause. 
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Societal Resonance 
 
Scholars interested in societal conditions for suicide attacks first looked to find a relationship 
between poverty and terrorism.  Indeed, in former President George W. Bush’s 2002 address at 
the United Nations Conference for Development and Change, he asserted that the fight against 
poverty is crucial to winning the war against terror because “hope is an answer to terror.”59  He 
went on to argue that the United Nations and its member states should “challenge poverty and 
hopelessness and lack of education…that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize and 
try to turn to their advantages.”60  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has also said that it 
should be the earnest work of the U.S. and her allies “to advance reforms that will eliminate the 
frustration, the injustice, [and] the poverty,” which gives rise to terrorism.61  Implicit in these 
statements is the assertion that poverty and lack of education leads to terrorism.  This belief is 
entrenched in the rhetoric of political leaders, the media and international organizations. 
Economist Alberto Abadie investigated the link between poverty and terrorism. He 
conducted a study, which analyzed all the instances of domestic and international terrorism in 
2003 to determine if there was a linkage between poverty and terrorism.  He observes that since 
September 11, 2001 politicians and the media have focused intensely on the relationship between 
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poverty and terrorism.  He admits that this theory is widely accepted as a result of the established 
notion that economic factors widely contribute to and exacerbate internal conflict.  Before 
Abadie conducted his study, he “believed it was a reasonable assumption that terrorism had its 
roots in poverty.”62  However, after analyzing the data collected, he argues that the connection 
between poverty and terrorism simply does not exist.  He claims that this “is true not only for 
events of international terrorism but…also for the overall levels of terrorism both domestic and 
foreign.”63  Therefore, the “terrorist risk is not significantly higher for poorer countries” then it is 
for developed nations.64   
Abadie’s conclusion is supported by the research of Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, 
who assert that “any connection between poverty…and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and 
probably quite weak.”65  Krueger and Maleckova argue that terrorism “is more accurately 
viewed as a response to political conditions…[and] has little to do with economics.”66  Economic 
theories that tout poverty and lack of education as the catalyst for suicide terrorism do not “yield 
an unambiguous answer to the question of whether higher income and more educated [people] 
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would reduce participation in terrorism.”67  Krueger and Maleckova’s data, which compare 
poverty and the education of Palestinian suicide terrorists with the Palestinian population, is most 
revealing.  According to the data, the poverty rate for suicide bombers is an astonishingly low 13 
percent while the population’s poverty level is at 32 percent.68  From the data it is evident that 
“the individuals who carried out suicide bomb attacks for [Palestinian terrorist organizations] are 
less likely to come from impoverished families.”69   
The comparison of educational distribution for Palestinian suicide bombers and the 
Palestinian population depict similar results.  The data show that among suicide terrorists “36 
percent had finished at least secondary school. Only 2 percent had not gone past primary 
school,”70 compared with the Palestinian population where close to 50 percent had not completed 
primary school.  Almost 57 percent of suicide terrorists had a post high-school, college, or post-
graduate degree, while only 12 percent of the Palestinian population had a post high-school, 
college, or post-graduate degree.  These results are striking and reveal that very few of the 
Palestinian suicide terrorists ‘were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed.  
Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held high paying jobs…[and] two were 
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the sons of millionaires.’71  These findings cast doubt on the deeply engrained and popular 
political idea that societal poverty and lack of education breeds terrorism.    
Another aspect of the societal dimension of suicide attacks is the reception it receives by 
the public.  The strategic logic approach ignores the interaction between the attack and the 
society where it takes place.  In Pape’s logic, the societal frame of reference is important only to 
the organization because it is the organization that wages the suicide campaign against foreign 
occupiers.  Parting from Pape’s analysis, Bloom notes that “suicide terrorism, like terrorism 
more generally, is a form of political theater in which the audience’s reaction is as important as 
the act itself.”72  If the audience reacts with revulsion, there will be negative consequences for 
the group that uses the tactic.  Such consequences include a loss of legitimacy by the public, 
condemnation by the international media, and a reduction in financial backing by local or 
diaspora communities.  Adding to this literature, Assaf Moghadam argues that the analyst should 
be aware of environmental factors that are meant to give the suicide attacks their context.73  
Indeed, suicide attacks must resonate with the target audience, but this ultimately depends on 
how the tactic is used, against whom, and for what purpose.  As Bloom notes, if suicide attacks 
do not resonate with the larger population, the tactic will fail.  However, if the tactic is 
                                                 
71 Berrebi quoted in Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism:  Is There a 
Causal Connection?” 135-136.  Emphasis added.   
72 Mia Bloom, “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism,” in Ami Pedhazur ed., Roots Causes of 
Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, 26. 
73 Assaf Moghadam, “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,” in Pedahzur, Ami. Root Causes of Suicide 
Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, (London: Routledge, 2006), 86.  
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applauded, it will flourish.74  A critical question that has been overlooked by scholars of suicide 
attacks is how the organization chooses to present the tactic to its target audience so that it gains 
resonance.75  
 
 
Integrating the Three-Levels of Analysis 
 
The above discussion outlines three approaches that scholars have taken in studying suicide 
attacks.  The strategic logic approach focused on the organization, psychological theories 
prompted the researcher to investigate individual commitments, and questions involving poverty 
and education pushed researchers to investigate the societal environment.  The literature review 
highlighted the flaws in each.  The strategic logic approach ignored the circumstances by which 
organizations choose suicide attacks as well as the forces that prompt individuals to become 
suicide attacks.  Similarly, psychological theories proved unsatisfactory at explaining what 
motivates individuals to become suicide attacks.  Finally, scholars who looked for structural 
conditions in a society such as poverty or lack of education and its relation to suicide attacks 
were unable to find a correlation.   
The analytic framework posed in this dissertation has two goals.  First, it offers an 
alternative explanation at each level of analysis.  At the organizational level, the framework 
looks to the strategic environment to help explain why a group chooses suicide attacks.  At the 
individual level, the framework looks at the subjective beliefs a person holds, which help that 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 30.  
75 Resonance is defined as the way a message synchs with an audience.   
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person make the transition from person to suicide attacker.  Finally, at the societal level, instead 
of looking for structural causes, the framework looks at the socio-cultural factors that help the 
attack attain resonance.  The second goal is the movement away from investigating suicide 
attacks solely at one level of analysis.  As the literature review demonstrates, these approaches 
have not been combined into a coherent framework.  Departing from this tendency, this 
dissertation purposefully investigates suicide attacks along three levels of analysis.  As such, it 
integrates prior approaches to suicide attacks and recognizes the complexity of suicide attacks in 
that it dispels the notion that suicide attacks are the result of one cause and that they should be 
investigated solely at one level of analysis.  Suicide attacks are organizational, individual and 
societal phenomena that are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.  As such, the 
framework in this dissertation shifts the debate from the single level causes of suicide attacks to 
an analysis of the nature and characteristics of suicide attacks by recognizing the mutual 
reinforcement that exists at each level of analysis.  What is important is the linkage that exists 
amongst each level of analysis, which will be explored in depth in each of the case studies the 
dissertation examines.     
It must be mentioned that this researcher’s use of multiple levels of analysis is not 
original.  Indeed, it follows an historical precedent set by international relations scholar Kenneth 
Waltz who made the same argument to understand the causes of war.  Perhaps Waltz’s most 
enduring legacy was the three images he used to investigate conflict.  The three images provided 
a systematic framework by which scholars of international relations could examine war.  While 
the images yield certain insights about the causes and nature of war, they are deficient if taken 
separately.  Indeed, Waltz argued that “[s]ome combination of our three images, rather than any 
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one of them, may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations.”76 This 
researcher believes that Waltz’s statement is not only applicable but also essential to the study of 
suicide attacks. 
  
1.4 HYPOTHESIS 
The dissertation argues that organizations use suicide attacks out of defensive necessity and for 
specific strategic purposes; individuals are motivated to become suicide attackers by a religo-
nationalist liberation ideology that promises the attacker post-mortem incentives for his or her 
death; and that societal resonance is achieved when the organization draws on religious, cultural 
and nationalistic narratives to make it acceptable to the target population.  
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 14. Emphasis 
added.  
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1.5 THE MODEL:  SUICIDE ATTACKS AT THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
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It is useful to think of the model proposed by this dissertation as a Venn diagram involving three 
circles.77  As the literature review reveals, each circle comprises a strand of research where the 
researcher’s primary focus involved one level of analysis.  As such, prior approaches looked in 
isolation at the interaction between each circle and suicide attacks.  The model advocated here 
brings together each level of analysis and demonstrates that each level of analysis interacts with 
the other as it pertains to the occurrence of suicide attacks.  Looking at one level of analysis in 
isolation from the two others presents only a partial view of the complexity of suicide attacks.  
The Venn diagram acts as a heuristic tool to help the researcher envision the interaction that 
takes place among the individual, organizational and societal levels of analysis.  It also helps the 
researcher to explore the linkages that exist amongst each level of analysis.  
 To better explore the linkages at each level of analysis, a process model is required, 
which is represented in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 A larger scale of the Venn diagram is available in Appendix A.  
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Figure 1. The Suicide Attack Process Model at Three Levels of Analysis 
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Figure 1 is a process model showing how the levels interact as a reinforcing system.  It is also a 
useful way to diagram the argument that this dissertation makes.  The process begins on the left 
with an external stimulus of some sort that places the organization in a defensive posture.  The 
organization makes the decision to use suicide attacks based on strategic necessity.  This requires 
that the organization recruit and indoctrinate willing individuals to participate in the attack.  In 
order to do this, the organization draws from religious, cultural, and nationalistic narratives 
thereby creating a liberation ideology that entices the individual to exchange his or her life to 
become a suicide attacker.  The individual is promised a post-mortem incentive for death 
drawing more willing recruits to the organization.  Once the organization recruits, indoctrinates 
and carries out a suicide attack, the attack must be packaged and presented to the target audience.  
Again, the organization draws on religious, nationalistic, and cultural narratives in an attempt to 
make the attack resonate.  At the right of the diagram at societal level, there is a feedback 
mechanism that goes back both to the organization and individual levels.  This feedback loop is 
critical in that it could have the ability to aid or hinder an organization’s ability to use suicide 
attacks.  Additionally, the feedback loop also affects the individual in that it has the potential to 
encourage or discourage individuals from becoming future suicide attackers.     
Feedback Loop 
Post-Mortem 
Incentives  
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1.6 METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation uses the qualitative methodology of structured focused comparison with four 
case studies.   
1.6.1 Structured Focused Comparison With Multiple Case Studies  
This research will employ a structured, focused comparison into the phenomenon of suicide 
attacks by utilizing multiple case studies.78  There are six main reasons why the case study 
methodology is chosen in this context.  
First, the case study is the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed 
and when the focus is on a contemporary problem within some real-life context.79  The central 
research questions posed by this dissertation asks why organizations choose to adopt suicide 
attacks, why individuals are motivated to become suicide attackers, and how the attacks achieve 
                                                 
78 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, the structured, focused comparison “method is 
‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions 
are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison 
and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 'focused' in that it deals only with certain 
aspects of the historical cases examined." See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67. 
79 Robert Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, (New York: Sage Publications, 1989), 13.  
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resonance in the target populations.  These research questions do not readily lend themselves to 
quantitative analysis, which usually seeks to determine if a number of independent variables 
have a causal effect on a chosen dependent variable.  Quantitative analysis oftentimes ignores the 
rich cultural and historical contexts where the dependent variable operates.  In this research, the 
social, historical, cultural, religious, and political contexts are crucial to better understanding 
suicide attacks.  
Second, the case study is intended “to catch the complexity of a real world 
phenomena.”80  Cases are “intricately wired to political, social, historical, and especially 
personal contexts.”81  This is undoubtedly so with suicide attacks because it is a phenomenon 
that draws on the historical and cultural narratives of the societies where they occur.  
Third, the case study approach allows the researcher to engage in comparative historical 
analysis where the researcher asks a structured set of questions about specific sets of cases that 
exhibit sufficient similarity to be meaningfully compared with one another.82     
Fourth, the small-N nature of the case study methodology allows the researcher to know 
each of the cases with a great amount of depth thereby giving the study a higher level of 
conceptual and measurement validity than is possible in a large-N study.83  As Sidney Tarrow 
notes, a small-N study “allows for and indeed demands a degree of intimacy and detail that 
                                                 
80 Robert Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), xi.  
81 Ibid., 17.  
82 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and 
Agendas," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8.  
83 Ibid., 13.  
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inspires confidence that the connections drawn between antecedent conditions and outcomes are 
real.”84   
Fifth, the case study methodology is concerned more with explanation and the 
identification of certain features that produce the outcome of interest rather than prediction.  As 
such, it avoids the causality trap in favor of a more modest interpretive approach to research.  
Indeed, the quest for predictive theory in the social science rests on the mistaken analogy 
between natural and social phenomena.85  Natural phenomena, as philosopher David Hume 
notes, are part of the mathematical and natural sciences that pertain to ideas that “are always 
clear and determinate, [where] the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, 
and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity or variation.  An 
oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis.”86  In contrast, the social 
sciences fail to achieve this measure of accuracy because they deal with “the finer sentiments of 
the mind, the operations of understanding, the various agitations of the passions…[which] easily 
escape us, when surveyed by reflection.”87  
                                                 
84 Sidney Tarrow, "The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice," (Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2010), 239. 
85 Steven Bernstein et al, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an 
Unpredictable World," (European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No.1, 2000), 43.  
86 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (Cambridge:  P.F. Collier and Son, 1910).  
Available online at http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html#7.  Accessed on 2/25/10. 
87 Ibid. 
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Finally, the case study methodology permits the researcher to draw on multiple sources of 
evidence.  This serves to triangulate evidence, which ultimately contributes to the overall validity 
of the study.   
 
1.6.2 Unit(s) of Analysis; Unit(s) of Observation  
The unit of analysis or the “phenomenon under study” in this dissertation is the suicide attack.88  
The units of observation are the organizations that use suicide attacks, the individual suicide 
attacker, and the society where the suicide attack takes place.  This dissertation seeks to 
investigate the interaction between the unit of analysis and the units of observation.  The 
organizational incentives, individual motivations and methods used to achieve societal resonance 
are essential components toward a greater understanding of suicide attacks.  
 
1.6.3 Data Collection and Analysis  
This dissertation collects data from a variety of primary and secondary open source materials.  
As often as possible, the author used translated primary sources.  Such sources include diaries, 
articles, tracts, and books written by individual suicide attackers, and the ideologues and 
organizations justifying the use of suicide attacks.  While these sources are hard to come by, the 
author made extensive use of the translated documents and archives from the Combating 
                                                 
88 Thomas Lee, Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999), 59.  
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Terrorism Center at West Point, the Palestinian Media Watch and the Middle East Media 
Research Institute [MEMRI].  These websites contain an impressive collection of translated 
primary source documents and interviews that were invaluable to the author.  Additionally, the 
study accessed MEMRI’s extensive collection of videos and written statements left by suicide 
attackers.  The videos, some of which are also available online at other websites like YouTube, 
were crucial when dealing with the question of individual motivations of suicide attackers 
pertaining to Hamas and Al Qaeda.  The secondary sources used include formal studies of 
similar cases, newspaper articles, scholarly books and articles, congressional testimony and 
organizational documentation.  The dissertation also used the archival resources donated by 
Donald M. Goldstein to the University of Pittsburgh library when completing the chapter on the 
kamikazes. 
 
1.6.4 Selection of Cases and Dissertation Overview 
According to Martha Crenshaw, one major deficiency in the literature on suicide attacks is that it 
suffers from the analytical problem of “over-aggregation.”89  Indeed, much of the recent work on 
suicide attacks by scholars such as Hafez and Moghadam fail to acknowledge that suicide attacks 
have been used in a variety of conflict contexts.  As Crenshaw argues, the majority of the 
literature on suicide attacks treats the phenomenon only as terrorism.90  However, she rightly 
notes that suicide attacks have been utilized not only by terrorist organizations but also by states 
                                                 
89 Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” 162.  
90 Ibid. 
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in warfare, by insurgent groups in irregular warfare, and by terrorist organizations with domestic 
and transnational aims.  As such, this dissertation selects the cases for examination along 
Crenshaw’s conflict continuum in the hope of producing new analytical insights on the subject. 
 The most basic condition for selection is that each case is an instance when an 
organization used suicide attacks to achieve a strategic end.  The other main condition that 
greatly influenced the selection of cases rested on the availability of open-source information.  
When dealing with questions of individual motivations and societal resonance, the availability of 
translated materials was a main requirement in the selection of cases used in this study.  The four 
case studies and the reasoning behind their selection are listed below. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2-Suicide Attacks in War:  The Japanese Use of the Kamikazes 
 
There are many historical instances of the use of suicide attacks in warfare.  One of the first 
occurs in the 16-18th centuries during the Moro Wars between the Spanish and the Atjenese 
Muslims living in the Philippines.  The Muslim armies, often outnumbered by the Spanish, 
resorted to suicide attacks in order to damage Spanish morale.  A group of Atjenese soldiers the 
Spaniards called juramentados (meaning ‘one who took the oath’) were a force in whose sole 
task was to die killing as many of the enemy as possible.  These juramentados were sent in 
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waves before the rest of the Atjenese army would engage the Spanish.91  Their purpose was to 
sow discord and discourage the Spanish army from fighting. 
 The most famous modern day example of suicide attacks in warfare, and the first case 
selected for analysis in this dissertation, is the Japanese use of kamikaze pilots in World War II.  
This happens to be one of the most understudied cases of suicide attacks by social scientists.  In 
this case, the reasons why the Japanese adopted the suicide attack are examined.  Thanks to the 
diaries left by the kamikaze pilots, the chapter uncovers the individual motivations that made 
young Japanese men decide to become a suicide attacker.  Finally, the availability of government 
documents demonstrates how the Japanese Imperial government framed the attacks so as to 
resonate with the Japanese population. 
 
   
 
Chapter 3-Suicide Attacks in Irregular War:  The Case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
 
The decision to use suicide attacks in warfare is one made by a national government.  In irregular 
war, the decision to use suicide attacks is made by an insurgent group(s) or faction(s), which 
considers the established government illegitimate.  Such actors resort to asymmetrical tactics due 
to the power imbalance that exists between the state and the insurgent group.  The first known 
insurgent groups to use suicide attacks were the Jewish Zealots and the Assassins who operated 
in modern day Israel and Iran respectively.  The Zealots used the tactic against officials of the 
                                                 
91 Stephen Frederic Dale, "Religious Suicide In Islamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines," (The Journal of Conflict of Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1988), 37. 
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Roman Empire while the Assassins targeted those they believed were the illegitimate successors 
of the eighth Caliph.92 
 The second case selected by this dissertation is the LTTE’s use of the ‘Black Tiger’ 
suicide squad in its irregular war against Sri Lanka.  Until recently, the LTTE has been at war 
with the Sri Lankan government since the mid 1980s.  The LTTE has chosen irregular warfare 
and suicide attacks as a way to engage the Sri Lankan army in an effort to secure an independent 
Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka.  The LTTE’s first reported use of a suicide attack was in 
1987 against a Sri Lankan army camp.  Since then, the LTTE has become a sophisticated 
proponent of the tactic.  The sheer length of the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government made certain that there would be plenty of available and translated resources.  This, 
coupled with the dissemination of a great deal of important primary source materials by the 
LTTE’s propaganda wing, ensured that enough information was available to answer the case 
study questions.   
        
Chapter 4-Suicide Attacks as Domestic Terrorism:  The Case of Hamas  
 
While this component on the conflict continuum has been the most studied by terrorism 
researchers, it has yet to be analyzed using a framework that integrates three-levels of analysis.  
The case selected for this point on the conflict continuum is Hamas.  Similar to the irregular 
warfare point on the continuum, the domestic terrorist organizations use suicide attacks to 
address a power imbalance.  Indeed, Hamas adopted the tactic as a way to strike at Israeli 
                                                 
92 For a cogent discussion of the Zealots see Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Terrorism: Assassins to 
Zealots, (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2003).  
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security forces and Israeli civilians.  The large amounts of translated information by individual 
Hamas suicide attackers, communiqués from Hamas leadership concerning the adoption of the 
tactic, and the systematic method Hamas used to make the attack resonate with its target 
population warranted its selection.   
 
 
Chapter 5-Suicide Attacks as Transnational Terrorism:  The Case of Al Qaeda  
 
The final point on the conflict continuum is suicide attacks used in transnational terrorist activity.  
In the 1980-1990’s, suicide attacks were employed largely by irregular forces or terrorist 
organizations operating within the territorial confines of a nation-state.  The LTTE limited its 
target selection to Sri Lankan government and military officials just as Hamas sent suicide 
attackers to self-detonate within Israel.  The 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, however, demonstrated a 
new globalized phenomenon of suicide attacks that are transnational in nature and goals.  Thus 
the final case study of this dissertation is an examination of Al Qaeda.  There was no dearth of 
information available for this case study.  Quite the contrary, there was an overabundance of 
information requiring the researcher meticulously to sort through it all.  This and the 
proliferation of Al Qaeda inspired suicide attacks across the world warranted this case’s 
selection.     
 
 
Chapter 6-Conclusion and Discussion of Cases 
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The dissertation concludes with a review of the findings coming from the case studies, an 
examination of why organizations abandon suicide attacks, which leads to a discussion of policy 
implications flowing from the case studies, and finally the dissertation offers suggestions for 
further research.  
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2.0  SUICIDE ATTACKS IN WAR:  THE KAMIKAZES IN WORLD WAR II 
“We believed that our spiritual convictions and moral strength could balance your 
material and scientific advantages.  We did not consider our attacks to be ‘suicide.’  The pilot did 
not start out on his mission with the intent of committing suicide.  He looked upon himself as a 
human bomb which would destroy a certain part of the fleet…[and] died happy in the conviction 
that his death was a step towards final victory.” 
-Lt. General Torashira Kawabe93 
 
 
"The Way of the Samurai is, morning after morning, the practice of death, considering 
whether it will be here or be there, imagining the most slightly way of dying, and putting one's 
mind firmly in death." 
-Yamamoto Tsunetomo94 
 
 
 
“In blossom today, then scattered; 
Life is so like a delicate flower. 
How can one expect the fragrance to last forever?” 
-Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Lt. General Torashira Kawabe quoted in Richard O’Neill, Suicide Squads, (London: Salamander Books, 
1999), 130-131.  The comments were made to U.S. Army interrogators after World War II.    
94 Yamamoto Tsunetomo, Hagakure The Book of the Samurai, translated by William Scott Wilson. 
(Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1979), 73.   
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese kamikazes represent the most potent example of suicide attacks used in twentieth 
century warfare.  From October 1944 to August 1945, over 4,000 Japanese army and navy pilots 
attempted to crash their aircraft into U.S. naval vessels.  This tactic was part psychological and 
part strategic.  The psychological reasoning behind the tactic was that it would break the will of 
American forces by showcasing the indomitable Yamato Damashi, the Japanese Fighting Spirit.  
The strategic rationale was that the kamikaze pilot could cause massive damage to American 
aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships.  If the Japanese could sink enough American ships, 
this would force U.S. naval commanders to re-think their naval strategy in the Pacific and could 
tilt the war in Japan’s favor.  
While this topic continues to pique the interest of historians, the subject has remained 
largely unexamined by social scientists.  As Andrew Silke astutely notes, “[t]oday, many 
discussions of suicide terrorism make a passing, throwaway reference to the kamikaze as a 
precursor, but little real analysis and comparison is made.”95  A cursory examination of the most 
prevalent authors on suicide attacks confirms Silke’s statement.  Indeed, there are only three 
social scientists, Mia Bloom, Peter Hill and Robert Pape, who mention the kamikazes in their 
work on suicide attacks.  While Bloom and Pape devote a combined total of seven pages to the 
kamikazes, Hill offers a more nuanced treatment in a chapter included in an edited volume 
                                                 
95 Andrew Silke, "The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism." (Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2006), 42. 
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released in 2005.96  The dearth of analysis on the kamikazes by social scientists is a major 
oversight since a fuller treatment of the kamikazes would be genuinely helpful in understanding 
modern suicide attacks.97  This chapter attempts to fill this gap, as it investigates the kamikazes 
at the organizational, individual, and societal levels of analysis. 
The first section of the chapter investigates the kamikazes at the organizational level and 
argues that the tactic was chosen out of defensive necessity. The father of the kamikazes, Rear 
Admiral Takijiro Onishi, believed that Japan was losing the war in the Pacific to the Americans.  
The Japanese had suffered a humiliating defeat in the Philippines theater, especially the October 
1944 Battle for the Leyte Gulf in which the Japanese navy was decimated by Admiral W.F. 
Halsey’s Third Fleet. To recover from such a loss, Onishi needed a weapon that could be 
manufactured quickly and delivered effectively.  Onishi knew that the Japanese had a surplus of 
planes including the MXY7 Ohka, the A6M Zero and the D4Y4 Bomber.  The problem was that 
Japan lacked skilled pilots to fly these planes; by late 1944, skilled Japanese pilots were a rare 
commodity.  Indeed, the grim reality was that American fighter pilots consistently outclassed the 
Japanese pilots that managed to enter the aerial theater.98  Onishi insisted that instead of wasting 
precious time training pilots that would lose in one-on-one aerial confrontations against the 
Americans, Japan should teach pilots to crash their bomb carrying planes into U.S. vessels.  He 
                                                 
96 See Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Bombing, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 35-37.  Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 
2005), 13-17.  Peter Hill, “Kamikaze, 1943-1945,” in Diego Gambetta ed,, Making Sense of Suicide Missions, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-32. 
97 Andrew Silke, "The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism," 42.  
98 Max Gadney, “Kamikazes, Deconstructed,” (World War II, April/May 2008), 46.  
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believed that this tactic, if implemented effectively, would turn the tide of the war toward 
Japan’s favor.  
The second section of the chapter analyzes the factors motivating the pilots of kamikaze 
operations.  The majority of pilots who manned Onishi’s suicide squadron came from Japan’s 
elite universities.  These students left an abundance of valuable information through the copious 
diaries that many kept.  While it would be impossible to determine a single motivating factor that 
drove each pilot to participate in a suicide attack, an investigation of the kamikaze diaries reveals 
that pilots were motivated by a desire to protect their family and country, and a conviction, 
stemming from the Bushido warrior tradition, that they would face death without reservation if it 
could help save Japan.  It was also believed that the pilots would achieve a post-mortem god-like 
status through their selfless sacrifice for Japan and they would meet one another again in the 
hereafter.  Indeed, the pilots who made the decision to die in a suicide attack were heralded as 
‘warrior gods.’ 
The third section of the chapter explores the factors that allowed the tactic to resonate 
with the Japanese population.  The most important factors identified are the widely held beliefs 
in the sacred and inviolable nature of Japan, and the god-like status of the Emperor.  These 
beliefs were integrated into a wartime ideology that was reinforced through state education.  The 
widespread belief in the sacred Japanese homeland and the ‘god-man’ emperor allowed the 
Japanese public to embrace and support the suicidal sacrifice made by the kamikaze pilots.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of what social scientists can learn from studying 
this event. 
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2.2 FROM VICTORY TO DESPERATION  
Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was meant to deliver a mortal blow 
to the American Pacific Fleet, which would clear the way for Japanese dominance of the Pacific 
Ocean.  With the American Pacific Fleet out of commission, Japan could procure the wealth that 
she as an island nation lacked.  If the action were successful, Japan would be able to throw a 
protective cordon stretching from the Kuriles, passing by the Wake and Marshall Islands, 
including the southern and western extremities of the Malayan barrier, and ending at the frontier 
separating India and Burma.99  With this vast section of space, Japan would have access to oil 
and other material including bauxite, rubber, and aluminum that were needed to maintain the 
wartime effectiveness of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy.100   
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a success for the Japanese in that they took the U.S. by 
surprise.  As a consequence, the U.S. lost two carriers (Arizona and Oklahoma), with six carriers 
severely damaged (California, West Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Nevada), two 
destroyers sunk (Cassin, Downes), 176 aircraft destroyed, 155 damaged, and 2,345 military and 
155 civilians killed.101  While the Pearl Harbor attack had been devastating for the U.S. it could 
have been far worse.  Lieutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, the lead pilot during the Pearl 
                                                 
99 Andrieu D’Albas, Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II, (New York: The Devin-
Adair Company, 1957), 7.  
100 George Sanson, "Japan's Fatal Blunder." (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1948), 
548. 
101 Andrieu D’Albas, Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II,  35-36. 
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Harbor attack, laments; ‘[w]hat I most regret is that we did not bring a landing force with us to 
take Hawaii. [Had Japan done this] [w]e would have been masters of the Pacific.”102   
Despite this missed opportunity, Japan scored an early victory with its surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor. As Roberta Wohlstetter notes, the U.S. failed to anticipate a Japanese action on 
Pearl Harbor despite the presence of numerous ‘signals’ indicating that an attack was likely.103  
The Japanese also experimented with a new type of attack, which consisted of nine midget 
submarines manned by a two-person crew that would detonate next to docked ships.  According 
to Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, “it was presumed that the midget submarines 
penetrated deep into Pearl Harbor and, after sunset, attacked unguarded ships in the harbor.  It 
was believed that they caused a certain amount of damage to the [U.S.] fleet.”104  This was the 
first instance of a suicide attack used by the Japanese during World War II.105  These types of 
attacks would become a hallmark as the war against the Americans progressed and the Japanese 
military situation grew more desperate. 
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In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Americans realized that Japanese expansion to the 
east and southeast had to be stopped.  U.S. submarines began to engage Japanese military and 
commercial shipping in an effort to stop material from reaching the Japanese mainland.  The 
U.S. also tried to attack the Japanese homeland.  Lieutenant Colonel James “Jimmy” Doolittle 
successfully did this on an April 18, 1942 raid on Honshu by U.S. B-25’s.  As Doolittle argued, 
“[t]he Japanese had been told they were invulnerable. An attack on the Japanese homeland 
would cause confusion in the minds of the Japanese people and sow doubt about the reliability of 
their leaders.  There was a second, equally important, psychological reason for this 
attack…Americans badly needed a morale boost.”106  The Doolittle raid did boost U.S. morale 
by proving that the Japanese homeland was vulnerable to U.S. air attack.  The next decisive 
turning point for the U.S. in the Pacific War occurred during the Battle of Midway. 
The Battle of Midway was, indeed, a decisive victory for the Americans against the 
Japanese.  According to Admiral Ernest King, chief of all U.S. naval operations, the June 4, 1942 
Battle of Midway “had been the first decisive defeat of the Japanese navy in 350 years and had 
restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific.”107  Prior to the Battle of Midway, Japanese 
naval operations had gone more or less according to plan, and it seemed that the Japanese 
Imperial High Command expected the same good fortune in this campaign.  The Japanese 
thoroughly expected the bombing of Midway to bring the American fleet out of Oahu and were 
confident that Japanese scouting submarines would be able to detect and report movement by the 
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American fleet.108  Unbeknownst to the Japanese was that the U.S. had cracked the Japanese 
coded radio that sent operational instructions to the Japanese Navy.109 Admiral Chester Nimitz, 
thus, was well aware of Japanese intentions, allowing the U.S. Navy to set a trap of its own.   
The American attack against the Japanese fleet proved devastating because the latter was 
unprepared to attack when American carriers were sighted on June 4.  At 10:22 A.M. American 
dive-bombers spotted the Japanese fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu.  The carriers could do 
little to counter the imminent U.S. attack since Admiral Nagumo, earlier that same morning, 
gave the order to send his airplanes to the hangars for rearming.110  This proved to be a fatal 
mistake since there were no Japanese aircraft to stop the U.S. attack.  What ensued in the next six 
minutes would radically alter Japan’s position in the war.  From 10:22 A.M. to 10:26 A.M., 
Japan lost four of its prized fleet carriers, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu.  Mitsuo Fuchida, 
onboard the Akagi, describes the utter confusion and chaos resulting from the U.S. attack: 
“I staggered down a ladder and into the ready room.  It was already jammed with badly 
burned victims from the hangar deck.  A new explosion was followed by several more, 
each causing the bridge structure to tremble.  Smoke from the burning hangar gushed 
through passageways and into the bridge and ready room, forcing us to seek other refuge. 
Climbing back to the bridge I could see that Kaga and Soryu had also been hit and were 
giving off heavy columns of black smoke.  The scene was horrible to behold.”111 
 
When American dive-bombers attacked, the Akagi was in the midst of fueling and arming 
their planes in order to attack the USS Yorktown.  Unfortunately for the Japanese this never 
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happened, as American bombs penetrated the wooden deck of the ship and exploded in the 
hangars where the fully fueled and heavily armed planes resided.  This had devastating effects as 
recorded by Rear Admiral Kusaka: 
“…the deck was on fire and anti-aircraft and machine guns were firing automatically, 
having been set off by the fire aboard the ship. Bodies were all over the place, and it was 
not possible to tell what would be shot up next…I had my hands and feet burned-a pretty 
serious burn on one foot. That is eventually the way we abandoned the Akagi-helter-
skelter, no order of any kind.”112 
 
The same fate of the Akagi befell the Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu.  Again, American dive-bombers 
penetrated the ships’ wooden decks and caused fires in the hangars below.  In a matter of 
minutes, not only did Japan lose four aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers and 332 planes, she 
also lost the best naval pilots and flight crews in the Imperial Japanese Navy.113  This 
humiliating defeat prompted Japan to focus its efforts on the Philippines in a last-ditch effort to 
halt American progress. 
 By the summer of 1944, the advance of American forces under the leadership of General 
McArthur and Admiral Nimitz had put Japan in grave danger.  Japan’s protective cordon that it 
had established early in 1942-1943 to ensure that material would reach the Japanese homeland 
was vanishing.  As the Americans moved westward, Japan’s situation worsened because the 
Americans could interrupt the commercial shipping lanes that the Japanese relied upon.  One 
thought that preoccupied the Japanese Imperial Navy was the dwindling supply of oil.  Indeed, 
“the lack of oil had become [Japan’s] crucial naval problem, so much so that she was no longer 
able to fuel the whole of her fleet in home waters and had been compelled to base part of it on 
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the Lingga Islands in the vicinity of Singapore.” 114  If the Japanese failed to hold the Philippines 
then the Japanese Empire would be cut off from its only remaining fuel source, resulting in the 
Japanese Navy’s inability to defend the Japanese homeland from a U.S. invasion force.115  Rear 
Admiral Takijiro Onishi realized that Japan’s military situation was deteriorating so he proposed 
a tactic that, he believed, would be so bold and so deadly as to halt the American advance.116  He 
would call this tactic by the name ‘Special Attack Force’ or, as it is better known, the kamikaze. 
  
2.3 THE KAMIKAZES:  ONISHI’S GAMBLE 
In the aftermath of Midway, Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi took stock of the strategic situation 
for the Japanese Navy.117  He concluded that Japan had lost its air superiority as veteran pilots 
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killed in battle were being replaced with progressively worse aviators.118  Another troubling 
occurrence was, by 1944, the Allies were conducting air raids throughout Japan.119  Not only was 
Japan’s homeland exposed to attack, but also there simply were not enough trained pilots to deal 
with American bombers.120  The Japanese Imperial Navy attempted to respond by reducing the 
number of flight-training hours from 1300 to 500, but this did little except expose novice pilots 
to better-trained American aviators.121  Additionally, fuel shortages prompted the Japanese Navy 
to create a mixture of fuel and alcohol in an attempt to conserve gasoline.  This proved disastrous 
for Japanese aviators whose engines would often stall while airborne.   Furthermore, even if 
Japanese pilots were able to keep their Zero’s airborne, they proved largely ineffective against 
the new U.S. Hellcat fighter, a superior aircraft when compared to the Zero.122  Onishi realized 
that Japan’s options were dwindling and that the only hope remaining for Japan was to reclaim 
Japan’s dominance in the air.  
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Onishi truly believed that if Japan could reclaim air superiority it could then re-take 
command of the sea.  He argued that Japan must accept the grim reality that it was losing the war 
to the Americans.  In a controversial essay penned in November 1943, he argued that Japan 
“must dispel wishful thinking…[since] too many people have been intoxicated by our early 
victories and dream only of final victory.  [Instead of thinking this way], we must endure every 
sacrifice and strive with our whole material and spiritual power to achieve eventual victory.”123  
In his mind, the key to victory involved the harnessing of Japanese spiritual power and fusing it 
with the appropriate military tactic.   
Onishi’s search for the right tactic took him back to the Pearl Harbor attack.  As 
Mordecai Sheftall notes, it was Onishi who had formulated the ideas for the shallow-run 
torpedoes and the midget submarines used during Pearl Harbor.124  Onishi believed that the 
midget submarines were employed with great success precisely because the mission was one-
way and because it capitalized on the element of surprise.  As Onishi ruminated over Japan’s 
predicament, he came to the conclusion that the only way to stop the American advance, and 
reassert Japanese air superiority, was to sink U.S. carriers.   
While he was well aware of the fuel shortages and the lack of experienced pilots, he 
thought that if a pilot could be trained to fly his armed Zero into a U.S. carrier this could 
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potentially cripple the U.S. fleet.  With the U.S. carrier fleet in disarray this could give Japan the 
time it needed to reassert itself in the Pacific.  At the heart of Onishi’s thinking was the firm 
belief that warfare was more of a spiritual, rather than physical, contest.125  According to Gordon 
Prange, Onishi “was the type who believed that nothing was impossible if one went forward with 
great spiritual determination.  [He believed] one could accomplish anything if he believed in it 
and worked hard enough a it.”126  Indeed, Onishi held firmly to the notion that the Japanese soul, 
which possessed a unique strength to face death without hesitation, was the only means of 
brining about a miracle for the Japanese Imperial Navy.127  The Japanese fighting spirit would 
overwhelm the Americans, whom Onishi believed had no spiritual strength due to their fondness 
for physical pleasure and material possessions.128  He concluded that “in America, they can’t 
unite for a common purpose.  One blow against them, and they’ll fall to pieces.”129  Having 
made this realization, he then proceeded to make the case for the establishment of the ‘Special 
Attack Corps.’ 
The Japanese high command, at this stage in the war, faced a desperate, although not 
hopeless, situation.  It was agreed that if Japan would have any chance of stopping the 
Americans then they must be defeated decisively in the Philippines.  To achieve this end, the 
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Japanese high command devised a plan called Operation Sho-Go (‘To Conquer’).  Operation 
Sho-Go recognized that Japan’s only remaining offensive weapons were her land-based air 
forces and super battleships.130  In order for Japan’s battleships to engage successfully the Allied 
fleet, then at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, it would be necessary to either destroy American 
carriers or at least put them out of action.  The Imperial command was confident that their super 
battleships could destroy the American carriers, but there was concern that Japan would lack air 
cover once the attack commenced.131  Onishi, seeing an opening, presented his idea to create the 
‘Special Attack Unit’ that would be tasked to fly deliberately into U.S. carriers.  While Vice-
Admiral Takeo Kurita initially opposed the idea, Onishi convinced him that this was the only 
way to provide cover for Japan’s super battleships.132  Kurita agreed and gave Onishi permission 
to begin training his special attack force.  The kamikaze’s debut would occur on October 25, 
1944 during the Battle of the Leyte Gulf as bomb-laden Japanese Zeros attacked with the sole 
purpose of sinking Allied ships.  Japan’s fate rested upon Onishi’s spiritual tactic.  
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2.4 THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF AND ITS AFTERMATH:  THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE KAMIKAZES 
The Japanese high command was well aware of the risk it was taking by committing what 
remained of the Japanese Imperial navy to the Leyte Gulf.  The diary of Admiral Teijiro Toyoda 
succinctly presents the situation: 
'If things went well, we might obtain unexpectedly good results. But if the worst should 
happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet. I felt that the chance had 
to be taken...the reason for my determination when sending the order was the fact that 
should we lose the Philippine operations...the shipping lane to the south would be 
completely cut off, so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not 
obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not received 
supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the 
expense of the Philippines.'133 
 
While Admiral Toyoda cautiously observed the situation with a level of strategic detachment, 
Admiral Matome Ugaki had complete confidence in Onishi’s special attack unit.  Ugaki, the 
commander-in-charge at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, believed that the kamikazes would “destroy 
enemy carriers without fail.”134  Perhaps what gave Ugaki the most confidence in Operation Sho 
was the kamikaze’s spirit of suicidal sacrifice on behalf of Japan.  As he notes in his diary, “[o]h 
what a noble spirit this is!  We are not afraid of a million enemies or a thousand carriers because 
our whole force shares the same spirit.”135 
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 On the morning of October 25, 1944, the Japanese unleashed the special attacks corps 
against the U.S. Navy as six Japanese kamikaze pilots took off from Cebu and flew eastward 
with orders to engage and sink U.S. carriers.  The first ship they spotted was the USS St. Lo, 
which had left Seeadler Harbor in order to provide air support for the Leyte Battle.  Survivors of 
the engagement recall the kamikaze attacks in this way: 
“The Japanese aircraft emerged from the cloud[s] and began to 
dive…approaching…slowly and deliberately,…maneuvering just enough not to be hit too 
soon.  All those who watched felt their mouths go dry. In less than a minute he [the pilot] 
would…crash his machine on the deck.  All the batteries were firing: the 5-inch guns, the 
40 millimeters and 20 millimeters even the rifles. The Japanese aircraft dived through a 
rain of steel.  It had been hit several places and seemed to be trailing a banner of flame 
and smoke, but it came on, clearly visible, hardly moving, the line of its wings as straight 
as a sword.”136 
 
The lead pilot during the engagement with the St. Lo was Lieutenant Yukio Seki, one of Japan’s 
few remaining ace pilots.  According to witness accounts, upon seeing the St. Lo he dive-bombed 
into the ship and “[t]he plane hit the flight deck and exploded in a fireball.  The burning fuselage 
smashed right through the four-inch-thick wooden deck and came to rest amidst a stack of 
torpedoes and bombs.  The ensuing blasts-seven of them-peeled back the flight deck, threw 
pieces of the carrier as high as a thousand feet into the air, and knocked the St. Lo on her beam 
ends.  She was gone in fifteen minutes.”137   
Despite the initial success of the special attack unit, it proved unable to halt the U.S. 
advance in the Philippines.  Indeed, the U.S. Fleet eventually would overwhelm the Japanese 
Navy.  After four days of fighting, the Americans had lost a light carrier (the St. Lo), two escort 
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carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort and a torpedo motor boat.138  The Japanese, on the 
other hand, lost four carriers, three battleships (including the super-battleship Musashi), nine 
cruisers, and ten destroyers, totaling over 300,000 tons of steel that had been sunk by the U.S.139  
The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval engagement of the whole war, proved a catastrophic 
defeat for the Japanese Navy.140  The Leyte Battle also established the strategic reality that there 
was no way Japan could win the war in its present state.141  Indeed, the Japanese Navy “was 
effectively finished as a fighting force.”142 
Although the Battle of Leyte Gulf was a failure for the Japanese Navy, Admiral Ugaki 
acknowledged that the special attack units had caused considerable damage to the U.S. fleet.  As 
a result, the Japanese high command decided to utilize the special attack unit during the Battle of 
Okinawa.143  Tables 1 and 2 below show the impact of the kamikazes during the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf and the Battle of Okinawa. 
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Table 1. The Impact of Kamikaze ‘special attacks’ in the Battle of the Philippines, October 1944-
January 1945. 144 
 
Sunk                                                                                                Damaged 
Ships                 Japanese         U.S. Records                          Japanese                      U.S.  
                          Estimates                                                       Estimates                      Records  
Carriers 
Battleships 
Cruisers 
Destroyers 
Transports 
Other 
 
 
TOTAL 
5 
1 
5 
3 
23 
0 
 
 
37 
 
2 
0 
0 
3 
5 
6 
 
 
16 
 13 
3 
8 
1 
34 
0 
 
 
59 
23 
5 
9 
28 
12 
10 
 
 
87 
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Table 2. The Impact of Kamikaze ‘special attacks’ in Okinawa Campaign, March August 1945. 145 
 
 
Sunk                                                                                                Damaged 
Ships                 Japanese         U.S. Records                          Japanese         U.S.  
                          Estimates                                                      Estimates        Records  
Carriers 
Battleships 
Cruisers 
Destroyers 
Minesweepers 
Other 
 
 
TOTAL 
8 
12 
29 
18 
3 
27 
 
 
97 
 
0 
0 
0 
11 
1 
4 
 
 
16 
 11 
18 
27 
9 
2 
22 
 
 
89 
7 
10 
5 
61 
22 
80 
 
 
185 
 
 
While the special attack units failed to achieve victory in its final efforts to repulse the U.S. from 
the Pacific, they caused great concern amongst U.S. Navy admirals.  Indeed, it is important to 
note that more U.S. warships had been sunk or damaged by kamikazes in the Philippines than 
had been lost or damaged in the previous Pacific naval battles including Pearl Harbor.146  The 
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kamikazes proved a far more effective weapon than a conventional air attack, which would have 
relied on novice pilots.147  Although Japanese news sources often inflated the number of ships 
sunk or damaged by the special attack unit (compare the U.S. estimates as opposed to the 
Japanese estimates in both tables above), the kamikazes succeeded in becoming a potent 
psychological weapon.  As the American war correspondent Hanson Baldwin noted, “the strain 
of waiting, the anticipated terror, made vivid from past experience, sends some men into 
hysteria, insanity and breakdown.”148   
In retrospect, the adoption of the kamikaze attacks was a gamble that had little chance of 
success.  It was chosen out of a defensive strategic necessity to stop American progress in the 
Pacific.  The thought was that if the kamikazes could start sinking a number of U.S. warships 
then they could force a U.S. withdrawal from the Pacific.  Part of this calculation came from the 
belief that the U.S. was a weak-willed and individualistic society that would succumb to an 
enemy determined to achieve victory at any cost.   However, the tactic provided little more than 
a false hope for a miracle in much the vein as the 1281 typhoon, which saved Japan from the 
Mongol invasion.  The disillusioned Onishi, before committing seppuku (ritualistic suicide), 
confirmed this notion by saying, "[i]f history shows one thing beyond doubt, it is that in the 
affairs of mankind there is no room for miracles. The fortune of different nations is formed by 
the amount of honest effort they make."149   
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In analyzing the kamikazes, it becomes clear that Japan’s soldiers willingly answered the 
call to sacrifice their lives for their country.  Indeed, the individual sacrifices made by the 
participants of the special attack units are extraordinary.  A total of 4,615 soldiers deliberately set 
out to their deaths in order to attack the enemy.150  The question that arises from these figures is 
what beliefs motivated these soldiers?  One Japanese commander interviewed in Kwangtung, 
China described the special attack participants in this way:  ‘[m]y men were not war machines: 
they were young, they loved their country, and they took no thought for themselves. The spirit 
that inspired them stems from the warrior tradition of Japan.’151  This statement provides a clue 
as to what forces motivated the special attack soldiers.   
 
2.5 THE MOTIVATIONS OF KAMIKAZE PILOTS 
Roughly 85% of the pilots who became kamikazes were students from Japan’s most prestigious 
universities.152  By the fall of 1943, with the military situation becoming increasingly grim, 
Japan no longer granted student deferments for military service and began drafting university 
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students.153  Students majoring in liberal art disciplines like law, political science, and economics 
left the university and entered the armed services.154  Many of the students who were drafted 
volunteered to become pilots.  Those who wanted to become pilots were then asked to join the 
special attack units.  Through the diaries left by these university students turned kamikaze pilots, 
one discovers a group of young men who were intensely committed to the Japanese cause and 
who were willing to give their lives to ensure Japan’s success in the war.   This section finds that 
the readiness with which Japanese kamikaze pilots embraced their mission comes from a potent 
mix of a willingness to die stemming from the influence of the Bushido warrior code to protect 
their family and nation, and the belief that their souls would reside at Japan’s Yakusuni shrine 
where they would be honored as warrior-gods.  
 
2.5.1 Pilot Motivations:  The Bushido Code and Protecting Kin and Country 
Bushido literally translates into ‘the way of the warrior.’  Founded as an ethical system in feudal 
Japan, it governed the behavior and etiquette of fighting nobles known as ‘samurai.’155  In 
contrast with Western ethical systems that have grown out of religious texts or the thought of a 
principal author, the Bushido code “was founded not on the creation of one brain, however able, 
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or on the life of a single personage, however renowned.  [Instead] [i]t was an organic 
growth…[coming from] decades and centuries of military [experience].”156  The two most 
important principles extolled by the Bushido code are a fearlessness of death and loyalty to one’s 
master. 
Bushido sought to teach the warrior stoicism especially in the face of danger.  In order to 
face a foe without fear or restraint, it was necessary for the warrior to embrace death.  Indeed, the 
principal lesson of Bushido is found in the hagakure, the book of the samurai, which states that 
the “the Way of the Samurai is, morning after morning, the practice of death, considering 
whether it will be here or there, imagining the most slightly way of dying, and putting one’s 
mind firmly in death.”157  To say that the Bushido code is fixated on death is no exaggeration.  
By far the most common and oft repeated theme in the hagakure is how the warrior should 
prepare for death.  The hagakure tells the warrior that the only real choice one has to make is 
either to die or not to die and that one should always choose death over life.158  The true samurai 
had to cultivate a state of mind that impeded self-interested, rational calculation, which 
Tsunetomo called the shini gurui or the ‘death frenzy.’159  This required the warrior to confront 
death daily whether it was on the battlefield or in one’s mind.  According to the hagakure,  
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“Your day must begin with a meditation upon death as the ultimate event. Every 
morning, with a calm mind, form a picture in your head of the last moment of your life-
such as being slain by bow and arrow, gun, sword, or spears; or being carried away by 
ocean waves; jumping into a big fire; being struck by lightening in a thunderstorm; 
swallowed up by a great earthquake; falling down hundreds of feet from a high cliff; 
death by sickness; or unexpected sudden death.  Every morning, be sure to take time to 
think of yourself as dead.”160 
 
Thus, one of the most important tenets of bushido is that the true samurai was willing to risk his 
life when called by his lord to do so, and that he actually looked forward to the opportunity to 
sacrifice himself in the line of duty.161  Arthur Swinson confirms this and notes, “the essence of 
bushido was that the young warrior should aim at dying…[i]n any event, death for the samurai 
was not something that should be avoided; it was ‘a consummation devoutly to be wished;’ it 
was the realization of a great and wonderful ideal.”162  It was believed that the emphasis placed 
on death not only made one a more formidable warrior, but it also helped the samurai cultivate 
an unflinching loyalty to his master. 
Perhaps just as important as death in the Bushido code is loyalty.  Historically, samurai 
were servants of a powerful lord or daimyo, and it was expected that they follow one’s lord to 
whatever end even if that meant the samurai’s own death.163  The loyalty of the samurai to his 
lord “is said to have been unconditional and utterly selfless.”164  This intense focus on loyalty is 
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due, in part, to the lack of separation between the individual and the group in the Bushido code.  
Indeed, Bushido, unlike Western concepts of individualism, does not distinguish the individual 
person from the group.  As Inazo Nitobe notes, Bushido finds that the interest of the individual in 
relation to the group, usually family and the national polity, are “one and inseparable.”165  This 
extreme form of loyalty is best demonstrated through the story of forty-seven ronin. 
The tale of the forty-seven ronin, which are samurais without masters, describes a true 
event that occurred in 1702 during the Edo shogunate.  A young daimyo lord, Asano Takumi 
Naganori, was holding an annual reception consisting of imperial messengers at Edo castle.  He 
had been given the task to greet a shogun governor named Kira Kozuke Yoshinaka.  Upon 
arrival, Kira became upset with Asano due to the latter’s refusal to offer the former bribes.  Kira, 
becoming enraged, insulted Asano in front of other shogun officials.  Asano believed that Kira 
had humiliated him publicly so he drew his dagger and attacked the governor.  Asano struck Kira 
in the face with his dagger, but the wound did not kill him.  Asano’s actions violated reception 
protocol and the government wasted little time before coming to a decision to punish Asano.  
The government condemned Asano to death by disembowelment while praising Kira’s restraint 
during the heated situation.   
The samurai serving Asano believed this to be an unjust punishment, as the government 
did not address Kira’s unbecoming behavior of demanding a bribe upon being received at Edo 
castle.  The group of forty-seven masterless samurai plotted revenge against Kira.  One year 
later, the ronin enacted their revenge as they broke into Kira’s house and decapitated him.  While 
the ronin avenged their master’s death, they also violated the Shogun’s law, which prohibited 
revenge killings.  The Shogun was aware that their deed was popular amongst the Japanese 
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people.  With this in mind, the Shogun allowed the ronin to commit ritualistic suicide or 
seppuku.166   
The importance of this story should not be underestimated.  Indeed, as John Allyn notes, 
this is the national story of Japan, which has seeped into Japan’s national consciousness as it 
continues to be celebrated in song, story, drama and, more recently, motion pictures.167  Not only 
does the story powerfully demonstrate the absolute loyalty that warriors have toward their lord, 
but it also serves as the embodiment of the samurai virtue, which confirms that the way of the 
warrior is found in death.  Both these characteristics are widely found in the kamikaze diaries.  
 The willingness to embrace death and the premium placed on loyalty allowed the 
kamikaze pilots to carry out the extreme orders they had been given.  Former pilot Yokota 
Yutaka notes that when “you become a member of an attack force, you become deathly serious. 
Your eyes become set.  Focused.  Your life was dedicated to self-sacrifice, committed to 
smashing into the enemy.”168  He goes on to reflect on the maxim that Bushido is a constant 
search for a place to die.  He notes that this “was our fervent desire, our long-cherished dream.  
A place to die for my country.  I was happy to be born a man.  A man of Japan.  I don’t care if 
that makes me sound egotistical, but that’s how I felt.  The country was in my hands.”169   
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Hachiro Sasaki echoes the ease at which the pilots embraced death.  He finds that as “a 
young man living in Japan at this point in history, the opportunity to participate in the actual 
making of history is an extraordinary honor.”170  As a result, he feels an “honorable obligation to 
dedicate [his] self to the nation” and wishes to “die most beautifully as a person in the midst of a 
supreme effort.”171  Indeed, for the kamikaze pilots, the good death is one that is freely accepted 
without hesitation or regret.  As Takenori Nako notes, “[d]eath comes to all of us who are given 
life on this earth and to everything that exists in this real world [so that] to live well is to die 
well.”172  Yohei Aboshi reiterates the sentiment of the sublime death.  He states that ‘I am 
confident…that when the time comes for me to die, I can do so composedly and without getting 
unnecessarily excited.”173  He goes on to state that he wants to die “after achieving a victory over 
the rest of the world” and that Japan must “create [its] own fate” against the enemy she faces.174  
Ryoji Uehara, reflecting on the anniversary of the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, notices 
that “[w]hen we compare the situation that prevailed then to that of today, we see that the scale is 
quite different, but I think of the people’s spiritual condition then and now as pretty much the 
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same.”175  This spiritual condition would ensure victory for Japan and help her “conquer the 
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union,” which would allow Japan “to spread a 
cultural life that would even exceed theirs.  In time, as it was with the British Empire of the past, 
wherever one goes he would see the Japanese flag unfurled with dignity and power, and Japanese 
would be made the language of the world.”176  The student pilots also mention another prominent 
theme in their diaries, which is the commitment the pilots had to their family and their country.  
There is a belief created through popular fiction and motion pictures that the Emperor 
figured prominently into the motivations of the kamikaze pilots.177  The kamikaze diaries dispel 
this belief and replace it with a deep commitment to kin and country.   As Lieutenant Yukio Seki, 
the man selected to lead the first kamikaze sortie, notes: 
“Japan is finished!  Killing ace pilots like me, strewth!  If it was up to me, I know I could 
get a direct hit on the flight deck of a carrier with a number 50 [500 lb bomb] without 
plane ramming.  I am not going out for the Emperor…[but I am] going for my beloved 
wife.  If Japan were defeated, I reckon she would be raped by American GIs.  I am dying 
to protect her.”178  
 
As kamikaze pilot survivor Ryuji Nagatsuka recounts: 
“I too would have thought my death worthwhile if it saved my family and friends from 
being massacred by the Americans.  My thoughts never, at any moment, turned to the 
Emperor, who, in any case, had closed his eyes when this rash and inhuman tactic had 
been described to him.  Did the Emperor have any idea of what went on in the mind and 
feelings of a suicide pilot?...I would have liked to cry out to him:  ‘Look at me, wasting 
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copying out these hollow phrases!  To hell with it!  Give me some fuel and good weather, 
not your words!.  I would set out this minute on a suicide-mission to defend my family 
and my country, but I do not want to die for a man who calls himself Emperor!”179 
 
The two pilots mention a recurring theme, believing that the Americans were barbarians 
and if allowed to invade Japan would rape and pillage at will.  A female survivor of the Battle of 
Okinawa confirms this and says that “from the time we’d been children, we’d only been 
educated to hate them [Americans].  They would strip the girls naked and do with them whatever 
they wanted, then run over them with tanks.  We really believed that.  Not only us girls.  
Mothers, grandfathers, grandmothers, [and husbands] all were cowering.”180  The pilots also 
believed that participating in a special attack was a great honor, one that carried some 
otherworldly benefits.  
 
2.5.2 Post-Mortem Incentives:  Familial Honor and a Place at the Yakusuni Shrine 
The students explicitly state in their diaries that being selected to participate in a kamikaze 
mission was an honor.  One student, Yokota Yutaka, describes the intense competition that 
existed amongst the pilots to be chosen for a special attack mission.  When one of Yutaka’s 
friends was not selected to take part in the mission, “he dashed up to our squad commander, a 
desperate look in his eyes.  ‘How could you leave me?  Why won’t you take me?’  He was in 
tears.  ‘Please make me the one hundred and first.’  [That day] [t]hey chose one hundred out of 
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two thousand.”181  When pilot Ichizo Hayashi was selected he wrote, “I am pleased to have the 
honor of having been chosen as a member of a Special Attack Force that is on its way into battle, 
but I cannot help crying when I think of you, Mom.  Please be happy, however, that I have been 
chosen for my job because I so far exceeded the other competitors in our flying exercises.”182  
Similarly, Ryoji Uehara notes, “I am keenly aware of the tremendous personal honor involved in 
my having been chosen to be a member of the Army Special Attack Corps, which is considered 
to be the most elite attack force in the service of our glorious fatherland.”183   
When a pilot was selected to join a special attack unit, he was given a distinctive uniform 
with cherry-blossom buttons, a water chrysanthemum badge on his sleeves, and a white silk 
scarf.184  The cherry-blossom became the symbol par excellence of the kamikaze pilot as it 
represented the soldier’s sacrifice for Japan.  As Emiko Tierney-Ohnuki notes, the cherry 
blossom stands for “the most pressing concerns of an individual life, while offering a means to 
identify oneself as a member of a social group and ultimately as a Japanese.”185  As such, the 
cherry blossom was a symbol of group cohesion in that it bound the fate of the individual pilots 
to that of the nation.  The cherry blossom as an aesthetic symbol beautifully represented the 
individual sacrifices of kamikazes on the battlefield.  Kamikaze pilots euphemistically noted 
upon being selected for a special operation that they were “happy to fall like a cherry blossom 
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petal.”186  Ohnuki goes on to note that at the level of the individual pilot, the cherry blossom 
“represents [the] processes of life, death and rebirth.”187  While the individual soldiers fell as 
cherry blossoms, it was believed that they would posthumously reside at the Yakusuni shrine, 
Japan’s religious site for the heroic war dead.      
The Yakusuni shrine, founded in 1889 in a Tokyo suburb by the Meji government, is 
considered to be the most sacred place in Japan.  According to Japanese legend, it is said that 
Yasukuni houses the spirit of Amaterasu-Omikami, the Sun Goddess and founder of Japan.188  
The shrine was also built in order to ‘venerate the state’s martyrs, those devoted warriors who 
sacrificed their lives for their country’ and to provide a place for the spirits of fallen Japanese 
soldiers.189  The Meiji government believed that the Japanese state needed to construct a shrine 
in order to appease the souls of the fallen warriors.  This concern reflects the Shinto belief that 
the souls of the dead must be properly cared for lest they inflict misfortune on Japan’s national 
and international ambitions.190  The souls of the dead soldiers housed in Yasukuni shrine are 
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considered kamis or spirits.  These kamis have the ability to bring good or bad fortune for the 
nation, depending on if the nation remembers them during yearly Shinto rituals.191  The soldiers 
who died in special attack units were considered the epitome of national self-sacrifice and 
therefore would be enshrined as ‘national protecting kamis’ at Yasukuni shrine, where they were 
revered and honored by Prime Ministers, the Imperial High Command, and even the emperor 
himself.192  As the war with the U.S. intensified, Yasukuni became a symbol that figured 
prominently in the government’s propaganda effort.193  As Rear Admiral Kurihara Etsuzo 
commented, the intense focus on Yasukuni during Japan’s Pacific campaign against the 
Americans was an attempt to inject “the special attack spirit into the hearts of the entire 
[Japanese] nation.  The world will be shaken when the time comes for the Japanese people…to 
bring this spirit into play.”194  As the war drew on, Yakusuni became the location where the 
Japanese government remembered and valorized the souls of the dead.195 
                                                                                                                                                             
see C. Burnell Olds, “Japan Harnesses Religion in the National Service,” (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1943), 
535-547. 
191 Wang Zhixin, “China, Japan and the Spell of Yasukuni,” in John Breen ed., Yasukuni, the War Dead 
and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, 82. 
192 Takahashi Tetsuya, “Legacies of Empire: The Yasukuni Shrine Controversy,” in John Breen ed., 
Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, 109-110. 
193 David Earhart, "Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime Ideology,"  571. 
194 Rear Admiral Kurihara Etsuzo quoted in David Earhart, "Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime 
Ideology," 569-570. 
195 John Nelson, "Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the Military Dead at 
Yasukuni Shinto Shrine," (The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2003), 446. 
  76 
Another reason why the Yasukuni shrine became important to the pilots was because they 
believed that they would meet their fallen comrades at Yasukuni after they died.  This is 
exemplified in the special attack pilot pledge, which states, “I’ll go first.  I’ll meet you at 
Yasukuni.”196  As Araki Shigeko notes, the pilots were desperate to cling to the idea of meeting 
again as it helped them mentally prepare for the sacrifice they were about to make.197  Those at 
Yasukuni were dead in the physical sense, but their enshrined spirits still lingered to fight 
alongside the living to further Japan’s imperial ambitions.  Indeed, the emperor himself would 
preside over an elaborate enshrinement ritual at Yasukuni, ensuring that the dead man’s spirit 
joined the ranks of the imperial ancestors.198  After the ritual was over, the soldier would be 
pronounced of one Japan’s ‘warrior gods’ by virtue of his transformational sacrifice.199  
Outside of the spiritual benefits enumerated above, the kamikaze pilots also garnered 
some material rewards.200  Upon completing their missions, the kamikaze pilots were 
posthumously given a two-rank promotion, entitling their families to increased pension benefits.  
Moreover, the families of dead kamikazes were called homare no ie, ‘a household of honor,’ 
                                                 
196 Araki Shigeko in Haruko Cook and Theodore Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History, 324. 
197 Ibid.  
198 The notion that the fallen warrior is not dead is a recurring theme in history.  The poet Simonides when 
speaking about the death of the Spartan warriors at the Battle of Thermopylae echoes this sentiment when he said, 
“having died, they are not dead; for their valor, by the glory which it brings, raises them from above out of the house 
of Hades.”  Simonides quoted in Anthony Smith, Chosen Peoples, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 217. 
199 David Earhart, "Kamikazefication and Japan's Wartime Ideology," 576. 
200 It is interesting to note that there is no mention in the diaries of the pilots being motivated by these 
material rewards.  At best, the pilots were aware of them and of the benefits their families would receive but there is 
no evidence that it actively influenced their decision to become a special attack pilot.   
  77 
they received better rations, and were given places of honor at official state ceremonies.201  If a 
family lost a son in a kamikaze mission, it was common for the government to release the name 
of the pilot so that the family would be congratulated by the townspeople.202  The government 
counted on the unwavering support of the Japanese public for the special attack.  How and why 
the Japanese public came to embrace the special attack tactic is the subject of the next section.   
 
2.6 SOCIETAL RESONANCE AND JAPAN’S WAR-TIME IDEOLOGY  
When the Japanese High Command adopted Onishi’s recommendation to create the special 
attack units, little thought was given to the question of how the Japanese public would view these 
attacks.  The reason being is that since the Meiji era, the Japanese public had been heavily 
indoctrinated with an ideology that viewed Japan as a sacred nation.  At the head of Japan’s 
sacred founding was the emperor, who was considered a direct descendent of the gods.  In order 
to demonstrate absolute fealty to the emperor, the individual was required to align his will with 
the state.  This absolutist political ideology was propagated through Japan’s public education for 
nearly two generations so when the war began with the U.S. the Japanese public was willing to 
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do their ‘divine duty’ to help the emperor and Japan succeed.  As a result of this indoctrination, 
the public heralded and lauded the sacrifice made by the kamikaze pilots.     
 
2.6.1 The Divine Origins of the Japanese Nation 
Scholars of nationalism have long recognized the importance of the founding myths of nations.  
As Anthony Smith notes, many nations conceive themselves to be a ‘sacred communities’ since 
the nation is “invested with sacred qualities that it draws from older beliefs, sentiments, and 
ideals about the nature of community, territory, history and destiny.”203  That Japan possesses 
stories detailing the sacred origins of the country is not unique.  What is unique, however, is how 
the post-Meiji Japanese government actively integrated these beliefs into the Japanese 
consciousness.  The most powerful belief that the government cultivated was that there was a 
national Japanese essence separating Japan from the other nations on the earth.  Known as the 
Kokutai No Hongi (translated as ‘The Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan’), this 
mindset helped to foster feelings of Japanese exceptionalism and later militarism.   
The Kokutai No Hongi (KNH) became an official statement of national policy in the Meji 
government.  The bedrock of the KNH is the belief in the divine origin of Japan, its people and 
its ruling family.  The KNH explains the unbroken line of the emperors who have reigned 
eternally over the Japanese empire.  The line of unbroken and divine rule “is our eternal and 
immutable national entity.  Thus, founded on this great principle, all the people, united as one 
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great family nation in heart and obeying the Imperial Will.”204  The KNH describes how Japan 
was the first nation created on the earth and as such it was home to the gods.  The greatest of the 
gods was Amaterasu Ohmikami (the ‘Heavenly Shining Great August Deity’ or also simply 
known as the ‘Sun Goddess’) who sent down heavenly legions to pacify the native inhabitants of 
Japan.  Once order was brought to the land, she sent the fledgling nation her ‘Heavenly 
Grandchild’ to begin the dynasty of emperors.  The royal line of Japan is considered to be 
“coeval with heaven and earth,” meaning that the emperor is part man and part god.205  Indeed, 
the KNH calls the emperor the hitogami (translated as ‘god-man’ or ‘deity-incarnate’) who is 
both human and divine.  
The emperor’s main duty is to protect the lineage of the gods.206  This notion gained such 
importance that Article I of the Meiji Constitution explicitly states, “the empire of Japan shall be 
reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.”207  The preamble of 
the Meji constitution reinforces Japan’s sacred nature:   
“Japan is the Land of the Gods.  Our Imperial Ancestor for the first time set the foundation of the 
nation, and the Sun Deity forever handeth the Imperial Throne.  This is a thing existing only in 
our country and without parallel in foreign lands.  This is why we call it a Land of the Gods…We 
the Emperor with discretion and awe to the divine spirits of the Imperial Ancestors do declare and 
say:  We the Emperor, in keeping with the tremendous tasks coeval with Heaven and Earth, do 
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succeed to the Imperial Throne and, holding firm unto the projects laid down of old, shall never 
fail.”208 
    
It is obvious from the KNH and the Meji Constitution that the Japanese Emperor is different 
from those rulers of other countries; he is not a ruler chosen by his subjects on the grounds of his 
virtue, reason, or intelligence.  Instead, the Emperor’s primary duty is to act as a steward of the 
country’s divine lineage.  To complete this awesome task requires the absolute loyalty and 
devotion of Japanese inhabitants.  
The KNH describes ‘The Way of the Subjects,’ which is a set of recommendations about 
how the individual can best serve the emperor.  The two most important virtues described are 
loyalty and filial piety.  Loyalty entails more than a mere reverence for the emperor.  Instead it 
requires the “offering [of] our lives for the sake of the Emperor.”209  The KNH is explicit in not 
calling this ‘self-sacrifice,’ but rather the “the casting aside of our little selves to live under his 
august grace and the enhancing of the genuine life of the people [in the] State.”210  What is 
perhaps most shocking for a modern audience is the way in which loyal Japanese subjects are 
portrayed.  The individual is “an existence belonging to [the] State and her history, which form 
the basis of his origin, and is fundamentally one body with it.”211  Since there is no separation 
between individual and the state, the subject has little choice but to follow the dictates of the 
emperor and concomitantly the state.  While this raises the philosophical question of whether one 
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can exhibit loyalty if the individual has no choice in the matter, the practical reality is that the 
Japanese subject is required to submit his will and desires to that of the state at all times.  
 The second virtue, filial piety, is also connected with the state.  The KNH speaks of the 
‘national family’ and contrasts this with Western notions of ‘individual family.’  In the latter, the 
main relationship is between the parent and child, which becomes the primary building block in 
the Western social order.  By contrast, the KNH notes that the ‘national family’ entails more than 
the Western notion of the parent-child relationship.  Instead, “the life of the family in our country 
is not confined to the present life of a household of parents and children, but beginning with the 
distant ancestors, is carried on eternally by the descendants.”212  Linking the national family to 
the ‘distant ancestors’ establishes the state as the primary unit in the Japanese social order.  
Indeed, the KNH describes the individual as “an existence belonging to a State and her history 
which form the basis of his origin, and is fundamentally one body with it.”213  There are two 
main points to note here.   
First, the individual owes its existence and identity to the state.  This is in stark contrast 
with Western ideas of how the state is created.  In Western political philosophy, the individual 
enters into the social contract in order to preserve one’s life from the perils of the state of nature, 
which, in Thomas Hobbes’ famous description, is “poor, nasty, brutish and short.”214  The 
individual acts to preserve life and limb, which is the necessary condition for the formation of 
the state.  In contrast, the divine creation of Japan finds that the state precedes the individual.  
The individual never enters into a social contract, but rather finds the state as a pre-established 
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social order imposed by the gods.  The divine social order places a premium on subordinating 
one’s individual will to that of the state.  
Second, the individual is subservient to the state.  As such, the truest form of filial piety is 
when the individual conforms to the divine national entity.  Individuals are essentially “not 
beings isolated from the State, but each has his allotted share as forming part of the State.”215  
This requires that the Japanese people exude a spirit of self-effacement, which means living for 
the great self (the state) by dying to the small self (individual ego).216  With the emperor as the 
divine head of the national entity, the greatest act an individual can do is to make the will of the 
state his or her own.  The divination of the emperor created a unique Japanese political 
philosophy formed around the notion that obedience to the emperor had a quasi-religious 
character and that obedience to the emperor was the same as obedience to the national-family.217    
Investigating the KNH reveals the core beliefs that the Japanese public would come to 
hold before World War II began.  The emperor became known as the ‘unmoved mover’ or “the 
incarnation of the absolute unity of the state and the nation.”218  Every decree from the emperor 
carried the authority of the gods and thus became a sacred duty for individual Japanese citizens.  
Additionally important was the mythology that Japan was an ancient and divine dynasty, which 
had remained unbroken since the birth of the sun.  How these beliefs were converted successfully 
into a compelling ideology requires an examination of Japan’s education system.  
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2.6.2 Japan’s Public Education:  Promoting the State’s Ideology 
The principles of the KNH were propagated to the public by Japan’s Ministry of Education, 
which was created in 1872.  From the beginning of the Meiji era, Japanese education was 
controlled by the state, and, except for a few private institutions, the government, through the 
Ministry of Education, operated all schools and universities.219  Beginning in 1903, teachers in 
Japan were expected to “expound a state-prescribed orthodoxy in their courses, comprising an 
‘absolutist’ interpretation of the emperor’s position in the state” and upholding the sacred 
founding of Japan.220  Another feature was the pronounced anti-Western sentiments that 
appeared in Japanese history textbooks.  Any admiration of the West was removed and replaced 
with open hostility.  Westerners were portrayed as a self-serving and weak-willed race that 
thought only of comfort and riches.  One archetypal example of the West’s weakness is found in 
a 1903 history textbook that re-tells the story of U.S. Commodore James Biddle.   
Biddle, after anchoring two American warships in Tokyo Bay in 1846, was brought to 
Tokyo by a group of Japanese sailors.  As Biddle was walking, one Japanese sailor deliberately 
broke ranks, pushed Biddle and verbally insulted him.  This violation of decorum was punishable 
by death and the Japanese expected Biddle to kill the sailor on the sport.  Instead, Biddle smiled 
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and ignored the incident.  The textbook notes that the “word spread that the Americans were 
weak and need not be taken seriously.”221 
 Additionally, the Ministry of Education actively promoted the notion that Western ideas 
were harmful to Japan.  Ideas such as limited government, liberty, and individual freedom were 
considered anathema to the Japanese state.  As a result, the Ministry of Education passed the 
“Imperial Rescript on Education” [IRE] on October 30, 1890.  As Charles Spinks notes, the IRE 
was 
 
“[o]ne of the most significant documents of modern Japan, fully equal in importance to 
the Imperial Constitution which had been promulgated the year before.  The evil genius 
who drafted this Rescript, Akimasa Yoshikawa (then Minister of Education), frankly 
admitted that its primary purpose was to halt the westernization of Japan.  [T]he Rescript 
on Education is the intellectual Magna Carta of their country, which emancipated Japan 
from the malignant bondage of Western thought and culture.  Still more important, this 
document became the cornerstone of modern Japanese nationalism.”222        
 
At the heart of the IRE is the idea of ‘spiritual training.’  Spiritual training begins when a student 
is in primary school and continues throughout the student’s education, even at the university 
level.  Part of a student’s curriculum involves taking courses that promote the national virtues of 
Japan.  In these classes, a student reads from a carefully selected text, which is intended to 
demonstrate a national virtue.  For example, when the curriculum called for a lesson on loyalty, 
the teacher was instructed to present the story of the forty-seven ronin.  It should be the teacher’s 
goal to make it the ambition of all of his pupils to want “to burn an incense stick before the 
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tombs of these warriors who avenged an injustice to their lord and paid with their lives for their 
loyalty.”223  
 The IRE also unabashedly promotes Japanese exceptionalism.  Indeed, it instructs 
teachers to present the idea of hakko ichiu, which translates as ‘over all directions of the earth, 
one sky,’ to their students.  Reminiscent of the American notion of manifest destiny, although 
much greater in purpose and scope, hakko ichiu is the idea that it is Japan’s divine destiny to 
extend its borders to all corners of the earth.  Japan’s culture and way of life were such that the 
rest of the world would benefit from it.  The IRE quotes the Japanese philosopher Yoshida Shoin 
who proclaims that “it goes without saying for the Imperial Land to reign in all directions as 
unending as the Heavenly Sun, [and] as boundlessly eternal as heaven and earth.”224 
 It should be unsurprising to note that the IRE promoted the virtues found in the KNH.  
The IRE reinforced the idea that the emperor was identical with the nation and deserved absolute 
loyalty.  Moreover, the IRE reminded Japanese citizens that Japan was founded by the gods and 
has an unbroken ancestral line “as unchanging as heaven and earth, [that] is to be passed on to 
ten thousand times ten thousand generations.”225  The IRE made clear to all Japanese students 
that the Emperor and the state were divine entities that demanded absolute loyalty and self-
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sacrifice.  Consider the lessons of a fourth-grade and ninth-grade text designed to inculcate 
spiritual readiness into Japanese students: 
• “The Imperial Scion [the Emperor] is holy, by virtue of the Imperial 
Progenitor [Amaterasu Omikami].  By virtue of the august spirit of the 
Imperial Progenitor, the authority of the extant Emperor is inviolate.”226 
• “The state protects the subjects.  But if the subjects do not completely 
obey the state, the state cannot completely protect the subjects.  It is the 
first duty of subjects to obey and protect the state.”227 
• “Subjects are particles which together comprise the whole nation.  The 
prosperity of the subjects is tied to the prosperity of the state.  Subjects 
and state are one body.”228 
• “The state exists independently forever, but the individual for only a time, 
and compared with the state his life is very brief.  It is only natural that the 
people must conform to the purposes of the eternal state, and give no heed 
to personal interests.”229 
• “Remembering our deep obligation to the Emperor for his favors, we 
should strive to become good Japanese by devoting ourselves to ruler-
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loyalty and patriotism, revering the Imperial family, respecting the law, 
honoring the flag, and bearing in mind the origin of festival days.”230 
 
From 1904 until 1945, the Ministry of Education controlled the distribution of all 
elementary school texts and oversaw the textbooks that went to public universities.  This ensured 
that nearly two generations of Japanese had been indoctrinated by the state’s absolutist ideology.  
Students were taught to venerate the emperor through in-class rituals, such as praying in front of 
the imperial photograph, which were used to instill awe and obedience to the emperor and state.  
State education was not meant to promote critical thinking and independent reasoning.  Instead, 
the education promulgated during this period produced citizens who became zealous supporters 
of Japan’s Imperial policies. Consider the composition of one third-grade student during the 
Russo-Japanese War, “I will become a soldier and kill Russians and take them prisoner.  I will 
kill more Russians, cut off their heads and bring them back to the Emperor.  I will charge into 
battle again, cut off more Russian heads, kill[ing] them all.  I will be a great man.”231   
This exemplifies the Japanese zeitgeist in the years preceding World War II.  With an 
education system focusing on the sacredness of the emperor and country, coupled with the 
idolization of the Bushido virtues of loyalty and the willingness to die for one’s country, the 
militarization of Japanese education was complete.  This state-produced, militaristic ideology 
was injected into the Japanese populace first through the education system and later through the 
                                                 
230 Ibid., 240.  
231 Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 24 
  88 
active control over the press and media.232  These elements combined to create a population that 
was willing to accept the special attacks as part of the ‘national will’ and would celebrate and 
revere the sacrifice of the kamikaze pilots.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
The Japanese use of suicide attacks during World War II is the first modern use of such a 
tactic.  Because of this, it should no longer be confined to the dustbin of history and ignored by 
social scientists who study terrorism and political violence.  Indeed, the Japanese case study 
presents a fascinating account of how and why an organization pursues this extreme tactic.  
As this chapter demonstrates, the Japanese military adopted the special attack because 
they found themselves in a position of increasing weakness and desperation.  The Americans, 
having soundly defeated the Japanese Imperial Forces at Midway, continued to press on toward 
the Philippines.  This action threatened Japan’s access to the precious war-related material 
resources that the surrounding islands provided.  If Japan failed to defeat the U.S. in the 
Philippines theater, the war effort would suffer a critical blow.  Thus, at the organizational level 
of analysis, the Japanese High Command sought a new tactic that would turn-the-tide of the war 
in Japan’s favor.  Takijiro Onishi’s idea of a special attack unit devised for the sole purpose of 
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ramming Japanese planes into U.S. ships became the tactic that the Japanese High Command 
believed would halt the American advance. 
At the individual level, the diaries left by kamikaze pilots reveal that they were motivated 
by nationalistic and familial sentiments.  They did not want their country nor their loved ones to 
be conquered by the ‘barbaric’ American GIs.  In order to protect their kin and country, the pilots 
embraced Bushido, the ancient warrior ethic of medieval Japan, allowing them to face death with 
courage and bravery.  Additionally, the belief the pilots had that they would see each other again 
at Yasukuni shrine helped them cope with the gravity of the sacrifice their country required them 
to make.  Indeed, the Japanese High Command exploited the pilot’s noble spirit of self-sacrifice 
and used that to create a squadron of flying, human bombs. 
Finally, the kamikaze attacks gained acceptance by the Japanese population largely 
through the indoctrinating efforts of the Ministry of Education.  Since the Meiji restoration, the 
Japanese populace had been fed a healthy dose of a state-created ideology containing a powerful 
mixture of militarism and exceptionalism.  The Japanese people, believing in the sacred qualities 
of their country and their emperor, thought that loyalty to the state was the highest virtue one 
could display.  As a result, the individual was urged to align his individual will with that of the 
state.  When the public learned of the kamikaze attacks, they were hailed as ‘warrior gods’ and 
celebrated as the supreme example of Japan’s fighting spirit. 
This case study is an example of a hierarchical linkage structure amongst the three levels 
of analysis.  As the case study identifies, the main catalyst for the Japanese leadership to adopt 
the special attack squad was the position of weakness that the Japanese armed forces was in.  
Once the decision was made to use the special attacks, the Japanese High Command found itself 
atop of a hierarchical structure that sought to align the will of the individual pilot as well as the 
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Japanese public to supporting the tactic.  In this hierarchical system, there is a fluid compatibility 
amongst each level of analysis.  The Japanese High Command presented those individuals 
chosen for a special attack as an elite group who were dying nobly for their country.  The noble 
sacrifices of the pilots fit nicely into a societal narrative, which subjugated the individual will to 
that of the state’s collective will.  What is interesting is that the individual pilots and the Japanese 
public needed little coaxing to accept the special attack tactic as a result of the state fashioned 
ideology that had been administered by the Ministry of Education.  Thus, before the decision was 
made to use suicide attacks both the individual and societal levels had been primed by the state’s 
ideology. 
What makes the kamikazes a unique historical event is that the tactic was used by one 
nation against another in warfare.  What is of lasting value for social scientists is found in the 
circumstances through which the Japanese High Command adopted the tactic.  Indeed, the 
kamikaze example is a prelude to future instances where a power imbalance exists and an 
organization adopts an extreme method to alter that power imbalance.  
The next chapter of the dissertation investigates the use of suicide attacks when the power 
imbalance is indeed more pronounced.  The case study of the Tamil Tigers and the irregular war 
effort against the Sri Lankan state contains many of the same factors at each level of analysis that 
this chapter on the kamikazes revealed.   
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3.0  SUICIDE ATTACKS IN IRREGULAR WAR:  THE CASE OF THE TAMIL 
TIGERS  
“We will reach the path of the leader 
Who sacrificed himself totally 
We will, as the tigers are known 
For self-sacrifice. 
We will rise as wave after wave 
Looking for a day-break for us. 
To teach that goal, we will 
Sacrifice our lives.  
And become exploding bombs. 
We will tread as Black Tigers 
And attack the enemies. 
We will climb the battlefield and 
Live to see the flowering Eelam.” 
-Vellupillai Pirabakaran, Founder of the LTTE 
 
 
“The Century started by Black Tigers 
Began today. 
On the earth and Sea,  
Mingling with air as air 
And with waves as waves, 
Filling our hearts 
Are the Black Tigers.” 
-Poem read aloud on Black Tiger Commemoration Day, July 5, 2004 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Sri Lanka is a small island about 270 miles long and 150 miles wide located to the east of the 
Indian subcontinent.  It is situated 1500 miles west of the Straits of Malacca and the Sunda Strait, 
the two major gateways to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, making the island accessible to 
European travelers and explorers.  When Portuguese explorers arrived in the sixteenth century, 
they called it the ‘jewel of the Indian Ocean.’  Later in the nineteenth century, the British began 
to cultivate high quality tea and cinnamon, exporting the goods around the world.  At the end of 
World War II, it seemed as though Sri Lanka would emerge as a pillar of democracy in South 
Asia; Sri Lanka adopted the British Parliamentary system, had a large and educated middle class, 
and had a thriving tea and spice trade with Europe and North America.233  All signs indicated 
that the country was on the right path toward establishing a vibrant democracy.  This proved to 
be a mistaken assumption. 
Since 1973, the Sri Lankan Government [SLG] has been engaged in a violent and 
protracted conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE].  The LTTE has emerged 
as one of the deadliest, most proficient and durable terrorist organizations in the world.234  The 
LTTE’s sophistication is such that it became the only terrorist organization in the world with its 
own army, navy and air force.  Additionally, it is the only terrorist organization to boast the 
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assassination of two heads of state.235  Through a violent guerrilla war, the LTTE has 
successfully engaged SLG army forces and repelled an Indian Peacekeeping Force.  The LTTE 
has made suicide attacks a permanent feature of its insurgency strategy.  This chapter seeks to 
answer the following questions:  What is the historical context of the conflict between the SLG 
and the LTTE?  Why did the LTTE choose to adopt suicide attacks?  What motivates LTTE 
suicide attackers, also known as ‘Black Tigers,’ to participate in such an act?  Finally, how is the 
LTTE able to make the attack resonate with the Tamil population?  
The first section of the chapter explores the historical roots of the conflict between the 
LTTE and the SLG.  While it is tempting to look to the early years after Sri Lankan 
independence for the antecedents of the conflict, this tells only part of the story.  Instead, one 
must begin by looking at the resurgence of Buddhism in Sri Lanka during the nineteenth century.  
An anti-Western Buddhist monk named Ankarika Dharmapala [1864-1933] led this resurgence.  
He believed that Western culture and Christianity were corrupting Sri Lanka.  In order to recover 
from this state of weakness, he advocated that the country embrace its Buddhist heritage.  This 
created a strain of Buddhist infused nationalism that would eventually pit the Sinhalese Buddhist 
majority against the Tamil Hindu and Christian minority.  Once Sri Lanka attained 
independence, supporters of this virulent strain of nationalism convinced the nascent Sri Lankan 
government to first marginalize, and later actively discriminate against, the Tamil minority.     
The second section of the chapter chronicles the rise of the Tamil Tigers.  As the SLG 
became more oppressive against the Tamil population, the Tigers emerged as the group best able 
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to engage the SLG militarily.  In this context, the LTTE began to experiment with suicide 
attacks.  This section argues that suicide attacks at first were utilized out of a defensive necessity 
and then later were integrated into the LTTE’s arsenal for offensive use.  The LTTE’s leader, 
Vellupillai Pirabakaran, recognized early on that suicide attacks could be used to offset the Sri 
Lankan Army’s disproportionate possession of heavy weaponry.  As a result, he formed the 
‘Black Tiger Squad,’ which would become the most feared cadre of suicide attackers in the 
world.  The Black Tigers would be used to assassinate heads of state and traitors to the Tamil 
cause as well as to attack fortified Sri Lankan Army [SLA] posts.   
The third section of the chapter investigates the motivations for why one chooses to 
become a Black Tiger.  Unlike Middle Eastern terrorist groups like Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Al 
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade that produce and publish videotapes and writings of their martyrs, the 
LTTE is much more guarded in its release of such information.  Despite the dearth of primary 
source information by Black Tigers themselves, this section finds that Pirabakaran has shrewdly 
created an ideology of martyrdom within the LTTE at large and the Black Tiger units in 
particular.  This ideology of martyrdom is a potent mixture of nationalism and religious 
symbolism, which extols the abandonment of one’s life for the cause of Tamil Eelam [Tamil 
Homeland]. 
The fourth section looks into the factors that have allowed LTTE suicide attacks to 
resonate with the Tamil population in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora.  The section argues that the 
main contributor has been the LTTE’s development of a cult of martyrdom, which exists locally 
in the northern part of Sri Lanka and internationally over the Internet.  Like Pirabakaran’s 
martyrdom ideology, this too draws on nationalistic and religious elements.  To garner support 
for the martyrs, the LTTE sponsors year-round events honoring the memories of the Black 
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Tigers and others who have been martyred fighting for a free Tamil homeland.  These events are 
available to those living in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, at the heart of the LTTE insurgency and to those 
Tamils living in diaspora via the Internet.  As a result, the LTTE Black Tigers are the first cadre 
of suicide attackers that have both a local and global support base.   
 
3.2 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS:  A RESURGENT BUDDHISM  
When speaking of the historical roots of the Sri Lankan conflict, David Little notes, “it is 
frequently asserted…that the Sri Lankan civil war between the Sinhala majority, which is mostly 
Buddhist, and the Tamil minority, which is overwhelmingly Hindu, has nothing to do with 
religion.  That is supposed to be true…because the conflict can be shown not to be about disputes 
over religion.”236  The scholarly champion of this viewpoint is Robert Pape, who argues that the 
struggle between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE is mainly one between competing 
nationalisms.237  On the surface, this is true.  Tamil nationalism fuels the LTTE’s desire to create 
an independent and autonomous Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka.  Similarly, Sinhala 
nationalism prompts the SLG to deny the LTTE’s claim since it wants to keep the entire state 
intact.  The problem with this explanation is that it forcibly separates ethnicity and religion, 
which, as David Little notes, produces a view that ignores and distorts crucial historical 
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realities.238  Specifically, it ignores the crucial fact that Buddhism became the source for 
Sinhalese nationalism.239  Indeed, a resurgent, racist and xenophobic Buddhist nationalism laid 
the groundwork for the terrible confrontation between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka.  How 
this virulent nationalism evolved will now be explored.   
 
3.2.1 Buddhism and Sri Lanka 
Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka over 2,200 years ago and remains the religion professed 
by 70% of the island’s population.240  A sacred Buddhist text called the Mahavasma depicts how 
Buddhism came to Sri Lanka.  According to it, the Buddha foresaw the demise of Buddhism in 
India, the religion’s birthplace.  He wanted to establish a stronghold for the nascent faith, and 
thus created the Sinhalese race, sending it to inhabit Sri Lanka.  A great Sinhalese prince name 
Duttugemunu went to Sri Lanka to conquer the island and prepare it for Buddhism’s arrival.  
When he arrived, he found a flourishing Tamil kingdom to the north under the rule of a king 
named Elaru.  Duttugemunu, armed with a spear containing a relic of the Buddha embedded in 
its tip, traveled north to crush the Tamil kingdom.241  The battle between the two yielded a 
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stalemate and had to be decided in a one-on-one battle between the two rulers.  Duttugemunu 
and Elaru, each mounted on a great elephant, attacked one another.  Duttugemunu and his 
magical spear defeated Elaru and the island was claimed as the newfound home for Buddhism.  
After the battle, the Mahavamsa has Duttugemunu declaring that it was “not for glory but for 
religion [that I] wage[d] this battle.”242  After the fall of the Tamil kingdom, a sapling of the 
Bodhi Tree, the tree under which Buddha attained Enlightenment, was sent to Sri Lanka.   
The Sinhalese, which means ‘people of the lion,’ believe themselves to be the defenders 
of Buddhism, which they have done since the 2nd century BC.  Despite flaws in the historical 
accuracy of the Mahavamsa, historian K.M. de Silva notes, “Buddhism became the bedrock of 
the culture and civilization of the island…[and was] the main influence shaping the outlook of 
the masses of the people.”243  After the religion’s arrival in Sri Lanka, it enjoyed a type of 
‘Golden Age’ as it spread over the country.244  Buddhist monasteries were established in the 
southern part of the island, making it an important center for Buddhist learning.  During this 
time, the Mahavamsa inspired the belief that Sri Lanka was a nation brought into being for the 
sole purpose of propagating Buddhism became ingrained in the Sinhalese mindset.245  The link 
between Buddhism and the Sinhalese race had been forged during the almost two centuries when 
Buddhism had little external competition from other religions.  This changed upon the arrival of 
European explorers who brought Christianity with them.  
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3.2.2 The Christian Challenge and Buddhist Revivalism   
The disestablishment of Buddhism began with the arrival of the Europeans and their variants of 
the Christian faith.  The Portuguese brought Roman Catholicism came to Sri Lanka in 1587, 
followed by the Dutch with their Reformed Protestantism in 1638 and the British with their 
Anglicanism in 1796.246  When the British secured the island from the Dutch, they opened it to 
Anglican missionaries.  The Anglican missionaries created many schools and taught English 
along with their version of Christianity.  Many Tamils attended the missionary schools and 
learned English giving them a distinct advantage over their Sinhalese counterparts whose 
Buddhist run schools did not teach English.  Their English-language abilities made employment 
with the British civil service more likely because entry to the civil service was based on 
examinations administered in English.  
 The Buddhist monks [bhikkhus] became worried when the British began to help Christian 
missionaries establish a new system of church-run schools in Sri Lanka while withdrawing all 
government support to Buddhist schools.247  Christian evangelism and the establishment of 
Christian schools prompted many Buddhist monks to believe that the British wanted to sever the 
connection between Sri Lankan and Buddhism.  The Buddhist monks were offended by what 
they believed to be Christian denigration of their culture and their religion.  The Christian 
missionaries conducted an aggressive proselytization campaign by releasing public documents 
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seeking to disprove and denigrate Buddhism.  The bhikkhus were alarmed at the proliferation of 
pamphlets distributed by Christian missionaries exhorting the people to discard and abandon 
their Buddhist superstitions and to embrace Christianity.248  The bhikkhus began to see 
Christianity as a threat because they believed that the British wanted to replace Buddhism with 
Christianity as the foundation for Sri Lanka.  This prompted a Buddhist convert named Don 
David Hewaviratne to argue that Sri Lanka needed to return its Buddhist roots before their 
religion disappeared.  
 Don David Hewaviratne was not born a Buddhist.  He had attended an Anglican school 
sponsored by the British government and learned English.  He became convinced of the need to 
revive Buddhism in Sri Lanka after a visit to a sacred Buddhist shrine.  He saw the shrine close 
to ruin and under the control of the British government.  As Robert Bond notes, he then “vowed 
beneath the Bodhi Tree to rescue Buddhism from neglect.”249  Converting to Buddhism and 
changing his name to Anagarika Dharmapala, which means ‘protector of the Dharma,’ he argued 
that the people of Sri Lanka needed to reclaim their Sinhalese Buddhist roots and traditions. 
Dharmapala linked Buddhism with nationalism as he sought to revive the great tradition 
espoused by the Mahavamsa.  He called on the Sinhalese people to become patriots “for the 
preservation of our nation, our literature, our land, and our most glorious religion at whose 
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source our forefathers drank deep for nearly seventy generations.”250  He believed that 
reestablishing Buddhism and Buddhist values would enable the Sinhalese to reestablish the 
glorious civilization that had existed in antiquity that was “free from foreign influences…with 
the word of Buddha as their guiding light.”251 
 To achieve his goal of recapturing Buddhism for Sri Lanka, Dharmapala obtained the 
help of Col. Henry Olcott.  Olcott, the founder of the Theosophical Movement, came to know 
Dharmapala during the former’s trip to Sri Lanka to mount a public campaign against 
Christianity.252  Dharmapala discussed with Olcott how Western culture and Christianity had 
tainted Sinhalese culture and society.  Dharmapala told Olcott “he saw how the influence of [the] 
missionaries had eaten into the vitals of the [Sinhalese] people and was corroding all that was 
noblest in their national character.”253  He went on to say that ‘the sweet, tender, gentle Aryan 
children of an ancient historical race are sacrificed at the altar of the whiskey-drinking, beef-
eating, belly-god of [Christian] heathenism.’254 In order to combat Christianity, Dharmapala and 
Olcott devised a number of public debates between Christian missionaries and Buddhist monks.  
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The Buddhist monks who debated the Christians had a nuanced understanding of Buddhism and 
were well versed in Christian theology.255  In front of large audiences, the monks called into 
question such theological concepts as the Trinity, theodicy, transubstantiation, consubstantiation 
and original sin.  The Christian missionaries chosen to debate the Buddhist monks did not have 
sufficient theological training about Christian doctrine and little to none about Buddhism.  The 
debates were a major success for Dharmapala, which, in turn, helped cultivate a nationalism 
grounded in religion and race.  This religo-racial nationalism would become a powerful force 
after Sri Lanka obtained its independence from the British.  
 
 
3.2.3 Language: Another Element of Buddhist Nationalism  
After Sri Lankan independence in 1948, a group of influential Buddhist monks under the name 
of the ‘Buddhist Committee of Inquiry’ published a report entitled ‘The Betrayal of Buddhism.’  
The report’s purpose was to “inquire into the present state of Buddhism in Ceylon and to report 
on the conditions necessary to improve and strengthen the position of Buddhism, and the means 
whereby those conditions may be fulfilled.’256  Not surprisingly, the report argued that Sri Lanka 
was losing its Buddhist heritage and advocated that ‘education in Ceylon today should be 
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oriented towards the bringing forth of a generation with an intimate awareness of its national 
language [Sinhala], history and culture and capable of enriching that national heritage.’257  In 
order to accomplish this goal, the report advocated that Buddhism should be the country’s 
national religion and that Sinhala should replace English as the national language so that 
Buddhist values could be easily transmitted.  The report added yet another dimension to the 
growing nationalism, language. 
 As aforementioned, the British left a government and civil service that operated in 
English.  Official government documents were printed in English and the key to obtaining 
employment with the government was a strong command of the English language.  The Buddhist 
monks wanted to shift from English as the medium of governmental administration to Sinhala, 
which was the native language of the Sinhalese population.  The monks argued that since 
approximately 74% of the population was Sinhalese and spoke Sinhala, it was only logical that 
an independent Sri Lanka utilize the language of the majority population.258  The Tamils were 
worried about this proposal since they did not speak Sinhalese.  They also saw this as a threat to 
the positions they had been able to obtain as a result of their ability to learn English.  This 
created much concern amongst the Tamil population and Tamil leaders like G.G. Pannambalam 
tried to persuade the new Sri Lankan government not to institute the change recommended by the 
monks.259  The Tamils were able to delay the statewide implementation of Sinhala for a few 
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years, but the 1956 candidacy of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike for Prime Minister of Sri Lanka 
threatened to change this. 
1956 was a watershed year for the newly independent country.  Indeed, it was a year of 
great expectations because it marked the 2500th year since the death of Buddha and the 
concomitant arrival of Buddhism to Sri Lanka.  Taking advantage of this, S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike ran a campaign seeking to restore Buddhism to its rightful place in Sri Lanka.  
Central to his platform was that, if elected, he would pass a bill making Sinhala the official and 
sole language of Sri Lanka.  This made his candidacy extremely attractive to the nationalistic 
Buddhist clergy, which in turn helped him get elected.  The victory of Bandaranaike in 1956 saw 
the introduction of a new fundamentalist and militant Buddhism advocating the takeover of 
denominational schools to reduce the power of the Christian missionaries, the compulsory 
teaching of Buddhism in state schools, and establishing Sinhala as the official language of Sri 
Lanka.260 Bandaranaike adeptly understood the power of language as an aspect of group identity 
and capitalized on it to get elected.  He won the support of the Buddhist monks who warned the 
Sinhala population of the “danger that would befall the Buddhist religion and the Sinhalese 
tradition if Sinhala were allowed to fall into decay under the powerful influences of English and 
Tamil.”261  The Tamils saw the election of Bandaranaike and his United National Party [UNP] as 
a threat.  They questioned whether the Tamil language and culture would be preserved under the 
                                                 
260 Ganath Obeyesekere, “The Origins and Institutionalization of Political Violence,” in James Manor, ed. 
Sri Lanka In Change and Crisis, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 157.  
261 Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1987), 43 
  104 
leadership of someone who was an advocate for the primacy of Sinhala.  Their worst fears were 
realized in the days after Bandaranaike’s election. 
 
3.2.4 Tamil Discrimination: Language, Education and a New Constitution  
Keeping his campaign promise, Bandaranaike enacted into law the ‘Official Language Act No. 
33 of 1956.’  This act made Sinhala the official language of Sri Lanka.  All government business 
and affairs would be recorded in Sinhala, courts would only use Sinhala, and government 
officials faced the choice of either having to learn Sinhala or losing their position. Additionally, 
the act “marked the end of the political control exercised by the westernized, English-speaking 
elite, including Tamils, in all spheres of life in Sri Lanka and symbolized the end of foreign 
domination of Sri Lanka.”262  Tamil leaders believed that the Sinhala-Only language policy 
would lead to forced assimilation and the loss of the Tamil language and culture.  They 
responded by lobbying the Bandaranaike government to include a provision recognizing Tamil, 
at the very least, in the northern areas of the island where the majority of the Tamil population 
lived.  Bandaranaike rejected these overtures.  
 The Sinhala Only act also functioned as a way to help Sinhalese gain employment in the 
government, which had been monopolized by the Tamils due to their mastery of English.  
Indeed, “although the Sinhalese were about six times more numerous than the Ceylon Tamils, 
the selective Ceylon Service employed nearly half as many Tamils as Sinhalese, and the Judicial 
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Service had two-thirds as many Tamils as Sinhalese.”263  The establishment of Sinhalese was an 
effort to make the Sinhalese people more competitive against their Tamil counterparts.  With the 
passage of the act, the Tamils in the government saw the future prospects for their advancement 
quickly disappearing. 
 For the Tamils, the Sinhala Only act presented a threat to the very existence of the Tamil 
minority.  The ruling party and the nationalistic Buddhist clergy who advised Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike were attacking their language, culture and heritage.  Tamil politicians decided to 
use satyagraha [peaceful protest] in the Gandhian tradition to protest the Sinhalese Only Act.  On 
June 5, 1956, peaceful protestors congregated outside of the Parliament complex located in 
Colombo, the capital city of Sri Lanka.  The Tamils intended to raise awareness about their 
plight by meditating and fasting from morning until sundown.  After a few hours, a crowd of 
Sinhalese people led by Buddhist monks staged a counter protest.  Only a few minutes passed 
before the counter protestors attacked the non-violent protestors.  As Neil DeVotta notes, “the 
satyagrahis were beaten and pelted with stones; at least one Tamil was thrown into the nearby 
Beira lake, and another had an ear bitten and torn off. The police…stood by as passive observers, 
having been given explicit orders not to intervene unless they themselves were attacked.”264  
Upon learning of the violence, Bandaranaike appeared and addressed the stunned Tamil crowd 
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telling them to disperse and go home.  When the protestors refused, the police then used fire 
hoses to drive them from the area.265 
 After the riot, it is fair to say that Bandaranaike realized he had unleashed a potent and 
violent nationalism driven by religion, ethnicity, and language.  To his credit, he attempted to 
reign in the very nationalism he released.  Going to the Sri Maha Bodhia shrine, the most holy 
shrine in Sri Lanka,266 he made this appeal: ‘Let it not be said, to the eternal disgrace of 
Buddhism as well as Ceylon, that the Sinhalese, the chosen people of the Buddha, have done 
harm and injury to our Tamil brothers.  To the non-Sinhalese and non-Buddhists I say, ‘Bear 
with us, have faith in us, and join hands with us, so that we united can lead our land to peace, 
prosperity and success.’267  Bandaranaike went on to argue that Tamil grievances should be 
accommodated.  To this end, he made the following four exceptions to the Sinhala-Only Act. 
First, the Tamils had the right to be educated in their common tongue.  Second, civil service 
examinations would be given in Tamil.  Third, Tamil correspondence with state and local 
government institutions would be returned in Tamil.  Finally, local authorities could use Tamil to 
conduct business with the Colombo government.268  While the Tamils were relieved by these 
overtures, the Buddhist factions that helped elect Bandaranaike believed them to be a betrayal 
tantamount to treason. 
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Bandaranaike attempted to pass these accommodations in legislation entitled ‘The Tamil 
Language Special Provision Act.’  Immediately, his Buddhist support base verbally denounced 
him.  Bandaranaike noted, “every kind of opprobrious epithet has been flung at me.  Sinhalese 
anonymous letters have come to me [saying] that I have been a traitor to the Sinhalese 
people…All types of things have been said.  They are all wanting to bump me off.”269  The 
prime minister’s prediction proved correct.  In September 1959, a Buddhist monk named 
Talduwe Somarama came to Bandaranaike’s home dressed in the official saffron robes under the 
guise to discuss alternatives to the new course of action the prime minister had chosen to take.  
As the monk approached, the prime minister made the customary bow that is done when greeting 
a Buddhist monk.270  As he prostrated himself, the monk shot the prime minister at point-blank 
range with a revolver.  The wave of Buddhist nationalism that swept Bandaranaike to power 
ultimately cost him his life.  The assassination reveals just how much political power the 
Buddhist monks had acquired and the extent to which they would go to ensure that their vision of 
a Sinhalese-Buddhist Sri Lanka remained intact. 
With the death of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, his widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, assumed 
the helm as prime minister.271  To assuage her Buddhist support base, she vowed to take an even 
tougher stance on the Tamils than did her husband.  She wasted little time as she began to 
overhaul the education system in Sri Lanka.  In 1973, her government introduced an affirmative 
action policy to “adjust the ethnic balance in university admissions as a measure for correcting 
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disparities in marking standards between different subjects and different media and as a way to 
compensate for the unequal provision of facilities to different groups.”272  Essentially, she 
introduced a discriminatory policy against Tamil students, which gave Sinhalese applicants a 
weighted score when applying for university admissions.  For example, the qualifying mark for 
admission to the medical faculty was 250 out of 400 for Tamil students.  For Sinhalese students, 
however, the mark was reduced to 229.273  As K.M. de Silva notes, “students sitting for the 
examinations in the same language, but belonging to two ethnic groups, had different qualifying 
marks.”274  The university quotas were distributed in the following manner:  72% of university 
spots were held for Sinhalese students, 11% for Jaffna Tamils, 9% for Indian born Tamils and 
2% for other minorities.275  The implementation of a strict quota system not only made it harder 
for Tamil students to gain admission to university, but it also negatively impacted their prospects 
for obtaining employment.  Indeed, in 1949, Tamils made up 41% of the government workforce.  
By the mid-1980’s, the Sinhalese held 85% of all public sector jobs, 82% of technical and 
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professional positions, and 83% managerial and administrative positions.276  Simply put, Tamil 
youth were being squeezed out of the university and the workforce. 
Immediately following the university quotas, Ms. Bandaranaike submitted a new 
constitution for consideration in 1972.  The new constitution enshrined the Sinhala-Only Act 
making Sinhala the official language of the island.  In addition, the assumption that the state was 
secular had vanished as the constitution conferred a special status to Buddhism.  In one telling 
clause, the constitution states, “it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.’277  
Buddhism thus became the official state religion of Sri Lanka and it would receive the financial 
and political support of the state.  Moreover, Ms. Bandaranaike’s constitution eliminated 
protection for minority groups.  Gone was the clause in the previous constitution stating that 
‘Parliament has no right to enact legislation which would confer an undue advantage to a race, 
religion or community.’278  Finally, the new constitution declared that the country would no 
longer be called Sri Lanka but would go by ‘Ceylon,’ which was the ancient Sinhalese name for 
the country used in the Mahavamsa.  Reacting to the active and blatant discrimination of Ms. 
Bandaranaike’s government, the Tamil opposition party, called the Tamil United Front [TUF], 
decided to hold a protest on March 22, 1973. 
The protest began in Jaffna and was led by S.J. V. Chelvanayakam the leader of the TUF 
who was committed to the Gandhian method of ahimsa [non-violence].  He believed that the 
Tamils could compel the Colombo government through satyagraha to grant them equal rights the 
                                                 
276 Ibid. 
277 1972 Sri Lanka constitution quoted in Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in 
Sri Lanka, 56.  
278 1972 Sri Lanka constitution quoted in Ibid.  
  110 
same way that the Indians used this tactic against the British.  Thousands of Tamils marched to 
Jaffna on the day that a number of Ms. Bandaranaike’s cabinet ministers were scheduled to 
arrive.  The group of Tamils sat in the streets, preventing the ministers from going into the city.  
Ms. Bandaranaike, claiming emergency powers, sent in police to round up and arrest the 
protestors.  The police violently confronted the protestors, beating hundreds and killing five 
Tamil students.279   
The violent government response made many Tamils, especially the younger student 
population, disillusioned with Gandhian methods of non-violent civil disobedience.  In the mind 
of one Tamil student, Vellupillai Pirabakaran, the Sinhalese government could only be persuaded 
with force.  While Chelvanayakam tried to convince the Tamil youth to be patient with the non-
violent struggle, Pirabakaran quickly realized that their Sinhala Buddhist adversaries were not 
like Britain’s government in India.  To that end, Pirabakaran and many in the Tamil community 
abandoned the Gandhian non-violent struggle and were ready to try the Churchillian path of 
‘blood, toil, tears, and sweat.’280  This event marked the birth of the Tamil militant movement, 
which would later erupt into a violent insurgency against the SLG.  
3.3 SUICIDE ATTACKS AND THE LTTE  
Pirabakaran was convinced that non-violent resistance was failing.  He believed the Tamils 
should assert their fundamental right of self-determination, the right of one nation to secede and 
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form a state of its own, in order to prevent the ‘Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinists’ from crushing 
the Tamil freedom movement.281  He and a small band of Tamil students came together to form 
the Tamil Student Federation [TSF], which was renamed the Tamil New Tigers [TNT] in 1972 
and later the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] in 1976.282  This section investigates the 
rise of the LTTE and why the organization decided to use suicide attacks.  Simply put, the LTTE 
adopted suicide attacks out of a defensive necessity.  Pirabakaran believed that the tactic would 
offset the military imbalances that existed between the LTTE and the SLA.  What Pirabakaran 
discovered was a powerful offensive weapon that could be used to achieve a variety of strategic 
aims.  He then decided to create the Black Tiger cadre, the mysterious and much feared suicide 
squad of the LTTE.  During the years 1987-2004, the LTTE became the world’s most prolific 
user of suicide attacks.  Additionally, the LTTE became an innovating force behind the tactic as 
Pirabakaran sought out new ways to conduct suicide attacks.  Ultimately, this would lead to the 
most drastic innovation yet, the inclusion of women in suicide attacks.  
 
3.3.1 Beginnings of an Insurgency 
On July 27, 1975, the LTTE committed its first act of violence by assassinating the Jaffna 
Mayor, Alfred Duriappah, who Pirabakaran considered to be sympathetic with Ms. 
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Bandaranaike’s government.  According to a government report, four young men, including 
Pirabakaran, ambushed the mayor as he was leaving his car to enter a Hindu temple.  
Supposedly, it was Pirabakaran himself who shot the mayor.283  Anti-Tamil violence flared up 
after the assassination, which was one of many such acts perpetrated by the LTTE.  The LTTE 
then participated in a number of bank robberies in order to secure funds to finance the 
burgeoning movement.  After the bank robberies, Sri Lankan President Jayewardene declared a 
state of emergency and sent the SLA to occupy Jaffna.  Additionally, Jayewardene passed the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which gave the government and internal security forces 
special privileges when dealing with Tamil separatists.  According to William McGowan, it 
allowed government forces 
 
“…to deny trial by jury, to make confessions under torture admissible evidence, and to detain 
suspects without trial or access to counsel for up to eighteen months on suspicion alone. It also 
banned the expression of sentiments and opinions that could cause religious, racial, or communal 
disharmony, authorized stop and seizure at will, authorized arrest without a warrant, and banned 
support, espousal, or financial backing for separatists causes.  In addition, its powers were 
retroactive.  Basically, the PTA suspended civil government and fundamental rights and 
substituted police and military rule.”284 
 
Also hidden in the PTA was an old provision resurrected from colonial times dealing with the 
prevention of disease.  This provision, dubbed ‘Emergency Regulation 15A,’ allowed the 
security forces to dispose of corpses without a postmortem inquest, thus allowing them to kill 
civilians or guerrilla suspects and burn their bodies on the spot without reporting the deaths to 
government officials.285  The effects of the PTA did little to curb Tamil militancy.  As Mia 
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Bloom notes, “rather than mitigate the occurrences of violence, the PTA escalated Tamil 
violence in the 1980’s, and additional repressive counter measures of the government led to a 
spiral of increasing brutality and tit for tat violence.”286  The PTA prompted the LTTE to adopt 
higher profile targets.  One attack that would cause outrage occurred in 1983 when the LTTE 
attacked a group of Sinhalese soldiers. 
On July 23, 1983, an army jeep carrying SLA army soldiers was ambushed by the LTTE 
outside of Jaffna.  When the thirteen dead soldiers were brought back to Colombo for a 
collective funeral the next day, a large crowd gathered to pay their respects.  After the funeral the 
crowd left the cemetery and began to attack Tamil shops and properties in the surrounding 
neighborhood.  As Jonathan Spencer notes, “much of it [the violence] was the work of relatively, 
small, well-organized groups of men, methodically identifying Tamil properties from electoral 
lists and systematically setting fire to them.   But this routinized destruction was punctuated by 
moments of panic and frenzy in which innocent Tamils were set upon, beaten, killed, [and] in 
same cases burnt alive.”287  As the Times of London reported, unlike earlier riots “the 
Government detected plain signs of deliberate organization.  The rioters, seeking out Tamil 
homes and burning them, had a particularly detailed knowledge of who lived where and who 
owned what.”288  Indeed, the violence produced three days of chaos as Sri Lanka was reduced to 
the Hobbesian state of ‘a war of all against all.’  As the chaos continued, a group of fifty-three 
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Tamils, who were incarcerated in a Colombo jail under the PTA for ‘terrorist activities,’ were 
summarily executed in retaliation.  The SLG told the public that a group of outraged Sinhalese 
prisoners killed the Tamil prisoners.  While this is plausible, suspicions arose suggesting that the 
prison guards murdered the Tamil inmates.289   
The riots marked a major breakdown in law and order.  Also disturbing were stories that 
police and SLA soldiers were involved in the violence against innocent Tamil civilians.  The 
Times of London stated that SLA “personnel actively encouraged arson and looting of [Tamil] 
business establishments and homes in Colombo and absolutely no action was taken to apprehend 
or prevent the crucial elements involved in these activities.”290  Other stories suggesting that 
SLA soldiers had raped Tamil women began to proliferate.  In the end, the SLG claimed that 
some 350 Tamils were killed, but other estimates place the number dead over 1,000.291 The 
official response by the SLG did little to alleviate Tamil concerns.  Prime Minister Jayewardene 
released a statement stating, “Sri Lanka is inherently and rightfully a Sinhalese state…and it 
must be accepted as such, not a matter of opinion to be debated.  For attempting to challenge this 
premise, Tamils have brought the wrath of [the] Sinhalese on their own heads; they have 
themselves to blame.”292  The violence and the prime minister’s statement faulting the Tamil 
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community with the violence prompted many Tamils to leave Colombo and travel north to 
Jaffna.  Indeed, after the riots the Tamil population had lost faith in the SLG and did not believe 
it would protect them.  The influx of Tamils into Jaffna saw the LTTE’s ranks swell and also 
marked the beginning of a violent insurgency campaign against the SLG.293 
After the 1983 riots, the LTTE received an outpouring of support from the Tamil 
population living in India.294  Pirabakaran capitalized on the sympathy from his Indian brethren 
and established training camps in Tamil Nadu.295  More importantly, Pirabakaran and the LTTE 
received guerrilla and military training from India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).296  
Indira Gandhi turned a blind-eye to the LTTE training camp in Tamil Nadu largely for political 
reasons as she was relying on the Tamil vote for her election campaign.  As a result, from 1983-
1987, the LTTE were trained, armed, financed and directed by the RAW.297   
The RAW helped the LTTE become a formidable fighting force.  The RAW instructed 
the Tigers in the use of weapons for low intensity warfare.  They became proficient with large 
caliber machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, grenades, and large caliber mortar shells.298  
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The RAW also helped the LTTE gain an important capability, the ability to produce explosives.  
The LTTE capitalized on this ability as they began to use landmines with a ferocious intensity.  
The most powerful mines they developed were 55 gallon barrels filled with 50-150 kilograms of 
explosives.  These were placed in culverts under roads and ignited by wires from a nearby house 
when SLA soldiers would drive by.299 
As the LTTE became a more formidable insurgent force, the SLG stepped up its efforts to 
eliminate it.  In 1983, the SLG established an economic blockade that made food and raw 
materials, used primarily for weaponry, harder to obtain.300  In 1987, the SLG launched an 
offensive entitled Operation Liberation, which was designed to take back the now LTTE-
controlled Jaffna Peninsula.  Despite protests by India, the SLG launched the offensive on May 
26, 1987.  Due to superior firepower and sheer numbers, the SLA was able to capture 
Vadamarachchi, which was known as “the cradle of the Tamil Eelam liberation struggle.”301  
The capture of Vadamarachchi was a strategic victory for the SLG as it cut off the LTTE from 
India’s Tamil Nadu.  According to Asoka Bandarage, “at this point, only Jaffna…and the nearby 
area remained, and they appeared about to fall.  It looked like the LTTE would be defeated and 
the armed conflict would end.  Operation Liberation is said to have come within a hair’s breadth 
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of capturing Pirabakaran who was in Vadamarachchi.”302  With the situation turning desperate, 
Pirabakaran turned to suicide attacks as a way to halt the SLA advance on Jaffna.  
 
3.3.2 The First Suicide Attack and the India-LTTE Skirmish  
According to legend, Pirabakaran “was supposedly influenced into using suicide bombers by 
watching a Hollywood movie that depicted a woman blowing herself up and assassinating a 
world leader.”303  Anecdotal evidence aside, the most probable influence on Pirabakaran was the 
devastating use of suicide attackers by Hizbollah against American and French forces in 1983.  
As Shanaka Jayasekara notes, LTTE operatives had received training form Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations like Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and it is 
likely that LTTE operatives were in Palestine when the Hizbollah attack occurred.304  Indeed, the 
first suicide attack by the LTTE is almost a carbon copy of the Hizbollah attack. 
On July 5, 1987 an LTTE member known as Captain Millar drove a truck filled with 
explosives into an SLA camp stationed at a former college in Nelliady, located in the north of the 
Jaffna peninsula.  Like Hizbollah’s simultaneous attacks against U.S. and French forces, the 
explosive laden truck was a ‘land torpedo’ that was driven into the barracks.  After the truck 
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exploded, the LTTE emerged from the jungle catching SLA soldiers unaware and quickly took 
the camp.  This was a major victory for the Tigers as they destroyed the main SLA 
telecommunications center, which had been relaying critical military intelligence to the SLG.305   
According to one former Tamil Tiger, the attack was driven out of desperation.  Up until 
that point, the “Tamils had no power with regards to the SLA.  No power with regards to the 
military.  The members [of the LTTE] were ready to sacrifice their lives in any way needed.306  
As Stephen Hopgood notes, “this single attack was hugely effective, shocking the Sri Lankan 
government and stopping a major army offensive, Operation Liberation, in its tracks.”307  The 
attack also prompted the Indian government to send a peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka with the 
purpose of brokering a peace deal between the LTTE and the SLG. 
On July 29, 1987, some three weeks after Captain Millar’s suicide attack, the Sri Lankan 
Tamils and the LTTE welcomed the arrival of the India Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).  At Indian’s 
behest, the LTTE and the SLG met and signed the ‘Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace 
and Normalcy in Sri Lanka.’  Indian troops were brought to Sri Lanka in order to enforce a 
cease-fire so that the SLG and LTTE could participate in negotiations.  The terms of the accord 
were as follows:  the LTTE and SLA were to immediately cease hostilities; there would be a 
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temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces thereby creating one ‘Tamil province’; 
the SLG would allow the Tamils to introduce a system of provincial councils for the devolution 
of power to the new Tamil province; finally India would provide military assistance to Sri Lanka 
for the implementation of the accord.308  On paper, the agreement appeared promising, but that 
would change in due course. 
Three months after the IPKF’s arrival, the LTTE believed that the SLG was not holding 
to its end of the bargain.  At issue was the establishment of the autonomous provincial councils, 
which should have given the Tamils a measure of self-government.  However, in practice the 
SLG still had wide ranging power to nullify what the provincial councils had established.  On 
October 1, 1987, thirteen LTTE members staged a demonstration against the IPKF and were 
arrested and brought to Colombo for questioning.  Rather than be questioned, the captured Tigers 
committed suicide by swallowing the cyanide capsules that every LTTE member wears around 
his or her neck.309  The LTTE believed that the IPKF was reneging on its agreement to be 
impartial brokers.  As a result, the LTTE declared the ceasefire null-and-void.  On October 2, 
one day after the incident, the LTTE captured nine Sinhalese soldiers, executed them and hung 
their bodies near the Jaffna university campus.310  A few days later on October 8, the LTTE 
targeted and killed five Indian commandos.  This began a violent campaign between the LTTE 
and the IPKF.  
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Rajiv Gandhi launched ‘Operation Pawan [Wind],’ in order to recapture Jaffna and 
subdue the LTTE.  The counter-insurgency methods practiced by the IPKF mimicked those done 
by the SLG, which included harsh interrogations, torture, and executions.  All this had the effect 
of completely alienating the Tamil population and increasing the LTTE’s popularity in Jaffna.  
The IPKF’s attempt to disarm the LTTE by force proved futile.  Both the IPKF and LTTE 
suffered heavy causalities, but Rajiv Gandhi never anticipated the ferocity of the fighting that 
ensued.  At its height, the IPKF had between 75,000-100,000 troops in Sri Lanka and yet they 
could not pacify the LTTE.  The LTTE was much more adept at fighting a guerrilla war than the 
IPKF was at conducting a counterinsurgency.   
With causalities mounting, the IPKF “soon found that popularity and gratitude are the 
most ephemeral of political commodities; and that intruding foreign armies are hailed as 
liberators, only to be denounced, within a very short time, as arrogant and bumbling invaders.”311  
In 1989, Gandhi announced that IPKF forces would withdraw from Sri Lanka.  As Asoka 
Bandarage notes, “the Indian Army, the fourth largest in the world, departed in humiliation, 
leaving behind a trail of death and destruction.”312  On March 24, 1990, the last of the forces left 
Sri Lanka.  The peacekeeping force cost US$1.25 billion and 1,555 Indian lives and failed to 
eliminate the Tamil Tigers.313 
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It is intriguing to note that during this time period, the LTTE used no suicide attacks 
against the IPKF.  There are three potential explanations for why this is so.  First, it is possible 
that Pirabakaran had not developed a comprehensive motivating rationale that could inspire 
recruits to become suicide attackers.  While all LTTE members carried the cyanide capsule, this 
was largely a defensive measure used by the LTTE to prevent captured operatives from revealing 
critical information to the SLG.  In this view, Pirabakaran had yet to create a potent ideology that 
would foster a willingness to die that was offensive not merely defensive in nature.314  Second, 
the LTTE was no longer in the precarious situation as it had been when the SLA was close to 
taking Jaffna.  In this view, the LTTE probably believed that it could engage the IPKF militarily 
in a guerrilla war, which would slowly wear the IPKF down to the point where they would be 
forced to withdraw.  Finally, it is plausible that the IPKF camps were simply better fortified and 
protected thereby preventing a Captain Millar type of suicide attack from occurring.315 
Each explanation is plausible and the reality is that the decision of the LTTE to not use 
suicide attacks during this time is probably a combination of all three.  The LTTE would return 
to the tactic in 1990 as a way to target SLA bases and assassinate leaders who were either threats 
to an independent Tamil Eelam or traitors to the cause.  It is during this period of time that the 
LTTE developed the Black Tiger cadre and experimented with different ways to deliver the 
suicide attacker.  
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3.3.3 The Black Tigers and the Innovation of Suicide Attacks  
There is some discrepancy as to when the LTTE actually established the Black Tiger squad.  
While official LTTE documents claim that it was created in 1983, other scholars like Mia Bloom 
put its creation at 1987.316  Regardless of when it was created, from 1983-2004 the LTTE Black 
Tigers perpetrated the most suicide attacks of any single terrorist organization in the world.  
Unlike Islamist terrorist organizations that keep their suicide attackers separate from the 
organization and in isolation, the Black Tigers are drawn from the ranks of LTTE.  Every LTTE 
fighter undergoes a three month type of ‘basic training’ in which he or she is instructed in 
guerrilla warfare tactics, which include, but are not limited to:  intelligence and 
counterintelligence, weapons handling, ambush, camouflage, escape and evasion tactics.317 
During this time, candidates have to prove their dedication to the cause of Tamil Eelam and 
demonstrate a strong spirit of self-sacrifice.318  After the recruit completes this process and 
becomes an LTTE member, he or she must make an individual choice to become a Black Tiger.   
According to Karikalan, an LTTE commander in Jaffna, the process to become a Black 
Tiger is as follows:  “To become Black Tigers, our cadre must apply in writing to our leader, Mr. 
Vellupillai Pirabakaran.  [Pirabakaran] then goes through the applications, looking at the 
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applicant’s particular skills, the kinds of missions he or she has been involved in, their 
motivations and their family situations.  Are they an only son or daughter?  Do they have 
dependents?  All these things are considered, after which the applicant is told whether he [or she] 
can become a Black Tiger.”319   
After Pirabakaran reviews the letters, he sends responses back to the applicants.  As Amy 
Waldman notes, more often than not the applicant is rejected with a letter saying, “[t]here are 
many applicants.  Do what duties are sent to you.  If the necessity arises we’ll call you.”320  
Those who are selected to become Black Tigers undergo more physical and psychological 
training.  Another LTTE commander named Thamilini notes that the Black Tigers are “strong in 
spirit and firm in purpose.”321  She goes on to say that “people dejected in life won’t be able to 
go as Black Tigers.  There must be a clear conception of why and for what we are fighting.  A 
deep humanitarianism is very necessary—a love of others, for the people.”322   
Due to the elaborate process by which one becomes a Black Tiger, speculation that the 
Black Tigers are forced into becoming suicide attackers is implausible.  Forcing someone to be a 
Black Tiger, according to Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, “would run counter to [the] LTTE’s 
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philosophy and probably in its eyes weaken its fighting strength.”323  He argues that “[i]ts 
soldiers have to be committed, and they do not trust in the run-of-the-mill Jaffna man to be that.  
It is actually an honour to be a member of the LTTE [Black Tigers], and this membership is not 
open to everybody.”324  To this end, there is a mystique surrounding the Black Tiger squad.  
Even after the Black Tiger successfully completes his or her training, no LTTE member, outside 
of Pirabakaran and his closest advisors, knows that the person is a Black Tiger.  The Black Tiger 
returns to his or her unit and waits until given a suicide mission.  The rest of the LTTE discover 
the identity of a Black Tiger only after that mission has been completed.325 
The Black Tigers are used by the LTTE for three major purposes.  First, Black Tigers are 
used in order to achieve conventional warfare goals, which include the taking of territory and 
strategic assets, destroying enemy resources, and targeting Sri Lankan armed forces.  The first 
suicide attack by Captain Millar was an example of human being used as a guided artillery round 
in order to halt the advance of the SLA.  As aforementioned, Millar’s van was filled with 
explosives and his mission was to drive and detonate it in the SLA camp.  The surprise and 
shock of having a van explode in the middle of the SLA barracks stunned the army and allowed 
LTTE fighters to over-run the base.   
In order to capitalize on this ability, the LTTE developed what they call the ‘Sea and Air 
Tigers.’  The Sea Tigers are used to control LTTE access to Palk Bay, the body of water 
separating India from Sri Lanka.  This waterway is crucial for the LTTE as it is where arms and 
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materiel are shipped from Tamil Nadu to help the LTTE fight against the SLG.  The Black Sea 
Tigers are placed in high-powered speedboats that are filled with explosives and their purpose is 
to ensure that the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) does not intercept goods arriving to Jaffna.  Tactically, 
the Black Sea Tigers “rely on wolf pack-style attacks, carried out by fast attack crafts-some of 
them featuring crude, self-made stealth design-aiming at overwhelming the defenses of their 
prey.”326  According to maritime security expert Tony Britley, 
“…the Sea Tigers’ suicide craft are almost impossible to detect.  They are dark, sit low in the 
water and cannot be detected by radar.  The only way for the Sri Lankan navy to find them is 
through heat-detecting systems, but even then they travel at such speed that they are very difficult 
to shoot at.  The boats, packed with explosives, are modeled on an American stealth bomber, but 
a more recent development is a human torpedo craft designed especially for suicide attacks.”327 
 
This has allowed the Sea Tigers to engage the SLN with relative success.   
The Air Tigers, which R. S. Vasan argues was inspired by the kamikazes and Al Qaeda’s 
9/11 attacks, represent the LTTE’s recent experimentation with air power.328  To this end, the 
LTTE purchased an unknown number of Czechoslovakian made Zlin 143 aircraft.  These are 
single engine planes that are powered by a six-cylinder engine.329  Its light frame makes the 
aircraft agile, which could allow a pilot to drop a bomb or to fly it into a SLA base.  The LTTE 
attempted the latter on February 20, 2009 when it launched two Zlin 143 aircraft in an effort to 
hit a Sri Lankan Air Force hanger in Katunayake and the Bandaranaike International Airport.  
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The mission failed as the planes were intercepted by radar and brought down with anti-aircraft 
gunfire.330  
The second way the Black Tigers are utilized is to assassinate threats or traitors to the 
Tamil cause.  The two most high profile assassinations are the deaths of Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.331  To eliminate these targets, 
the LTTE integrated women into their suicide attack arsenal.  Before female suicide attacks 
became a morally and religiously sanctioned strategy in Palestine, Israel, Iraq and Chechnya it 
had become a routine tool in the LTTE’s arsenal.332  Up until this point, a woman had not been 
used as suicide attackers in any terrorist organization other than the LTTE.333   
There are two main reasons why the incorporation of women into the Black Tigers is 
strategic.  They were recruited to replenish the LTTE ranks.  As the SLG began targeting Tamil 
men aged between 14-40, many were lost in combat, which diminished the ranks of the Black 
Tigers and subsequently the fighting capacity of the LTTE.  As a result, the LTTE created units 
known as the “Freedom Birds” and “Black Tigresses,” which are suicide units exclusively made 
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up of women.334  Also, women suicide attackers have tactical advantages over men.  Because of 
their sex, women are assumed to be non-threatening due to “their inherent nature [weak and soft] 
and social roles [subservient to males].”335  Women are also more likely to get through a security 
checkpoint because of cultural sensitivities about men touching women.  As a result, this allows 
a woman wearing a suicide belt to slip through security and approach her target with relative 
ease.336  Indeed, this is what happened when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated.  A Black Tigress 
named Tenmoli Rajaratnam passed through a security checkpoint when Gandhi was 
campaigning in Chennai, India.  She positioned herself by Gandhi and began to bow in mock 
reverence to the prime minister.  She then rose and approached him to garland his neck with 
flowers.  As she reached out to put the flowers over Gandhi’s neck, she detonated the suicide 
vest killing Gandhi and fourteen others.337  As such, the Black Tigresses ability to evade security 
checkpoints and get close to key targets became an invaluable asset to the LTTE.   Table 3 below 
demonstrates that the Black Tigress’ comprise 32% of all Black Tiger attacks.   
                                                 
334 Alisa O'Conner-Stack, "Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds: How and Why the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam Employs Women," (Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007), 50.  
335 Ibid., 47. 
336 As Peter Schalk notes, the idea for the belt bomb came from the Indian National Army [INA].  While 
the INA was the first to use it, the LTTE became the most prolific user of the device.  It is likely that Palestinian 
terrorist groups were inspired by the LTTE to use suicide belt bombs for their own use.  See Peter Schalk, "Women 
Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil Ilam. The Martial Feminism of Atel Palacinkam," (South Asia Research, 
Vol. 14, No. 2, Autumn 1994), 174.   
337 “The Untold Story of Rajiv Gandhi’s Assassination,” (Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, Public Security, 
Law and Order, 11/7/06).  Article available online at http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20060521_02.  
Accessed on 7/15/09.  
  128 
Table 3. Black Tiger Participants in the LTTE:  1983-2009. 338 
 
 Female Male Total 
Black Sea Tigers 63 133 196 
Black Land Tigers 29 61 90 
Total Black Tigers 92 194 286 
 
 
 
The third and final way Black Tigers are used is more akin to traditional goals of 
terrorism by attacking targets to sow fear or prompt a backlash by the SLG.  While Eelamweb, 
the official online mouthpiece of the LTTE, insists that the LTTE does not target civilians, the 
facts indicate otherwise. The LTTE has been known to choose targets with high symbolic value.  
One of the most notorious attacks occurred when a pair of suicide attackers detonated their 
suicide vests in the Temple of the Tooth, one of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrines, on January 
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25, 1998 killing 14 people and wounding 50.339  Other incidents of the LTTE attacking public 
targets include:   
• January 31, 1996-A suicide truck bomb driven into and detonated in the 
Central Bank building in Colombo killing 81 people and wounding 1,400. 
• Jul 26, 1996-Two bombs were exploded by suicide attackers on a public 
commuter train near Colombo, killing 78 people. 
• October 15, 1997-LTTE suicide bomber drove a truck filled with 400 kg of 
explosives and detonated it by the World Trade Centre in Colombo killing 18 
and wounding 100. 
• February 7, 2000-Suicide attackers engaged in simultaneous attacks on trains 
and buses in Colombo.340 
 
Table 4 below demonstrates the breakdown of how suicide attacks are used by the LTTE.   
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Table 4. Targets of LTTE Black Tigers:  1983-2009.341 
 
 Military Assassination Civilian 
Male 178 6 10 
Female 71 16 5 
Total 249 22 15 
 
 
According to the table, the bulk of all Black Tiger attacks are directed against the SLA, which 
account for 87% of all the LTTE’s suicide attacks.  Next are assassinations, which comprise 8% 
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of the suicide attacks.  What is most interesting here is female Black Tigers make up 72% of all 
Black Tiger assassinations.  Finally, civilian targets comprise 5% of Black Tiger attacks. 
It is useful to summarize what this section has argued.  The LTTE adopted suicide attacks 
out of a defensive necessity since the SLA’s Operation Liberation had the LTTE close to defeat.  
The Captain Millar attack bought the LTTE some time and prompted India to intervene.  The 
LTTE then began to use the Black Tigers as a way to attack the SLA, assassinating threats or 
traitors to the Tamil cause, and sowing fear in the population.  The following section addresses 
the question of why one becomes a Black Tiger.   
3.4 WHY BECOME A BLACK TIGER? 
In order for the LTTE to have become the world’s most prolific user of suicide attacks, there 
must be a powerful individual incentive motivating the suicide attackers.  The precise manner by 
which the LTTE uses suicide attacks makes it unlikely that their suicide attackers are coerced.  
As the last section demonstrated, the Black Tigers are a highly trained and motivated group 
designed to achieve specific goals.  Black Tigers, like all LTTE members, are motivated by an 
elaborate ideology of martyrdom designed by LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirabakaran.  This 
ideology combines elements of nationalism and religion that sees the attainment of Tamil Eelam 
as a ‘holy aim,’ which requires a sacrificial commitment.  As a result, the LTTE martyr is one 
who ‘abandons’ his or her life for the Tamil cause.  The ideology of martyrdom is inculcated 
through the use of elaborate rituals that instill this incentive for death in every LTTE member.  
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3.4.1 The LTTE Martyr:  One Who Abandons  
The LTTE developed an ideology of martyrdom to suit its own military purposes.  This potent 
ideology is one major factor that accounts for the LTTE’s success because it motivates the entire 
organization.  For those in the LTTE, one can achieve martyrdom in two ways.  First, there is 
offensive martyrdom, which entails becoming a martyr by fighting the SLA on the battlefield or 
by participating in a suicide attack.  Second, there is defensive martyrdom, which happens when 
a captured or wounded LTTE member bites the cyanide capsule and commits suicide.  
Regardless of the manner by which the LTTE operative becomes a martyr, the member is hailed 
as abandoning his or her life for the greater cause of Tamil Eelam. 
In Tamil, there are several words for ‘martyr’ and ‘martyrdom’ but the most common 
words are tiyaki (one who abandons) and tiyakam (abandonment).  As Peter Schalk notes, “these 
concepts have been developed mainly in the 1980s and were officially promoted by the LTTE 
from 1989 onwards to rationalize armed and unarmed struggle, and personal and collective 
suffering in a specific historical situation of war in the process of state formation.”342  While the 
LTTE appeals to the Western notion of the martyr, there is a dramatic difference between the 
LTTE’s understanding of martyrdom and the Western, Judeo-Christian notion of the martyr.  
The word martyr is derived from Greek and means ‘to bear witness to.’  The Judeo-Christian 
martyr is one who endures unjust suffering and death yet remains faithful to his or her religion.  
In this sense, the Judeo-Christian martyr is a passive actor.  He or she is the recipient of death as 
a result of the religious beliefs he or she holds.  Contrast this with the LTTE martyr who is an 
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active actor.  The LTTE martyr has “not chosen like the Christian martyr to suffer in the mind 
the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.  [Rather,] [h]e has taken up arms against a sea of 
troubles trying to end them by opposing them.”343  The tiyaki then “combines what is 
unthinkable for a martyr in the original Judeo-Christian tradition, [which is] to get killed in the 
very act of killing.”344  The concept of the tiyakam is rooted in the last section of the Bhagavada 
Gita and came into modern day usage during the Indian struggle against the British.345  It is 
useful to quote the final section of the Bhagavada Gita at length in order to identify the elements 
Pirabakaran borrows to create his ideology. 
At the end of the Bhadavada Gita, Arjuna asks to be told “of the essence of renunciation, 
and the essence of surrender.”346  Krishna replies as follows: 
“The renunciation of selfish works is called renunciation; but the surrender of the reward 
of all work is called surrender.  Works of sacrifice, gift, and self-harmony should not be 
abandoned, but should indeed be performed for these are works of purification.  But even 
these works, Arjuna, should be done in the freedom of a pure offering, and without 
expectation of a [personal] reward…[i]t is not right to leave undone the holy work which 
ought to be done.  Such surrender of action would be a delusion of darkness.  And he who 
abandons his duty because he has fear of pain, his surrender…is impure, and in truth he 
has no reward.  But he who does the holy work, Arjuna, because it ought to be done, and 
surrenders selfishness and thought of reward, his work is pure and is peace.  This man 
sees and has no doubts:  he surrenders, he is pure and has peace.”347 
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346 The Bhagavada Gita, translated by Juan Mascaro, (London: Penguin Books, 1962), 79. 
347 Ibid. Emphasis added.   
  134 
Pirabakaran draws two important themes from the text.  First, tiyakam signifies abandonment, 
not inaction.  In fact, Krishna tells Arjuna that works of sacrifice should be performed because 
they result in one’s spiritual purification.  Similarly, the Tiger fighter must abandon the pleasures 
associated with civilian life and his individuality by embracing the Spartan and austere lifestyle 
of the LTTE and its quest for an independent Tamil Eelam.  The Tiger existence, much like the 
bhakti tradition, is one of unyielding dedication and asceticism.348 
 Second, abandonment enables the Tiger to complete ‘the holy work which ought to be 
done.’  This sentence should be investigated with care.  For Pirabakaran, the ‘work’ corresponds 
to the Tamil word cutantiram, which translates as ‘holy aim.’  This holy aim is at the very center 
of the LTTE’s movement and has strong religious undertones.  The Tamil politician and leader 
Celvanayakam, drawing broadly from the Judeo-Christian tradition, introduced the term and 
linked it with the Tamil struggle.349  Celvanayakam saw how the term was associated with the 
Indian struggle for independence as it established a homology “between English colonization and 
the Indian freedom struggle.”350  In the same manner, cutantiram creates a homology between 
the oppressive Sinhala government and the Tamil struggle for an independent homeland.  Not 
only is this ‘work,’ but also it is qualified as ‘holy.’  Therefore, the quest for a separate Tamil 
Eelam acquires religious importance and urgency.  
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Giving the goal of Tamil Eelam a religious significance makes it a transcendental ideal 
and it is the ultimate incentive that compels Tiger men and women to sacrifice their lives.  
Indeed, the holy aim is what every individual Tamil Tiger must strive for.  According to the 
Bhagavada Gita, forsaking the holy aim is described as a ‘delusion of darkness,’ and an 
‘impurity.’  The person who is not willing to make the required sacrifices is rebuked and called 
impure.  As such, Pirabakaran views the tiyaki as “an outstanding living man [or woman] who 
has extraordinary mental and moral qualities that all amount to self-restraint.”351  The ideology 
of martyrdom is focused on achieving the holy aim through the tiyaki’s immeasurable 
abandonment of life, or martyrdom, which is the force that will liberate Tamil Eelam.   
The above discussion raises serious flaws with the argument, primarily espoused by 
political scientist Robert Pape, that the LTTE is a secular and areligious organization.  Pape is 
quick to identify nationalism as the sole motive for an individual’s participation in a suicide 
attack.  The problem with this is that he ignores the religious elements and symbols that are 
infused within the LTTE”s brand of nationalism.  The concepts of tiyakam and cutantiram are 
integral features comprising Pirabakaran’s ideology of martyrdom.  Simply put, Pape’s analysis 
suffers from an inability to enumerate and give adequate weight to the cultural, historical and 
religious factors found in Pirabakaran’s ideology of martyrdom.  This leads anthropologist 
Michael Roberts to note “the facile manner in which Robert Pape and so many other scholars 
present the LTTE as ‘secular’ seems quite erroneous.”352  Instead, the scholar and analyst should 
be aware that religion plays a significant influence in the creation of the LTTE’s ideology of 
                                                 
351 Pirabakaran quoted in Ibid., 64.  
352 Michael Roberts, "Blunders in Tigerland: Pape’s Muddles on 'Suicide Bombers' in Sri Lanka," (South 
Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Working Paper No. 32, November 2007), 38. 
  136 
martyrdom.  The significance of Pape’s error is that he ignores a wellspring of symbols, culture 
and history that have motivated the Black Tigers.  This type of analytical myopia can lead to a 
misdiagnosis of proper counterterrorism measures that must be taken to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the motivating ideology of the insurgency.  With this in mind, the next section 
addresses the manner in which the ideology is inculcated into its members.        
3.4.2 The Cyanide Capsule 
In a statement about the Black Tigers, LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirabakaran said, “I have 
groomed my weak brethren into a strong weapon called Black Tigers…the Black Tigers have 
cast aside fear from its very roots.  Death has surrendered to them.  They keep eagerly waiting 
for the day they would die.  They just don’t bother about death.”353  LTTE members and Black 
Tigers ‘don’t bother about death’ because from the moment they join the LTTE ranks they are 
desensitized to death through an elaborate ritual in which all LTTE members participate.  This 
ritual is called the ‘kupi ceremony.’   
The kupi is the small vial of cyanide that each Tiger wears around his or her neck.  After 
the Tiger completes basic training and proves worthy of becoming a Tamil Tiger, the member 
participates in the kupi ceremony.  Before the ceremony begins, the new Tiger makes the ‘Tiger 
pledge’ stating, “I pledge my life, my body and my mind to our esteemed leader Vellupillai 
Pirabakaran in self-sacrificial service to the achievement of our organization’s aim of a separate 
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Tamil Eelam.  The Tiger’s thirst is the Tamil Eelam motherland.”354  After swearing loyalty to 
Pirabakaran and Tamil liberation, the recruit receives a vial containing a lethal mixture of 
potassium cyanide that is to be worn at all times.   
During military training, “misplacement or even forgetting to wear the cyanide capsule 
by a ‘cadet’ result[s] in a severe punishment…which entail[s] carrying about the “Paska,” a 
heavy two foot length of coconut tree, and a large bottle of flour…hung on a string round the 
miscreant’s neck…[which is] intended to ridicule and bring dishonor to the ‘cadet.’”355  
According to Peter Schalk, the cyanide “vial is fully and consciously exposed hanging on a cord 
around the neck [of LTTE members during] processions and in the daily encounters of the LTTE 
cadres and civilians.”356  The glass vials are manufactured in Germany and the cyanide is bought 
from India.357  If a Tiger is captured or cornered on a mission, he is trained and expected to bite 
down on the vial immediately.  The “taking of cyanide may lead to mental confusion and painful 
convulsions during the death struggle.  Having passed into the bloodstream, death is present 
within two minutes, but if the amount taken is too small, death does not occur and the person 
may become an idiot, [or] be crippled for life.”358  Pirabakaran claims that “[c]arrying cyanide on 
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one’s person is a symbolic expression of our commitment, our determination, our courage.”359  A 
Jaffna regional commander, Kittu, reiterates the point:  “[a]s long as we have this cyanide around 
our neck, we have no need to fear any force on earth!  While attacking, our fighters don’t count 
their lives.”360  The cyanide capsule becomes a crucial ally to the LTTE fighter; “[t]he whole 
meaning of life:  freedom alone, indeed, is greatness [won] by the cyanide vials, holding them 
with assurance.”361  Indeed, the cyanide capsule is what sets the Tiger fighter apart from his 
enemies.  According to Sri Lankan journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “[f]rom the Tiger perspective it is 
this readiness to die for the cause that elevates the LTTE member from his surroundings.  It is 
the cyanide capsule that symbolizes the Tiger’s superiority to others and signifies the dedicated 
mission in life…[resulting in] a curious blend of rational obscurantism, absolute nihilism and 
revolutionary commitment [that] has succeeded in making a fetish of the cyanide capsule.”362  
LTTE leader Pirabakaran confirms this view when he was interviewed by The Hindu newspaper 
on September 5, 1986.  The reporter asked Pirabakaran about the cyanide capsule.  Here is his 
response: 
“Yes, we have adopted this measure [wearing the cyanide capsule] from the start. As a 
consequence, many comrades have sacrificed themselves. You won't find people from 
our movement in jail, at least, not many more than you can count on your fingers, 
perhaps to or three, and even those are people not involved in the inner circle of activity. 
Our fighters, through laying down their lives, protect our sympathizers and contacts, the 
people who give us support and assistance. Otherwise, the great mass of people who 
support us, and their families, would be herded into jail. But that is not the only reason 
for this practice.  It is this cyanide that has helped us develop our movement very rapidly. 
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Carrying cyanide on our person is a symbolic expression of our determination, our 
commitment, our courage. It gives our fighters an extra measure of belief in our cause, a 
special edge; the cyanide has instilled in us a determination to sacrifice our lives and our 
everything for our cause.”363 
 
The main purpose of the cyanide ceremony is to instill a fearlessness of death into all 
LTTE members.  Wearing the cyanide capsule is a physical representation of the fact that death 
is always close.  Pirabakaran’s use of this ritual not only demystifies death, but also it inculcates 
the notion into each person that death for a free Tamil Eelam is a noble and virtuous act.  Indeed, 
it is estimated that roughly 15% of Tiger deaths are the result of taking the cyanide capsule, 
which means that out of the 22,000 Tigers killed in the insurgency against the SLA some 3,300 
have died by biting into the kupi.364  This number demonstrates the potency of Pirabakaran’s 
ideology of martyrdom and it is no exaggeration to say that this ideology permeates the entire 
organization.  Thus, the ‘holy aim’ of an independent Tamil Eelam is the factor that motivates 
both LTTE members and Black Tigers to willingly embrace death.  Those who bite the kupi or 
embark on a suicide attack are revered as martyrs who have abandoned their lives for the Tamil 
cause.  Having established this ideology, Pirabakaran introduced it to the Tamil population living 
in Jaffna and in the diaspora.  
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3.5 SOCIETAL RESONANCE AND THE CULT OF THE MARTYR 
As Pirabakaran fashioned his ideology of martyrdom, a crucial component involved convincing 
the Tamil people that this form of sacrifice was necessary to the Tamil Eelam struggle.  
Pirabakaran created a propaganda wing in the LTTE whose sole purpose is to curry public 
support for the martyrs who died fighting for the Tamil cause.   To this end, Pirabakaran and the 
propaganda wing began to foster what the LTTE calls the ‘cult of the martyr.’  This was 
cultivated in three ways:  through a yearly celebration known as ‘Great Heroes Day’ in which all 
the martyrs and Black Tigers are remembered collectively for their self-sacrifice; the creation of 
burial grounds called ‘Martyr shrines’ where the LTTE martyrs are venerated by the population; 
and the ‘cult of the martyr,’ available to those Tamils living in diaspora via the World Wide 
Web.  Tamils residing in Western Europe and North America are able to watch videos of 
Pirabakaran’s speeches and obtain press releases by the LTTE on their personal computers. 
 
3.5.1 Great Heroes Day 
The LTTE created the ‘Office of Great Heroes’ (OGH) in 1991 in order to foster public support 
for LTTE martyrs.  The office is part of the LTTE’s propaganda wing, which operates in Jaffna 
as well as in various European and North American countries.365  With Pirabakaran’s guidance, 
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one of the first actions instituted by the OGH was the establishment of the ‘Great Heroes Day’ 
(GHD).  GHD occurs every year on November 27, the day in which the first Black Tiger, 
Captain Millar, participated in a suicide attack against the SLA.  It marks the end of what the 
LTTE calls ‘Heroes Week.’  The purpose of GHD is twofold.  First, it introduces the martyrs to 
the Tamil population.  The LTTE keep the identities of their martyrs in strict secrecy until a few 
months after an attack has occurred.  Details are then slowly released to the public by the OGH.  
This is in stark contrast with a Islamist groups, like Hamas, that actively broadcast the identity of 
a suicide attacker almost immediately after the suicide attack has occurred.   
Second, the GHD is a way to inculcate a societal veneration of all LTTE martyrs.  In 
Tamil, GHD is called eluccinal or ‘the day of rising.’  Poems and stories are read about the lives 
and heroism of the LTTE martyrs.  Also shared for the first time are the poems written by Black 
Tigers or others who have become martyrs fighting for Tamil Eelam.  An example of one such 
poem is given below written by an LTTE member named Tirunamam. 
 “They go, the great heroes, they go- 
 Having won the war with the enemy they go to their death. 
 The big army of the ruler arranged to march in rows 
 In the sounds of music they dissolve- 
 In a vehicle decorated with flowers, wrapped in the red flag 
 Go the ones who command respect. 
 Having paid the great debt to the soil of the good Tamil Mother 
 Crowned with the golden band they go- 
 Their Mothers to wail and our country’s people in sobbing rows they go. 
 Consciously having given their own body for the land 
 The life for Tamil, they go- 
 Courageous with the pride of youth in their body 
 Flower bedecked they go- 
 In the house’s doorway a lamp, the filled jar of perfection, the black flag 
 A string of coconut leaves to hang over the threshold, so they go 
 Having created an epic like to the deep sea 
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 Go the heroic guardians. 
 Before the heroic war tigers sink into the ground 
 A thousand tigers sprout  
 Having beaten their chest, having lived in honor, these 
 Unbowed they go-Great Heroes 
 Unsullied, having given their lives for the life of our village 
 To seek the final resting place they go- 
 Their names mentioned they go on to live as history 
 In the hearts of the Tamils tomorrow.”366 
 
The event is emotionally charged and inundates residents with Black Tiger propaganda.  
Posters of the dead martyrs line the streets, pro-LTTE music is broadcast constantly, and Black 
Tiger videos are played throughout the day.  A popular movie that attracts Tamil youth is called 
Tayakkanavu, a movie produced by Nitarcanam, the official television station of the LTTE.   
According to Peter Schalk,  
“[the movie begins] by showing a happy family…[who are] sitting in the garden 
celebrating a birthday.  They have good relations with their neighbors.  The son takes the 
neighbor’s young daughter to school on his motor-bike.  One day the Lankan Air Force 
drops bombs on the school, and the boy can only take the dead body of his young friend 
to her parents.  In his inner vision, he anticipates that this could have happened to his own 
younger sister.  He decides that he will enter the squad of the Black Tigers.”367   
 
The film depicts the rigorous training given to a Black Tiger and emphasizes the Tiger’s joy 
when he is chosen to participate in a Black Tiger operation.   
Another prominent event of Heroes Day is the annual speech given by Pirabakaran.  
Pirabakaran’s speech is considered as “a sort of throne speech in which he usually elaborates on 
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the victories, ground situation, future plans and an analysis of the current political situation.”368  
The speech is given at sunset next to the ever-burning ‘flame of sacrifice,’ which commemorates 
the eternal memory of all LTTE martyrs.   
The public speech enables Pirabakaran to present his ideology of martyrdom to the Tamil 
people.  From his first speech delivered in 1992, to the one given before his death in 2009, he has 
used this chance to inject his ideology into the Tamil population.  During his first GHD speech 
delivered in 1992, he told his Tamil audience that GHD “is the sacred day when we cherish in 
our memory those exceptional beings who, by their sacrifice, have made our freedom struggle a 
heroic epic in the annals of world history.”369  This mirrors the language that he uses with the 
Black Tigers, who believe that achieving a liberated Tamil homeland is a sacred aim.  This 
theme is of central importance to Pirabakaran’s ideology of martyrdom, which is evidenced by 
the fact that the theme appears in every GHD speech given by Pirabakaran from 1992-2008.370  
Pirabakaran uses this to emphasize to the Tamil people the importance of the struggle against the 
Sinhalese state.  It is a struggle that takes on a religious importance and as such requires the 
sacrifice not only of the LTTE members but also the Tamil people.   
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After laying the groundwork for the holy aim, Pirabakaran goes on to describe the 
characteristics of LTTE martyrs.  He calls the LTTE heroes “supreme idealists” who “loved their 
goal more than their lives.”371  He goes on to say that “none can equal our martyrs in their 
dedication, deep commitment to the goal and tremendous courage that transcends the fear of 
death.”372  Again, this mirrors the concept he developed for the Black Tigers.  As 
aforementioned, the martyr is the tiyaki or ‘one who abandons’ his or her life for the Tamil 
cause.  This is why Pirabakaran calls the martyrs ‘supreme idealists’ because the martyr believes 
that abandoning his or her life will make an independent Tamil country a reality.  Additionally, 
Pirabakaran roots the Tamil Eelam struggle in the sacrifice of the martyrs.  As he says, “our 
martyrs are the pillars of our freedom movement, whose blood enriches the history of our 
freedom struggle, whose ideal makes our struggle supreme, whose sacrifices shape the formation 
of our nation, [and] whose memories make our determination stronger.”373  An image 
Pirabakaran often uses is that the idea for Tamil Eelam is but a seed that must be watered by the 
blood of the martyrs.374  
Also, the speech serves to remind the Tamil people that the SLG is the cause of the 
conflict and concomitantly of their suffering.  Pirabakaran reiterates to the population that the 
injustice and intolerance of the SLG has prompted the LTTE to fight a ‘war of liberation.’  
Indeed, he claims that the “anti-Tamil attitude of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism…has turned Sri 
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Lanka into a blazing cauldron of violence.”375  In every GHD speech he has given, Pirabakaran 
uses the term ‘Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism.’  He goes on to say that this chauvinism has “its 
roots buried in Sri Lankan Buddhism, [which] has perversely spread throughout the Sinhala 
social formation and penetrated into the Sinhala political system.”376  The main message he is 
conveying is that the roots of the Tamil conflict stem from a politicized Buddhism that the first 
section of this chapter addressed.  Indeed, he mentions that “the Sinhala nation continues to be 
entrapped in the Mahavamsa mindset, in that mythical ideology.  The Sinhalese people are still 
caught up in the legendary fiction that the island of Sri Lanka is a divine gift to Buddhism, a holy 
land entitled to the Sinhala race.”377   
After identifying the main cause of the Tamil conflict, he is quick to remind the Tamils 
that “Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism [is] not prepared to resolve the ethnic conflict through 
peaceful means.”378  If the SLG refuses to address Tamil grievances, then the only option is to 
obtain independence through the use of violence.  As Pirabakaran tells his audience, “we cannot 
gain our rights by pleading with the Sinhala rulers.  We must fight and win our rights.  History 
has not recorded any liberation struggle that has won without fighting, without bloodshed, 
without death and destruction, without sacrifice.”379  He states that the fight they are engaged in 
is just because it is rooted in the right of self-determination.380  Since the struggle is based on 
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self-determination, he tells the Tamil people that the LTTE is not a terrorist organization.  As he 
says, “we are not terrorists.  We are not mentally demented as to commit blind acts of violence 
impelled by racist and religious fanaticism.  We are fighting and sacrificing our lives for the love 
of a noble cause, human freedom.”381 
The creation of GHD and the speeches given by Pirabakaran has helped the LTTE to 
create and foster grassroots support and loyalty among the population for Pirabakaran’s ideology 
of martyrdom.  This has caused the LTTE to be “the only group that is accepted by the [Tamil] 
population as ‘on of our own.’”382  The Tigers are lovingly referred to as ‘our boys’ and ‘our 
sons and daughters’ in popular discourse.383  Additionally, the Tamil population venerates the 
Black Tigers as examples par excellence of the sacrifice required to achieve Tamil Eelam.  
Another way the LTTE fosters popular support for its martyrs is through the building of ‘martyr 
cemeteries’ that the Tamil population visits to revere and remember the martyrs’ sacrifices.  
3.5.2 Martyr Cemeteries 
To help foster the cult of martyrdom, the LTTE intentionally utilizes visible mediums, such as 
being buried in a tuyilum illam, a ‘sleeping house,’ to honor their martyrs.  The sleeping house is 
a simple mound of earth that commemorates the life and death of the Black Tiger.  In front of the 
mound is a sign, which has the operative’s name, his Black Tiger nom de guerre, town of birth, 
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date of birth and death, and how the Black Tiger became a tiyaki.384  The LTTE remembers its 
first martyr, Captain Millar, in this way on his headstone: 
 Black Tiger Captain Millar 
 Vallipuram Vacantan 
 Tunalai 
 01.06.66-05.07.87 
When in Nelliyati the Black Tiger had diffused a bomb on the Sri Lankan army, having 
been driven by a car, whilst striking there occurred his heroic death.385          
 
The sleeping houses are a permanent construction in the Jaffna region and function as a burial 
ground for LTTE martyrs only.  According to Michael Roberts, this tradition came from the 
eulogy of a Catholic priest who was also a Tiger.386  Roberts claims that at the burial of Marcelin 
Fuselus, a Catholic Tiger who led a raid which killed 146 people in Anuradhapura, the “priest 
who delivered the funeral oration…deployed a metaphor from St. John’s Gospel, the motif of the 
seed that shall not bring forth life unless it fall on the ground and die.”387  Pirabakaran uses the 
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St. John motif to view the martyr’s death as the planting of a seed, which will bring forth the 
fruit of a free and independent Tamil Eelam.  Moreover, Pirabakaran utilizes the metaphor to 
grant the Black Tiger immortality in the minds of the Tamil people.  He claims that the “LTTE 
martyr never dies.  His body is planted as a seed to be reborn.”388   
 The decision to bury its martyrs was an important decision and can only be fully 
understood if one has some knowledge of Hinduism.  Michael Roberts estimates that over 50% 
of Sri Lankan Tamils are Hindus of the Vellalar caste.389  The Hindus do not bury their dead 
because the body acts as a trap for the soul.  In order for the soul to be released, the body must be 
burned on a funeral pyre.  Indeed, for centuries Hindus have engaged in cremation rituals to 
ensure that the soul’s release from the body.  It is crucial to note that in northern Sri Lanka, the 
only group that buried their dead was low caste [dalit-also known as the untouchables] Christian 
converts.  Roberts captures the significance of this when he notes, “for the Tiger hierarchy to 
order the burial of their dead and impose it on the peoples under their thumb was a radical 
measure.”390  Indeed, the Tigers went against a religiously established practice that was centuries 
old for the sole purpose of allowing the cult of the martyr to proliferate.   
One of the biggest martyr cemeteries is the Viscamadu cemetery located in the 
Killinocchi district in Jaffna.  Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam describes it in this way: 
“Visually the headstones resemble a lotus…the walls around the graveyard are plastered 
with the photos of the dead heroes and their date of death.  [Visitors] File past the photos 
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and offer flower buds.  In the sand the map of Tamil Eelam is picked out with donated 
tomb lamps.  In the middle the kuttu vilakku or ‘eternal light’ burns steadily.”391   
 
These cemeteries have become the focal point for parents, relatives, friends, colleagues and all 
the Tamil people congregate.392  They congregate at the cemeteries because the Tamil population 
believes the graves have spiritual properties since those buried there are considered local deities.  
These “defied humans inspire hope.  They help one surmount fear and to derive magical power.  
They protect, and thereby renew, one’s being.”393  The Tamil population can directly appeal to 
the martyrs to help bring about the liberation of Tamil Eelam.  This practice helps to foster the 
cult of the martyr amongst the Tamil population because it provides a physical location in which 
the sacrifice of the martyr is made manifest.  Indeed, the martyr and his or her sacrifice survive 
in the memory of the group.  As a result, this has created a sacred topography centered on the 
sacrifice of the martyr, which is available to the entire Tamil population living in northern Sri 
Lanka.394  The cult of the martyr is not geographically limited in scope.  The LTTE shrewdly 
disseminates information pertaining to the cult of the martyr via various websites on the World 
Wide Web.  
 
                                                 
391 Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “And Heroes Die: Poetry of the Tamil Liberation Movement in 
Northern Sri Lanka,” 119. 
392 "Veneration of Martyrs Permeates Nooks and Corners of Tamil Eelam," article dated 9/25/2004. 
Available online at www.tamilcanadian.com.  Accessed on 6/26/2009. 
393 Michael Roberts, “Tamil Tigers ‘Martyrs’:  Regenerating Divine Potency?” 500. 
394 Ibid., 493.  
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3.5.3 The Tamil Community and the Internet   
The LTTE is perhaps the first insurgent organization to capitalize on the internet’s ability to 
broadcast propaganda material all over the world.  With a diaspora of roughly 700,000 living 
abroad in Western Europe and North America, a way had to be found to keep these émigrés 
informed about how the freedom struggle was faring against the SLG.  Today, there are four 
main websites dedicated to the distribution of information relating to the Tamil struggle.  These 
websites are tamilnet.com, eelamweb.com, tamilcanadian.com, tamilnation.org.  
The main purpose of the websites is to highlight abuses by the Sri Lankan government.  
If one visits tamilnet.com the main page of the website is devoted entirely to linking stories that 
call into question the Sri Lankan government’s handling of the Tamils.  Here one can find a mix 
of international news stories coming from the BBC, Reuters, the Associated Press, the Hindu, the 
New York Times and other outlets as well as stories written by tamilnet’s own reporters.  It is 
interesting to note that tamilnet.com has become a source of information used by the 
international news media as the latter usually cite or quote tamilnet.com’s reports almost 
verbatim.395  This happens because tamilnet’s reporting mimics Western journalism as their 
articles are authoritative in tone, contain facts and figures that are double-sourced and carefully 
checked and because tamilnet articles may be reproduced without charge as long as there is 
attribution.396  Despite these characteristics, tamilnet slants their coverage so that the SLG looks 
like the aggressor and the Tamils look like the victims.  Similarly, eelamweb says on its webpage 
                                                 
395 Mark Whitaker, "Tamilnet.com: Some Reflections on Popular Anthropology, Nationalism, and the 
Internet," (Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 3, 2004), 478.  
396 Ibid., 478. 
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that “the mass human rights abuses committed by the Sri Lankan government and its forces are 
done so in the cover of a complete censorship of all information concerning Tamils in Tamil 
Eelam.  Due to the sufferings that Tamil people are facing in their own home land, we, at 
EelamWeb have found this page a necessity to expose the terror of the Sri Lankan government 
and its forces.”397  Going further, eelamweb claims that the reports released by the SLG cannot 
be trusted and that the website has attempted to compile information relating to the Tamil 
struggle, tradition and culture.398 
   In addition, the Tamil websites are integral for the spreading of LTTE ideology and 
propaganda.  The two websites dedicated to doing this are tamilnation.org and eelamweb.com.  
Eelamweb has a section of the website that is devoted exclusively to the speeches of LTTE 
leader Velpullai Pirabakaran.  Here one can find every Heroes Day Speech Pirabakaran has 
given, and which have been translated.399  In addition to the text of the speeches, if one 
understands Tamil one can listen to the actual audio file of the speech.  This gives Tamils living 
outside of Sri Lanka unprecedented access to the LTTE.  Also there is a webpage on eelamweb 
devoted exclusively to the memory of LTTE martyrs.  The visitor can browse statistics of those 
LTTE martyrs killed in the fight against the SLG.  Additionally, the website features what it calls 
“Heroes Week Feature,” which has a link introducing an LTTE martyr to the web surfer.  
Currently on the site is Lieutenant Shankar, the first LTTE member to commit suicide biting on 
the kupi.  As would be expected, the website extols Shankar as a martyr:  “Shankar firmly 
                                                 
397 See “About Us,” Available online at http://www.eelamweb.com/aboutus/, accessed on 7/20/2009.  
398 Ibid. 
399 The Heroes Day Speeches are available online at 
http://www.eelamweb.com/leader/messages/herosday/.  Accessed on 7/20/2009.  
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believed that we can achieve the liberation of Tamil Eelam if and only if the political and 
military leadership of the LTTE is unwavering. He lived and breathed the liberation struggle, and 
took up arms for it.”400  The website goes on to say that those who died a martyr’s death are 
remembered every year at the Heroes Day celebration.  The website contains links to photo 
gallery of various Heroes Day events through the years as well as ‘martyr songs’ that one can 
download and listen to.401   
The other website dedicated to spreading LTTE ideology and propaganda, tamilnation, is 
perhaps the most sophisticated, pro-Tamil website on the internet.  Tamilnation contains 
academic articles and books pertaining to Tamil history, culture, and the current struggle.  These 
resources have been downloaded as PDF files or scanned into a computer and posted on the 
website for visitors.  It also serves as a forum where articles and books critical of the Tamil 
liberation struggle are debated.402  The most interesting feature on the website is the extensive 
posting of videos.  These videos run the gamut.  From low-quality, homemade productions 
depicting LTTE training to sophisticated music videos utilizing pop music and rap extolling the 
LTTE martyrs.  The LTTE’s London propaganda office also produces short films on Black Tiger 
                                                 
400 “The Death of Lt. Shankar,” article available online at http://www.eelamweb.com/maveerar/shankar/. 
Accessed on 7/20/2009.  
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martyrs that demonstrate how the martyrs are venerated and remembered by their families.403  
Also of importance are the many videos of the Great Heroes Day celebration.  This gives the 
Tamil living in diaspora a chance to participate virtually in the most important event in the 
LTTE’s ritual calendar.  Here the visitor can watch Pirabakaran light the great heroes torch and 
then listen to his speech commending the LTTE martyr’s for their sacrifice.404   
The website also serves a social networking purpose as Tamils living abroad can go to 
the site to find Tamils that will come together to celebrate Great Heroes Day.  In 2008, Tamils in 
diaspora celebrated Great Heroes Day in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the USA.405 
Pirabakaran created an ideology of martyrdom that has permeated Sri Lankan society and 
has been disseminated to a worldwide audience via the internet. The celebration of Great Heroes 
Day and veneration of martyr cemeteries have become fixtures in the northern areas of Sri 
                                                 
403 In the video “Maveerar Kanam,” a mother and father approach the grave of their martyr son.  In front of 
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Lanka.  This helped to inculcate a cult of the martyr in the Tamil population.  Those living 
abroad also experience the cult of the martyr as the videos and speeches are widely available for 
the Tamil diaspora to view on their personal computers.  As a result, Pirabakaran has succeeded 
in an ideology that is rooted locally but transnational in scope.  
3.6 CONCUSION 
The case study in this chapter investigated the LTTE as an instance where suicide attacks were 
used to wage an asymmetric war.  The chapter probed the historical antecedents of the conflict, 
the organizational reason why the LTTE adopted suicide attacks, the motivations of the suicide 
attackers, and how the attacks were made to resonate with the Tamil population.  The first 
section of the chapter argued that the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese has roots in a 
xenophobic and militaristic Buddhism that began in the late nineteenth century and became a 
powerful political force in Sri Lankan politics in the twentieth century.  Upon the election of 
S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, the SLG began to actively discriminate against the Tamils.  While the 
Tamil independence movement at first advocated non-violent resistance to the SLG, they 
changed tactics when the SLG began to react violently against Tamil calls for an autonomous 
state.  The LTTE chose armed resistance against the SLG as the only way to achieve Tamil 
Eelam.   
At the organizational level, the LTTE adopted suicide attacks out of a defensive 
necessity.  As the irregular war between the LTTE and SLG escalated, the LTTE needed a 
weapon that could stop the advance of the SLA into Jaffna.  Captain Millars’s suicide attack 
halted the SLA advance into Jaffna.  Suicide attacks were later turned into an offensive weapon 
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that were used as a conventional tactic against the SLA, to assassinate Sri Lankan and Tamil 
leaders, and to sow terror by targeting civilians. 
At the individual level, Pirabakaran fashioned an elaborate ideology of martyrdom that 
combined religious and nationalistic language and symbols to create a powerful incentive for 
death.  By equating martyrdom with the Hindu concept of abandonment, tiyakam, the quest for 
an independent Tamil homeland acquires a quasi-religious significance.  Indeed, the struggle for 
Tamil Eelam is holy, and the ideal tiyaki is one who abandons his or her life in pursuit of Tamil 
Eelam.  He used rituals such as the cyanide ceremony to instill in both the Black Tigers and 
LTTE members that death for the Tamil nation exceeds the importance of an individual’s life. 
The ideology of martyrdom’s potency is further evident when one considers that the LTTE 
perpetrated more suicide attacks than the combined total of all other terrorist organizations that 
have adopted this tactic. Most astonishingly, the Black Tigers have killed roughly 1,000 people 
and assassinated two heads of state, including India’s former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 
1991 and Sri Lanka’s President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. 
Finally, at the societal level, resonance for the attack is achieved by fostering a cult of the 
martyr that exists domestically and internationally.  To this end, the LTTE created the Great 
Heroes Day celebration where the Tamil community gathers every year to pay tribute to the 
martyrs as well as the martyr cemeteries.  Both the celebration and the cemeteries act as visible 
symbols reinforcing Pirabakaran’s cult of the martyr.  The cult of the martyr is also broadcast to 
the Tamil diaspora via the World Wide Web.  Undoubtedly, the LTTE’s use of the internet to 
disseminate propaganda has inspired Islamist terrorist groups to do the same. 
The interaction amongst each level of analysis in this case study is lateral and can be 
represented by a less-than symbol [<].   
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     Individual 
  LTTE 
     Society 
 
The point at which the two lines intersect is the organization with one line representing the 
individual and the other society.  In this case, the organizational ideology of the LTTE is the 
most important feature because it not only attracts individuals from within the ranks of the LTTE 
but it is also presented to the Tamil society through Pirabakaran’s cult of the martyr.  Indeed, the 
LTTE’s organizational ideology is a necessary condition for suicide attacks in the Sri Lankan 
case.  This point has been reaffirmed since Pirabakaran’s death, as there have been no Black 
Tiger attacks since that event.   
The figure also demonstrates that there is no interaction between the individual and 
societal levels.  Unlike Hamas, the LTTE draws Black Tigers from its own ranks and does not 
have a need to recruit from the population.  Instead, those individuals who become Black Tigers 
are already full-fledged combatants in the LTTE organization that have given themselves to 
Pirabakaran’s ideology of martyrdom.  In this respect, societal resonance while important was 
not a critical issue for the Tamil Tigers since all the volunteers for Black Tiger attacks came 
from within their ranks.      
The next chapter of the dissertation investigates suicide attacks that are used primarily by 
an organization engaged in domestic terrorism.  
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4.0  SUICIDE ATTACKS AS DOMESTIC TERRORISM:  THE CASE OF HAMAS IN 
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
“This is a war which has not been extinguished…for close to fourteen centuries, and which 
continues until this moment, its blaze raging in all corners of the earth.” 
-Sayyid Qutb, Our Struggle With the Jews 
 
 
 
 
“O Mother, my religion has called me to jihad and self-sacrifice. O Mother, I am 
marching toward immortality, I will never retreat. O Mother, don’t cry for me if I am shot down, 
laid out on the ground. For death is my path; martyrdom my desire!” 
-Hamas, “Martyrdom Song” 
 
 
 
 
"These operations are the supreme form of Jihad for the sake of Allah, and a type of 
[warfare] that is allowed by the Sharia…He who commits suicide kills himself for his own 
benefit, while he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his 
nation. While someone who commits suicide has lost hope with himself and with the spirit of 
Allah, the Mujahid is full of hope with regard to Allah's spirit and mercy. He fights his enemy 
and the enemy of Allah with this new weapon, which destiny has put in the hands of the weak, so 
that they would fight against the evil of the strong and arrogant. The Mujahid becomes a 'human 
bomb' that blows up at a specific place and time, in the midst of the enemies of Allah and the 
homeland, leaving them helpless in the face of the Shahid who...sold his soul to Allah, and 
sought the Shahada for the sake of Allah." 
-Sheik Yussuf al Qaradhawi 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
On August 9, 2001 a group of people gathered at a Sbarro pizzeria at the corner of King George 
Street and Jaffa Road in downtown Jerusalem.  At 2:00 PM, the restaurant was filled with 
lunchtime guests.  Mothers were with their children, husbands with their wives, and friends were 
enjoying one another’s company.  At 2:05 PM, a younger gentleman entered the restaurant.  He 
wore sunglasses, carried a guitar case and appeared to be a tourist stopping for lunch.  
Unbeknownst to the restaurant patrons, the young man was wearing a suicide vest containing a 
5-10 kg bomb, which “was packed with nails, screws, and bolts to ensure maximum damage.”406  
The attacker calmly proceeded to the middle of the restaurant, set down his guitar case and 
detonated the suicide vest.  The results were devastating.   
According to one eyewitness, “[a]s soon as I cut into the pizza I heard a huge boom, and 
orange flames shot through the air.”407  Another survivor recalled, “there were people-babies-
thrown through the window and covered with blood.  The whole street was covered with blood 
and bodies:  the dead and the dying.”408  Fifteen people were killed, including seven children, 
and over 130 people were injured in the attack.  Later that evening, the Islamic Resistance 
                                                 
406 “Suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem,” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 9, 
2001). Article available online at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/10/Suicide%20bombing%20at%20the%20Sbarro%20pi
zzeria%20in%20Jerusale.  Accessed on 10/12/09.   
407 Suzanne Goldenberg, “The Street was covered with blood and bodies: the dead and the dying,” (The 
Guardian, August 10, 2001). Available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/aug/10/israel1.  Accessed 
on 10/12/09.  
408 Ibid.  
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Movement (also known as Hamas) claimed responsibility for the attack.  Hamas proudly 
announced that the suicide attacker, a 23-year-old male named Izekine al-Masri, became a noble 
shahid (martyr) and that he would spend an eternity in Paradise by virtue of his terrible action.  
This suicide attack would be one of many perpetrated by Hamas targeting Israeli civilians during 
the Al Aqsa Uprising (also known as the second intifada). 
Since 1993, Israel has been engaged in a protracted conflict with Hamas and other 
terrorist organizations seeking to use violence in order to achieve an independent Palestinian 
state.  This chapter focuses on Hamas exclusively because that group became the most prolific 
user of suicide attacks during the first and second Palestinian uprisings.  As such, the chapter 
seeks to answer the following questions:  What is the historical context of the conflict between 
Israel and Hamas?  Why did Hamas choose to adopt suicide attacks in the first and second 
intifadas?  What are the individual motivations prompting Hamas attackers to detonate a suicide 
vest?409  Finally, how is Hamas able to make the attack resonate with the Palestinian population?   
The first section investigates the historical roots of the conflict between Hamas and the 
state of Israel.  This requires an exploration into the profound ideological influence that the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had on Hamas.  Hamas, being the self-described military wing of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, inherited a powerful narrative from the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
combined history, grievance and theology.  This narrative was fashioned by Muslim Brotherhood 
founder Hasan al-Banna and then perfected by its most famous ideologue, Sayyid Qutb.410  It is a 
virulent mix of anti-Semitic and orthodox theological arguments that seek to dehumanize the 
                                                 
409 This question is particularly pertinent since suicide is strictly forbidden in Islam.  
410 The impact of Sayyid Qutb’s thought on Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda will be examined in the next 
chapter.   
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inhabitants of Israel while justifying jihad (struggle) to liberate the Palestinian state.  This 
narrative gained traction with successive failures by Arab and Palestinian nationalism to resist 
the state of Israel.  Indeed, Hamas presented a cogent Islamic ideology of liberation to a 
Palestinian population disillusioned with the promises of Arab nationalism.  Following the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s lead, Hamas then proliferated this ideology by way of dawa (charity) 
activities in mosques, and schools.411  
The second section investigates why Hamas used suicide attacks during the first and 
second intifadas.  The section argues that in each instance the tactic was adopted out of a 
defensive necessity as a means to engage Israel militarily in order to achieve a specific strategic 
goal.  The first intifada of 1993-1996 saw an increasing commitment to a peaceful solution to the 
Palestinian conflict led by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, PLO leader Yasser Arafat and 
U.S. President Bill Clinton.  In September 1993, Israel and the PLO entered into the Oslo 
Accords in Washington DC, which called for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank and affirmed the Palestinian right to self-government within those areas 
through the creation of the Palestinian Authority.   Hamas decried the peace process and 
instituted its first campaign of suicide attacks to disrupt and dismantle the peace process.  The 
second intifada of 2000-2006 saw a dramatic increase in suicide attacks by Hamas as its ideology 
of martyrdom grew more potent.  Hamas’ main strategic goal was an attempt to make Israel 
engage in a unilateral withdrawal of Palestinian land.  Hamas achieved this goal as it prompted 
Israel to withdraw from Judea, Samaria and Gaza at the end of the second intifada.  This 
                                                 
411 Dawa literally translates as ‘preaching’ or ‘a call to god’ but it was used by the Muslim Brotherhood as 
social service network.  
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dramatically increased Hamas’ popularity and, as a result, the group won the Palestinian 
Legislative Council in 2006.      
The third section delves into the motivation of Hamas suicide attackers.  The motivation 
must have a powerful allure since the suicide attacker is convinced that his or her act is not 
suicide.  Hamas tells the potential attacker that the goal of the act is to become a martyr, which 
thereby nullifies the Islamic injunction against suicide.  Martyrs do not commit suicide but rather 
die in the path of god.  A deadly mixture of martyrdom, and the post-mortem incentives this act 
provides, and hatred against the Israeli enemy emerges as the primary motivator for the Hamas 
suicide attacker.  This is confirmed by the great deal of personal information Hamas martyrs 
leave behind as to why they participate in an attack.  This information comes in the forms of 
martyrdom videos and the final written testaments released by Hamas after the attack takes 
place.  The videos and final testaments are critically important because they serve as a way to 
cement the suicide attacker’s commitment, acting as a ‘martyrdom contract’ between the attacker 
and the organization.  What emerges is a picture of an individual who is simultaneously 
motivated by the post-mortem incentives of martyrdom as well as an intense hatred for the Israeli 
occupier. 
The fourth section investigates how Hamas is able to make the attack resonate with the 
Palestinian population.  This is of particular importance in light of a worrying 2008 poll 
conducted by the Palestinian Survey Research Unit, which found that 91% of Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip and 74% in the West Bank support suicide attacks against Israel.412  The section 
argues that Hamas successfully has created a culture of martyrdom, which is pervasive in the 
                                                 
412 "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 27," (Palestinian Survey Research Unit, No. 27, March 24, 2008). 
Available online at www.pcpsr.org.  Accessed on 10/6/2009. 
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West Bank and Gaza.  It has achieved this by engaging in an impressive campaign that markets 
martyrdom via videos, television, graffiti, and the internet.  Moreover, Hamas sponsors schools 
and school-related curriculum that teach Palestinian children from a young age to aspire to be 
martyrs and hate their Jewish neighbors.  Collectively, these efforts have created a society 
inculcated with the belief that the martyr’s death is the greatest act one can aspire to with his or 
her life.  
 
4.2 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HAMAS AND 
ISRAEL  
The Muslim Brotherhood, in a sense, gave birth to Hamas.  This is evident in chapter I, article 2 
of Hamas’ founding charter, which states that Hamas “is one of the wings of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine.”413 The main difference between the two organizations is that Hamas 
wanted to adopt military means to confront Israel.  The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine 
believed that confrontation with Israel should exist primarily on the social and theological fronts 
with armed struggle to occur at a later date.  Though the two differed on the means, they both 
agreed that the establishment of a Palestinian state was of paramount importance.  By virtue of 
being the offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas inherited the Brotherhood’s ideology of 
liberation fashioned by Hasan al-Banna and later Sayyid Qutb.  This ideology is a potent mix of 
anti-Semitism and Islamic fundamentalism, which blames the travails of the Palestinian 
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population on “the Jews” and advocates armed resistance as the only way to achieve a 
Palestinian state.  The history of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideology it bequeathed to 
Hamas will now be explored.   
4.2.1 Precursor to Hamas: The Muslim Brotherhood  
The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna.  The Egyptian based 
Islamist group was conceived to be a mass opposition movement and under Banna’s leadership it 
grew to become a powerful non-governmental force with enormous influence.414  Banna’s 
movement was rooted in Islam and offered a clear alternative to the secular and materialist trends 
that he perceived to be gripping Egypt.415  Banna’s hope was to institute an Islamic revival 
through the establishment of an Islamic society in Egypt governed by shariah (Islamic) law, 
which would then spread throughout the Middle East.  He firmly believed that “[t]he Ikhwan [the 
Brotherhood] is not a regional movement, but it is indeed an international Islamic one, because 
Islam is an international religion.”416 
 From the Brotherhood’s founding, it was interested in what it called ‘the Palestinian 
problem.’  For Banna and his Brotherhood, the Palestinian problem was many centuries old.  He 
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saw Palestine as the scene of ancient clashes between decaying and emerging empires from the 
Egyptian, Hebrew, Babylonian, and Hittite to the Greek and Roman.  By 640 AD, Palestine had 
come under Islamic rule as the Ummahyyad, Abbasid and Fatimid dynasties only to fall in 1099 
AD to the Christian Crusaders from Western Europe.417  Jerusalem would then return to Islamic 
control after the famed warrior Salah al-Din routed the Crusaders in 1187.  The last invasion 
came from the Ottomans in 1250, which maintained control over Palestine until the breakup of 
the Ottoman Empire during World War I.418  After World War II, European powers took control 
of the Levant with France controlling Syria and Lebanon and the British controlling Iraq, 
Transjordan and Palestine.419   
In 1935, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam left Egypt to establish the Brotherhood’s first 
branch in British Occupied Palestine marking the beginning of the Brotherhood’s involvement in 
Palestine.  This is also of consequence because Qassam instituted guerrilla warfare against the 
British in what is called the ‘Great Arab Revolt.’  He achieved great notoriety during the 
guerrilla war against the British, as he became the first Muslim Brother to be martyred in 
Palestine.420  In 1945, Banna sent his own brother, Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, to found the 
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Brotherhood’s branch in Jerusalem.421  The Brotherhood then moved into the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip where it established religious centers that ran a number of charitable organizations 
such as hospitals, neighborhood clinics, schools and universities.422   
1948 was a watershed year for the Brotherhood as it witnessed the creation of the state of 
Israel.  Banna denounced this as ‘a great mistake’ and blamed it on a “global Jewish 
conspiracy.”423  His language is similar to that of an anti-Semitic Russian document entitled The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion.424  Following the Russian piece, Banna claimed that the Jews 
had cut a deal with the British government as a way to marginalize the Palestinians.  Like the 
Protocols, this claim is based on the argument that the Jews held power because they controlled 
many of the banks that operated in Great Britain.  Banna essentially reinterpreted the Protocols 
through an Islamic lens.  Banna also believed that the only way for the Arab world to counter the 
Jewish threat and regain its preeminence involved a return to faith.  In particular, he argued for a 
balance between the internal and external jihad.  The internal jihad made use of preaching and 
education (da’wa) in order to purify one’s soul.  Banna thought that the internal jihad would lead 
to an extensive Islamic revolution and the subsequent creation of an Islamic state.  The external 
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jihad, or the struggle against Israel, should be postponed until the advent of the Islamic state.  
According to this logic, “since Israel’s very existence was the result of the abandonment of 
Islamic norms, only when the Islamization of society was completed and the sharia (Islamic law) 
fully implemented would the Muslims be capable of defeating Israel.”425  Banna’s assassination 
in 1949 left one important question unanswered:  when was the appropriate time to begin the 
external jihad against Israel?  Sayyid Qutb emerged as the new ideologue for the Muslim 
Brotherhood and provided an answer to this question.  Qutb, following Banna, fashioned a potent 
Islamic ideology of liberation that would have a profound influence on Hamas.   
 
4.2.2 Sayyid Qutb and the Islamic Ideology of Liberation  
Sayyid Qutb was born in 1906 and educated at the University of Cairo.  He began his career as a 
literary critic and then obtained employment working for the Egyptian Ministry of Education.  
During his professional work at the Ministry of Education he was exposed to the American 
education system.  The Egyptian Ministry decided to send Qutb to the United States so that he 
could learn more about the American school curricula.  In 1948, he spent nearly a year studying 
at the Teacher’s College of Colorado State College (now University of Northern Colorado).  His 
time in the United States was enough to galvanize a deep hatred of the United States and 
Western culture.  This hatred was due to the fact that he saw the United States as a degenerate 
and corrupt culture where lust and greed were pursued over virtue. In a letter to a friend he 
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opined, “[h]ow I hate and despise this European civilization and eulogize humanity which is 
being tricked by its luster, noise and sexual enjoyment in which the soul suffocates and the 
conscience dies down, while instincts and senses become intoxicated, quarrelsome and excited 
by the red lights.”426   
Qutb’s humble sensibilities were affronted by the great intermingling between men and 
women as they attended class together, ate in the cafeteria together and often accompanied one 
another on social outings.  In a seminar on American Social Life, he wanted to know what role 
personal ethics and morality played in the interaction between the sexes.  An American woman 
at the Teacher’s College responded to Qutb in this manner:  “[t]he issue of sexual relations is a 
purely biological issue. You-the Orientals-complicate this simple issue by introducing the ethical 
elements in it.  The horse and the mare, the bull and the cow, the ram and the goat and the rooster 
and the hen do not think of this story of ethics while they are mating.  So their life is easy, simple 
and comfortable!”427  The woman’s statement merely confirmed Qutb’s view that Americans 
were a licentious lot focused on satisfying “a body that lusts after another body…[like] an animal 
that craves another animal, with no time for spiritual longings, [or] high aspirations.”428   
Another aspect of American life in particular and Western civilization in general that 
disturbed Qutb was the value placed on material goods and money.  In a letter, he noted that 
America and all Western nations “take their bearings from one source, and that is the 
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materialistic civilization which has no heart and nor moral conscience.  It is a civilization, which 
does not speak of anything but commerce. How I hate and disdain those Westerners! All of them, 
without exception.”429   
Needless to say, Qutb returned to Egypt disgusted with what he had seen in America.  As 
Ronald Nettler notes, his experience in Colorado prompted Qutb to return to Islam and “he began 
to see in America and the West intrinsic features of moral corruption and decadence which, in 
his view, totally contradicted Islamic morality and endangered Islamic values.”430  Qutb also 
believed that both Judaism and Christianity had sacrificed their ethical systems on the altar of 
economic materialism.  He came to see both Jews and Christians as opponents of Islam and felt 
that the best course of action was a healthy distance between the Abrahamic religions.   
The creation of the state of Israel threatened this separation and inspired Qutb to write 
polemical tracts against what he perceived as Western and Jewish imperialism in the traditional 
land of Islam.  Like Banna, Qutb viewed Israel as the most important problem facing 
contemporary Muslims.  In an essay Qutb published in 1950 entitled ‘Our Struggle with the 
Jews’ he lays out the dire situation for the Islamic community.  According to Qutb, the creation 
of the Israeli state marks the beginning of a major crisis for the Islamic faith.  He notes that the 
Jews’ total emancipation from Muslim rule and their establishment of a Jewish state on Muslim 
lands is a signal of Islam’s total collapse.431  The problem as identified by Qutb is not only a 
political problem but also a theological one.  Qutb believed that the Jewish state was a danger to 
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the social and political strength of Islam.  Indeed, he goes on to say that the loss of ancient 
Palestine to the Jews is a direct result of Muslims having abandoned their faith and then, in this 
weakness, succumbing to Jewish deception. 
Qutb identifies the Jews as the ancient enemy of Islam.  He states that, “the Jews have 
confronted Islam with enmity from the moment that the Islamic state was established in 
Medina.”432  This ancient confrontation has persisted until the twentieth century where, 
according to Qutb, the Jews “have instilled men and regimes [in the Islamic World and the 
West], in order to conspire against this [Muslim] community. Hundreds, then, even thousands 
were plotting within the Islamic world” to wrest Palestine from Muslim control.433  The Jews 
were able to do this subversive work through a proliferation of false ideologies like 
secularization and materialism emanating from the West that were undermining Islam.  He notes 
that “behind the doctrine of atheistic materialism was a Jew; behind the doctrine of animalistic 
sexuality was a Jew; and behind the destruction of the family and the shattering of sacred 
relationships in society…was a Jew.”434  Here Qutb identifies the socialist economics of Karl 
Marx, the psychosexual theories of Sigmund Freud and the atheistic sociology of Emile 
Durkheim.  These anti-Islamic ideologies continue to lead the Muslim community “away from 
its religion and to alienate it from the Koran.”435  This prompts Qutb to conclude that the 
“struggle between Islam and the Jews continues in force and will continue, because the Jews will 
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be satisfied only with the destruction of this religion [Islam].”436  So far, Qutb has equated the 
establishment of Israel with a loss of faith, and identified the Jews as the ancient enemies of 
Islam who are responsible for this current predicament.  Simply put, he has revealed the problem, 
assigned blame and now must put forth a plan of action for Palestine’s liberation.  For Qutb, the 
liberation of Palestine can only occur if the Muslim community returns to their faith and then 
wages a jihad against Israel. 
Qutb expounds on the role of jihad in a book he wrote while in prison called Milestones.  
According to R. Scott Appleby, Milestones was a major contribution to Sunni fundamentalism.  
He notes that the book is shaped by “a tortured vision of the past-a construction of history that 
casts the long and otherwise dispiriting record of humiliation, persecution, and exile of the true 
believers as a necessary prelude to the decisive intervention of God and the vanquishing of the 
apostates.”437  Probably the most radical idea in the book is the abrogation of jihad as a defensive 
war to an offensive war.  Islam, like Christianity, has a rich tradition of ‘Just War theory.’438  
Before Qutb, the theological consensus was that violent jihad should only be engaged in a 
defensive effort to repel the enemies of Islam.439  Qutb rejects this because he believes that a 
defensive jihad is too restrictive and puts the Islamic community at risk.  Such a jihad “confined 
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to geographical…limits [that] does not take any action except out of fear of aggression…[has 
lost] all its inherent dynamism.”440   
For Qutb, jihad is not restricted to the defense of the Islamic homeland, but rather should 
extend to the end of the earth.  He couches this goal in egalitarian language.  He claims that 
Islam brings peace and equality into societies gripped by inequality and materialism.  Since 
Islam is a divinely ordained “perfect system” aimed at the liberation of humankind, extending 
Islam’s influence should be in humanity’s interest because it brings human beings a “taste of true 
freedom.”441  The major goal of jihad, then, is the “establishing of the dominion of God on earth, 
the abolishing of the dominion of man, the taking away of sovereignty from the usurper to revert 
it to God, and the bringing about of the enforcement of Divine Law (Sharia).”442  This requires 
offensive action “to replace this jahiliyya (state of ignorance) with Islamic ideas and 
traditions.”443   
Qutb’s exposition on jihad presents a solution for how to deal with the creation of Israel.  
The first move requires a return to orthodox Islam.  He claims that “we must begin where the 
Prophet began, with a small group of people [vanguard] who have committed themselves to 
serve God and God alone in all aspects of life.”444  Once the idolatrous ideologies propagated by 
the Jews are tossed in the “rubbish heap of the West” then the group can begin to implement 
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jihad.445  By the time of Qutb’s death, he had succeeded in fashioning a revolutionary Islamic 
ideology of liberation, which vilified the Jews and espoused an offensive jihad in order to 
Islamize and thus free those societies gripped by unbelief.    This Islamic ideology of liberation 
had a profound influence on the Muslim Brotherhood and was easily transferred to Hamas after 
it declared itself to be the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The ideology would become 
even more potent when its chief competitors, Arab and Palestinian nationalism, failed to liberate 
Palestine.  
 
 
4.2.3 The Failure of Nationalism  
In the twentieth century, nationalism took two forms when dealing with Israel.446  First, there 
was Pan-Arab nationalism exemplified by the Egyptian President Gamal’Abd al-Nasser.  Next 
there was Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian nationalism of Fatah and the PLO.  Despite the claims by 
both pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalism to rid the Middle East of Israel, both failed to achieve 
their goals.   
The failure of pan-Arabism lies in the disastrous outcome of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.  
While there is a large literature on this conflict, most scholars point to three actions undertaken 
by President Nasser, which prompted an Israeli preemptive strike against the airfields of Egypt 
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and Syria.447  On May 14, 1967, Nasser sent two Egyptian infantry divisions accompanied by 
some 200 tanks to the Sinai Peninsula.  Two days later on May 16, he demanded that the United 
Nations Emergency Force withdraw from Egyptian soil.  Finally, on May 22, he declared the 
Straits of Tiran closed to Israeli shipping.448  He then increased his belligerent rhetoric claiming 
that if a battle was begun between Israel and Egypt that Egypt’s “basic objective will be to 
destroy Israel.”449  Reacting to these actions, Israeli leaders “repeatedly emphasized that Israel 
would regard any interference with the principle of free passage as an act of aggression.  They 
warned that Israel would take action to defend its right to sail through the Straits even at the cost 
of war.  Closing the Straits, the Israeli government concluded, amounted to a casus belli.”450  
When faced with amassing Egyptian troops on its border and the closing of the Straits of Tiran, 
which would cripple the Israeli economy, the Israeli leadership decided that a preemptive war 
was a necessary option.   
Israel launched its preemptive war against Egypt and Syria on June 5, 1967.  The Israeli 
Air Force dubbed its mission Operation Moked (Focus) as it aimed “to launch a surprise attack 
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on the enemy air bases by small formations that would bomb the runways and then return to 
destroy the enemy aircraft on the ground by strafing.”451   The attack achieved complete surprise; 
losses on the Israeli side were lighter than anticipated whereas the Egyptian Air Force was 
crippled.452  During the next five days, Israel would further humiliate the Arab armies as it 
obtained control over the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai and the Golan 
Heights.  The 1967 defeat was a stunning blow to Pan-Arab nationalism and raised questions 
amongst Palestinians as to the feasibility of fighting Israel in a conventional war.453  Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip found themselves separated from their Arab neighbors 
and living under direct Israeli control.454  Yasser Arafat and his Fatah organization turned to 
Palestinian nationalism and concomitantly terrorism as a way to wrest control of Palestine from 
Israel. 
Established in 1958, Fatah had anticipated a war with Israel before 1967.  However, 
Yasser Arafat and other leaders did not believe it would happen so soon.  They wanted to 
gradually build up the Arab forces of Egypt and Syria and then launch an invasion into Israel in 
order to reclaim the territory they believed had been confiscated from the Palestinians.  On 
August 20, 1967, Fatah’s leadership convened in the Old Quarter of Nablus, “a West Bank town 
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with a long history of Arab nationalist fervor.”455  The main issue on the agenda was how they 
were going to resist the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.  Arafat believed that the only 
option left was to engage in guerrilla activities, which should begin as soon as possible.456   
Arafat wanted Fatah to engage Israel on two fronts.  The first involved guerrilla warfare 
and terrorism.  Fatah’s main modus operandi was to attack Israel’s checkpoints and to lure the 
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers into a gunfight.  Fatah also sought to inspire the local 
Palestinian population to engage in active resistance against the Israeli occupier.  It was Arafat’s 
hope that “the two courses of action-Fatah’s terrorism and local rebellion-would finally merge 
into one movement-a popular armed revolution, led by Arafat and his colleagues.’457   
Arafat’s dream of one united movement against Israel was not to be realized.  While he 
had substantial control over the main governing body in Palestine, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), of which Fatah was a main member, many different guerrilla groups 
appeared to challenge Arafat.  Others include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PLFP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Liberation 
Front (PLF), Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF).  
The challenging groups agreed on the end they wanted to achieve; the restoration of a Palestinian 
state.  However, some groups did not agree on the means.  Fatah, the PFLP and the DFLP 
believed that armed struggle was the only way to obtain a Palestinian state.  Others, like the PPP, 
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believed that Israel would be defeated through a Marxist class revolution, which would sweep 
Israel out of power and usher in the Palestinian state. 
Fatah’s lack of tangible results raised concerns from one Muslim Brother living in Gaza 
named Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.  Yassin had been sent to Gaza to head the Mujamma, a welfare 
charity organization that provided social services to the Palestinian population.  One event in 
particular caught the Sheikh’s attention.  The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon revealed just how 
impotent the PLO and Fatah were to what Yassin believed to be blatant acts of Israeli 
aggression.458  For Yassin, this latest defeat was not just a military matter.  He believed that the 
reason why the Palestinians had not achieved their goal was due to a lack of religious faith. 
   
4.2.4 The Emergence of Hamas  
Sheikh Yassin became the force behind a devastating critique of Palestinian nationalism.  He 
argued that Arab and Palestinian nationalism had done little to improve the situation of everyday 
Palestinians.  Worse yet, it had not come close to liberating Palestine.  The Sheikh, turning to the 
writings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, believed this failure to be a direct result of the 
secular orientation of Fatah and the PLO.  Rather than putting one’s faith in Islam, these 
organizations had adopted Western ideologies.  Yassin offered a simple solution to the problem 
at hand.  If the Palestinian community would turn to Islam, then they would be better able to 
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engage Israel.  As such, Yassin declared that “the Islamization of society was a precondition for 
the establishment of an Islamic state in a liberated Palestine.”459   
The Sheikh supported his argument for a return to Islam by drawing from the Iranian 
Revolution and Hizbollah as evidence.  The Iranian revolution had a major impact on Yassin and 
the Muslim Brothers working in Palestine.  Even though the Iranian Islamists emerged from a 
different religious tradition (Shia instead of Sunni), their seizure of power supported the idea that 
Islam could usher in profound change if the faithful believed in it.460  Yassin admired how 
Ayatollah Khomeini galvanized the population as Islamic fervor swept the Shah out of power.461  
Similarly in Lebanon, Yassin marveled at the way Hizbollah militarized their faith.  The April 
23, 1983 suicide attacks against American marine and French army barracks led both countries 
to withdraw their forces.  The United States Marine barracks bombing was, at that time, the 
largest terrorist act in United States history with 220 Marines dead.462  Yassin listened carefully 
to Hizbollah cleric Hassan Trad when he said that “Lebanon was only liberated thanks to the 
ishtihad [martyrdom] actions.”463  Yassin observed how Hizbollah turned to jihad and succeeded 
in expelling the Western multinational forces in Lebanon.    
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These experiences confirmed for Yassin the primacy of faith and how it could be 
mobilized as a weapon to fight Israel.  Yassin, like Banna, saw the Palestinians as locked in an 
ancient conflict between Muslims and Jews in which the latter had used deception against the 
former in order to obtain the state of Israel.  Since the Jewish state was militarily superior to the 
Palestinians, the only way to bridge the gap was a strict reliance on faith.  As such, Yassin 
agreed with Qutb’s proscription of jihad as the method by which the Palestinians would defeat 
Israel.   
Yassin and other members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood began to consider 
providing an Islamic alternative to the PLO’s secular leadership.464  The failure of the 1967 war 
and continuing Israeli aggression against Palestinians were signs that the PLO had placed its trust 
in a false ideology.  Their deliberations acquired a sense of urgency when in December 1987, an 
Israeli truck crashed into a vehicle transporting Palestinian workers.  The crash, dubbed an 
accident, triggered violent riots that grew into a social uprising.  This marked the beginning of 
the first intifada where the Palestinian society engaged in open demonstrations and violence 
against their Israeli occupiers.465  In February 1988, two months after the beginning of the 
intifada, Yassin’s Gaza based Muslim Brotherhood created a splinter group called Hamas 
(Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyya, meaning ‘zeal’ in Arabic).  Hamas presented a new, 
Islamic based formula for victory and became the chief competitor against the secular PLO and 
Fatah organizations.  Unbeknownst to Israel, Hamas would later emerge as the most prolific user 
of suicide attacks during the first and second Palestinian intifadas.    
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4.3 HAMAS AND SUICIDE ATTACKS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND INTIFADAS   
Hamas classified itself as the militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Through the creation of 
Hamas, “the founding fathers of the Muslim Brotherhood had effectively adopted jihad as a 
means for achieving national and religious redemption, recognizing the primacy of armed 
struggle to mobilize the masses, and taking the initiative in guiding the popular uprising.”466  
Hamas inherited the Islamic ideology of liberation created by Banna and Qutb, which sanctioned 
the doctrine of external jihad against Israel with the goals of liberating Palestine and creating an 
Islamic state.  According to Hamas’ charter, jihad “becomes an individual duty binding on every 
Muslim man and woman…[and] [t]here is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by 
jihad.”467   
Despite this language, Hamas did not emerge during the first intifada as a group that 
engaged in wanton violence.  An examination of the first intifada reveals that Hamas adopted a 
pragmatic strategy of controlled violence against Israel out of a defensive necessity since the 
organization could not engage Israel in an open confrontation, which aimed at disrupting peace 
talks between the PLO and Israel.  During the second intifada, Hamas increased the frequency of 
suicide attacks to terrify the Israel public so that it would pressure the Israeli government to 
engage in territorial concessions.  Hamas’ successful ability to use suicide attacks is attributed 
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largely to the martyrdom ideology that it developed.  This potent ideology ensured that Hamas’ 
suicide cadres were filled with willing volunteers ready to attack Israel.        
 
4.3.1 Suicide Attacks and the First Intifada  
Hamas’ first act of terrorism against Israel was not a suicide attack.  Instead, in 1989, Hamas 
instituted what amounted to be a sicari-like campaign of stabbings and kidnappings.468  Like the 
sicari, Hamas members openly attacked Israeli citizens in the West Bank and Gaza cities with 
easily hidden daggers.469  This caught the attention of Israeli counter-terrorism officials and 
Israel responded by conducting a wave of arrests in the West Bank and Gaza.  With over 415 
Hamas members arrested, Israel decided to deport these individuals to southern Lebanon.470  
This proved to be a disastrous decision that Israel would later regret.  When the Hamas members 
arrived in Lebanon, they were approached by members of Hizbollah.  It is believed that the 
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Hamas members received weapons training from Hizbollah and witnessed Hizbollah’s use of 
suicide attacks.  As Shaul Shay argues, Hamas operatives “underwent terrorist training under the 
tutelage of the Hizbollah and implemented everything they had learned in their struggle with 
Israel.”471  When the exiled members returned to Palestine, they came back with sophisticated 
military training and an idea of a new tactic that could be used against Israel.   
Hizbollah’s influence on Hamas was apparent in 1993, when Hamas launched its first 
suicide attack on April 16, 1993, almost four years after the group’s creation.472  A car filled with 
explosives driven by Sahar Tama Nabulsi was detonated next to a group of buses in a parking lot 
where a restaurant, frequented by members of the Mechola settlement in the Jordan valley, was 
located.  The number of causalities “was relatively reduced owing to the fact that most of the 
soldiers destined to travel on these buses were in the restaurant at the time.”473  According to 
security officials and policymakers in Israel, “the first Palestinian incident was received with a 
great astonishment because until that day, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism was mostly 
limited to the Lebanon region.”474  This marked the beginning of a Hamas suicide campaign that 
lasted from 1993 until 1996.  During that three year time, Hamas engaged in 16 suicide attacks in 
which 119 people were killed and 467 people were injured.475   
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What shocked many in Israel about Hamas’ campaign of suicide attacks was that it 
targeted Israeli civilians.  Public statements from Hamas claim that the group began to target 
Israeli civilians in response to Baruch Goldstein’s Temple Mount massacre.476  In a sense, 
Hamas sought to capitalize on the rage many Palestinians felt in the aftermath of the Temple 
Mount carnage so it used the Goldstein atrocity to test whether the Palestinian public would 
accept their newfound tactic.477  When the retaliatory suicide attack against Israeli civilians was 
greeted with jubilation on the Palestinian side, Hamas must have realized that targeting civilians 
with suicide attacks could be integrated into a viable resistance strategy.  Hamas made the 
necessary internal adjustments as it formed the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, which would 
dedicate itself to perpetrating suicide attacks against Israel. 
Apart from revenge for the rampage of Baruch Goldstein, Hamas’ first wave of suicide 
attacks was intended to spoil the forthcoming Oslo Accords.  Indeed, the April 4, 1996 suicide 
attack that killed 8 and wounded 50 was an attempt to sabotage the Declaration of Principles and 
to undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority.  Hamas believed that the Oslo Accords 
were fundamentally flawed because they “would bring an end to [Hamas’] lofty vision of an 
establishment of an Islamic state on all Palestinian-Israeli territory.”478  A two-state solution was 
irreconcilable to Hamas’ goal of an Islamic Palestine, which included the occupied territories and 
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Israel.  Hamas argued that historic Palestine, which included the state of Israel, comprised a holy 
land (waqf), which had been endowed to all Muslim generations ‘until the day of 
resurrection.’479   As a result, a solution that did not involve the return of the entire waqf should 
be rejected. Moreover, the accords granted Fatah a dominant status in the Palestinian Authority 
in terms of creating and implementing policy.  As such, it became evident that Islamic 
organizations like Hamas would have no voice in the political process. 
Toward the end of its first campaign of suicide attacks, Hamas succeeded in its role as 
saboteur.  At the end of 1996, the peace process was in disarray and Hamas had created a climate 
of fear within Israel.  Additionally, Hamas conducted two devastating suicide attacks in 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv before the Israeli general election.  The attacks killed 33 and wounded 
110 and, according to Mia Bloom, prompted the Israeli public to elect the conservative Likud 
party candidate Benjamin Netanyahu who declared his firm opposition to the peace process.480 
The limited nature with which Hamas used suicide attacks during this period suggests an 
organization that was carefully implementing a new strategy.  As aforementioned, there were 
only 16 attacks in a three year period.  The primary reasons why Hamas did not utilize suicide 
attacks more during this period are a combination of organizational and ideological restraints.  
Ideologically, Hamas was in the process of developing a sophisticated martyrdom ideology that 
would be presented to the potential suicide attacker.  As Mohammed Hafez observes, the 
incentive for martyrdom during the first intifada was presented by Hamas to the attacker in a 
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largely ‘top-down approach.’481  Hamas recruiters utilized the dawa social network system it 
inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood.  As a result, recruiters would often visit mosques and 
religious schools in search of martyrs.  Most of the martyrs-to-be were recruited and then 
immediately “kept in isolation for several weeks [to months for] mental, technical and [religious] 
preparation.”482  Additionally, as Quintan Wiktorowicz notes, during the first intifada support for 
suicide bombings in Palestine “never exceeded a third of the population and generally hovered 
around 25%.”483  This translated into organizational restraints as Hamas had to choose its targets 
selectively, only attacking when it believed there was a promising opportunity to marginalize the 
PLO or disrupt the peace process.  During the second intifada, these organizational restraints 
began to disappear.  As Hamas developed a more robust martyrdom ideology, more members of 
the Palestinian population sought to become suicide attackers.  This gave Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-
Qassam the strategic flexibility to unleash their newfound ‘arsenal of believers’ to pressure Israel 
into making unilateral concessions.484   
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4.3.2 Suicide Attacks and the Second Intifada  
During the months preceding the second intifada, the peace process between the Israelis and 
Palestinians was stalling.  In July 2000, the peace summit at Camp David between U.S. President 
Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barack and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser 
Arafat failed to produce a comprehensive peace agreement.  According to Charles Enderlin, the 
four issues preventing an agreement involved questions over what constituted a sovereign 
Palestinian territory, who would have control over Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees, and what unilateral security measures Israel could take if Palestinian violence 
erupted.485  The failure of the peace process also hardened Israeli and Palestinian attitudes 
against one another.  On the Palestinian side, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for 
Policy and Survey Research found that 60% of Palestinians believed that peace between Israel 
and Palestine was ‘impossible or definitely impossible’ and that 66% believed that ‘violent 
confrontation’ was the only way to secure an independent Palestinian sate.486  This general 
feeling of pessimism and anger created a Palestinian populace who was willing to re-engage in 
violent conflict with Israel.  Once the second intifada erupted, Hamas and its potent martyrdom 
ideology would take full advantage of this atmosphere.   
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 The second intifada started on September 28, 2000 and would prove to be much more 
violent than the first.  It is commonly asserted that the trigger for the second collective uprising 
was a visit to the Temple Mount by future Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.487  Captured by Israel in 
the 1967 war, the Temple Mount (known to Muslims as the Haram al Sharif) is sacred to all 
three Abrahamic faiths because it is the location where it is believed Abraham bound his son 
Isaac to offer him as a burnt offering to God.488  Additionally, for Jews, the Temple Mount is the 
site where King Solomon built the first Jewish temple almost 3,000 years ago.  For Muslims, the 
Haram al Sharif is where the Prophet Mohammad, accompanied by the Angel Gabriel, made the 
night journey to Allah’s heavenly throne where the Prophet saw all the wonders of the 
afterlife.489  According to Sharon, he visited the Temple Mount “in order to see what happens 
here and really to help the feeling that we are now ready to move forward.”490  Despite Sharon’s 
peaceful intentions, his visit was decried as another example of Israel’s occupying presence.  
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Soon after Sharon left the Temple Mount, angry demonstrators clashed with the Israeli police 
forces.491 
From the outset of the second intifada, Israel noticed something different.  While Hamas 
perpetrated the first suicide attack in the second intifada targeting Israeli citizens on January 8, 
2001, secular organizations like the PFLP and Fatah’s newly created Al Aqsa Martyr Brigade 
(AMB) also began to engage in suicide attacks.492  According to Mia Bloom, the secular 
organizations adopted suicide attacks as a way to outbid and marginalize their Islamic 
competitors.493 As Bloom notes, the secular PFLP and AMB organizations were engaged in a 
battle of legitimacy against the Islamic organizations like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ).  When looking at inter-group dynamics, this explanation is certainly plausible.  Not 
wanting to be marginalized, the PFLP and AMB adopted a tactic that would raise their visibility.  
Indeed, the PFLP and AMB must have seen how much attention was devoted to Hamas’ suicide 
attacks, especially those targeting Israeli civilians.  While Bloom’s explanation is useful in 
seeing how different groups vie for perceived legitimacy in a population, there are three 
shortcomings with her argument.   
First, there is evidence that Hamas collaborated with PIJ and AMB.  Michele Esposito 
finds that Hamas worked together with PIJ and AMB on as many as 10 suicide attacks.494  With 
142 total suicide attacks during the second intifada, this means that roughly 7% of the attacks 
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involved collaboration between Hamas and another group.  It is hard to imagine groups engaged 
in such an intense competitive struggle would collaborate at all.  Also, looking at the aggregate 
number of suicide attacks performed from 2001-2006 during the second intifada reveals that 
66% of them were perpetrated by Hamas.495  Rather than competition, this suggests that PIJ, 
PFLP and AMB adopted the strategy as a way to stay relevant in the struggle for Palestine.   
Second, focusing on inter-group competition ignores external factors that prompted other 
organizations to adopt suicide attacks, the most critical being Israel’s policy of targeted killing.  
Instead of competing with one another, the PFLP, PIJ, and AMB could have adopted the tactic 
out of a defensive need to retaliate against Israel’s targeted assassination policy.   
Finally, the inter-group competition all but ignores how the PFLP and AMB copied 
Hamas’ martyrdom ideology. Although avowedly nationalist in their goals, both the PFLP and 
the AMB began to entice potential attackers with talk of martyrdom.  The PFLP and AMB were 
attempting to inject an Islamic concept that was, until that point, strictly used by Hamas in the 
hope of tapping into a population increasingly drawn by the promises of martyrdom.  The sheer 
power of this ideology is best demonstrated by the speed and frequency with which Hamas sent 
suicide attackers to target Israel. 
During the first intifada, Hamas averaged around five suicide attacks per year.  These 
attacks were usually spread out, as they had to be timed carefully to disrupt the peace process.  
During the second intifada, Hamas’ use of suicide attacks soared to 18.8 per year.  What is most 
striking in this period is the increase in the frequency of the attacks.  The lag time between 
attacks that existed in the first intifada was gone in the second intifada.  As was noted earlier, the 
first intifada saw Hamas marketing martyrdom mainly through a top-down approach.  This 
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required Hamas to actively identify recruits that would participate in suicide attacks.  As such, 
Hamas had to scout out potential suicide attackers then sequester them to instill in them the 
desire for martyrdom.   
This dynamic changed completely in the second intifada.  Hamas did not have to invest 
nearly as much time identifying, recruiting and ideologically preparing young martyrs-to-be 
because the allure of martyrdom had set in for those Palestinians living in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.496  Instead, as former Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin noted, “our 
biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [on a 
suicide attack].  It is difficult to only select a few.  Those whom we turn away return again and 
again, pestering us and pleading to be accepted.”497  During the second intifada, Hamas had too 
many willing recruits, which allowed the group to expand the manner in which it used suicide 
attacks.  For instance, Hamas was able to participate in simultaneous attacks where the 
organization sent two suicide attackers to strike different parts and/or targets in Israel.  Hamas 
could also send attackers in a relatively back-to-back fashion.  Perhaps the most infamous 
example of this occurred in May of 2003 where Hamas dispatched one suicide attacker on May 
14, one on May 17, two on May 18, one on May 23 and finally one on May 27.498  Finally, 
Hamas made it a point to target Israeli civilians in public places.  Suicide attackers detonated 
themselves in cafes, nightclubs, restaurants, and buses creating a palpable climate of fear within 
Israel.  
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The ferocity with which Hamas unleashed suicide attackers in the second intifada 
produced three tangible results.   The first was that public support for suicide attacks rose 
dramatically.  As aforementioned, Palestinian public support for suicide attacks in the first 
intifada had hovered between 25-33%.  By the end of 2003, a poll revealed that 74.5% of the 
Palestinian population supported suicide attacks against Israel.499  The increase in support for 
suicide attacks during the second intifada is largely due to Hamas’ organizational success in 
marketing martyrdom at the grass-roots level.  Israel also contributed to Palestinian public 
support of suicide attacks by its controversial counter-terrorism policy of targeted killings.500  
This policy only heightened the strong feelings of resentment that Palestinians had toward 
Israelis. 
Secondly, the suicide attack campaign during the second intifada increased popular 
support for Hamas amongst the population.  According to a poll conducted by the Jerusalem 
Media and Communications Center in June 2004, public support for Hamas rose to 22% while 
support for Fatah fell to 26%.501  This increase in public popularity would translate into political 
gains for Hamas during the 2004-2005 municipal elections and later in the 2006 Palestinian 
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Legislative Council Elections, which effectively made Hamas the governing authority in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.502 
Finally, Hamas’ suicide campaign pressured Israel to engage in unilateral withdrawals of 
Israeli territory.  As Ami Pedhazur notes, the deadly wave of suicide attacks directly “contributed 
to the acceleration of the Israeli withdrawal from cities in the West Bank, Judea, Samaria and 
Gaza Strip.”503  The Israeli public, now thoroughly disillusioned with the peace process, “was 
willing to accept the idea of secession from the territories without a Palestinian commitment to 
peace or even an end to terror.”504 
To summarize what has been argued thus far, one must remember that Hamas has used 
suicide attacks out of a defensive necessity to achieve a strategic end.  Suicide attacks in the first 
intifada sought to engage Israeli militarily and disrupt the Oslo Peace Agreements in 1993 and 
later the Declaration of Principles in 1996 between Israel and the PLO.  In the second intifada, 
Hamas continued to disrupt the peace process, gained increasing popularity amongst the 
Palestinian public, which translated into political clout for Hamas, and prompted Israel to engage 
in territorial concessions.  The next section investigates how martyrdom attracts individuals to 
become suicide attackers.  
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4.4 THE ALLURE OF MARTYRDOM: A POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE 
FOR DEATH 
The question as to why an individual would wear a suicide vest and detonate it on a bus, in a 
mall or at a restaurant is a troubling one, which has produced various popular explanations one 
of which is that suicide attackers are poor, uneducated, or have psychological problems.  Alan 
Krueger and Jitka Maleckova have dispelled the myth that suicide attackers are impoverished 
and uneducated youths.  Their research indicates that suicide attackers are in their mid to late 
twenties, they are better educated when compared with the national population from which they 
come and rarely come from families plagued by poverty.505  They note that suicide attackers 
overwhelmingly come from the middle class and many have college degrees or post graduate 
degrees in engineering or the hard sciences.506  As for the psychological state of the suicide 
attackers, Nasra Hassan notes that they “all seemed to be entirely normal members of their 
families. They were polite and serious, and in their communities they were considered to be 
model youths. Most were bearded. All were deeply religious. Many of these young men had 
memorized large sections of the Koran and were well versed in the finer points of Islamic law 
and practice.”507  Contrary to the popular misconception that suicide attackers are insane or 
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psychologically disturbed, Hassan notes, that “[t]hey are so normal for their communities and 
societies.”508  If suicide attackers are not poor, uneducated, or psychologically disturbed, then 
something else must be drawing them to participate in the attack.  This section argues that what 
primarily attracts the Hamas suicide bomber to become a human bomb is a potent mixture of 
martyrdom, and the post-mortem incentives it provides, and hatred of the Israeli ‘other.’  This 
combination creates an outlet for the hatred the bombers hold against Israelis as well as a belief 
that martyrdom is the highest goal one can achieve.  Hamas uses written testaments and videos 
as a way to cement the individual’s commitment.  This is a ‘martyrdom contract’ that ensures an 
individual will attain all the benefits of martyrdom if the person successfully completes the 
suicide mission. 
 
4.4.1 Suicide, Martyrdom, Hatred and the Hamas Attacker 
There is an uncomfortable tension for the potential Hamas suicide attacker.  In order for the 
Hamas member to achieve martyrdom, the martyr-to-be must commit suicide.  Just as in Judaism 
and Christianity, suicide is forbidden (haram) in Islamic teaching.  According to Franz 
Rosenthal, the Islamic theological attitude towards suicide can be expressed as follows:  “suicide 
is an unlawful act and the person who commits suicide will be doomed to continually repeat in 
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Hell the action by which he killed himself.”509  This is supported by various hadith, the oral 
statements of the prophet Mohammad, which say: 
• The Prophet was present when a wounded man killed himself.  Then God said, ‘My 
servant anticipated my action by taking his soul in his own hand; therefore, he will not be 
admitted into Paradise.510 
• The Prophet said, ‘Whoever strangles himself will repeat his deed in the Fire, and 
whoever kills himself by stabbing his own body with some weapon will repeat his deed 
in the Fire.”511 
• The Prophet said, “Whoever kills himself with a steel instrument will be punished by the 
same manner in the fire of Hell.”512 
 
The numerous hadith that condemn suicide coupled with the Koranic injunction not to take one’s 
own life posed a problem for Hamas clerics seeking to legitimize suicide attacks.  To get around 
this, Hamas clerics turned to a tenth century thinker named Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi.  In his 
writings, Tawhidi discusses two lesser-known hadith where suicide was considered appropriate: 
• One hadith reports of a man who fought on the side of the Muslims and was 
seriously wounded and in order to shorten his sufferings he fell on his sword and 
ended his life.  Tawhidi notes that ‘since the Prophet had predicted that this man 
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would be doomed in spite of the valor he displayed for the Muslim cause, his 
suicide was an indication that the Prophet had not been mistaken.”513 
• The second involves a story that Tawhidi recounts:  "[r]ecently we saw what 
happened to a learned Sayh. This Sayh had come to live in very reduced 
circumstances.  Therefore, people began to avoid him more and more, and his 
acquaintances no longer wanted to have anything to do with him.  This went on 
for a while until one day he entered his home, tied a rope to the roof of his room, 
and hanged himself, thus ending his life.  When we learned about the affair, we 
were shocked and grieved.  We discussed his story back and forth, and one of 
those present said:  ‘What an excellent fellow! He acted like a man!  What a 
splendid thing he did of his own free will!  His action indicates magnanimity and 
a great staunchness of mind.  He freed himself from a long drawn-out misery and 
from circumstances which were unbearable.’"514 
 
What both stories cited by Tawhidi have in common is that they address the intent of the person 
committing suicide.  In the first story, the wounded soldier is not committing suicide to escape 
his life, but rather he commits suicide to free himself from the wounds suffered while fighting 
for the cause of Islam.  In the second story, the man is lauded for removing himself from an 
unbearable situation.  In fact, his action is praised as ‘magnanimous’ and one requiring a ‘great 
staunchness of mind.’  By focusing on intent, Hamas clerics and ideologues are able to skirt the 
Islamic injunction against suicide.  This is best captured in two interviews done by Jerrold Post 
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with incarcerated Hamas operatives whose explosive devices failed to detonate.  When asked 
whether his failed attack would have amounted to suicide, one responded by saying that “suicide 
is selfish, it is weak, it is mentally disturbed.  This is isthishad (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the 
service of Allah).”515  The other objected to the term suicide and said, “a martyrdom operation is 
the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith.  The bombers are holy fighters 
who carry out one of the most important articles of faith.”516  This sentiment is echoed by former 
Hamas leader and ideologue Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi who said, “suicide depends on volition. 
If the martyr intends to kill himself, because he is tired of life, it is suicide.  However, if he wants 
to sacrifice his soul in order to strike the enemy and to be rewarded by Allah-he is considered a 
martyr [rather than someone who committed suicide].”517  For the Hamas suicide operative, his 
intent is not to kill or to escape the world, but rather it is to embrace martyrdom in order to 
achieve the goal of a liberated Palestine.  The operative is also enticed by certain post-mortem 
incentives to become a martyr. 
Martyrdom has a long history in Islam because “it is rooted in the fact that from the 
beginning of the religion, Muslims died in the struggle to establish and expand the Islamic state, 
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and their deaths in the course of this struggle were remembered and celebrated.”518  As such, the 
martyr is portrayed as someone who has died valorously defending the faith having achieved a 
great reward that the living can only imagine.  Hamas points to the numerous descriptions of 
Paradise in the Holy Koran as a way to help convince potential suicide attackers.  Such verses 
include: 
• Surah 38: 49-52-“For the righteous, [Paradise] is a beautiful place of [final] 
return…Gardens of Eternity, whose doors will [ever] be open to them; therein 
they will recline [at ease]: therein they can call [at pleasure] for fruit in 
abundance, and [delicious] drink; and beside them will be chaste women…of 
equal age.”519 
• Surah 78: 31-36-“Verily for the Righteous there will be a fulfillment of [the 
heart’s] desires [in Paradise]; gardens enclosed, and grapevines, companions of 
equal age; and a cup full [to the brim].  No vanity shall they hear therein, not 
untruth-recompense from thy Lord, a gift [amply] sufficient.”520 
• Surah 55: 54-56-“They [the houris] will recline on carpets, whose inner linings 
will be of rich brocade: the fruit of the gardens will be near [and easy of reach]. 
Then which of the favors of your Lord will ye deny?  In them will be [Maidens-
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the houris], chaste, restraining their glances, whom no man or jinn before has 
touched.”521 
• Surah 37: 40-48-“But the sincere [and devoted] servants of Allah [the martyrs]-
for them is a sustenance determined, fruits [delights]; and they shall enjoy honour 
and dignity, in gardens of felicity, facing each other on thrones [of dignity]; round 
will be passed to them a cup from a clear-flowing fountain, crystal-white, of a 
taste delicious to those who drink [thereof], free from headiness; nor will they 
suffer intoxication therefrom.  And besides them will be chaste women; 
restraining their glances, with big eyes [of wonder and beauty].  As if they were 
[delicate] eggs closely guarded.”522 
• Surah 44: 51-56-“As to the righteous [they will be] in a position of security. 
Among gardens and springs; dressed in fine silk and in rich brocade, they will 
face each other; moreover, we shall join them to companions with beautiful, big 
and lustrous eyes [the houris].  There can they call for every kind of fruit in peace 
and security; nor will they there taste death, except the first death; and He will 
preserve them from the penalty of the blazing fire. As a bounty from thy Lord! 
That will be the supreme achievement!”523 
• Surah 83: 22-28-“Truly the righteous will be in bliss: on thrones [of dignity] will 
they command a sight [of all things]: thou wilt recognize in their faces the 
beaming brightness of bliss.  Their thirst will be slaked with pure wine sealed: the 
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seal thereof will be musk: and for this let those aspire, who have aspirations: with 
it will be [given] a mixture of tansim [the purest wine]: a spring, from [the waters] 
whereof drink those nearest to Allah.”524 
 
Other theological benefits to being a martyr include an immediate ascension into heaven.  This 
means that the martyr avoids the two great trials: one by the angels Munkar and Nakir, and the 
second happening on Judgment Day.  The martyrs are spared from the Day of Judgment because 
their “sins have been cancelled by their meritorious life and death.”525  The martyr is also able to 
be an intercessor for those friends and family members who might not escape damnation in Hell.  
Once in Paradise, “they share the place closest to the throne of God with the prophets, war 
jeweled crowns, and are each given seventy houris (virgins of Paradise).”526  Additionally, upon 
the martyr’s death, his or her family receives a monetary payment.  Families of Hamas suicide 
bombers receive from $3,000 to $5,000 U.S. dollars for a martyr’s death.527  Moreover, the title 
‘family of a noble martyr’ is bestowed on the family, which is tantamount to an elevation in 
status.528      
It should be noted that the Islamic martyr is like “an athlete, who anoints himself, enters 
the arena, meets his adversary in personal battle, reports victory [through death] and is crowned 
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with a wreath.”529  This makes martyrdom an active endeavor, which is to be sought after.  As 
such, death and martyrdom are portrayed by Hamas as a noble virtue, while the natural or 
accidental death is banal, ignoble and to be avoided at all cost.  Additionally, Hamas emphasizes 
that those who die ‘in the way of God’ (fi sabil Allah) are not dead, but rather are living.  They 
quote Surah 2: 154, which says “And say not of those slain in God’s way, ‘They are dead;’ 
rather, they are living, but you are not aware.’  Similarly in Surah 3: 169-171:  “Count not those 
who were slain in God’s way as dead, but rather living with their Lord, by Him provided, 
rejoicing in the bounty God has given them, because no fear shall be on them, neither shall they 
sorrow, joyful in blessing and bounty from God, and that God leaves not to waste the wage of the 
believers.”   
In sum, the martyr escapes death because he is able to transcend it.  The Hamas suicide 
attacker attempts to follow in the footsteps of the prophet Elijah who was not killed but rather 
was taken to Heaven by a blazing chariot of fire.530  In the current context, the blazing chariot of 
fire has become the suicide vest, and the invitation to become a martyr has become a powerful 
incentive for the individual to don and detonate the vest.  Martyrdom’s magnetism is best 
described by Hasan al-Banna who said: 
“Brother!  God gives the ummah (the Islamic community) that is skilled in the practice of 
death and that knows how to die a noble death an exalted life in this world and eternal 
felicity in the next.  What is the fantasy that has reduced to loving this world and hating 
death? If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed and yearn for death, life shall be given to 
                                                 
529 A.J. Wensinck, "The Original Doctrine of the Martyrs,” 105.  
530 See II Kings: 2: 1-12 
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you…Know, then, that death is inevitable, and that it can only happen once.  If you suffer 
in the way of God, it will profit you in this world and bring your reward in the next.”531     
 
 
The allure of martyrdom and the post-mortem benefits it confers on individuals is a 
primary motivating factor to convince an individual to strap on a suicide vest, but it is not the 
only one.  Almost as powerful as martyrdom is the presence of an intense hatred harbored by the 
suicide operative for the Israeli occupier.  As the first section of this chapter noted, the MB and 
Hamas are influenced by an ideology possessing a strong and virulent anti-Semitism.  Such is the 
case for the individual suicide attacker.  As psychologist Jerrold Post notes, those who live in the 
West Bank and Gaza have been raised in a climate of hopelessness and despair, with ‘hatred bred 
in the bone’ so that violence against Israeli civilians is not only tolerated but also encouraged.532  
This hatred demonizes and delegitimizes the humanity of the Israeli ‘other’ who is denigrated as 
less than human.533  The Jews are derided as being ‘the worst enemies of the Muslims believers,’ 
‘the falsifiers of Divine Truth,’ and the ‘slayers and transgressors against the prophets who were 
sent to them.’534  The suicide operative is told to meditate on Koranic Surah al-Maida 5: 64, 
which says that ‘their hands [the Jews’] shall be shackled and they shall be cursed for what they 
                                                 
531 Hasan al Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949): A Selection from the Maju’at Rasa’il al-
Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna.’ Translated by Charles Wendell, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 
156.  
532 Jerrold Post, "When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary 
Terrorism." (Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2005), 635. 
533 Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Pedagogy of Hate,” (Jerusalem Post, January 4, 2004.  Available 
online at http://www.pmw.org.il/.  Accessed on 10/22/09.  
534 Ronald Nettler, Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews, 11.  
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say…we have put enmity and hatred among them till the day of resurrection.”  As Hilal Khashan 
observes, this “vilification invites dehumanization, which makes it appear as if it were morally 
permissible to unleash indiscriminate terror [and violence] against Jews.”535  
The combination of martyrdom and hatred is a powerful lure for those individuals 
wanting to become a suicide attacker.  By calling the suicide attacker a shahid Hamas has 
opened the gates of paradise to any individual willing to obliterate him or herself with a suicide 
vest.  The martyr-to-be will join the ranks of Imam Hussein and other famous Islamic martyrs.  
Additionally, dying a martyr’s death allows the individual to have “all the things they have been 
denied in life, namely a paradisiacal existence.”536  The martyr is able to spend eternity in 
comfort and ease through his or her sacrifice.  As Hamas ideologue Dr. Azzam al-Tamini 
confirms, “[f]or us Muslims, martyrdom is not the end of things, but the beginning of the most 
wonderful of things.  In the next life one is in an everlasting bliss.”537  Finally, martyrdom 
becomes liberation for both the individual and the future Palestinian community, which in turn 
makes martyrdom an ideal that has intrinsic value.  The martyr liberates his or her self from the 
travails of earthly life and contributes to the founding of a free and independent Palestinian state.  
Indeed, the “blood of the martyrs provides nourishment and sustenance for those who continue to 
struggle” against the Israelis.538  As such, the combination of martyrdom’s post-mortem 
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incentives and hatred for the enemy ensured that Hamas had plenty of volunteers during the 
second intifada who were willing to die.  While the allure of martyrdom and hatred were no 
doubt strong, Hamas devised ways in order to solidify an individual’s commitment to death 
through the use of videos and final testaments. 
 
4.4.2 The Martyrdom Video and Final Testament:  A Contract for Death  
While preparation to become a Hamas suicide attacker is undoubtedly focused on the hereafter 
and hating the Israeli occupier, the individual must be primed to follow through with his or her 
mission.539  Two ways this is accomplished is through the martyrdom video and final testament.  
These are important methods because they bring the reality of death to the attacker.  According 
to Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, the martyr videotapes “are generally of very poor 
quality, many having been recorded over pirated versions of movies like Hulk Hogan Suburban 
Commando and Terminator 2, themselves often the copies of copies of copies.”540  The tapes are 
frequently made the night before a suicide operation.  The Hamas videos follow a similar format 
in that the candidate wears a green mask, brandishes as many weapons as he or she is physically 
                                                 
539 A former Hamas member who trained suicide attackers commented, “we focus his [the suicide attacker] 
on Paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, on meeting the Prophet Muhammad, on interceding for his loved 
ones, so that they too can be saved from the agonies of Hell, the houris, and on fighting the Israeli occupation and 
removing it from the Islamic trust that is Palestine.’  See Nasra Hassan, "An Arsenal of Believers."  
540 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyr’s Square, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 152.   
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able to hold, wears the suicide vest and clutches a copy of the Koran.  The videos serve two main 
purposes. 
First, the videotapes act as ‘plays’ of the upcoming attack in that the attacker tells the 
viewer exactly what he or she intends on doing.  In this view, the video serves a practical 
purpose because it is a chance for the attacker to review and familiarize him or herself with the 
logistical steps needed to complete the suicide operation.  One often sees the martyr doing 
routine work such as inspecting the suicide vest, cleaning a gun or sharpening a knife.  Once the 
weaponry is examined, other actors pretending to be Jews enter the foreground.541  Those 
playing the Jews wear hideous Halloween masks, signifying the Jews as the demonic enemy of 
Muslims.  The martyr then slips into their midst, smiles at the cameraman and yells ‘Allahu 
Akbar’ (God is Great).  After the cry, there is a fake explosion and the Jews fall to the ground, 
but the perpetrator remains standing.  Some of the martyrdom videos in the second intifada have 
become a bit more sophisticated using special effects technology.  One video uses animation that 
portrays “a disembodied arm [that] repeatedly stabs an Israeli soldier with a dagger.  The arm is 
formed form the word ‘Hamas,’ while bloody letters above spell out ‘Allahu Akbar.’”542 This is 
a type of quasi-theater so that the operative is able to act out what he or she intends to do in a few 
hours.   
Second, the filming of the video means that the individual’s martyrdom is imminent.  
One Hamas volunteer of a failed suicide attack commented on the immediacy of paradise: “[i]t is 
very, very near-right in front of [my] eyes. It lies beneath the thumb.  On the other side of the 
                                                 
541 It is assumed that the other actors are Hamas members that have had a role in the training or planning of 
the mission.   
542 Ibid., 152. 
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detonator.”543  It is here where the video takes on more than a theatrical significance.  The video 
now becomes a type of ‘martyrdom contract’ between the individual and the terrorist 
organization.  The individual is promised martyrdom if he or she succeeds in successfully 
detonating the suicide vest.  It is at this point that the individual becomes the al shahid al hayy, 
the living martyr.  The individual is told that he or she occupies some plane of existence between 
the living and the dead.  This is the point of no return for the potential attacker.  If the person 
backs out now then he or she is cast away in shame.  According to Nasra Hassan, at this stage 
“the young men undergo intensified spiritual exercises, including prayers and recitations of the 
Koran…which feature such themes as jihad, the birth of the nation of Islam, war, Allah’s favors, 
and the importance faith.  The living martyr does lengthy fasts…[and] he spends much of the 
night praying.”544  The living martyr also charges another Hamas member to pay off all his debts 
and he asks for forgiveness for actual or perceived offenses.545   Additionally, the living martyr is 
made to watch the other videos of martyrs who have gone before him or her.  As one Hamas 
trainer says, “these videos encourage him to confront death, not fear it.  He becomes intimately 
familiar with what he is about to do.  Then he can greet death like an old friend.”546 
While the candidate is in the living martyr state, he or she is asked to write his final 
testament.  Like the video, the final testament follows a format.  The living martyr recounts how 
he or she has come to be where he or she is.  Usually, this involves a story of how the individual 
was wronged by Israel.  In the testaments translated by the Middle Eastern Media Research 
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Institute (MEMRI), many explain how the individual lost a family member or loved one as a 
result of Israeli violence.547  Attackers claim to have lost siblings, parents, cousins, wives, and 
friends, which feeds the intense hatred of the attacker.  Additionally, the testaments speak to the 
shame and humiliation that comes with life under occupation.  Some testaments cite the 
difficulty this creates with obtaining a well paying job.  However, the overarching theme in this 
respect is that Israel is acting purposefully to affront the attacker’s dignity.   As such, the suicide 
attacker is enacting revenge as a way to strike back at his or her oppressor.548   
Next, the testaments discuss a verse of the Koran or a hadith in detail.  The purpose of 
this is to demonstrate theological acumen in some point of Islamic theology or jurisprudence.  
The living martyr becomes more than a defender of the faith, but also a propagator of it as well.  
Here the living martyr is able to wax about the joys of martyrdom and the necessity of jihad 
against Israel.   
Finally, the testament turns personal.  The living martyr addresses his or her family and 
friends.  This is the martyr’s living will as the attacker gives away any possessions he or she 
might have.  The attacker also gives instructions to the family member.  A reoccurring theme is 
that the family should not be sad after the attacker’s death, but rather they should hold a 
celebration honoring the sacrifice that was made.  Indeed, the attacker describes the celebration 
as a ‘wedding party’ in which the individual is married to Paradise.549   
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For male attackers, the wedding translates into the ‘services’ of the houris or the black-
eyed virgins. 550 While it is a settled point of Islamic theology that the houris serve no sexual 
purpose in Paradise, Hamas clerics have twisted this to claim that the black-eyed virgins will 
satisfy every desire of the shahid.551  Indeed, one Hamas cleric named Sheikh Ayman Sayda has 
conducted a number of interviews for Palestinian television saying that Paradise is a place of 
infinite pleasure where the “black-eyed virgins [are] ready for you [the martyr].”552  Another 
Hamas cleric named Imam Shaeb claims that “after your death you will be resurrected again as a 
healthy young man of 25 years old. There in heaven you will be given beautiful houris, wine, 
and plenty of foods to eat.  You will stay young for ever and death, disease will never come near 
you again.”553  According to this, the male martyr will regain a body that is in its sexual prime 
supposedly enabling him to engage in sexual acts with the houris.  It is interesting to note that 
this sexual aspect of Paradise does not exist for female suicide attackers.  In fact, there is not an 
                                                 
550 Here are some of the Koranic descriptions of the houris:  Koran 52: 17-20-‘they will recline with ease 
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houris equivalent for female martyrs in Paradise.554  Instead, female suicide attackers are 
“married to their religion” and are hailed as the “chaste defenders of Islam.” 555 
With the individual attackers being motivated by a complex mix of martyrdom, and the 
post-mortem incentives it provides, as well as an intense hatred of the Israeli occupiers, the 
martyrdom videos and final testaments are practical elements that create a contract between the 
individual and the terrorist organization.  In order to gain the benefits of the hereafter and enact 
revenge, the Hamas suicide attacker must fulfill his or her end of the bargain by engaging in a 
successful suicide attack.  This narrative of martyrdom and hatred was a powerful draw for 
individual attackers during the second intifada.  Additionally, Hamas was able to create support 
for their suicide attacks amongst the Palestinian population through an ingenious campaign 
designed to market martyrdom.  The next section addresses how Hamas was able to accomplish 
this.  
4.5 MARKETING MARTYRDOM: HOW HAMAS MAKES SUICIDE ATTACKS 
RESONATE WITH THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION 
The fact that public support for suicide attacks remained consistently high during the second 
intifada and beyond is a testament to just how well Hamas marketed martyrdom to the 
Palestinian public.  Hamas used different mediums in order to inculcate the population with the 
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belief that what the suicide attacker was doing was an act of heroic sacrifice rather than suicidal 
homicide.  Hamas achieved this by engaging with the Palestinian population on numerous fronts.  
The first involves the vast network of social services that Hamas runs in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.  The most important of these social services are the mosques and schools that Hamas funds 
and operates throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which teach grade school and high-
school aged children to aspire to become martyrs.  Additionally, Hamas utilizes an array of 
social media, which include primitive methods of posters and street art, to more advanced 
techniques like using the television and the internet to create popular support for martyrdom.  By 
making use of education and social media, Hamas fashioned a culture of martyrdom within 
population that came to support suicide attacks.  
 
4.5.1 Teaching Martyrdom through the Mosque and Schools  
Perhaps the two most important venues Hamas used to create support for martyrdom was the 
mosque and the school.  The mosques served two main functions.  First, It was the prime 
recruitment environment for Hamas during the first and second intifadas.556  Since the mosque 
acted as a sanctuary from interference of the Israeli authorities, Hamas could send its scouts there 
in order to identify individuals they believed would make a good suicide attacker.  With some 
700 mosques in the West Bank and around 600 in the Gaza Strip, this ensured Hamas a steady 
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supply of potential recruits.557   Second, the mosques funded by Hamas became locations where 
one could hear sermons denigrating the Jews, glorifying suicide attackers and praising the 
martyr’s everlasting life in heaven as well as propagating the notion that Israel and Palestine are 
locked in a holy war with one another.558  Below are parts of sermons delivered during the 
second intifada that were obtained and translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute: 
• Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan on the war between Israel and Islam-“ Have no mercy on 
the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. 
Wherever you meet them, kill them. Wherever you are, kill those Jews and those 
Americans who are like them – and those who stand by them – they are all in one 
trench, against the Arabs and the Muslims – because they established Israel here, 
in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine. They created it to be the 
outpost of their civilization – and the vanguard of their army, and to be the sword 
of the West and of the Crusaders, hanging over the necks of the monotheists, the 
Muslims in these lands. They wanted the Jews to be their spearhead… Allah, deal 
with the Jews, your enemies and the enemies of Islam. Deal with the crusaders, 
and America, and Europe behind them, O Lord of the worlds.”559 
 
• Sheikh Abd Al-Aziz in Saleh al-Jarbu on warfare with Israel-"It has become clear 
to us from past experience that [Israel] is a country warring against Islam and 
Muslims. Indeed, it is its greatest enemy. It uses war against Islam, and crimes 
and corruption that are inconceivable to humankind. Thus, it should be treated 
according to the laws of war on Islam, and not according to [laws] of peace.”560 
 
 
• Sheikh Ismail Aal Radwhan on martyrdom-“"[Even when] a martyr's organs are 
being chopped off, and he turns into torn organs that spread all over, in order to 
meet Allah, Muhammad, and his friends, it would not be [considered] a loss… 
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This is the honor given to our martyrs, the martyrs of the Islamic nation, who 
were killed due to their loyalty to Allah... The sacrifice of convoys of martyrs 
[will continue] until Allah grants us victory very soon. The willingness for 
sacrifice and for death we see amongst those who were cast by Allah into a war 
with the Jews, should not come at all as a surprise… Oh believing brothers, we do 
not feel a loss...[t]he martyr, if he meets Allah, is forgiven with the first drop of 
blood; he is saved from the torments of the grave; he sees his place in Paradise; he 
is saved from the Great Horror [of the day of judgment]; he is given 72 black-
eyed women; he vouches for 70 of his family to be accepted to Paradise; he is 
crowned with the Crown of glory, whose precious stone is better than all of this 
world and what is in it.”561 
 
Such sermons are often taped and distributed in local libraries where people are able to 
listen to them.562  The sheer number of mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip ensure that a 
large portion of the Palestinian population has come in contact with such sermons.  Another way 
that Hamas is able to create support for martyrdom entails supporting schools that teach jihad 
and glorify martyrdom to its students. 
 Hamas funded schools dominate the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they provide 
elementary and high-school education for Palestinian children at low cost.  In addition to 
teaching the essentials of reading, writing, mathematics and the sciences, the students at these 
schools are given a steady dose of propaganda designed to praise suicide attackers and denounce 
Israelis.  Indeed, a study funded by the Jerusalem based Center for Monitoring the Impact of 
Peace finds that a majority of the textbooks published by Hamas and Fatah “do not recognize 
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any rights the Jews might have in Palestine.”563   Israel is not represented on any maps in 
textbooks and Palestine is “represented as a sovereign state in the region in place of Israel, 
alongside Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.”564  The textbooks present the Jews as evil without a 
single, positive redeeming trait.565  They often claim that the Jews came to Palestine in 1948 with 
genocidal like intentions.  As two textbooks note: 
• “The coming of the Jewish throngs to Palestine continued until 1948 and their 
goal was taking over the Palestinian lands and then taking the original 
inhabitants’ place after their expulsion or extermination.” From the National 
Education Textbook, Grade 7.566 
• “Your enemies killed your children, split open your women’s bellies, held your 
revered elderly men by the beard, and led them to the death pits.” From the 
Reading and Texts Textbook, Grade 8.567  
 
As such, the Jews are “mostly portrayed within the context of their political rivalry with the 
Prophet of Islam in Arabia, or within the context of the present conflict, which automatically 
casts them [the Jews], in both cases, into the category of villain.”568  The textbooks also give 
credibility to anti-Semitic propaganda such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.  The 
Protocols are presented as fact in a tenth grade book entitled History of the Modern and 
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Contemporary World, which teaches tenth graders that there is a secret Jewish cabal aspiring to 
world domination.569 
 Perhaps most importantly, the textbooks exalt jihad and martyrdom for the sake of the 
liberation of Palestine.  The Center for the Monitoring of Peace in Palestine conducted a series 
of yearly reviews from 2001-2008, which found that jihad and martyrdom were portrayed 
positively in practically all textbooks from grades 1 to 12.  Additionally, there are examples 
where students had to read pro-martyrdom literature and complete assigned homework making 
them reflect on martyrdom: 
• Homework-“Mention the names of Palestinian and Arab Jihad fighters who fell as 
martyrs while defending Palestine.” From National Education, Grade 7.570 
• Homework-“Let us write down the biography of some of the martyrs of Palestine, 
who sacrificed their lives for the sake of their homeland.” National Education, 
Grade 7.571 
• “Your enemies seek life and you seek death.  They seek spoils to feed their empty 
stomachs and you seek a garden the width of which is both Heaven and earth [i.e. 
Paradise].  Do not be sad to encounter them, for [the taste of] death is not bitter in 
the believers’ mouth.” Reading and Texts, Grade 8.572 
• “Hundreds of Palestinians, men and women, have fallen as martyrs in the intifada 
for the sake of liberty.” Reading and Texts, Grade 8.573  
• “The Muslim nation should be bent on constantly preparing for Jihad, as it is a 
Jihadic nation. The construction of the Muslim state’s military power is not 
merely for defensive preparation [purposes]. It is rather a definite matter so that it 
will be easier for the [Muslim] state to perform what God has imposed on it, 
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namely, carrying the Islamic mission and announcing it to mankind.” Islamic 
Systems, Grade 12.574 
• Jihad is considered a fundamental pillar of Islam and some of the jurisprudents 
consider it ‘the Sixth Religious Duty.’ Moreover, it is the highest peak of Islam. 
Those of neglected Jihad were humiliated.”575 
• “Palestine is the blessed land…Its soil has been watered by the blood of the 
heroic martyrs who died in battles for its liberation and defense since the [days of 
the Prophet’s] Companions to our own days.” Islamic Education, Grade 12.576  
• “O my homeland, I would not cry in this wedding party [the martyr’s marriage to 
Paradise].  For our Arabness refuses that we cry over the martyrs.” Arabic 
Language-Linguistic Sciences, Grade 12.577  
 
Students as young as six to eighteen-year-old young adults are exposed to a curriculum that 
glorifies jihad and martyrdom.   For Hamas, this ensures that jihad and martyrdom are kept on 
the minds of those children growing up in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Children growing up 
believing that martyrdom is the highest virtue one can achieve are not shocked when a suicide 
attacker detonates himself in a public place killing civilians.  In fact, the evidence indicates that 
children are being taught to idolize such an act.  Other ways Hamas is able to increase public 
support for suicide attacks involves using various forms of media.   
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4.5.2 Surrounded by Death:  Posters, Television and the Internet  
 
Perhaps the simplest yet most pervasive form of media that Hamas has utilized consistently 
during both the first and second intifada are posters.  These posters use macabre images that 
combine death and happiness.  The West Bank and Gaza Strip are littered with such posters 
giving the onlooker the impression that death “never felt so wondrous…so full of consequence 
and meaning, so self-fulfilling, so pleasurable, so lush and exciting.”578  The posters portray the 
martyr as someone who has left the troubles of this world and has collected a great reward in 
Paradise.  The posters convey a simple point; martyrdom is the noblest of virtues, which should 
be sought after by anyone wishing for an end to the Israeli occupation.  The violent content of 
the posters implore Palestinians to “beware of natural death [and] don’t die except in a shower of 
bullets.”579   With posters on street corners and billboards, one could “turn nowhere during the 
intifada[s] without encountering a call to death.”580  Indeed, the posters were a constant reminder 
that Palestine would only be liberated through the sacrifices of the martyrs. 
The second intifada saw a proliferation of martyrdom posters in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.  As Hamas increased its use of suicide attacks, posters became the organization’s ‘calling 
card.’  This served as an important branding mechanism as it allowed the Palestinian public to 
associate the suicide attack with the Hamas organization.  Indeed, within hours of a suicide 
operation a new poster was created hailing the act of the martyr.  The more deadly the attack, the 
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larger and more elaborate the poster would be.  According to Kevin Toolis, the posters represent 
a “competitive death league…[where] real glory, and the biggest print run of posters, is 
apportioned to those ‘bombing martyrs’ who make it through military checkpoints” or into 
civilian spaces and slay as many soldiers and civilians as possible.581  Like the videos discussed 
in the previous section, martyrdom posters follow a similar and simple format.   
The poster has a picture of the martyr, which is either a family photo, or one taken by a 
digital camera the night before the operation, and is transposed on a template.  A typical Hamas 
poster has the martyr’s face cropped in the center or on the side.  The terrorist organization then 
“formally introduces their latest killer:  ‘The Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] proudly 
presents the executor of the Jerusalem martyrdom operation.’”582  Enveloping the martyr is the 
template, which during the second intifada is a picture of the Al-Aqsa mosque since it has 
become a symbol associated with martyrdom.  Underneath of the picture and introduction are 
Koranic verses extolling martyrdom.  One of the most quoted verses is from Surah 33: 32, which 
states that “among the believers are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah; among 
them are those who had fulfilled their vow by dying, and others among them are awaiting [their 
deaths], and have not changed at all.”583  Other verses utilized by the posters emphasize the 
virtues of jihad and the pleasures of Paradise.   
On a practical level, Hamas uses martyrdom posters to differentiate themselves from 
other terrorist organizations operating in Palestine.  To this end, Hamas implants slogans or  
                                                 
581 Kevin Toolis, “Walls of Death,” (The Guardian, 11/25/2003). Available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2003/nov/23/features.magazine47.  Accessed on 11/2/09.  
582 Ibid.  
583 The Holy Koran, translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.  
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‘martyrdom catchphrases’ on their posters.  For example, “Hamas often capitalize[s] on the idea 
of personal salvation, as can be evidenced in slogans like…‘he who desires salvation follows 
Hamas.’”584  Another popular catchphrase comes from the Hamas charter stating, “Allah is its 
goal, the Prophet is its model, the Koran is its constitution, Jihad is its path, and death for the 
sake of Allah is its most coveted desire.”585  One other intriguing feature of the posters is that 
“the martyr is often addressed…as if still alive, [and] heroically invulnerable.”586  As 
aforementioned, the martyrs are never referred to in the past tense.  This practice has made its 
way into Palestinian parlance as evidenced by an interview with a mother of a Hamas suicide 
attacker.  When a Palestinian journalist asked how she felt about her son’s death she declared, 
“[m]y son is not destroyed, he is not dead; he is [in Paradise] living a happier life than I.”587  
Posters are just one way that Hamas promotes martyrdom and violence in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  Two other mediums Hamas has used effectively to market martyrdom are television 
and the internet. 
 Hamas created the ‘Al Aqsa Television Channel’ in an attempt to engage a larger 
Palestinian audience.  This channel airs programming, which includes “ideologically tinged 
                                                 
584 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, “Information and Revolutionary Ritual in Intifada Graffiti,” in 
Akiba Cohen ed., Framing the Intifada: People and Media, (Norwood: Alex Publishing Corporation, 1993), 9.  
585 Hamas Charter, Article I, Section 8. 
586 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, “Information and Revolutionary Ritual in Intifada Graffiti,” in 
Akiba Cohen ed., Framing the Intifada: People and Media, 23.  
587 “An Interview with the Mother of a Suicide Bomber,” (The Middle East Media Research Institute, 
Special Dispatch Series, No. 391). Available at www.memri.org.  Accessed on 10/22/09.  
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children’s shows, strident news talk, and religious inspired entertainment.”588  The channel also 
broadcasts anti-Semitic sermons preached from mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In 
the genre of children’s entertainment the most disturbing shows involve those starring Assud the 
Hamas bunny, Nassur the Hamas bear, Farfour the Hamas Mickey Mouse and Nahoul the Hamas 
bee, which are actors dressed in costumes that teach children about virtue and vice.  These shows 
appear to be modeled after Sesame Street and have a number of child and adult actors who 
perform skits with Assud, Farfour, Nahoul, Nassur and a number of other puppets.  The show is 
simply another means to indoctrinate Palestinian children with a love of martyrdom and a hatred 
for their Jewish neighbors.  Recent episodes include: 
• “Nassur the Hamas Teddy Bear Vows to Join Military Wing of Hamas and Die a 
Martyr’s Death.”589  This episode shows Nassur the bear trying out for the Izz al 
Din al Qassam Martyr’s Brigade.  Nassur must demonstrate to the organization 
that he is spiritually, mentally and physically ready to become a martyr.  
Essentially, this video teaches children what they will encounter if they want to 
become a suicide attacker.  
• “Assud Hamas Rabbit Wants to Eat Jews.”590  Assud claims that even though he 
is a rabbit he has a fierce desire to ‘kill and eat Jews.’  He hopes to become a 
member of Hamas so he is able to fulfill his desire to kill Jews. 
                                                 
588 Eric Westervelt, “Hamas Launches Television Network,” (NPR, February 3, 2006). Article available 
online at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5186883.   Accessed on 11/9/09.  
589 “Al Aqsa TV, Clip #2028”, translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Project. 
Available online at http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/2028.htm.  Accessed on 11/9/09. 
590 See Palestinian Media Watch, available online at www.pmw.org.il.  Accessed on 11/9/09.  
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• “Assud Is Tempted by Satan to Steal and He Has His Hand Chopped Off.”591  
This episode is one that teaches children that strict interpretation of shariah law is 
in their best interests.  Assud is visited by Satan and steals something from a 
store.  He is caught by the storeowner and is sentenced to have his hand cut off.  
After this happens, Assud tells the viewers that this is a ‘just punishment’ and that 
shariah law must instituted throughout all of Palestine.  
• “TV Bee, Nahoul, Weeps Over ‘Martyred’ Family.”592  Here Nahoul receives 
news that two brothers died in a martyrdom operation.  Nahoul weeps until a 
child actor comes to comfort him.  Nahoul then stops weeping and tells the child 
that the ‘martyrs are alive in Paradise.’ 
 
A more recent development on these children’s shows is the use of martyr music videos, which 
urge children and young adults to become suicide attackers.593  In one Hamas music video, the 
lyrics are sung by “a women vocalist wearing an army uniform, and the visuals include children 
in frenzied war dances, interspersed between scenes of children participating in combat 
zones.”594  The lyrics glorify suicide attacks and becoming a shahid: “You will not be saved, Oh 
                                                 
591 “Al Aqsa TV, Clip #1814,” translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Project. 
Available online at http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1814.htm.  Accessed on 11/9/09. 
592 “Al Aqsa TV, Clip #1639,” translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Project. 
Available online at http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1639.htm.   Accessed on 11/9/09. 
593 Aaron Klein, “Kids Get Martyr Message in Music Video,” (WorldNetDaily, October 18, 2004). Article 
available online at http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=40967.   Accessed on 11/9/09.   
594 Ibid.  
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Zionist, from the volcano of my country’s stones, you are the target of my eyes, I will even 
willing fall as a Shahid [martyr]. You are the target of my eyes, I will even willingly fall as a 
Shahid. Allahu Akbar, of the young ones!”595  Another music video that captured widespread 
attention is a video obtained by Palestinian Media Watch, which shows a young girl of five years 
old watching her mother prepare to become a suicide attacker.  The video has the child asking 
her mother “what are you carrying in your arms instead of me?”596  The mother hides the suicide 
bomb and leaves her house.  The video shows the mother approaching an Israeli checkpoint as 
soldiers push her away.  The mother looks at the camera and explodes the bomb as a picture of 
the Al Aqsa mosque appears on the screen.  At home the child learns of her mother’s death as 
she watches television.  The child claims, “only now, I know what was more precious than us.  
Instead of me you carried a bomb in your hands.”597  The child then searches through her 
mother’s dresser and finds an extra bundle of explosives and the white shawl that each martyr is 
given before leaving for a suicide mission.  The video ends with the child exclaiming, “[m]y love 
for Muhammad will not be merely words.  I am following Mommy in her steps!”598   
The final medium Hamas uses to foster support for suicide attacks amongst the 
Palestinian population is through the internet.  The website al-fateh.net is just one of many 
Hamas websites that act as virtual propaganda centers for Hamas.  It explains to the viewer that 
the root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a result of Jewish deception.  The message gleaned 
                                                 
595 Ibid.  
596 “Hamas Teaches Children to be Suicide Terrorists,” (Palestinian Media Watch), video available online 
at http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx.  Accessed on 11/9/09.  
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid.  
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by visitors includes a healthy dose of “scathing hatred, disdain, and demonization of the 
‘other’…[which includes] the U.S. and Europe, the Jews, Israel, and Zionism-as well as a call for 
establishing an Islamic state in entire Palestine and the annihilation of the State of Israel trough 
violent liberation.”599  The website has an archive of martyr videos available for downloading 
and the final testaments of the martyr’s are available to those that want to read them.600  The 
website has instructions on how to teach individuals to construct and detonate an Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED).  Finally, there is a ‘shahid page,’ which is devoted to the purpose of 
putting potential martyrs in touch with the organization.  The website also used a version of Pay 
Pal so one can use a credit card to ‘finance a martyr.’601  The use of the internet to inculcate and 
promote martyrdom has serious implications according to Gilles Kepel: 
“[t]hanks to the internet we now have bearded cyber-salafists who have taken the place of the 
ulema [the Islamic learned religious community] and they know only one [Koranic] 
interpretation: the literal one.  To them everything that is digital is transcendental which creates a 
blur between the virtual and the afterlife in one separate world, disconnected entirely from the 
real world with its own laws.  At the juncture of these two universes we can find a double death: 
the suicide of the martyr which relieves him from the tension-which is considered schizophrenic-
between those two worlds and the slaughter of [Israeli] infidels.”602 
 
                                                 
599 "Al-Fateh-The Hamas Web Magazine for Children: Indoctrination to Jihad, Annihilation and Self-
Destruction," (Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education, 2009), 9.  Article 
available online at www.impact-se.org.  Accessed on 10/9/09.  
600 Ibid.  
601 Ibid., 49.  
602 Gilles Kepel quoted in “Cyber Jihad,” (Peak Talk, August 4, 2005).  Article available at 
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  222 
Though Israel is strongly opposed to these websites, there is no dearth of countries willing to 
host them.603  The use of the internet ensures that Hamas reaches a large audience both 
domestically and internationally.  This allows Hamas to cultivate support for martyrdom and 
armed resistance against the Israeli other while presenting the suicide attacker as the Palestinian 
role model par excellence.  The fruits of this poisonous ideology manifest itself in recent public 
opinion polls showing that the Palestinian public continues to favor suicide attacks against 
Israel.604  Despite the absence of suicide attacks since Hamas won the Parliamentary elections in 
2006, the population is so saturated with the message of martyrdom that it is quite feasible that 
Hamas could revert to suicide attacks whenever it chooses.605  
4.6 CONCUSION 
 
The case study in this chapter investigated Hamas, which used suicide attacks as a form of 
domestic terrorism against Israel.  The chapter began with a discussion of the ideology that 
                                                 
603 “Hamas Markets Terrorism,” (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Center for Special 
Studies, November 22, 2005). Available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/tunis_e.htm.  Accessed 
on 11/9/09. 
604 The Palestinian Survey Research Unit finds that support for suicide attacks is 91% in the Gaza Strip as 
compared with 79% in the West Bank. See "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 27,” available online at 
www.pcpsr.org.  Accessed on 10/6/2009. 
605 Matthew Levitt, email correspondence with the author, October 6, 2009.  Levitt argues that Hamas has 
not given up on the tactic of suicide attacks but finds the use of missiles more productive and effective at this time.  
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Hamas inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood.  This merited an overview of Hasan al-Banna 
and Sayyid Qutb, the two foremost ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Banna and Qutb 
advanced what the chapter termed as an Islamic liberation ideology.  This ideology was riddled 
with anti-Semitism and espoused a worldview where the Jews and Muslims were engaged in an 
ancient religious struggle.  For both Banna and Qutb, the only way to prevail in this conflict was 
to return to Islam.  The failure of Pan-Arab nationalism strengthened Banna and Qutb’s 
argument that Islam was the only solution to the ‘Jewish problem.’  Since Hamas was an 
outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, they inherited the latter’s Islamic liberation ideology.   
At the organizational level, Hamas adopted suicide attacks as a means to engage Israel 
militarily in order to achieve strategic goals.  Despite their motivating ideology, which framed 
the conflict with Israel as a religious one, Hamas was careful in its use of suicide attacks during 
the first intifada.  The main reason why Hamas used the tactic during the first Palestinian 
uprising was to derail the Oslo Peace Process and later the Declaration of Principles.  In this 
case, Hamas was a spoiler organization, which acted to disrupt the peace process.  During the 
second intifada, suicide attacks became a weapon to prompt Israel to withdraw unilaterally from 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.  The number of suicide attacks during this time period 
increased as Hamas capitalized on the ideology of martyrdom, which ensured that Hamas had its 
military ranks full of individuals wanting to die a martyr’s death.   
At the individual level, the chapter found that the Hamas suicide attacker is motivated by 
a mixture of post-mortem incentives for martyrdom and an intense hatred of the Israeli ‘other.’  
The Hamas martyr is elevated to a status in death that the person could not have achieved in life.  
The post-mortem benefits include direct entry to Paradise, the comforts of the seventy-two black 
eyed virgins, and the ability to save family members from going to Hell.  Moreover, becoming a 
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suicide attacker gives the individual a way to strike against the ‘Israeli occupier.’  By turning the 
body into a bomb, the Hamas suicide attacker uses deception and cunning to level the battlefield 
in order to enact revenge against Israel.  This section also investigated the use of final testaments 
and martyrdom videos as ways with which Hamas cements the desire to die within the individual 
attacker.  These act as a ‘martyrdom contract’ where the attacker receives the benefits of 
martyrdom after accomplishing the mission.  Such videos and testaments are also effective 
recruitment tools for others who want to become martyrs. 
Finally, at the societal level, Hamas has successfully marketed martyrdom to the 
Palestinian population.  By using mosques and schools, Hamas educates young children to aspire 
to become the future martyrs of the Palestinian resistance.  These children read books and listen 
to sermons denouncing the humanity of Israelis while also advocating violence against them.  
Hamas also uses a wide variety of social media from posters, television and the internet to 
saturate Palestinian society with images of the martyrs.  Indeed, the Hamas sponsored television 
station promotes shows that idolize martyrdom, which are targeted at youth and adults.  Some of 
the children’s shows feature Sesame-Street-like characters that teach children to ‘kill Jews.’ 
Other innovative ways that the television station markets martyrdom is through the creation of 
martyrdom music videos.  These videos have a wide audience from children to adults, which 
feature songs that laud martyrdom.  Finally, Hamas has become a presence in the virtual world as 
it operates a variety of websites dedicated to disseminating martyrdom propaganda.  What 
emerges at this level of analysis is a picture of an organization that has created an environment 
saturated with the belief that martyrdom and violent death is the only way to achieve an 
independent Palestinian state. 
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The interaction amongst the three-levels of analysis in the Hamas case study is triangular.  
In this operational structure, each level of analysis fluidly interacts with and supports the other.   
 
      Organization  
 
 
    Society   Individual  
 
At the top of the triangle is the Hamas organization, which as this chapter has argued, adopted 
suicide attacks to engage Israel.  The organization fashioned a martyrdom narrative to both 
attract individuals and to engage the Palestinian public.  Since Hamas relies on external recruits 
to become suicide attackers, the martyrdom ideology was critical as it used martyrdom’s post-
mortem benefits to entice individuals to become suicide attackers.  Additionally, the martyrdom 
narrative was presented to the Palestinian population in order to create a wellspring of support 
not only for the tactic but also for Hamas.  What is interesting to note is while Hamas has 
stopped using suicide attacks support for it remains relatively high.  This means Hamas’ 
ideology of martyrdom is incubating and continues to hold sway and influence over individuals 
and portions of Palestinian society.  As a result, the entrenched ideology would make it quite 
easy for Hamas to transition back into using suicide attacks should the organization choose to do 
this.  
The next chapter of the dissertation investigates how a transnational group like Al Qaeda 
utilizes suicide attacks.  
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5.0  SUICIDE ATTACKS AS TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:  THE CASE OF AL 
QAEDA  
“The coming jihadist generation must know its roots and must digest the experiences of its 
forebears.  The coming jihadist generation must build on these lessons so that it becomes a 
natural link in the chain formed by the journey of the glorious caravan toward the desired Islam, 
which is returning the rule of God to this earth.  Knowledge has become the most important 
weaponry in this age, and the ignorant cannot lead in this struggle, however loyal to the 
obligation they may be.”   
-Abu Musab al-Suri, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance  
 
 
“Just as armies achieve victory only when the infantry occupies territory, the Islamic movement 
of jihad will not triumph against the world coalition unless it possesses an Islamic base in the 
heart of the Muslim world.”  
-Ayman al Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner  
 
 
 
"To those champions who avowed the truth day and night…and wrote with their blood 
and sufferings these phrases…[t]he confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate 
regimes does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it 
knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the 
diplomacy of the canon and machine-gun.  Islamic governments have never and will never be 
established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils.  They are established as they 
[always] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth.” 
-Al Qaeda Training Manual  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The morning of September 11, 2001, began as a beautiful and clear fall day.  On the east coast of 
the United States, temperatures were mild and at U.S. airports weather conditions were nearly 
perfect.  The sunny and clear skies ensured that all airline passengers would leave on time.  
Nineteen passengers, however, did not intend to reach their destination.  As the day unfolded it 
became clear that these nineteen passengers, who were members of a terrorist organization called 
Al Qaeda606 [Arabic for ‘the base’], had nefarious plans that involved using airplanes to ram into 
pre-selected targets.  The peaceful and tranquil September day soon turned into a nightmare.  At 
8:46 AM, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center 
in New York City.  At 9:03 AM, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower.  At 9:37 
AM, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon and at 10:02 AM United Flight 93 
hit ground in a desolate field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  The North and South Towers 
collapsed at 10:28 AM and 9:59 AM respectively.607 
 The coordinated suicide attacks of September 11, 2001 killed some 2,750 people 
representing over twenty-five different countries.608  The suicide attacks were also the first major 
foreign assault on American soil since 1814, when the British Army and Royal Navy bombarded 
                                                 
606 While there are many ways to spell the name of the organization, for consistency the chapter uses ‘Al 
Qaeda.’ 
607 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 2-14.  
608 Eric Lipton, “Struggle to Tally all 9/11 Dead by Anniversary,” (New York Times, September 1, 2002). 
Article available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/01/nyregion/struggle-to-tally-all-9-11-dead-by-
anniversary.html?pagewanted=1.  Accessed on 12/20/2009. 
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the city of Baltimore.609  Additionally, the 9/11 attacks became the second most violent day in 
U.S. history following the Civil War battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862.610   
As the details about Al Qaeda [hereafter AQ] came pouring in, the U.S. realized that it 
faced a new type of non-state adversary that was determined to strike the United States and its 
allies.  As Rohan Gunaratna notes, the AQ organization was not rooted in one location but 
operated on many different fronts in areas such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines.611  As time went by it became clear that AQ also 
could operate in the West in such places as Great Britain, Spain and even the United States.612  
Gone were the days when terrorism was confined to one territory or region.  The transnational 
reach of AQ and its ability to use suicide attacks to target different countries makes it an 
important case study.  As such, the chapter seeks to answer the following questions:  What is the 
historical context of AQ?  Why did AQ adopt suicide attacks and how has the AQ organization 
adapted in its use of suicide attacks?  How does AQ’s ideology motivate individuals to become 
suicide attackers?  Finally, how does AQ make the attacks resonate in the populations that 
support them?   
The first section investigates the historical context of AQ.  This requires a brief 
examination of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  It was in Afghanistan where Osama bin 
Laden and his lieutenant Abdullah Azzam created AQ.  Osama bin Laden [hereafter OBL] met 
                                                 
609 Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future, (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 1. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 95.  
612 Ibid.  
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Azzam when the former came to Afghanistan to help the mujahideen fight the Soviet invaders.  
The financial resources OBL brought and his managerial experience gained working in his 
father’s construction business helped him create an organization that trained, accommodated and 
provided logistical support for volunteers seeking to join the mujahideen.  When the Soviets left 
Afghanistan in 1989, OBL saw this as a sign that faith could defeat a superpower.  After the 
Soviet withdrawal, OBL and Azzam focused their attention on creating an international Islamic 
group that would encompass jihadists from many different countries.  Azzam provided the 
framework for this organization but OBL, influenced later by Ayman al Zawahiri, differed on its 
objectives.  Subsequently, as the U.S. became more involved in the region during the 1990s, 
OBL turned his attention to the last remaining superpower.  
The second section investigates why AQ chose to utilize suicide attacks to strike the 
United States.  Using the many written statements by OBL and Abdullah Azzam, the section 
argues that AQ adopted suicide attacks because they believed they were engaged in a defensive 
jihad.  Azzam laid the foundation for AQ’s conflict because he felt as though the West, with the 
U.S. in particular, was engaged in a cultural and physical assault upon Muslim lands.  Azzam 
believed that the U.S. was the head of a culture inimical to the values of Islam.  Instead, the 
values espoused by the U.S. and the West did nothing but promote vice and lead faithful 
Muslims away from their religion.  After Azzam’s death, OBL adopted this framework and 
condemned the U.S. for its activities in the land of Islam.  The physical and cultural presence of 
the U.S. in land of Mecca and Medina, in OBL’s view, was an assault that activated a defensive 
jihad whereby it was legitimate to attack the U.S. by any means necessary.   
Another interesting feature this section explores is how the AQ organization has evolved.  
Between 1991 and 2001 AQ operated as a hierarchical organization.  The suicide attacks that 
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occurred during this time period included heavy involvement by senior AQ leadership.  
Following the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan much of AQ’s leadership was killed or captured 
by U.S. and coalition forces spurring AQ to change from a hierarchical organization to a more 
diffuse and network centric group.613  The 7/7 London bombing is presented as an example of 
the network-centric AQ that acts like a ‘fifth column’ in Western societies.614  The recent arrest 
of U.S. born citizen Najibullah Zazi on September 24, 2009 is another example of the emerging 
AQ fifth column where individuals living in the U.S. and Western Europe are self-starting, self-
radicalizing and self-activating.615  What is worrisome about the network and fifth column forms 
of AQ is that those who join are integrated members of Western society.   
The third section investigates the ideology of AQ.  Unlike the previous case studies, AQ 
has an ideology that is transnational in its appeal.  Indeed, AQ has formulated a potent meta-
narrative, which includes broad, overarching themes that are referred to consistently in AQ’s 
statements.  The section argues that the meta-narrative represents a transnational Islamic 
liberation ideology that is grounded in three core principles:  a hatred of the West and its culture, 
a belief in an inevitable clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West, and 
                                                 
613 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 138.  
614 A fifth column is defined as a group of sympathizers of an enemy that engage in sabotage within 
another country’s national borders.  
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martyrdom.  These principles are found in the writings of AQ’s most important ideologues such 
as Sayyid Qutb, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al Suri.  The jihadist 
meta-narrative can then be adopted by different sections of the Muslim community that operate 
both within the Islamic world and in the West.  As such, different parts of the Muslim 
community easily project their grievances onto the narrative thereby giving the individual or 
group its own unique raison d’etre within the larger AQ meta-narrative.  The reason why AQ 
and its associates have proven so durable is due primarily to the potency of this meta-narrative.  
The fourth section looks into the ways that AQ attempts to achieve global resonance.  
Like the LTTE and Hamas, AQ operates an impressive propaganda campaign.  Through the use 
of released statements, videos, ideological tracts and jihadist websites, AQ markets its ideology 
to cultivate support for its cause.  Particularly, AQ highlights the shortcomings of its avowed 
enemy, the United States, through an unrelenting critique of U.S. action abroad.  AQ’s use of 
modern technology is a critical part of this project.  The sheer growth in the number of jihadist 
websites in the last few years is staggering with thousands on the internet each one containing a 
wide-variety of content available for the potential user.  While AQ will not achieve the 
popularity that Hamas did during the second intifada, AQ has a much larger pool to draw from.  
Even with global support declining for AQ, there is no such decline for anti-Western and anti-
American sentiments, especially as the U.S. continues military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.616  This combined with AQ’s sophisticated use of modern technology ensures that 
there will be a global audience for AQ’s Manichean liberation ideology.       
                                                 
616 Juliana Menasce Horowitz, “Declining Support for bin Laden and Suicide Bombing,” (Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, September 10, 2009).  Article available online at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1338/declining-
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5.2 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AL QAEDA  
The history of AQ is rooted in the Khyber Pass, the inhospitable mountain range linking Pakistan 
to Afghanistan.  The Khyber Pass stands as an important strategic location as it is the gateway to 
India.  As Milton Bearden notes, the Khyber Pass “has witnessed the traverse of the world’s 
great armies on campaigns to and from South and Central Asia” from Alexander the Great, 
Timur, Babur, Mahumud of Ghanzai, Nadir Shah, to Genghis Khan and the Mongol horde.617  
More recently in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Anglo-Indian forces came through the 
Pass during the three Afghan wars of 1839-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919.  A lieutenant in the 
British Light Infantry division succinctly summed up the history of the Khyber pass when he 
aptly commented that “[e]very stone in the Khyber has been soaked in blood.”618   
Before the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the last global power to enter 
Afghanistan was the Soviet Union.  Its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan brought OBL to the Khyber 
Pass where he and Abdullah Azzam formed the ‘Afghan Services Bureau,’ or the Maktab al-
Khidmat [MAK].  OBL’s experience in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly positive.  He believed 
that the mujahideen and the ‘Afghan Arabs’ of the MAK had defeated a global superpower.  This 
newfound confidence prompted OBL and Azzam to consider forming a permanent group of 
Islamic warriors that could act as a rapid reaction force to defend Islamic lands when they were 
in danger.  As the U.S. became more involved in the region, especially after Saddam Hussein’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
American sentiments see Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved, (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 23, 
2009), 16.     
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invasion of Kuwait in 1990, OBL turned his attention to the last remaining superpower thus 
starting, in OBL’s mind, a war between AQ and the United States.   
 
5.2.1 Precursor to Al Qaeda: the Afghan Arabs and the Conflict with the Soviet Union  
In hindsight, the time of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan speaks to a bygone era of 
superpower conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S.  The Cold War represented a time in 
history when two competing superpowers engaged in a global chess match whereby each power 
sought to gain an advantage over the other.  This meant that the two powers, instead of directly 
fighting one another, engaged in proxy wars.  At that time, the latest proxy war for the U.S. was 
the one in Vietnam, which did not go as planned.  Instead of shoring up and establishing an anti-
communist regime in Vietnam, the U.S. became bogged down in a deadly insurgency against a 
mobile, cunning and ruthless enemy.  The horrific images of jungle warfare and the staggering 
amount of American casualties drained public support for the war.  By 1973, the U.S. Congress 
approved the Case-Church amendment, which terminated all U.S. military action in Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia causing the U.S. to leave the region in defeat. 
 In 1979, only a few years after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan.  The Soviet Union expected no real resistance from the U.S. given that its 
public was war weary coupled with the Soviet impression that the Carter administration was 
“weak, indecisive, and hesitant to use force as an instrument of national policy.”619  The rationale 
                                                 
619 Milton Goldman, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Roots and Causes," (Polity, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
Spring 1984), 399.  
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for invading Afghanistan was simple.  Soviet leaders believed that they had a strategic opening 
to take control of a territory with close proximity to the Persian Gulf and its vast oil resources.  If 
the Soviet Union could gain access and possibly control those oil resources, it would have a 
significant advantage in its struggle with the United States.  Just as important as the oil reserves, 
the Soviet invasion was a chance to extend their sphere of influence into Central Asia whereby 
the Soviets sought to plant a foreign ideology in Afghanistan. 
 After the Soviet’s took Kabul, some 385,000 Afghan refugees left to neighboring 
Pakistan.620  The refugees entering Pakistan began to form a mounted resistance against the 
Soviets.   At first, the guerrilla resistance was comprised solely along ethnic and tribal grounds.  
As such, the main tribes consisting of the Pashtuns, Balochis and Hazaras formed different 
guerrilla groups.  These groups were uncoordinated, unorganized, and operated independently of 
one another.  As Olivier Roy notes, this tribal and ethnic based resistance did not perform well 
since the groups were militarily ineffective and often resorted to fighting one another rather than 
their Soviet adversary.621  Rather than uniting under tribal and ethnic loyalties, the Afghan 
refugees began to utilize the ideology of jihad to bring the fighters under a common banner.  As 
a result, a number of fundamentalist groups formed as they rallied the refugees to fight for Islam 
with the goal of expelling the foreign invader.  The fundamentalist fighters, also known as the 
mujahideen (translated literally as ‘jihad warrior’), began to stage an effective resistance.  
Indeed, it was on the Pakistani side of the Hindu Kush Mountains where the jihad against the 
Soviets began in earnest.  As Tahir Amin notes, the mujahideen succeeded in framing the 
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conflict against the Soviets as a war for Islam.622  This religious war caught the attention of a 
young Saudi Arabian named Osama bin Laden who traveled to Afghanistan to fight alongside 
the holy warriors. 
 OBL arrived in the Khyber Pass sometime between 1980-1981.  Here OBL met Abdullah 
Azzam, a Palestinian religious scholar who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Transjordan.  The Afghan jihad began to gain international attention mainly because Azzam, and 
other Islamic theologians at the time, wrote essays and issued religious decrees [fatwas], which 
decried the invasion as a siege of the land of Islam.  Azzam argued vigorously that a defensive 
jihad should be mounted.623  In a book entitled Join the Caravan, Azzam outlines the main 
reasons why a Muslim should join the fight in Afghanistan: 
• In order that the unbelievers do not dominate an Islamic land 
• The scarcity of men 
• Fear of damnation and Hell-fire for those who ignore the call 
• Fulfilling the duty of jihad, and responding to Allah’s call 
• To follow in the footsteps of Islam’s pious forbears 
• Protecting those who are oppressed in Afghanistan 
• The hope and desire for martyrdom624 
                                                 
622 Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future," (Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1984), 395.  
623 It is interesting to note that OBL frames his conflict against the U.S. almost the same way Azzam 
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624 Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan Part III, (London: Azzam Publications, 2001). Available online at 
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The invitation to jihad drew thousands of Muslims who ventured from across the Islamic 
world to Afghanistan to defend the faith and fight the Soviets.625  With the steady stream of 
volunteers, the MAK “provided accommodation and logistical services to transport the flood of 
fighters to the front and provide for their needs.”626  The some 25,000 volunteers who flocked to 
the Afghan jihad were known as the ‘Afghan Arabs.’  OBL pledged “to offer ticket, residence, 
and living expenses for every Arab volunteer and his family who was willing to join his and 
Azzam’s new militia.”627  When the Afghan Arabs arrived, they made use of the training camps 
and safe houses that OBL and Azzam established.  Additionally, those leaving the front lines 
from their battle with the Soviets had a place to rest and recuperate.  These camps were located 
in Peshawar, a Pakistan city located on the Eastern end of the Khyber Pass, which became a 
central hub for the Afghan resistance. 
 While there is a great mythology around the effect that the Afghan Arabs had on the war 
effort, the reality is that their contributions were marginal at best.  Of those 25,000 volunteers 
only 3,000 trained as fighters and no more than a few hundred actually saw combat.628  The 
Afghan refugees who fled the Soviets did the bulk of the fighting.  The ferocity of these fighters, 
combined with generous financial and material support from the U.S., helped drive the conflict 
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to a stalemate.629  Despite the negligible effect of the Afghan Arabs, jihadist historian and 
ideologue Abu Musab al Suri maintains that what should be noted is that “the refugee tents and 
training camps of Pakistan and Afghanistan became centers of dialogue and discussion between 
various Islamic schools of thought, and the environment was permeated by the notion of 
jihad.”630            
  Al Suri touches on a significant point here.  OBL and Azzam had succeeded in uniting 
Muslims from different nationalities under one banner.  Up until that point in history, the Islamic 
community had been plagued by the divisiveness of nationalism.  For OBL and Azzam, the last 
time that the Muslim community effectively rallied under the banner of Islam was the Ottoman 
caliphate.631  Additionally, OBL and Azzam had witnessed the impotence of Arab nationalism 
especially as it pertained to its lackluster performance against the state of Israel during the 1967 
                                                 
629 Aid to the Afghan resistance began under President Carter who tasked the CIA with arming the Afghan 
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war.632  They believed that nationalism was a hindrance to Muslim unity and should be 
discredited as a legitimate ideology.  Islam, on the other hand, allowed the fighters to think 
outside themselves and their nationality to focus on something they all held in common and had 
complete faith in.  The MAK’s training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan had revived 
excitement in jihad and proved that the transcendent nature of Islam eliminated what OBL and 
Azzam saw to be the petty rivalries of nationalism.  This created a cohesive and committed 
group of fighters who waged jihad and sought glory and martyrdom to achieve their goal.  
 The Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988 was a result of numerous 
factors.  The Soviets did not anticipate the fierce resistance that they would encounter in the 
Afghan mujahideen.  The Soviet military brought some 105,000 troops to conduct a highly 
intensified counterinsurgency campaign against the guerrillas.  The counterinsurgency campaign 
was costly as it claimed the lives of some 15,000-20,000 Soviet troops.  Additionally, the Afghan 
strategy of staying in the mountains and keeping Soviet helicopter gunships at bay by using 
Stinger missiles negated the Soviet’s air superiority.633  Although the mujahideen did not defeat 
the Soviet army, they used classic guerilla hit-and-run tactics that sapped the morale of Soviet 
forces prompting thousands of desertions.634  The mujahideen also controlled between 75-80% 
of the countryside thereby preventing the Soviet army from moving supplies and materiel to their 
military units.  In the final analysis, however, the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal from 
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Afghanistan are many and are best described by Baird O’Neill who argues that it is “explained 
by their [Soviet’s] own blunders, environmental factors, external support [for the mujahideen 
from the United States], and, perhaps most important, a changed Soviet leadership with new and 
different priorities.”635  The costly military stalemate, the millions of dollars in aid and weapons 
given to the mujahideen by the United States, and the election of a reformist candidate in 
Mikhail Gorbachev prompted the Soviets to abandon their adventure in Afghanistan.636 
 Azzam and OBL saw the Soviet retreat in a different light.  For them, the superpower had 
lost because it was motivated by the godless ideology of Communism.  With newfound elation, 
OBL and Azzam wrestled with the question of what do to next.   
        
5.2.2 Establishing the Solid Base and Determining its Objectives  
In 1989, Azzam published an article entitled ‘The Solid Base’ in the influential Al Jihad journal.  
The article is a theological tract, which entertains a radical thought namely the reestablishment of 
the Islamic caliphate.  While many of Azzam’s contemporaries devoted their intellectual 
energies decrying the fall of the Ottoman caliphate, Azzam’s experience in Afghanistan made 
him believe that the conditions were right for the restoration of the caliphate.  In the article, he 
argues that this new Islamic society “cannot be founded without a movement that has been 
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forged in the fire of trials, and unless its members have developed in the heat of conflict.”637  The 
movement must be led by a vanguard of committed believers.  Azzam believed that such a 
vanguard existed in the Afghan mujahideen and that they would become “the new guardians of 
the ummah’s faith, money, honor and life.”638   
This vanguard constituted the ‘solid base’ [al qaeda al sulbah] for the forthcoming 
Islamic society.  The key to the vanguard’s success was a firm and thorough grounding in 
Islamic ideology.  Without such a grounding, “the enormous sacrifices and disproportionate 
costs…[will] cause boredom and despair in time.”639  Azzam believed that the mujahideen’s 
victory in Afghanistan was a sign proving that Allah favored the idea.  Moreover, he thought that 
Afghanistan was only the first step in a global project designed to reawaken the desire for an 
Islamic state.  He argued that “this duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan…[but rather] 
jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to 
us so that Islam will reign again [as it did] in Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, 
Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, Yemen, Tashkent and Andalusia.”640  The banner of Islam 
would once again extend over the globe and it would be “necessary to continue the jihad, no 
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matter how long it takes, to the last man…until we see the Islamic state.”641  How this would 
happen was a matter of debate between Azzam and Ayman al Zawahiri. 
Azzam’s strategy mimicked the MAK organization.  He wanted to maintain the MAK 
where it was, in Pakistan, so that it could be a staging ground for other jihad campaigns 
elsewhere.  As such, he wanted to focus his efforts on providing logistical aid and training to 
mujahideen passing through MAK’s training camps for deployment elsewhere in the global 
Islamic theater.  Ayman al Zawahiri, who by this time was competing for the attention of OBL, 
thought otherwise and envisioned a much more aggressive role.   
Instead of merely training and allowing jihadist to return back to their own Islamic 
theater as Azzam wanted, Zawahiri desired to have more operational control.  He wanted an 
Islamic army of many divisions that would be sent wherever the commanders wanted.  He 
believed that “just as armies achieve victory only when the infantry occupies territory, the 
Islamic movement of jihad will not triumph against the world coalition unless it possesses an 
Islamic base in the heart of the Muslims world.”642  
Another point of contention between Azzam and Zawahiri involved stark differences 
over the issue of takfir or the branding of other Muslims as kafir [infidels].643  Azzam did not 
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agree with Zawahiri and desired to avoid this issue altogether.  Following the traditional Islamic 
interpretation, Azzam did not believe that one Muslim could call another a kafir.  This amounted 
to questioning another Muslim’s faith and the sincerity of the shahada or the profession of belief 
in Allah that every Muslim makes.644  Additionally, Azzam thought that following this action 
was bound to create fitna [discord] in the Muslim community.  Zawahiri, on the other hand, 
believed that it was crucial to purge the Islamic ulema of those who pretended to be true 
believers.  The debate was ultimately solved in favor of Zawahiri after Azzam was assassinated 
in Pakistan on November 24, 1989 while on his way to a Friday prayer service.645 
With Azzam removed from the picture, OBL and Zawahiri became the leaders of the 
organization known as AQ.  OBL believed that the goal of this new group was “to create an 
empire of all the world’s one billion Muslims, ruled by a single leader…unit[ing] all Muslims 
and establish[ing] a government which follows the rule of the caliphs.”646  Drawing from his 
experience in the MAK, OBL and Zawahiri fashioned a trans-national organization grounded in 
Islam.   
OBL’s ire would later be directed toward the United States in particular and the West in 
general after Saudi Arabian Prince Abdullah rejected OBL’s offer to use the new organization to 
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expel Iraq from Kuwait.  The refusal by the Saudi prince angered OBL and he came to see the 
U.S. as occupying the holy land of Islam.  Moreover, he developed a visceral hatred and 
resentment against the West’s wider cultural dominance, which he saw as perverting and 
enslaving the Muslim world.  For OBL, this one event marked the beginning of a war against the 
U.S. and the West.  Drawing from Azzam’s writings, OBL framed the conflict with the U.S. as a 
defensive jihad, which allowed him to adopt suicide attacks as the primary means of confronting 
the last remaining superpower.      
5.3 THE DEFENSIVE JIHAD, SUICIDE ATTACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF AL 
QAEDA 
Although Sheikh Abdullah Azzam did not live to see the emergence of AQ, he, more than any 
other person, is considered the strategic founder of AQ.647  As was mentioned in the previous 
section, it was Azzam who came up with the idea to establish the al qaeda al sulbah [the solid 
base] to export jihad wherever Muslims are persecuted.  Azzam’s strategic importance endures 
because of the way he framed the impending conflict between Islam and the U.S. as a defensive 
jihad.  Azzam argued that the defensive jihad was a compulsory individual duty for those 
Muslims who were physically able to fight.  OBL adopted this defensive jihad framework and 
with the influence of Ayman al Zawahiri integrated suicide attacks into AQ’s arsenal.  The 
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section argues that AQ adopted suicide attacks out of strategic necessity.  Using this tactic was 
the only way the organization could successfully engage the U.S. in a defensive jihad.  How AQ 
has utilized suicide attacks will then be examined.  The period from 1995 to 9/11 was one where 
a hierarchical AQ used suicide attacks as a means to probe the U.S. and bait it into an open 
confrontation.  AQ achieved this goal in the aftermath of 9/11 as the U.S. began combat 
operations in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.  Just as the U.S. failed to anticipate 9/11 so did AQ 
fail to anticipate the results of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, which decimated its 
leadership.  As such, the period from 9/11 to the present finds AQ having undergone a significant 
organizational evolution to a more network-centric and decentralized organization.  The 7/7 
London attacks will then be investigated as an example of the decentralized AQ organization.  
5.3.1 Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri:  The Defensive Jihad 
and the Need for Suicide Attacks  
Abdullah Azzam was a prolific scholar and ideologue who was introduced to Islamic activism at 
just nine years of age when he joined the Muslim Brotherhood.648  He obtained a master’s degree 
in Islamic jurisprudence from Damascus University in 1963 and went on to earn his doctorate in 
Islamic law from Egypt’s Al Azhar University in 1973.  Obtaining his doctorate from Al Azhar 
gave his scholarship added weight considering it is the oldest and most prestigious university of 
Sunni thought.  Azzam articulated his views about the defensive jihad in two main works:  The 
Defense of Muslims Lands, and Join the Caravan.  The influence Azzam had on AQ cannot be 
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overstated.649  As Islamic scholar Youssef Aboul-Enein argues, “Azzam is as significant 
strategically to AQ and its affiliates as Carl von Clausewitz is to the study of conventional 
warfare.”650  Each of Azzam’s works will now be considered in turn. 
 The Defense of Muslims Lands begins with a quote from a titan of Islamic 
fundamentalism, Ibn Taymia, who says, “[t]he first obligation after Iman [faith in Allah] is the 
repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly affairs [of the Islamic 
ummah].”651  Azzam then launches into a theological discussion as he cites Koranic verses and 
various hadith that speak to the necessity of waging jihad.  He claims that “this law [or defense] 
of jihad takes up many pages in the Book of God [the Koran], because truth cannot do without a 
force to protect it.”652  Such a force existed during the time of the Prophet as it defended the faith 
from foreign aggressors and internal enemies.  However, Azzam claims that this force no longer 
exists.  He argues that “unfortunately, there were generations that succeeded the early Muslims 
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who neglected the rules of Allah.  They forsook their Lord, so He forsook them.  They deserted 
His rules, and so they were lost.”653   
Perhaps the most negative consequence of this desertion of faith is that the present 
community has forgotten its obligation to wage jihad.  Since the obligation to wage jihad is 
absent from the current condition of the Muslims ummah, the result of this neglect is catastrophic 
and he underlines this point by quoting a hadith where the Prophet Mohammad says “you will be 
rubbish like the rubbish of flood water.  Allah will put wahn [disease] into your hearts and 
remove the fear from the hearts of your enemies because of your love for the world and your hate 
of death.” 654  The Prophet’s statement is telling because the loss of faith is rooted in excessive 
‘love of the world’ and a ‘hat[red] for death.’655  In Azzam’s view, love of the world has led to 
the disappearance of jihad leaving the Muslim community fearful and impotent.   
After diagnosing the problem, he goes on to explain the two different types of jihad that 
exist against the enemies of Islam.  First, there is the jihad al talab or the offensive jihad, which 
entails attacking unbelievers in their home countries as a way to spread the faith.  He declares 
this a fard kifaya or an obligation that is directed towards everyone but is only performed by 
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some members of the Muslim community.656  Here he harkens back to the Islamic caliphate 
when it possessed great armies that were able to wage offensive jihad against the enemies of 
Islam.  The second type is the jihad al daf or the defensive jihad, which entails expelling 
unbelievers from Muslim territory.  It is under the jihad al daf where Azzam makes a new 
theological argument.  Instead of calling the defensive jihad a fard kifaya, which is left to those 
who are able to fight he dubs the defensive jihad a fard ayn or a collective duty that is incumbent 
on every Muslim.   
The movement from jihad as fard kifaya to fard ayn is Azzam’s lasting contribution to 
jihadist thought.  By linking the defensive jihad with a new interpretation of jihad as fard ayn, he 
makes jihad a compulsory duty for the whole Muslim community.  The effect of making jihad a 
collective duty is best described by Azzam who says:   
“Jihad under this [defensive] condition becomes Fard Ayn upon the Muslims of the land 
which the Kuffar [unbeliever] have attacked and upon the Muslims close by, where the 
children will march forth without the permission of the parents, the wife without the 
permission of her husband and the debtor without the permission of the creditor.  And, if 
the Muslims of this land cannot expel the Kuffar because of lack of forces, because they 
slacken, are indolent or simply do not act, then the Fard Ayn obligation spreads in the 
shape of a circle from the nearest to the next nearest.  If they too slacken or there is again 
a shortage of manpower, then it is upon the people behind them, and on the people behind 
them, to march forward.  This process continues until it becomes Fard Ayn upon the 
whole world.”657 
 
What Azzam does here is quite remarkable because in one paragraph he dismantles the 
rules that govern jihad.658  In Islamic law, there are certain conditions that must be met before an 
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individual participates in jihad.  One involves the consent of parents with regard to offspring and 
a husband with regard to a wife.  If consent is not given, then the person who is seeking jihad 
should not be able to undertake it.  The other condition pertains to a person who is in debt.  The 
thinking goes that indebted persons should not be able to wage jihad because they potentially 
could leave their family with a financial burden they would incur should that person die.659  
Since jihad involves the protection of Islam, it supersedes the parental authority over offspring, a 
husband’s authority over his wife, and debt over the debtor.660  In fact, the necessity of the 
defensive jihad should be so self-evident that people should not even think about asking 
permission to wage jihad.  He illustrates this with a story: 
“[f]or instance, some people are walking along the seashore and amongst them is a group 
of good swimmers. They see a child about to drown. It shouts "save me!" and nobody 
moves towards him. One of the swimmers wants to move to save him but his father 
forbids him. Can any scholar in this day and time say that he must obey his father and let 
the child drown?  Saving the drowning child is Fard on all the swimmers who witness 
him. Before anyone moves there is a call for all to save him. If someone moves to save 
him, the sin falls from the rest. But, if no one moves, all the swimmers are in sin.”661 
 
He follows the story with a quote from Ibn Taymia who said “if the enemy enters Islamic 
lands, the entire Islamic empire and nation are one in repelling the invader, they need no 
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permission to travel to the fringe of the Islamic lands to conduct jihad.”662  Not only does Azzam 
abolish the rules governing jihad, but also he quotes Ibn Taymia to suggest that fighting is not 
limited to those who are closest to the incursion.  Instead, Azzam extends the duty of jihad ad 
infinitum to the whole of the Muslim community. 
The defensive jihad against the aggressor is of such importance that the jihad bil nafs [the 
jihad within one’s soul] is suspended indefinitely.663  Azzam is making the argument that jihad 
becomes the sixth pillar of Islam.  Moreover, as illustrated in the anecdote about the drowning 
child, Azzam believes that those who should be engaged in jihad but are not are in a state of sin.  
He continues by saying that the “sin increases according to the power, possibilities, and 
capabilities: so the ulema, leaders, and preachers…are then considered greater sinners than the 
masses and the people.”664  Essentially, those with the most to contribute to the jihadi effort but 
fail to do so are the greatest sinners in Azzam’s eyes.  As such, the neglect by those greatest in 
the Islamic community for the defensive jihad has led to an abandonment of faith thus causing 
Muslim territory to fall into the hands of the unbelievers.  This situation is unacceptable to 
Azzam and in his next work he proposes a way to entice Muslims to participate in jihad.   
 While The Defense of Muslims Lands makes an argument for why defensive jihad is 
necessary, Azzam’s Join the Caravan is an open invitation to the Muslim community to partake 
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in the jihad.  He opens the work with a lengthy quote from one of the most famous warriors in 
Islamic history, Salahuddin Ayyubi who conquered and liberated Jerusalem from the Christian 
Crusaders in the twelfth century.  Analyzing the situation of the Islamic community in the 
twelfth century, Salahuddin makes the following observation:  
“We hope in Allah Most High, to whom be Praise, who leads the hearts of Muslims to calm what 
torments them and ruins their prosperity.  Where is the sense of honor of the Muslims?  The pride 
of the Believers?  The zeal of the Faithful?  We shall never cease to be amazed at how the 
disbelievers for their part have shown trusts, and it is the Muslims who have been lacking in zeal. 
Not one of them has responded to the call.  Not one intervenes to straighten what is distorted 
 
In defense of their religion they [the Christian Crusaders] consider it a small thing to spend life 
and soul- and they have kept their infidel brothers supplied with arms and champions of war- and 
all they have done and all their generosity has been done purely out of zeal for him they worship 
in jealous defense of their faith.  
 
The Muslims on the other hand are weakened and demoralized [and] they have become negligent 
and lazy, the victims of unproductive stupefaction and completely lacking in enthusiasm.  If, 
Allah forbid, Islam should draw reign, obscure her splendor, blunt her sword, there would be no 
one, east or west, far or near who would blaze the zeal for Allah's religion, or choose to come to 
the aid of Truth against Falsehood.  This is the moment to cast off laziness, to summon from far 
and near all those men who have blood in their veins, but we are confident…in the help that will 
come from Him in sincerity of purpose and deepest devotion.  Insha-Allah [God willing] the 
disbelievers shall perish and the Faithful shall have a sure deliverance.”665 
 
The reason why Azzam quotes Salahuddin is because he finds great similarity between the past 
and present situations of the Islamic community.  Salahuddin, like Azzam, encountered a Muslim 
community who did not desire to wage jihad against the Christian Crusaders.666  Salahuddin 
believed that the Muslims were abandoning their religious duty to liberate Jerusalem and called 
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them ‘negligent’ and ‘lazy.’  This undoubtedly resonated with Azzam who saw himself 
confronting a similarly passive and reticent Islamic community. 
 Azzam believes that one of the ways to entice people to wage jihad is through 
martyrdom.  As Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milleli note, Azzam’s tract is not just an entreaty to 
join the caravan of Muslims resisting the unbelievers, bur rather it is an open invitation to join 
the caravan of mujahideen who will be going to heaven to collect their reward after dying a 
martyr’s death on the battlefield.667  After recounting the seven special favors that a martyr 
receives in the afterlife, Azzam quotes the Prophet who said:  “[i]n Paradise there are one 
hundred levels which Allah has prepared for the [martyred] Mujahideen; the difference between 
every pair of these is like the difference between heaven and earth.”668  As such, the defensive 
jihad is nothing less than a clarion call to death and martyrdom. 
After Azzam’s assassination, OBL appropriated the defensive jihad framework and made 
it his own.  This is evident in two fatwas issued by OBL in 1996 and 1998.669  The 1996 fatwa 
entitled, “The Declaration of War on American,” written in the Hindu Kush mountains near 
Khurasan, Afghanistan, adopts almost verbatim the language of Azzam.  In it he declares, “it 
should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity 
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and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist Crusaders alliance and their collaborators, to the 
extent that the Muslim’s blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the 
enemies.”670  Bin Laden asserts that the ‘Zionist Crusader alliance’ is currently conducting an 
offensive and is driving Muslims out of Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Burma, Kashmir, the 
Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya and Bosnia Herzegovina.671  This has led to horrifying 
“massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience.”672  The Zionist Crusader 
alliance also has exerted its global influence to silence the rest of the world to their misdeeds.  As 
a result, “a clear conspiracy [has] developed between the USA and its’ allies under the cover of 
the iniquitous United Nations and the dispossessed [Muslims] were even prevented from 
obtaining arms to defend themselves.”673   
If this were not enough, OBL says in his 1998 fatwa that the physical and cultural 
presence of the U.S. in the land of Islam is an insult to the Muslim Community.674  Indeed, the 
occupation of the Arabian Peninsula is the greatest “calamity to have struck Muslims…[in] the 
heart of the abode of Islam and the cradle of prophecy, since the death of the Prophet and the 
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source of the divine message-the site of the Holy Kaaba, to which all Muslims pray.”675  
Following Azzam’s lead, he argues that the root cause of the situation is due to the Islamic 
community’s abandonment of its faith.676  This has made so-called Islamic regimes unable to 
withstand the United States and, as such, these regimes have reneged on their duty to wage jihad 
to expel Islam’s adversaries.  As a result of the ills heaped upon the Muslim community, OBL 
claims that he has no choice but to issue a declaration of war against the United States and its 
allies.  In probably the most cited phrase from OBL he states:   
 
“Killing the Americans and their allies-civilian and military-is an individual duty for every 
Muslim who can carry it out in any country where it proves possible, in order to liberate Al Aqsa 
mosque and the holy sanctuary [Mecca] from their grip, and to the point that their armies leave all 
Muslim territory, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim...We-with God's help-call on every 
Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded [with martyrdom] to comply with God's 
order to kill the Americans and plunder them of their possessions wherever and whenever they 
find them.”677   
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OBL presents an uncompromising view of reality, which necessitates defensive jihad as an 
individual duty for all Muslims.  Defense jihad is the means by which OBL and AQ will 
accomplish two primary goals:  to expel the United States from Islamic holy lands and to re-
establish the Islamic caliphate.   
Through his sermons, one can observe that OBL was quite aware of the challenge he 
faced.  Indeed, he said that “America is a great power possessed of tremendous military might 
and a wide-ranging economy.”678  However, he goes on to cite Hizbollah’s suicide attacks on 
U.S. marine barracks and U.S. disengagement from Somalia to demonstrate that America has 
weaknesses that can be exploited through asymmetric tactics.  In two sermons he says: 
• America “is built upon an unstable foundation which can be targeted, with 
special attention to its obvious weak spots.  If America is hit in one 
hundredth of those spots, God willing, it will stumble, wither away and 
relinquish world leadership and its oppression.  A small group of young 
Islamic fighters managed…to provide people with proof of the fact that it 
is possible to wage war upon and fight against a so-called ‘great 
power’…because they used Jihad.”679 
• “We believe that America is weaker than [Soviet] Russia and from what 
we have heard from our brothers who waged jihad in Somalia, they found 
to their greatest surprise the weakness, frailness and cowardliness of the 
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American soldier.  When only eight of them were killed [in Somalia] they 
packed up in the darkness of night and escaped without looking back.”680 
• “I should like to remind you of the defeats suffered by a number of the 
great power…[like] the defeat of the American forces in the year 1402 of 
the Muslim calendar [1982] when the Israelis invaded Lebanon. The 
Lebanese resistance [Hizbollah] sent a truck full of explosives to the 
Americans Marines’ center in Beirut and killed over 240 of them.”681 
 
While OBL was aware of U.S. weaknesses and the potential destructive power of suicide attacks 
based on Hizbollah’s experience, the main proponent of the tactic came from his lieutenant 
Ayman Zawahiri.   
In Zawahiri’s manifesto, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, he makes the argument 
that the jihad movement “must move the battle to the enemy’s territory, to burn the hands of 
those who have set fire to our countries.”682  The jihadist movement should expand the theater of 
battle into enemy’s territory because it will make the effects of their attacks all the more 
significant.  Indeed, he argues that the movement must escalate the resistance to “be sure to 
inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, kill the greatest number of people, for this is the 
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language understood by the West, no matter how much time and effort such operations take.”683  
To this end, he advocates that the organization focus “on martyrdom efforts as the most 
successful way of inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in 
terms of casualties.”684  The targets of the martyrdom operations, as well as the manner in which 
they are conducted, must be such that they will “dissuade [the enemy] from its brutal ways, 
arrogance, and violations of every sacred custom.”685   
Zawahiri recognized that suicide attacks had an immense psychological value if they 
could be used against the U.S. because it would prove the country’s vulnerability, which would 
give the AQ organization legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim masses.686  As such, it becomes 
clear that AQ’s adoption of suicide attacks came as a result of strategic necessity and the 
realization that AQ could not openly confront the Western superpower.  Because they believed 
that faith could defeat a superpower as it had done against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 
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AQ’s founders turned to their faith and weaponized it in order to attack the U.S.687  This would 
become part of a burgeoning strategy to probe U.S. weaknesses and draw it into a prolonged and 
protracted conflict with AQ.  The next section examines the periods from 1995 to 9/11 and from 
9/11 to the present to investigate how AQ has adapted in its use of suicide attacks.   
 
5.3.2 Al Qaeda:  From 1995 to 9/11 
From November 13, 1995 to September 11, 2001, AQ was responsible for five suicide attacks, 
which brought the organization to the attention of U.S. counterterrorism officials:  the November 
1995 suicide attack against a U.S. Army operated training center for the Saudi Arabian National 
Guard in Saudi Arabia; the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia; the 1998 simultaneous 
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the October 2000 attack against the USS 
Cole in Yemen; and the infamous 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil.688  These attacks are representative 
of a time when AQ operated more as a hierarchical organization because it was involved in the 
organizing, planning and execution of each suicide attack.  Each of the attacks, which will be 
considered briefly below, demonstrates an organization that appears, in hindsight, to be probing 
its adversary. 
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1995 Suicide Attack on Saudi Arabian National Guard and 1996 Khobar Towers Attack 
 
AQ’s first two suicide attacks occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996 respectively.  In the 
1995 attack, five American and two Indian soldiers were killed with sixty injured when a large 
car bomb exploded just outside of the Saudi Arabian National Guard [SANG] training center in 
Riyadh.689  The explosives were placed in a truck, which was parked in a parking lot and then 
detonated by the driver.  The SANG headquarters was a relatively soft target in that there was 
minimal security in the parking lot and the building was not nearly as fortified as an embassy.   
Despite the lack of sophistication, the selection of the target was important.  As James 
Dunnigan notes, the SANG is the Saudi crown prince’s personal army.690  Moreover, the SANG 
was being trained by U.S. Army military personnel as well as a private company known as the 
Vinnell Corporation, a Fairfax, Virginia based company later acquired by Northrop-Grumman, 
which was first utilized by the U.S. military during the Persian Gulf War.691   
The 1996 Khobar Towers suicide attack was a great deal more sophisticated.  It is 
believed that AQ, cooperating with Hizbollah, scouted the target site for months in an attempt to 
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find weaknesses in the physical security of the building.692  Additionally, the truck bomb was 
filled with some 5,000 pounds of plastic explosives creating a bomb that was much more 
powerful than the one used in 1995.  The attack occurred on June 25, 1996 at 10:00 PM when an 
explosive laden truck was driven into a parking lot and then detonated.693  The explosion ripped 
off the outside wall of Building 131, which housed one hundred United States Air Force 
personnel killing nineteen American servicemen and wounding 372.694   
While the U.S. military had strategic intelligence indicating that Khobar Towers was a 
possible target, the successful explosion of the truck bombs in 1995 and 1996 demonstrated that 
the U.S. was vulnerable to this form of attack. 695  Moreover, it can be reasonably assumed that 
both attacks were directed at the U.S.-Saudi alliance.  In OBL’s view, the interaction between the 
Saudi royal family and the U.S. makes the former complicit in a most perfidious heresy; inviting 
Christian infidel forces into sacred Islamic land.   
 
 
 
                                                 
692 Dan Eggen, “9/11 Panel Links Al Qaeda, Iran,” (Washington Post, June 26, 2004), article available 
online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6581-2004Jun25.html.  Accessed on 12/22/09.  
693 “Khobar Towers,” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press Release, June 21, 2001), article available 
online at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/khobar.htm.  Accessed on 12/22/09. 
694 Ibid.   
695 William Cohen, “Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers,” (July 31, 1997).  
Report available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/khobar_dod/report.html.  Accessed on 12/22/09.  Cohen 
argued that the US did have enough strategic intelligence that they should have anticipated the attack.  
  260 
The August 7, 1998 Simultaneous Suicide Attacks in East Africa 1996  
 
The simultaneous suicide attacks in Kenya and Tanzania signals a turning point for AQ because 
it “marked the beginning of AQ’s involvement in the planning, direction, and execution of 
[suicide attacks], as well as its shift to a global strategy in which the ‘far enemy,’ especially the 
United States, would be targeted.”696  The planning for the East African embassy attacks began 
in earnest in December 1993 when AQ operatives are believed to have arrived in Nairobi.697  
OBL tasked Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who moved to the U.S., joined the 
U.S. Army and assisted in providing instruction to the 1993 World Trade Center attackers, to 
conduct detailed surveillance on a wide range of targets including the Kenyan embassy.  OBL 
provided Ali Mohamed with funds to purchase sophisticated surveillance and communications 
equipment.698  Using the equipment, he would then send OBL surveillance reports complete with 
hand-written diagrams, pictures and video recordings of each potential target.699   
As early as 1994, OBL and his leadership agreed to the selection of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania because they believed a car bomb could easily be parked and detonated 
close by each embassy.700  Based on their previous attacks at Khobar Towers and the SANG 
facility, AQ had learned that parking lots were an advantageous location to plant a car bomb 
given the relative lack of physical security close to the target.   
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 Explosive filled trucks were parked at the embassies at 10:30 AM.  The first explosion 
occurred in Nairobi at 10:35 AM and the second in Dar es Salaam at 10:39 AM.  In Nairobi the 
embassy was destroyed, due to the close proximity of the truck to the building, killing twelve 
Americans and 201 others.701  In Dar es Salaam, eleven people were killed, none among the dead 
were Americas, and 85 wounded.702 
 The picture of AQ that emerged after the embassy attacks was one of a sophisticated 
organization that engaged in careful target selection and collected a wide range of intelligence.  
The attack had been meticulously planned and was meant to coincide with the eighth anniversary 
of the arrival of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.703  Additionally, this marks the first time AQ used 
simultaneous attacks. 
  
October 12, 2000 Attack on the USS Cole 
 
 The USS Cole suicide attack was a ‘do over’ of a previously failed attempt that occurred on 
January 3, 2000 when a boat filled with explosives approached the USS The Sullivans.  Instead 
of arriving and exploding close to the ship, the small boat sank due to the weight of the 
explosives.  The AQ operative in Yemen at that time, Abd al Rashim al Nashiri, was instructed 
by OBL to try again.  In fact, attacking a U.S. ship was OBL’s idea as he “chose the target and 
location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to 
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purchase explosives and equipment.”704  Nine months later suicide attackers Hassan al Khamri 
and Ibrahim al Thawar received a second chance. 
On October 12, 2000 Thawar and Khamri captained a boat filled with explosives toward 
the USS Cole, which was docked in the Yemeni port of Aden.  Learning from the previous 
mishap, they utilized a fiberglass boat that was better able to transport the explosives without 
sinking.  As they approached the Cole, both smiled and waved to the crew before detonating the 
bombs, which killed seventeen sailors and wounded forty.705 
After the suicide attack, OBL believed that the U.S. would retaliate using military force.  
As a result, he evacuated AQ’s Kandahar airport compound in Afghanistan, fled to the desert 
where he rotated between five to six residencies spending only one night at each place, and sent 
his principal advisors Mohammed Atef and Ayman al Zawahiri to different locations so that all 
three could not be killed by U.S. air strikes.706  When no retaliatory measures came, OBL was 
dismayed but this only made him more determined to launch a bigger attack in the future.707 
 In order to reap the most propaganda value, OBL tasked Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to 
create a video recreating the USS Cole attack.708  The video produced “included a reenactment of 
the attack along with the images of the AQ training camps and training methods; it also 
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highlighted Muslims suffering in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Chechnya.”709  The 
videotape appeared in jihadist circles in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, and eventually on the 
internet at AQ’s al sahab.com website.710 
 
9/11 Attacks on the United States    
 
The 9/11 attacks were a clear escalation in AQ’s use of violence and were a frightening display 
of AQ’s operational and technical abilities.  It used the tactic of simultaneous strikes from the 
bombings in East Africa but decided to employ a different method of delivery.  As Stephen 
Holmes notes, “these transcontinental flights were apparently selected because of the negligible 
number of passengers likely to be on board at the time and the 10,000 gallons of aviation fuel 
that, upon impact, transformed the planes into immense incendiary bombs.”711   
The main architect of the 9/11 attacks was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [KSM].  As the 
9/11 Commission Report states, KSM was “[h]ighly educated and equally comfortable in a 
government office or a terrorist safehouse, [who] applied his imagination, technical aptitude, and 
managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist schemes.”712  
Moreover, he was the mastermind of 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and failed plans 
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including the Bojinka plot, an attempt to assassinate former Pope John Paul II and a plan to crash 
a plane into CIA headquarters.713  Indeed, it was after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
perpetrated by KSM’s cousin Ramzi Yousef when the former began thinking about attacking the 
U.S. using a ‘planes operation.’714 
KSM’s initial idea was a grandiose plan like the Bojinka plot involving the hijacking and 
crashing of 10 aircraft on both coasts that would hit targets from the CIA building, the FBI 
building, the White House, nuclear power plants, to the tallest buildings in Washington DC and 
California.715  OBL did not believe that such a plan was feasible but he did like the idea of 
crashing planes into selected targets.  Thus, in late 1998 or early 1999, it is believed that OBL 
made the decision to devote his resources to attack the U.S. using commercial airplanes as 
weapons. 
 Originally devised as a four-person operation, the plan grew to include nineteen 
hijackers.  Each plane would have two pilots, one primary and one back-up, and a number of 
‘muscle hijackers’ whose job it would be to storm the cockpit and control the passengers after 
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the planes were hijacked.716  An interview by OBL after the 9/11 attacks details just how much 
thought and preparation went into the operation:   
 
“We planned and made calculations.  We…estimated the casualties of the enemy.  We figured the 
passengers in the planes, those will die.  As regards [to] the towers, we assumed they would 
include the people in the three or four floors the planes would crash into.  That was all we 
estimated.  I was more optimistic.  Due to the nature of my profession [i.e. construction], I figured 
that the fuel in the plane would raise the temperature in the steel to the point that it becomes red 
and almost lose[s] its properties.  So if the plane hits the building here...the portion of the building 
above will collapse.  That was the most we could hope for.”717 
 
For AQ, the total cost of the operation was estimated between $400,000 and $500,000.718  
The economic damage caused by AQ on the U.S. was much more devastating.  As Olivia 
Jackson notes, the 9/11 attacks halted U.S. stock markets for four business days causing the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average to drop 648.81 points when the markets reopened.719  A CRS Report 
found that the 9/11 attacks cost the U.S. approximately $34 billion in insured losses, $576 
million for rebuilding the Pentagon, $7 billion for official victim compensation and $7.8 billion 
in lifetime earnings lost by the 2,780 New Yorkers killed.720  Not only had OBL and AQ 
significantly harmed the U.S. economy, OBL would succeed in baiting the U.S. into the Middle 
East when on October 7, 2001 President Bush announced the beginning of combat operations 
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[Operation Enduring Freedom] in Afghanistan.  The U.S. would later expand its military 
presence in the Middle East when in 2003 it invaded Iraq [Operation Iraqi Freedom] “to disarm 
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free 
the Iraqi people.”721   
Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer noted that 9/11 was a strategic success for OBL 
because it succeeded in luring the U.S. into the Middle East.  Moreover, he argues that the U.S. 
involvement in Iraq was playing into OBL’s strategy:   
“…[the Iraq war] was the perfect execution of a war that demanded jihad to oppose it.  You had 
an infidel power invading and occupying a Muslim country and it was perceived [by the Muslim 
world] to be unprovoked.  The war has validated everything bin Laden said:  that the United 
States will destroy any strong government in the Arab world, that it will seek to destroy Israel’s 
enemies, that it will occupy Muslim holy places, that it will seize Arab oil, and that it will replace 
God’s law with man’s law.”722 
 
Scheuer’s analysis is convincing.  Despite the noble motives of the United States, military action 
in Afghanistan and Iraq played into OBL’s defensive jihad framework.  OBL was free to frame 
U.S. involvement in the Middle East as “a new crusade against the Muslim world…[that will] 
have dangerous repercussions and damaging effects on Islam and Muslims, to an extent that only 
God knows.”723  A 2006 National Intelligence Estimate would later find that the Iraq war was 
                                                 
721 George Bush, “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” (President’s Radio 
Address, March 22, 2003). Available online at http://georgewbush-
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722 Michael Scheuer quoted in Ken Silverstein, “Six Questions for Michael Scheuer on National Security,” 
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723 Osama bin Laden, “Second Letter to the Muslims in Iraq,” in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al 
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becoming “the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in 
the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement” all of which align 
with the goals of OBL.724  While the U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan did play into OBL’s 
grand strategy, U.S. military success in capturing and killing senior AQ leadership forced the AQ 
organization to adapt.  What has emerged in the post 9/11 AQ is an organization that is more 
diffuse, decentralized and network-centric.  
  
5.3.3 Al Qaeda Post 9/11:  ‘Secret Bands of Disconnected Cells’  
According to Bruce Hoffman, U.S. military action in Afghanistan has killed or captured 75% of 
AQ’s leadership leaving AQ a different organization than it was on 9/11.725  In a 1,600 page 
tome, AQ ideologue Abu Musab al Suri investigates the post-9/11 AQ and addresses why the 
Americans were able to achieve such a quick victory over the mujahideen in Afghanistan.726  In 
his analysis he finds that the Americans relied on support from local collaborating Muslims 
                                                 
724 “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” (Declassified Key Judgment of the 
National Intelligence Estimate, April 2006), 2.  
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powers; they used neighboring countries to transport logistical supplies; they relied on 
overwhelming air and missile superiority; and they used excessive and brutal force, which 
transformed the Muslim people into impotent witnesses.727  Based on the situation in 
Afghanistan, Al Suri reaches the following conclusions:  open confrontation with the U.S. is 
impossible; U.S. measures to establish regional security have hampered the ability of hierarchical 
jihadi groups to operate in their domestic countries; and AQ must adapt to the current situation or 
face extinction.   
While Al Suri lauds the 9/11 attacks and claims they were justified because “the United 
States, Israel, and Western Europe were plotting against [the Muslim world],” he realizes that the 
jihadist movement “has now entered a difficult stage.”728  The quick fall of Kabul and the 
cooperation lent by Pakistan, he argues, has led “to the complete destruction of the jihadist 
movement…[as] the Arab mujahideen…faced the worst genocide in their history.”729  Out of the 
roughly 1,900 AQ fighters in Afghanistan, he believes that some 1,600 have been killed or 
captured.730  As a result, U.S. military action has “decimated the senior leadership of those 
jihadist organizations, who represent the third generation of mujahideen.”731    
The main weakness that Al Suri finds with the AQ organization is its hierarchical, top-
down nature.  The plain fact is that the U.S. effectively targeted senior members of the AQ 
hierarchy, which have hampered the operational effectiveness of the lower tiers of the 
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organization.  Instead of a top-down organization, he advocates a more diffuse one.  With this in 
mind he concludes, “the sole method for confrontation that presents itself in light of this situation 
is by way of secret bands of disconnected cells that are both varied and abundant.”732  Al Suri 
believed that relying less on hierarchy and more on independent, and disconnected cells would 
make the organization more resilient and better able to operate outside the Middle East, 
specifically in Western society.   
Since 9/11, AQ has perpetrated suicide attacks targeting a synagogue in Tunisia (April 
11, 2002), a nightclub Bali (October 12, 2002), the Paradise Hotel in Kenya (November 28, 
2002), the Al Hamra residential complex housing in Saudi Arabia (May 12, 2003), Spanish 
commuter trains (March 11/2004), and London subway stations (July 7, 2005).733  The London 
subway and bus suicide attack will be investigated briefly as the example par excellence of Al 
Suri’s vision of a decentralized AQ that is making inroads in Western society.    
 
July 7, 2005:  Radicalization in London 
 
At 8:23 AM four men are seen on closed circuit television [CCTV] waiting at the concourse 
close to the Thameslink platform for a train.  Each is wearing a rucksack and is dressed casually.  
At 8:30 AM the train approaches and CCTV catch the four men hugging, as “they appear happy, 
                                                 
732 Ibid,, 28.  Emphasis added.   
733 Some of the perpetrators of the Madrid attack died when a bomb exploded during a standoff with the 
Spanish Guardia Civil.  However, it is thought that the bomb went off unexpectedly, which raises doubt as to 
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even euphoric.”734  The men then split up and go separate directions.  Twenty minutes later at 
8:50 AM, there are three explosions:  one at the circle line tunnel between Liverpool street and 
the Aldgate station; the second on the circle line outside of Edward Road; the third in a 
Piccadilly line tunnel close to King’s Cross Station.  The fourth bomb detonates at 9:47 AM on 
the upper deck of a No. 30 bus traveling to Tavistock Square.735   
The near simultaneous London suicide attacks is representative of Al Suri’s new vision of 
AQ.  The self-starter cell was essentially an “autonomous clique whose motivations, 
cohesiveness, and ideological grooming occurred in the absence of any organized network or 
formal entry into jihad.”736  Three of the four perpetrators were British born Muslims of 
Pakistani descent, while the fourth was a Jamaican immigrant who later converted to Islam.  As 
the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London points out, what is striking is that 
the backgrounds of these four young men appear “largely unexceptional.”737  They grew up in 
the neighborhood district of Holbeck, which is located just outside Leeds and were educated.  
                                                 
734 “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005”, (House of Commons, 
May 2006), 4.  Hereafter referred to as “The London Report.”  
735 Ibid., 2.  As the London Report goes on to say, it is believed that the fourth bomber, Hasib Hussain, 
failed to detonate his explosive device.  CCTV captures Hussain at a Boot’s pharmacy in King’s Cross station 
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30 would have more people riding at that time in the morning.     
736 Aidan Kirby, "The London Bombers as 'Self-Starters': A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and 
the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques," (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, 2007), 416.  
737 “The London Report,” 13. 
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Mohammad Sidique Khan graduated with a degree from Leeds Metropolitan University and was 
married.738  Shehzaed Tanweer was an avid cricket player and studied sports science at Leeds 
Metropolitan University.739  Hasib Hussain was also enrolled at a local college where he was 
reading for a degree in business management.740  Finally, Jermain Lindsay had taken classes at a 
local university and was married to, and had a child with, a British convert to Islam.741  The 
group enjoyed “camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and other outward bound 
type activities;” hardly the activities that come to mind when one thinks of aspiring suicide 
attackers.742 
 Although Tanweer and Khan had visited family members in Pakistan from November 19, 
2004 to February 8, 2005, it is unclear just how much assistance, if any, the two received 
regarding their upcoming plot.  After the attack, articles appeared claiming that the attackers had 
direct links with AQ or had received training from AQ.743  In fact, the Official UK Report on the 
London Attacks concluded that there was no reliable intelligence or information to corroborate 
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the theory that Tanweer and Khan had visited AQ training camps or had informed AQ leadership 
of their plot.744   
The jump to link the 7/7 attackers with AQ “conveys the unwillingness on the part of 
many individuals within the security community [in the United Kingdom] to seriously consider 
the possibility that this attack could have been conceived, planned, financed, and executed by 
just a handful of people-all of them British.”745  Indeed, the only common link amongst the 
London attackers is that they frequented places in Leeds that were known for Islamic extremism.  
For example, one of the gyms the four used was known as ‘the Al Qaeda gym.’746  The four also 
went to a nearby bookstore where it is believed they would access extremist websites, listen to 
anti-Western lectures by local Islamists, and buy extremist propaganda in the form of video 
cassettes and DVDs.747  Outside of this there is scant evidence that the four received any 
ideological indoctrination or operational training from AQ.748 
What emerges in the aftermath of the London attacks is a picture of four individuals who 
self-started, self-radicalized and self-activated on their own without AQ’s assistance.  Perhaps 
more importantly, three of the four attackers were British born citizens who were, by all 
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accounts, well integrated into society and did not display any outward signs of radicalization. 
Unlike Hamas suicide attackers, there is no evidence that the London bombers withdrew from 
their lives before the attack.  On the contrary, the London bombers remained active in their daily 
lives and routines as they attended university, worked different jobs, and raised their children.  
Indeed, the families of the 7/7 bombers were shocked that their sons had become radicalized.749   
This type of autochthonously forming group is Al Suri’s realized vision of the new AQ.  
Although the AQ leadership may not be involved operationally with such groups per se, the 
groups can easily tap into AQ’s ideological meta-narrative.  This powerful narrative is proving 
able to radicalize Muslims who have been born in, lived in, and educated in the West.  One needs 
only to look at recent plots by Najibullah Zazi and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to see that Al 
Suri’s decentralized AQ is becoming a reality.750  AQ is becoming a fifth column of sorts that is 
found lurking both in stable Western liberal democracies and the world’s unstable weak-
states.751  The presence of the fifth column will remain active, al Suri argues, as long as AQ’s 
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ideology draws disaffected Muslims.  If the ideology is strong, he believes the West can do little 
to deter future suicide attackers.  The next section of the chapter investigates AQ’s narrative and 
examines how it influences AQ suicide attackers.  
 
 
5.4 AL QAEDA’S POTENT META-NARRATIVE AND HOW IT MOTIVATES AL 
QAEDA SUICIDE ATTACKERS  
The AQ meta-narrative is the engine that drives the ideology of this transnational terrorist 
organization.  For Western security analysts, academics and policymakers, examining this meta-
narrative has proven difficult.  As Jim Lacey notes, “for too long, analysts and even the general 
public [in the West] have observed the jihadi movement from the outside and tried to understand 
it from our own perspective.  Too often our own biases have gotten in the way of accurately 
interpreting what we see.  This misinterpretation of the movement’s ideas…has led policymakers 
not only to underestimate the enemy, but also to advocate policies that are, at best, 
inappropriate.”752  Instead of understanding AQ from the Western perspective, one must 
endeavor to understand AQ’s perspective.  This is done, in effect, by reading primary sources 
written by AQ ideologues.  Through an examination of the ‘jihadist canon,’ which include the 
works of Sayyid Qutb, OBL, Abu Musab al Suri and Ayman al Zawahiri, the section identifies 
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an AQ meta-narrative that is rooted in three primary principles:  a hatred of the West, a belief in 
a clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West, and martyrdom.  The three 
principles of AQ’s meta-narrative form the backbone of a transnational Islamic liberation 
ideology, which has become a powerful motivating force for AQ suicide attackers.753  The meta-
narrative frames the conflict with the West as a religious one, dividing the world between good 
and evil and offering the reward of martyrdom to the suicide attacker.  Indeed, the potency and 
durability of the meta-narrative has motivated and will continue to motivate suicide attackers 
who identify with it precisely because it allows the suicide attacker to project his or her 
grievances onto it.  
 
5.4.1 Hatred of the West  
The first principle of AQ’s meta-narrative is a hatred of the West, which comes in two forms.  
The first is cultural.  As Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin note, the United States is “resented 
for its cultural hegemony…[because] [i]ts cultural reach threatens traditional [Islamic] 
values…[i]t offers temptation, blurs social, ethical, and behavioral boundaries, and presages 
moral disorder.”754  Islamism’s hatred of the West is rooted in the thought of Sayyid Qutb.  
Qutb’s critique of the West is based on his belief that the West exists in a state of jahiliyyah 
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[ignorance].  In Islamic theology, jahiliyyah is the state of ignorance that the Arabian community 
existed in before they accepted the revelation given by God to the Prophet Mohammed.  
According to Qutb, the West’s “jahiliyya is evil and corrupt…[i]ts outward manifestations may 
be different during different epochs, yet its roots are the same.  Its roots are human desires, 
which do not let people come out of their ignorance and self-importance.”755   
Since the West’s state of ignorance is rooted in human desires, this has given rise to a 
corrupt culture.  What is offensive to Qutb and other AQ ideologues is not only the depravity of 
Western culture but the West’s cultural aggressiveness.756  Abu Musab Al Suri forcefully makes 
the point that the West has inundated the Muslim world with filth:   
“…from satellite dishes and television screens to radio stations, Internet networks, international 
information, newspapers, and magazines to forums and educational centers, and so forth, you will 
see that most of it is the source of demons' gateway to humanity.  Its very foundations are based 
on impermissible actions and abominations, from music, singing, entertainment, nudity, 
commingling of the opposite sex, fornication, and prostitution to the spread of fifth and corruptive 
thoughts.”757 
 
Western culture is offensive to AQ ideologues since it is all-pervasive and because it leads 
Muslims away from their faith.   
Western culture also has given rise to ideas such as democracy and secularism that Qutb 
and Ayman Al Zawahiri believe to be un-Islamic.  For Qutb, secularism and the concomitant 
notion that religion should be relegated to the private sphere of a state is impossible because, as 
he argues, Islam is a total and inseparable system of beliefs governing all aspects of human 
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action.758  Because of this any governing body seeking to rule by man-made law is un-Islamic.  
As Qutb argues, “God’s rule on earth can be established only through the Islamic system, as it is 
the only system ordained by God for all human beings.”759  Zawahiri, echoing Qutb, declares 
“either legislation comes from God alone, and one refers to him in case of conflict, in accordance 
with our words [‘There is no God but God’], or one gives the right to legislate to others, like the 
people and their delegates, referring to them in case of conflict.  This is tantamount to 
worshipping gods, peers, and associates alongside God.”760   
The point that Qutb and Zawahiri raise is that democracy, a derivative of Western culture, 
competes against the loyalty a Muslim has for Allah.761  They believe that Muslims cannot 
reconcile their loyalty to God with impious doctrines like positive law, secularism and 
democracy as well as all the temptation accompanying Western culture.762  With the innumerable 
ways that Western culture acts as a stumbling block for the Muslim faithful, Qutb and Zawahiri 
recommend its rejection in toto.   
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 The second root of Western hatred is the presence of Western forces in Muslims lands, 
which can be labeled ‘neo-Crusaderism.’763  As aforementioned, one of the main themes used by 
OBL and other AQ ideologues is the Crusades.  In the AQ narrative, the Crusades were a nadir in 
Islamic history when the faithful abandoned their religion and, as a result, lost the holy city of 
Jerusalem in 1099 to the invading Christian armies.  OBL sees a repetition of the same history 
occurring in the twentieth century.   
As OBL argues, the Christian Crusaders have “been occupying the most sacred of Islamic 
lands, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, 
terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead with which to 
fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.”764  OBL goes on to say that “Muslims are being drained 
of their blood, honor, possession, and land all over the world, at the hands of the hateful 
[Christian] Crusaders, led by that leader of international infidelity, America.”765  As such, OBL 
links the West’s neo-Crusaderism with the aggression, oppression and occupation of Islamic 
lands.  As James Payne notes, the neo-Crusaderism theme accounts for approximately 72% of 
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OBL’s written statements from 1994 to 2005.766  OBL, however, is not the only ideologue to 
address this subject.  
Departing slightly from OBL, al Suri believes that the neo-Crusade is nothing new and in 
fact has been occurring for nearly two centuries.  He argues that the Crusaders have conspired 
for two hundred years “to drive Muslims away from their faith, which they realize is the reason 
for Arab power and glory.”767  As such, the American-led crusade against the Arab and Islamic 
world is bent on the systematic and “total elimination of the civilization, religious political, 
economic, social, and cultural existence of Muslims.”768  For Al Suri, the neo-Crusade is 
tantamount to genocide and therefore the entire Muslims community is warranted to resist this 
oppression by any means necessary.   
In this brief discussion of the first pillar of AQ’s meta-narrative, one sees that it is rooted 
in culture, and subsequently values, as well as occupation.  Robert Pape has provided the 
definitive account of the role that occupation plays in AQ’s strategic calculus.769  However, he 
ignores the powerful role of culture and values.  For Pape, culture and values do little more than 
play a supplemental role in that they provide context and symbols of resistance.  The real issue, 
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he argues, is the American presence in the Middle East.  Pape narrowly defines this in terms of 
U.S. troops who appear to be occupying forces.  However, he overlooks the fact that AQ 
ideologues also feel bombarded and held hostage by Western culture.  Indeed, as Walter Laqueur 
notes, the cultural occupation is just as important to AQ as the physical occupation.770  This 
debate has caught the attention of OBL who asks the following question:  “[w]hy all the lies and 
false claims that the conflict with the Americans is not over values of justice and the choice of 
freedoms?  For indeed, the conflict with the Crusading Americans is over values of justice-both 
in theory and practice; likewise with freedoms-in theory and practice."771  The OBL quote is a 
reminder that AQ views this conflict as one involving cultural as well as the physical presence of 
the West in Islamic lands.  Any attempt to ignore one at the expense of the other misinterprets 
what AQ ideologues say in their own writings.       
The reason why AQ dwells on the cultural incompatibility between the West and Islam as 
well as Western neo-Crusaderism is because these factors haven proven successful at mobilizing 
the Muslim masses.772  With rising anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world, the more 
OBL and AQ can highlight the perception of a Western assault on Islam the more of an audience 
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they will have.  As such, the scope of the conflict is presented as a clash of civilizations where 
good [AQ] battles evil [the West]. 773  
5.4.2 Clash of Civilizations  
The clash of civilizations is the second pillar of the AQ ideology and, like the first, can be traced 
back to Sayyid Qutb.  Qutb’s commentary on the sheer incompatibility between the West and 
Islam ensures that the latter is destined to struggle with the former.  OBL frequently invokes the 
‘Neo-Crusaderism’ metaphor to describe the clash between Islam and the West as nothing less 
than total war as the West is confronting Islam on the economic, political, religious and cultural 
fronts.  As Roel Meijer notes, ideologues like OBL claim that the West engages in a civilization 
war against Islam as “it aims to destroy the identity of Muslims, corrupt their morals, and 
terminate their religious feelings in order that Muslims lose faith in their creed.”774   
The root of the clash between Islam and the West is the latter’s occupation of Islamic 
land.  The first time OBL mentions this is in his 1996 fatwa where he says, “the latest aggression 
[against the Muslims community] was one of the worst catastrophes to befall the Muslims since 
the death of the Prophet…[i]t was the occupation of the land of the two holy mosques [Saudi 
Arabia], the cradle of Islam, the scene of the revelation, the source of the message, and the site of 
                                                 
773 See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993).  
Huntington’s article, and later book, became one of the most discussed and controversial analytical works in the 
field of International Relations.     
774 Roel Meijer, "Yusu al Uyairi and the Making of A Revolutionary Salafi Praxis," (Die Welt Des Islams, 
Vol. 47, 2007), 432.  
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the holy Ka’bah…by Christian armies of the Americans.”775  Additionally, OBL argues that the 
war between the two civilizations is part of a long history of Western occupation:   
“O Muslims:  The situation is serious and the misfortune is momentous.  By God, I am 
keen on safeguarding your religion and your worldly life…The West’s occupation of our 
countries is old, yet new.  The struggle between us and them, the confrontation, and 
clashing began centuries ago, and will continue because the ground rules regarding the 
fight between right and falsehood will remain valued until Judgment Day.”776  
 
Another characteristic of AQ’s clash of civilizations is that it is defined in explicitly 
religious terms.  As OBL says, “the struggle [with the West] is an ideological and religious 
struggle and that clash is a clash of civilizations.  They [the West] are keen to destroy the Islamic 
identity in the entire Islamic world.  This is their real stand regarding us.”777  As Mark 
Juergensmeyer notes, the integration of religion absolutizes the conflict turning a worldly 
struggle into a sacred battle.778  Juergensmeyer goes on to say that OBL’s use of religion gives 
                                                 
775 Osama bin Laden, “Fatwa Declaring Jihad on Americans,” London, Al Islah, September 2, 1996 in 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Report, “Compilation of Osama bin Laden Statements 1994-January 2004, 
(FBIS, January 2004), 26.  
776 Osama Bin Laden, “Message to Brothers and Sisters in the Whole Islamic Nation,” Audiotape played 
on Al-Jazeera, January 4, 2004 in Thomas Hegghammer, “Al Qaeda Statements 2003-2004-A Compilation of 
Translated Texts by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri,” (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 
2005), 50.  
777 Osama bin Laden, “O Iraqi People,” audiotape released on Al Jazeera on May 6, 2004 in Thomas 
Hegghammer, “Al Qaeda Statements 2003-2004-A Compilation of Translated Texts by Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman Al Zawahiri,” 60 
778 Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religious Terror and the Secular State," (Orfalea Center for Global and 
International Studies, UC Santa Barbara, 2004), 2. Article available online at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4w99n8tk.  Accessed on 12/15/09.  Instead of using the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
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AQ a strong sense of moral legitimacy allowing the organization to argue that it is employing 
just violence against an evil and corrupt foe.779   
It must be noted that there is a tendency by social scientists to explain away the religious 
aspect of AQ’s clash of civilizations.  As Ami Pedhazur notes, “the depiction of AQ actions in 
general, and the organization’s suicide operations in particular, in terms of a clash of religions or 
civilizations goes a bit too far.”780  Likewise, Robert Pape argues that the clash is ethno-
nationalist rather than religious.781  Similarly, Stephen Holmes expresses doubt as to whether the 
analyst plausibly can assert that religious beliefs motivate AQ to plan and carry out attacks.782  
This reveals the strong tendency of some analysts to disregard the religious component of the 
AQ.783  Indeed, David Cook and Olivia Allison highlight this tendency when they assert that 
“many scholars and analysts shy away from considering the role of religion as a key determining 
factor in creating [Al Qaeda] suicide attackers, a factor that yet may be a cardinal, if not the 
                                                                                                                                                             
paradigm, Juergensmeyer developed what he termed the ‘cosmic war.’  Much like any Manichean world view, the 
cosmic war sees conflict in religious terms where good battle evil.  See also Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the 
Mind of God, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).   
779 Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religious Terror and Global War," (Orfalea Center for Global and International 
Studies, UC Santa Barbara, 2004), 3. Article available online at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5k99k5mq.  
Accessed on 11/12/09.  
780 Ami Pedahzur, Ami. Suicide Terrorism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 116.  
781 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 79 
782 Stephen Holmes, "Al Qaeda, September 11, 2001," in Diego Gamebetta ed., Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions, 132. 
783 Javier Jorda and Luisa Boix, "Al Qaeda and Western Islam," (Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 
16, No. 1, Spring 2004), 4.  
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cardinal, factor in the contemporary creation of radical Muslim suicide attackers.”784  By not 
discussing the religious components of AQ, some analysts are refusing to recognize how the 
adversary frames the conflict.  Instead, Pape, Pedhazur and Holmes are examples of analysts 
who seek to reframe the conflict from a secular, Western perspective where facts and values are 
separated.  However simplistic or anachronistic the religious worldview might appear to the 
social scientist, the statements, video tapes, audio tapes, articles and books authored by AQ 
ideologues give one the impression that AQ truly believes that the West is engaged in a religious 
war against Islam and that it is the duty of every individual Muslim to help expel the West.785  
This struggle is waged through jihad and martyrdom is the reward for those who give their lives 
willingly in this fight. 
5.4.3 Martyrdom  
Martyrdom is the last pillar of AQ’s meta-narrative.  Since AQ is engaged in a defensive jihad, 
which according to Zawahiri is “one of the greatest and most individually binding jihads in this 
day and age…waged against those apostate rulers who reign over Islamic lands and govern 
without the sharia-the friends of Jews and Christians,” those who die in this struggle are hailed as 
                                                 
784 David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics 
of Martyrdom, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), xiv.  
785 This is why the main counter-terrorism effort must center on countering the Al Qaeda ideology.  This 
will be explored in greater detail in the conclusion of this dissertation.  
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martyrs.786  It was Zawahiri who was responsible for providing the theological justifications for 
making an AQ suicide attacker a martyr. 
In an undated pamphlet entitled “Regarding the Duty of Jihad and the Superiority of 
Martyrdom,” Zawahiri provides the single, most nuanced treatment of what he calls ‘martyrdom 
operations.’787  The pamphlet asks two questions:  is it legitimate for a Muslim to kill himself for 
the sake of Islam and is it legitimate to bombard the infidels if fellow Muslims are intermingled 
with them?  Both questions are of critical importance because they deal with suicide and the 
potential killing of fellow believers because of the indiscriminate nature of suicide attacks.  
Zawahiri answers in the affirmative to both questions and his reasoning will now be explored.  
Suffice it to say that Zawahiri’s rationale has become the cornerstone in AQ’s justification for 
using suicide attacks.  
Zawahiri begins his endeavor with a simple quote by the Prophet Mohammed, “war is 
deceit.”  These three words form the basis of his entire argument about the justifiability of 
suicide attacks.  Zawahiri claims that the Islamic community is engaged in a defensive struggle 
against a militarily superior foe.  Since the mujahideen cannot confront this foe using 
conventional means, they must adapt by using deception.  As Zawahiri notes, “deception in 
warfare requires that the mujahid bide his time and wait for an opportunity against his enemy, 
                                                 
786 Ayman al Zawahiri, “Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and Lost Reality,” December 2002 in 
Raymond Ibrahim ed., The Al Qaeda Reader, 94.  
787 Zawahiri termed the phrase ‘martyrdom operation,’ which made its way into Al Qaeda’s organizational 
vocabulary.   
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while avoiding confrontation at all possible costs.  For triumph, in almost every case, is 
[achieved] through deception.”788   
The suicide attack is the epitome of a deceptive tactic.  Wearing and detonating a bomb-
laden vest or driving a car filled with explosives into a target are not examples of open 
confrontation.  Seeking to give his argument theological weight, he quotes Islamic scholars of 
the ulema who agree that “deception against the infidels in war is legal, unless it reneges an 
existing pact or treaty in which case it is unacceptable.”789  He cites other instances in the hadith 
where Muslim warriors dressed in disguises to surprise their enemies.  By analogous reasoning, 
Zawahiri’s argument goes as such: deception is legal in warfare; martyrdom operations are a 
form of deception; therefore martyrdom operations are legal.  For Zawahiri, the martyrdom 
operation is but one example when the Muslim community has used deception to combat its 
enemies.790 
After establishing the legality of martyrdom operations, Zawahiri confronts the thorny 
issue of suicide.  Instead of calling the act ‘suicide,’ he asks if the believer has permission to 
destroy oneself in order to ennoble and empower the Islamic religion.  To address this, Zawahiri 
quotes a hadith cited by Suhaib, which tells the story of a young boy who works miracles in the 
name of Allah.  According to the hadith, a non-believing king learns of the boy’s power and has 
the boy compete against the king’s magicians.  To demonstrate his power, the boy picks up a 
pebble and declares that the small stone will fell an animal when thrown.  After praying to Allah, 
the boy hurls the small stone killing the animal.  The king’s magicians are unable to match this 
                                                 
788 Ibid., 142.  
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid., 143.  
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feat so the king decides to kill the boy because his faith is attracting the attention of the king’s 
subjects.  
The king tries twice to kill the boy, but each time the boy prays to Allah and is delivered 
safely from harm.791  Finally, the boy tells the king that that “you will never kill me until you do 
what I tell you to do.”792  Desperate to eliminate this threat to his kingdom, the king agrees to 
listen.  The boy instructs the king to "gather the people [of the kingdom] into an open field and 
crucify me on a tree.  Then take hold of an arrow from my quiver, string it to a bow, and say: ‘In 
the name of Allah, Lord of the youth,’ then fire the arrow. If you do this, you will be able to slay 
me."793 
The king did as instructed resulting in the boy’s death.  The act however made the king’s 
subjects believe that it was Allah, not the king, who destroyed the boy.  Allah appeared more 
powerful than the king and as a result the king’s subjects came to believe in Allah and thereby 
adopted the Islamic faith.  The king, angry that his people now believed in Allah, dug ditches and 
lit them on fire declaring that those refusing to recant Islam would be cast into the fire.  The 
king’s soldiers rounded up the new converts and began throwing them into the burning pit if they 
refused to renounce their faith.  They did this until "a woman came [to the edge of the pit] with 
her child, and she hesitated jumping into the fire.  So [a] youth said to her:  O mother endure 
                                                 
791 The first time the king tries to hurl the boy from a mountain, but the boy prayed to Allah who sent an 
earthquake to shake the mountain killing his captors.  The second time the king orders the boy to be taken out on a 
boat and drowned if he does not renounce his religion.   
792 Ibid., 148.  
793 Ibid.  
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[this ordeal] for you are in the right."794  The mother then proceeded to jump into the burning pit 
with her child shocking the king.  
Zawahiri uses the hadith to argue that the believers who jumped into the fire pits did so 
because they refused to reject their religion.  Instead of committing suicide, they died as 
witnesses to the truth of the Islamic faith.  As a result, Zawahiri argues that “jumping into the fire 
of their own accord can never be [deemed] evil or suicidal.  On the contrary, such a deed Allah 
loves and extols, associating it with many blessings.”795  Similarly, the mujahid who engages in a 
martyrdom operation is performing a like sacrifice because the mujahid willingly destroys the 
self for the greater good of the religion.  The linchpin here, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
is the intent of the mujahid.  If the intent is to empower Islam, then the mujahid is justified in 
taking his or her life.796  On the other hand, if the mujahid destroys the self out of despair then 
the person will be condemned to hell.   
Now that Zawahiri has established the legitimacy of martyrdom operations, he turns to 
the question of whether they can be used if they kill fellow Muslims and other non-combatants.  
This is another hazardous issue because the Islamic jus in bello states explicitly that believers 
                                                 
794 Ibid., 149.   
795 Ibid.  
796 Raymond Ibrahim notes that it is significant that Zawahiri uses a hadith as opposed to a Koranic 
injunction, is used as the primary justification for martyrdom operations.  Ideally, Koranic verses form the 
foundation of an argument while hadiths serve as evidence.  Here Zawahiri uses the hadith as both the foundation 
and the evidence.  For Ibrahim, this suggests that Zawahiri could not find a Koranic foundation for his argument and 
had to rely solely on the hadith.  See Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, 137-138. 
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and non-combatants should not be targeted or killed.797  Again unable to find a Koranic basis for 
his argument, Zawahiri turns to the hadith.   
He quotes a hadith from Al Qurtubi who relates a story of a non-Muslim who takes a 
Muslim as a human shield.  The non-Muslim refused to let his victim go so a group of archers 
fired arrows slaying the culprit and human shield.  Zawahiri claims that the archers were justified 
in their action because the non-Muslim was a threat to the city’s inhabitants.  The archers had to 
kill the believer to protect the greater good of the city.  Relating this to martyrdom operations, 
Zawahiri states, “if the good to be gained is imperative, certain, and universal, and this is 
definitely the case in a Defense Jihad, where Muslims battle those infidels who are attempting to 
take over Muslims lands, then there is no problem killing those who should not be killed, by 
accident.”798  The intent of the archers was not to kill the believer but rather to slay the non-
believer in defense of the city.  Similarly, the intent of the person sent on a martyrdom operation 
is to target the enemies of Islam not fellow Muslims.   
Probably realizing the radical nature of his argument, Zawahiri utilizes another hadith 
relayed by Al-Jaas who described a time when the Prophet Mohammed besieged the inhabitants 
of the city of Taif in 630 AD.  Al-Jaas noted that the Prophet attacked the city with catapults 
despite his ban on killing women and children.  Zawahiri believes that the Prophet authorized the 
attack “knowing full well that women and children would be struck, for it was not possible to 
                                                 
797 Youssef Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare,” 15.  
798 Ayman Al Zawahiri, “Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents,” in Raymond Ibrahim, The Al 
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differentiate between them.  This demonstrates that if Muslims are intermingled with the people 
of war, it is permissible to fire at them, as long as the intended targets are the idolaters.”799   
In both instances, Zawahiri returns to the intent of the act.  If the intent is to engage the 
enemies of Islam, then the death of believers and other non-combatants is justified.  Not only are 
the attacks justified but also Zawahiri, citing Ibn Taymia, argues, “those Muslims who are 
accidentally killed are martyrs; and the obligatory jihad should never be abandoned because it 
creates martyrs.”800  Indeed, Zawahiri uses an extreme form of utilitarianism to weigh the death 
of the innocents against the damage inflicted on the non-believers by the suicide attackers.   
Now that Zawahiri has answered both questions he proposed at the beginning of his 
treatise, he turns to the subject of martyrdom.  If the suicide attacker desires to serve Islam, then 
the attacker will be a martyr.801  He then quotes the Prophet Mohammed who enumerates the 
benefits of the martyr’s death:  “[t]he martyr is special to Allah. He is forgiven from the first 
drop of blood [that he sheds]. He sees his throne in Paradise, where he will be adorned in 
ornaments of faith. He will wed the Aynhour [wide-eyed virgins] and will not know the torments 
of the grave and safeguards against the great terror [hell]. Fixed atop his head will be a crown of 
honor, a ruby that is greater than the world and all it contains. And he will couple with seventy-
two Aynhour and be able to offer intercessions for seventy of his relatives.”802   
                                                 
799 Ibid., 165.  
800 Ibid., 168.  
801 On the other hand, if the attacker becomes a suicide attacker out of depression or despair he will not 
receive martyrdom.  This reasoning is identical to Hamas’ ideology of martyrdom.     
802 Ibid., 143-144.  
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Zawahiri proceeds to dwell on each of the martyr’s benefits at length as he cites liberally 
from the Koran.  At this point, he asserts that the allure of martyrdom, if harnessed correctly, can 
be powerful.  He argues that martyrdom’s draw “is spreading, growing, and becoming stronger.  
By the grace of Allah, it has become a popular and trailblazing [ideology], confronting the new 
Zionist-Crusader campaign, in defense of all the plundered Muslim lands, and fighting all the 
apostate and collaborating regimes that rule our Muslim ummah.”803  If AQ can project the 
benefits of martyrdom to the ummah, then AQ’s ranks will be filled with mujahids who desire 
martyrdom. 
In sum, Zawahiri, in one treatise, establishes the three primary pillars of an AQ meta-
narrative that is global in its reach and scope.  The reason why the meta-narrative is so effective 
is because it allows the individual suicide attacker to project his or her grievances onto it.  The 
suicide attacker has a readied ideology that provides ample moral and theological justification 
for the act the attacker intends to commit.  
 
5.4.4 Al Qaeda’s Meta-Narrative and the Grievances of Suicide Attackers 
Al Qaeda’s ideologues have developed a clear, provocative and alluring epistemology.  The 
previous section identified the three pillars that exist at the meta, or transcendent, level.  These 
are the three ideas that occur most frequently in the writings of the AQ ideologues.  Additionally, 
the AQ epistemology operates at the local level.  The local level is where the individual attacker, 
who has specific grievances, projects them onto the meta-narrative.  Once the individual attacker 
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taps into the meta-narrative and plugs in those grievances the person has made the narrative his 
or her own.  This is a dangerous point in time because the individual has the potential to become 
radicalized.  The wills and statements of AQ suicide attackers demonstrate that the meta-
narrative is very much alive and has proven able to motivate suicide attackers in Iraq, Pakistan, 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere all over the globe.  
The wills and statements are the best indicators of why a person chooses to participate in 
a suicide attack.  One example that is most illuminating is the final testament of London bomber 
Mohammad Sidique Khan.  In his testament he states: 
“Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to 
offer.  Our religion is Islam-obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the 
footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Mohammed…this is how our ethical stances 
are dictated.  Your democratically elected government continuously perpetuates 
atrocities against my people all over the world, just as I am directly responsible for 
protecting and avenging my Muslims brothers and sisters.  Until we feel security, you 
will be our targets.  And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture 
of my people we will not stop this fight.  We are at war and I am a soldier.  Now you too 
will taste the reality of this situation.  I myself, I make du’a [an act of supplication] to 
Allah…to raise me amongst those who I love like the prophets, the messengers, the 
martyr’s and today’s heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al 
Zawahiri and Abu Musab al Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are 
fighting in the jihad…of this cause.”804  
 
Khan, in his final testament, clearly utilizes two pillars of the meta-narrative.  His first 
sentence of the testament declares that his motivation is other-worldly allowing one to infer that 
he is describing martyrdom.  He then uses the ‘Neo-Crusader’ image as he discusses how a 
democratically elected government engages in atrocities [bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture] against the Muslim world.  Because of this situation, he declares that he must make a 
du’a [an act of supplication] to Allah.  This, presumably, establishes his motive for undertaking 
                                                 
804 Final testament of Mohammad Sidique Khan quoted in “Report of the Official Account of the 
Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,” 19.  Emphasis added.   
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the suicide attack.  This fits within the framework developed by Zawahiri as Khan situates the 
attack as a religious act to further the Islamic religion.  Perhaps most interesting in this statement 
is the sentence where Khan says, ‘[n]ow you too will taste the reality of the situation.’  This 
statement exudes revenge as Khan delights in the knowledge that the United Kingdom will now 
experience what the Muslim world has experienced at the hands of the West.  
Here is another more recent example taken from the testament of Abu Dajana Al 
Khorasani, the AQ suicide attacker and double agent who self-detonated at the CIA Khost Base 
Station in Pakistan on December 30, 2009:  
 
“I decided to avoid publishing this…however, the sight of the blood of Muslims in Gaza, 
small children, women, and powerless people, who were killed by the bombs of the 
brethren of apes and pigs [an anti-Semitic reference to Jews], encourage me to publish 
the article, so that it may strengthen the resolve of [even] a single Muslim in the 
frontlines, and that I will gain reward from Allah. 
 
My heart burns to ashes because of my love for jihad.  Of, you who write about jihad and 
urge people to it, beware of falling in the same trap as me.  What I fear most is that [when 
I die] I would meet a man who died as a martyr under the effect of my words, whereas I 
shall die in bed.  This is a nightmare which makes me sleepless and it wrecks my nerves.  
I’m afraid that on the day of resurrection, standing before a mountain of [my] sins, I shall 
be asked to account for each and every one of them, and it shall be a long account, and I 
will be covered with sweat, while they [i.e. the martyrs] will be moving about the rooms 
of paradise in everlasting pleasure. 
 
By God, if the reward for martyrdom for the sake of Allah had only been forgiveness of 
sins and the exemption from being called to account for one’s sins, I should sacrifice my 
property and my life for it.  All the more so, since the reward includes also the uppermost 
paradise…in the Company of the Prophet Mohammad.  All the more so, since it includes 
being saved from the great anxiety [on the Day of Judgment].  All the more so, since it 
includes the right to intercede on behalf of seventy members of family…I looked at my 
extended family and counted more than 100 persons, both dead and alive, but I have not 
found among them any martyr, or father, or mother, or brother of a martyr.  I don’t know 
any martyr amongst whose seventy relatives, for whom he intercedes, I can be counted.  
So how shouldn’t I worry, and how shouldn’t I be alarmed? 
 
Oh God, I beseech Thee not to let me die except as a martyr for Your sake.  Oh God, I 
beseech Thee that I would [be given the chance to] massacre Your enemies…martyrdom-
how enraptured in it free men are!  It occupies their whole being, so they think of 
obtaining it before they fall asleep, and after they wage and even in their dreams…I want 
to be a mortar bomb which shall work like a taxi car brining the largest possible number 
  294 
of Jews to hell…I feel as though I smell the fragrance of paradise…as though heaven’s 
gates have become wide open….oh, that martyrdom for the sake of Allah shall be your 
wish.”805 
 
 
The final testament of the Jordanian doctor turned double agent again reveals many of the 
themes that exist in the AQ meta-narrative.  In this first paragraph, he describes the plight of the 
defenseless Muslims living in the Gaza Strip who are killed by Israel [‘the brethren of apes and 
pigs’ is a standard anti-Semitic phrase used in Islamist parlance], which fits in with the ‘Neo-
Crusader’ theme.  Unlike the testament of the Khan, Al Khorasani does not dwell on revenge, 
but instead on missing the opportunity to become a martyr.  His greatest fear is that he dies a 
normal death and meets a martyr in the afterlife.  The fact that he will stand before a ‘mountain 
of sins’ where he must account for every one of them while the martyr floats freely through the 
halls of Paradise is almost too much for Al Khorasani to bear.  The situation is made even more 
desperate when Al Khorasani claims to have searched his family lineage for a martyr but is 
unable to find one.  Therefore, he truly is stuck with his sins until the Day of Judgment unless he 
chooses to become a martyr.  In this context, it is clear that the post-mortem incentives of 
martyrdom are an integral factor behind his becoming a suicide attacker. 
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Al Khorasani then proceeds to declare his intent when he says, “Oh God, I beseech Thee 
not to let me die except as a martyr for Your sake.”  This statement satisfies Zawahiri’s demand 
that the intent of the suicide attacker be to further the cause of Islam.  Next, Al Khorasani 
describes how the desire for martyrdom becomes an omnipresent desire.  It overtakes his 
thoughts and dreams as the day draws closer for his suicide attack.  His statement about the smell 
of the ‘fragrance of paradise…as though heaven’s gates have become wide open” is a reference 
to Al Khorasani as a living martyr.  The living martyr who, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
occupies some plane of existence between the here and hereafter is sometimes said to be given 
glimpses of the after-life before becoming a shahid.  The smells and dreams Al Khorasani 
describes are tantalizing bits of what is to come should he become a martyr. 
This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to demonstrate that AQ’s meta-
narrative can be many things to different suicide attackers.  The attacker could be motivated by 
revenge, humiliation, and/or post-mortem benefits.  While there is no one motivation for a 
suicide attacker, the meta-narrative demonstrates that there are reoccurring themes that allow the 
potential suicide attacker to project his or her own unique grievances onto the meta-narrative.  
This has led one commentator to argue correctly that AQ suicide attackers’ “list of grievances 
against the West is not only self-replenishing but endlessly creative.”806  What emerges is a 
transnational Islamic liberation ideology that respects no boundaries.  This rigid yet flexible 
ideology allows for the individual to be radicalized regardless of their ethnic background or 
where they live.  This is why the world is witnessing greater degrees of radicalization in Western 
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Article available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom and even the United States.  This type of ideology 
is categorically different than other groups such as ETA, IRA, and FARC whose ideology is 
linked to a particular cause and region.  Instead, AQ’s meta-narrative is global in its focus and 
goals.  The next section examines how this ideology is broadcast and how it gains resonance in 
order to garner support for AQ’s actions.   
5.5  A GLOBAL IDEOLOGY AND GLOBAL RESONANCE?  
AQ ideologues not only have spent much time fashioning a global ideology, but they also have 
given much thought to how the ideology can be spread.  Abu Musab al Suri devotes an entire 
chapter to this question in his Call to Global Islamic Resistance, which he calls “The Media and 
Incitement in the Call to Resistance.”  In this chapter, he provides a clear plan for how AQ can 
market their ideology and make it appealing to the rest of Muslim world.  In order for the global 
ummah to receive the message, Al Suri argues that AQ must highlight atrocities committed by 
the West, and most notably the U.S.  By constantly bringing up the sins and transgressions of the 
U.S., AQ will control the message, which is that the West wants to conquer the Muslim world 
and the only way to prevent this is to wage a defensive jihad.  Therefore, AQ should focus on all 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy to frame any action the U.S. does as an attempt to subjugate the 
Muslim community.  Next, Al Suri argues that the message should be available in a wide variety 
of mediums.  From CDs, cassette tapes, to homemade movies, the message must be made 
accessible to potential sympathizers.  Perhaps most importantly, Al Suri argues that all these 
mediums can be posted on internet websites.  The internet gives AQ a transnational reach as the 
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proliferation of AQ affiliated websites gives the web browser unprecedented access to jihadi 
related materials.       
 
5.5.1 Controlling the Message:  Highlighting U.S. Sins Abroad  
Al Suri believes that the AQ message “needs to be lucid, streamlined, and cogent.  It must be a 
passionate and inspiring message that combines the promise of victory and rewards…for 
attempting to face foreign enemies.”807  Specifically, Al Suri argues that the root of the message 
should address the sins of the West, most notably the United States.  By focusing on the foreign 
policy of the United States, Al Suri hopes that this will galvanize other Muslims and prompt 
them to join the jihad against the U.S.  Since 9/11, the U.S. has invaded Afghanistan, Iraq and is 
conducting drone attacks inside Pakistan.  U.S. action in Iraq and Pakistan, as well as the 
presence of other symbols like Abu Ghraib and Gauntanamo Bay, gives AQ an abundance of 
material that they can use to market their ideology and garner support.   
Iraq 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it became clear that AQ had used Afghanistan as a safe 
haven to train mujahideen and plan terrorist attacks.808  This prompted former President George 
                                                 
807 Jim Lacey, A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri's Islamic Jihad 
Manifesto, 190-191.  
808 “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 66.  
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W. Bush to declare a ‘global war on terrorism’ [GWOT].  As a result, the U.S. believed the only 
way to deal with the threat of terrorism “was to end Al Qaeda’s ability to use Afghanistan as a 
sanctuary for its operations.”809  The first front in the GWOT was Afghanistan as the U.S. 
initiated Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF] on October 7, 2001.  The second front in the 
GWOT opened in Iraq on March 20, 2003 under the pretense that former dictator Saddam 
Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction.810  Despite the best efforts of the Bush 
administration to disabuse the notion that the U.S. was at war with Islam, AQ claimed that the 
war was one against Islam.811 
 As the U.S. increased its involvement in Iraq, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi emerged as the 
leader of an organization called Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI].  Zarqawi led a campaign of terror from 
2003-2006 against coalition forces.  He succeeded in igniting a sectarian civil war between 
Sunnis and Shias, which impeded U.S. efforts to bring order and security to the country.  
Zarqawi also became the creative force behind hundreds of propaganda videos that were 
                                                 
809 Ibid., 348.   
810 The US claimed that Iraq was harboring chemical and biological weapons on their Al Husseins, Al 
Samound IIs, and Ababil-100s missiles.  A CRS report, written in 2003, made the case that it was possible that “US 
and British intelligence may have overstated Iraq’s WMD and missile capabilities.”  This would prove true once the 
war progressed.  See Andrew Feickert, “Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capable Missiles and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles,” (CRS Report, Order Code RS21376, March 24, 2003), 5. 
811 In a 2006 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush said, “My country desires 
peace.  Extremists in your midst [Iraq] spread propaganda claiming that the West is engaged in a war against Islam.  
This propaganda is false and its purpose is to confuse you and justify acts of terror.  We respect Islam.”  President 
George W. Bush quoted in “Bush: Not at War with Islam,” (Michigan Daily, September 19, 2006).  Article available 
online at http://www.michigandaily.com/content/bush-us-not-war-islam.  Accessed on 12/20/09.  
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disseminated in order to turn public opinion against the U.S. and motivate foreign fighters to 
come to Iraq to wage jihad against the Americans. 
 There were two types of videos produced during Zarqawi’s reign as leader of AQI.  The 
first were videos of Iraqi suicide attacks.  Like Hamas, AQI often made videotapes of the suicide 
attackers giving their final testaments as well as actual footage of an attack.  One such video is of 
the infamous October 25, 2005 triple suicide attack on three Baghdad Hotels.812  The video 
begins with AQI’s symbol, which is an open Koran with a rifle coming out of the middle with 
the Iraq flag at the end of its barrel.813  The video then cuts to scenes of U.S. destruction in Iraq 
where buildings and homes are being raided by U.S. forces.  After this, the footage changes to a 
hand held camera, which is taking surveillance of the two hotels, the Ishtar Sheraton and 
Meridian Hotel.  During the scene with the hand held camera, a voice speaks about the route the 
suicide attackers will take.  This is the practice run of the impending suicide operation.  Next 
there is a cut scene and the martyrs-to-be give their final testimonies.   
The similarity between AQI videos and the Hamas videos is striking.  They follow almost 
the exact same format as the attacker introduces himself, discusses a selected Koranic verse, 
justifies why he is seeking martyrdom, rails against the unjust occupier, executes his will giving 
                                                 
812 The attack’s infamy is due to the fact that it was a triple suicide raid that occurred in three stages.  One 
attack was to detonate next to a concrete barrier, which allowed the two remaining cars to enter in order to get closer 
to the hotels.  See Solomon Moore, “Triple Bombing Hits Baghdad Hotel Area,” (Los Angeles Times, October 25, 
2005).  Article available online at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/25/world/fg-iraqbomb25.  Accessed on 
1/2/10.    
813 The video is entitled “Al Qaeda’s Preparation for the Triple Suicide Attack on Baghdad Hotels,” 
(MEMRITV, November 26, 2005).  Video available at www.memritv.org.  Accessed 1/3/09.   
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away all his worldly possessions, asks forgiveness for his sins, and finally implores his family 
not to be sad after his death.  After the final testaments are played, the video shows the attack 
happening in real time.  Probably filmed at the nearby traffic circle, the video shows the first 
bomb detonating into the concrete barrier followed a few seconds later by the two bombs at the 
hotels.  Finally, the camera cuts into an apartment where a group of people watch a news report 
on the suicide attacks.  When the attack is replayed on the television, there is much yelling and 
jubilation.  The video closes with an entreaty for those who seek jihad to come to Iraq to fight the 
Americans. 
 The aforementioned video is one of many productions of AQI and it is one of their more 
technologically sophisticated videos.  It demonstrates the use of video software equipment since 
it is evident that the video was edited using a computer.814  These videos take more time to 
prepare so AQI also made use of a much more simplistic method in their propaganda war.  This 
involves a lone person with a video camera who is instructed to wait in order to film an 
upcoming suicide attack.  The cameraperson sits at a safe distance filming until the suicide 
attacker detonates.  The video is not edited, but instead is put immediately online.  
 The second type of video produced by AQI is the execution video.  These videos, which 
proliferate amongst the jihadi websites of the world, are exercises in macabre sadism.  However, 
they serve a purpose, which is to drive fear into the heart of the enemy and kindle the bloodlust 
of those who wish to become jihadis.  The unfortunate victims of this atrocity vary from 
coalition troops, journalists, to Iraqi Shias and Sunnis.  In the few videos that are accessible over 
the internet, the common thread is that the person is executed because of his or her involvement 
                                                 
814 Such evidence includes slowing down the frames per second after the video has been recorded.  
Another alteration is enhancing the color during the explosion to make it appear more red and violent looking.   
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with the occupying power.  In one such video, the victims are blind folded and the captors, 
armed with automatic weapons, read off a list of charges, which includes fighting, spying or 
aiding coalition forces.815  After the charges are read, the captors proceed to kill the victims.  The 
method of executions varies from decapitation by a knife, being shot in the head, or kicked into a 
fire-burning pit. 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
Another example AQ uses to display U.S. aggression is the latter’s use of Predator drones in 
Pakistan.  The drones, operated by the CIA, have killed some 400 militants, including Taliban 
leader Baitullah Mehsud.816  However, the Pakistani government claims that the attacks are 
fomenting anti-American sentiment because they have killed some 500 civilians.817  Videos have 
appeared on AQ related websites claiming to show the destruction and civilian deaths caused by 
the drone attacks.        
                                                 
815 Al Qaeda in Iraq video showing prisoners being burnt alive.  Available online at 
http://videogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/Video.aspx?s=5&vid=2107.  Accessed on 1/4/10.   
816 Javed Siddiq and Dean Nelson, “US to Escalate Drone Attacks on Pakistan,” (The Telegraph, 
December 4, 2009).  Article available online at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6728577/US-to-escalate-drone-attacks-
on-Pakistan.html.  Accessed on 12/4/09.   
817 Gareth Porter, “Errant Drone Attacks Spur Militants in Pakistan,” (Inter Press Service, April 15, 2009).  
Article available online at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46511.  Accessed on 1/4/09.   
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Symbols of Persecution: Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay  
Aside from U.S. action in Iraq, the most potent symbols of American aggression come from Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.  According to Thomas Hegghammer, “the damage caused by 
Guantanamo [Bay Prison] and Abu Ghraib is irreparable [for the United States]…and [these 
symbols] have been among AQ’s most widely used and most potent recruitment tools in the 
post-9/11 era.”818  Despite arguments that Abu Ghraib was only a one-time occurrence and that 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay are treated humanely, those images have been harnessed and 
exploited by AQ.819  Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have been described by AQ sympathizers 
as worse than ‘Nazi war camps’ where innocent Muslims are tortured and abused.820  Equating 
U.S. action with the Nazis has become a familiar occurrence.  Another AQ sympathizer writing 
in Egypt described the treatment of Guantanamo detainees in this way:   
 
“…they are blindfolded, their ears covered, and their noses sealed.  They can’t see, can’t 
hear, and can’t smell; they are in masks of iron. Their hands, arms, necks, and legs are 
shackled in heavy choke chains.  Twenty hours of sensory deprivation is sufficient to 
damage the senses of any man. If the Americans add another 20 hours, [one doesn't 
know] whether he is alive or dead. If we then remove the shackles, he will not know how 
– or where – to walk!  In the solitary confinement cells, the darkness is absolute. 
Suddenly, [the Americans] shine a brilliant light and make aggressive [loud] noise for a 
                                                 
818 Thomas Hegghammer, “Irreparable Damage,” (Foreign Policy, May 4, 2009).  Article available online 
at http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/blog/6793.  Accessed on 1/5/09.   
819 Erick Stakelbeck, “Exploiting Abu Ghraib,” (National Review Online, May 12, 2004).  Article available 
online at http://www.investigativeproject.org/264/exploiting-abu-ghraib.  Accessed on 12/22/09. 
820 Mustafa Sami, “Guantanamo Like Nazi Camps,” (MEMRI, September 30, 2005).  Article available 
online at www.memri.org.  Accessed on 12/23/09.   
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few moments; then quiet and darkness are restored. Those moments are enough to make 
the prisoners blind, deaf, and brain-damaged.”821       
 
With AQ highlighting the shortcomings of U.S. action in the Muslim world, it is fashioning a 
message that potentially has great appeal to the Muslim masses.  This message is disseminated 
largely through the internet as AQ is able to present its ideology to a global community.   
5.5.2 Distributing the Message:  Al Qaeda Online 
AQ affiliated websites and online forums are the new vehicle for propaganda, proselytizing and 
indoctrination.  In the post-9/11 world, these forums are a central battleground in AQ’s war on 
the United States.  As Zawahiri argues, “we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is 
taking place in the battlefield of the media.  We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of 
our ummah.”822  In order to cultivate a global resonance for AQ’s ideology, affiliates and/or 
sympathizers of the organization use the internet mainly to transmit propaganda, and foster 
online e-communities. 823   
In regards to the transmission of propaganda and ideology, AQ affiliated websites have 
become the new libraries for the tracts, books, and articles written by AQ ideologues.  The 
                                                 
821 “American Torture of Al Qaeda Prisoners Worse Than Hitler’s Treatment of Jewish and Christian 
‘Rivals,” (MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 340, February 1, 2002).  Article available online at www.memri.org.  
Accessed on 12/22/09.    
822 Zawahiri quoted in Hanna Rogan, "Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the 
Horn of Africa," (Culture and Society, Summer/Fall 2007), 89. 
823 Hanna Rogan, "Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use the 
Internet for Terrorist Purposes," (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, FFI, 2006), 8.  
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former website Al-Nida, which was shut down in 2007, was one such online library filled with a 
comprehensive literature of various jihadi scholars, ideologues and trainers.  The website also 
contained a large amount of recorded sermons from OBL, Zawahiri, Azzam and other regional 
imams sympathetic to AQ.824  Not only do websites have digital copies of primary sources, but 
also some produce their own propaganda.  Probably the most infamous website in this regard is 
Al Sahab. 
The Al Sahab [the clouds] website became a world-wide producer of AQ related 
propaganda.  Since its creation in 2001, Al Sahab has released a total of 178 videos before the 
website went offline.825  In 2007, Al Sahab hit its production peak as it distributed 74 videos 
averaging a new release every three days.826  Operating somewhere out of Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, Al Sahab was the idea of KSM and Zawahiri.  KSM confirmed this when in a court 
hearing he declared that “I was the Media Operations Director of Al Sahab…under Dr. Ayman 
Al Zawahiri.”827  According to Kathy Gannon, Al Sahab was a sophisticated media machine as it 
employed experienced cameramen, video editors, couriers, and mobile minivan studios that were 
                                                 
824 Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Web Media Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications," (Paper 
Presented at the 'Check the Web' Conference, Berlin, Germany, February 2007), 4.  
825 “Al Qaeda Messaging Statistics,” (IntelCenter, September 9, 2007), 8.  Despite going offline in 2007, 
the Al Sahab still produces videos and they are distributed by other jihadist websites. 
826 Ibid.  
827 “Transcript of Combatant Status Review,” (Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, March 10, 2007).  
Transcript available online at www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf.  Accessed on 1/5/10.   
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used to edit and produce their videos.828  One of the reasons why Al Sahab became so popular 
was because it became one of the sole venues for the distribution of OBL and Zawahiri 
messages.  The tapes of the AQ leaders then were played on the Qatari based satellite television 
station Al Jazeera.829  Another reason for its online popularity is the availability of sophisticated 
original videos designed to ‘educate’ its viewers.  Perhaps the most famous of Al Sahab’s films 
is one entitled Knowledge is for Acting Upon: The Manhattan Raid, which is a documentary 
style production capturing the zeitgeist of the Muslim community before the 9/11 attacks. 
Being one of the most distributed pieces of propaganda created by Al Sahab, the video 
can be found easily online.830  It begins with a clip from OBL who is delivering a lecture on the 
state of the Islamic ummah.  In it he says, “the ummah in our time is lost and alienated.”831  The 
narrator then proceeds to recount a familiar litany of grievances against the Muslim community.  
In the next four minutes, the viewer gets an introduction to the entire AQ meta-narrative.  The 
culture of the West is derided, the Islamic community has fallen victim to the ‘Neo-Crusaders,’ 
and the only remedy for the situation is to wage jihad and seek martyrdom.  After this, the 
narrator claims that the videos of OBL and Zawahiri are being distributed all over the world and 
                                                 
828 Kathy Gannon, “Al Qaeda’s Media Machine,” (MSNBC News, June 23, 2003).  Article available online 
at www.msnbc.com/id/6363306.  Accessed on 12/20/09.   
829 Hanna Rogan, "Al Qaeda's Online Media Strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007," (Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment, 2007), 49.   
830 This researcher found the entire 55 minute video on Google Video.  Available online at 
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2227985208017300997#.  Accessed on 1/4/10.   
831 Ibid.  
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are contributing to an awakening of the Islamic community.  The video then proceeds into each 
area of the meta-narrative and produces historical footage as evidence. 
In its critique of Western culture, the video shows Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.  
Once a stronghold for Islam, the narrator claims that its leaders have been wooed by the West’s 
love for money.  One of the most striking images is of a luxury mall in Dubai.  In the mall the 
video camera captures people dressed in Western clothes walking to and from the mall shops.  
As shoppers buy ‘indecent’ clothing, a group of women wearing full burqas looks on.  The 
commentator notes that the West’s culture dehumanizes women because it treats them as objects.   
The video then shows historical footage that demonstrates the West’s crusader mentality.  
It has video of British delegates meeting with Zionist leaders before the founding of the state o 
Israel in 1948.  It shows American troops during Operation Desert Strom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom as they operate with impunity in the sacred land of Islam.  The video condemns the 
Saudi Arabian government for inviting the U.S. forces into their land.  It chastises them for 
abandoning their faith and not believing that the Islamic mujahideen could not have dealt with 
Saddam Hussein.832  There is also a segment of two American guards at Gunatanamo Bay 
leading a shackled prisoner from his cell.  The video reiterates the claim that the invasion of Iraq 
and Afghanistan were planned long before the 9/11 attacks.  The reason the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the video argues, was to control Middle Eastern oil.  Again, the video 
returns back to OBL who says that “the armies of unbelief and atheism have invaded the Muslim 
                                                 
832 This is a direct reference to the fallout OBL had with the Saudi royal family, which consequently led to 
OBL’s expulsion from Saudi Arabia.   
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world.”833 OBL goes on to note that the anti-Islamic forces are an offense to Islam and must be 
expelled. 
Addressing the third feature of the meta-narrative, the video has extended footage of 
Zawahiri who is giving a public lecture on the individual duty of every Muslim to wage jihad 
against the enemies of Islam.  The lecture discusses the legality of jihad and the post-mortem 
incentives given to those who die in God’s path.  Zawahiri then chastises the religious ulema for 
not doing more to convince young people to meet their deaths through jihad.   
During the fifty-five minute propaganda film one receives the entire explanation for why 
jihad must be waged against the West.  The film’s extensive use of the martyrdom videos of the 
9/11 attackers is powerful.  Throughout the film, the final testaments of Wail Al Shihri and 
Hamza Al Ghamdi are used to emphasize certain points of the meta-narrative.834  The recitation 
of the wills show each attacker declaring their love for jihad and intention of martyrdom while 
decrying the actions committed by Israel and the United States against the Islamic community.   
Such a video is intended to target both an internal and external audience.  Internally, the 
video could be used to strengthen morale and provide ideological support.  The clips of AQ 
ideologues could help cultivate the fortitude needed to undertake an operation.  Externally, it 
serves as a lure to get new people interested in AQ’s ideology.835  This is an easy way for AQ’s 
ideology to make inroads in different parts of the world.  Indeed, a website like Al Sahab could 
                                                 
833 Ibid.  
834 From the video, it is evident that the testaments of each attacker were copied and digitally overlaid on a 
new background giving them a visual sophistication.   
835 Brynjar Lia, "Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure," (Jane's Intelligence 
Review, December 2005), 2.  
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prove an ideal vehicle in maintaining and sustaining pro-jihadi subcultures in the West as it 
draws new recruits into its sphere of influence.836 
The second way AQ uses the internet is through the creation of online e-jihad 
communities.  Al Suri realized that the internet gave AQ a truly global reach.  He argued that the 
aim of the internet should be to “spread a Jihadist cancer to face the bad cancer of the [U.S. led] 
world order.”837  Part of the way this can be accomplished is by creating small enclaves of 
sympathizers.  Instead of meeting in a physical location, Al Suri advocated that jihadists begin 
meeting in cyber-space.   
While internet websites like Al Sahab are instrumental in spreading AQ related 
propaganda and ideology, the websites are vulnerable.  All websites have an internet protocol 
[IP] and a host, which acts as the website’s virtual address and information repository where 
information is stored.  After 9/11, it became a common occurrence for governments, especially 
the U.S., to target the companies hosting pro-AQ websites thereby taking their material 
offline.838  As a result, websites like Al Sahab proved to have a short life span online because 
they were located and shut down quickly.  This has prompted a shift from official websites to 
web forums that are hosted inadvertently by online media companies like Yahoo, Google, and 
American Online.   
                                                 
836 Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Web Media Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications," 3. 
837 Al Suri quoted in Paul Cruickshank and Mohammad Hage Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the 
New Al Qaeda," (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007), 9.  
838 Mac Fiddner, "Medieval Ideology and 21st Century Technology: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and the 
Internet," (Paper presented at the International Studies Association, 2008), 3.  
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These web forums can be little more than blogs, message boards, email distribution lists 
and links to external websites.839  The message boards are an interesting feature because the 
creator of the board acts as a moderator and is able to grant or deny membership to potential 
visitors.  It should be noted that a message board was the precursor to the Global Islamic Media 
Front, which gained notoriety as the online location for AQ’s training manuals.  Begun in 2003, 
it was a popular message board site hosted by Yahoo! Group and ran by a person with the online 
name of ‘Abu Banan.’  As Brynjar Lia notes, “it quickly grew to become a key hub for AQ 
related material, and had more than 7,000 members.”840   
The transition to web forums allows for the creation of what John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt term a ‘all channel network’ where one person is connected to an entire group.841  Such 
a network lacks a central hub or node because if the web forum is shut down it can migrate to 
another forum under a different name.  The all channel networks fostered by these web forums 
provide AQ supporters a sense of community, which they might have difficulty finding in real 
life, especially if they live in the West.842  While it is difficult to determine whether or not 
internet groups and communication actually lead people to become full fledged AQ members, 
                                                 
839 One jihadi website called ansar-jihad, has a registration feature allowing the visitor to enter an email 
address to receive jihad updates.  The website (www.ansar-jihad.net) declares: ‘Don’t be the last to know.  Hurry up 
and join us.  Receive the latest news of the jihad…and everything the mujahideen release.’  See Hanna Rogan, "Al 
Qaeda's Online Media Strategies: From Abu Reuter to Irhabi 007," 67. 
840 Brynjar Lia, "Jihadi Web Media Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications," 12.  
841 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwar:  The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 8. 
842 Deborah Touboul, "Francophone Internet Forums Shed Light on Concerns and Issues of Islamists in 
Europe," (The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, Herzliya, Israel, September, 2005), 11.  
  310 
what is important is that these networks ensure the distribution of AQ’s ideology on a global 
scale.  
 
5.5.3 The Diffusion of the Meta-Narrative:  Al Qaeda in Iraq and Inspired Individuals  
The effects of the diffusion of Al Qaeda’s meta-narrative is most apparent in the way it attracts 
volunteers to become martyrs for Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI].  In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. led 
a coalition of allies to engage Afghanistan and then Iraq as part of a strategy that the U.S. called 
the ‘global war on terror.’  As Mohammed Hafez notes, despite the best efforts of the Bush 
administration to dispel notions that the U.S. was at war with Islam, “the war on terrorism, with 
its emphasis on combating Islamic extremism, enraged many Muslims who felt targeted because 
of their religion.”843  Indeed, Hafez goes on to argue, “Muslims around the world perceived the 
conflict in Iraq, which the United States presented as part of the war on terrorism, as an unjust 
conflict that could only be explained as an attack on Islam by a hegemonic bully.”844   
The fact is that the U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced AQ’s meta-narrative 
and made it more potent.  Table 5 below is based on the Sinjar papers and demonstrates that AQI 
suicide attackers were lured by the meta-narrative and came from a variety of places.  
 
 
 
                                                 
843 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 166.  
844 Ibid., 167.  
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Table 5. AQI Suicide Attackers August 2006-August 2007.845 
 
Country Number of Suicide Attackers Percentage 
Saudi Arabia 44 43% 
Italy 8 8% 
Kuwait 7 7% 
Iraq 7 7% 
Syria 6 6% 
Libya 3 3% 
Jordan 3 3% 
Belgium 2 2% 
France 2 2% 
Spain 2 2% 
Lebanon 1 1% 
Tunisia 1 1% 
Morocco 1 1% 
Britain 1 1% 
Turkey 1 1% 
Unknown 11 10% 
                                                 
845 The data for AQI’s suicide bombers comes from Ibid., 251.  The primary sources of the data were 
obtained from AQI’s Biographies of Eminent Martyr and Martyrs in Iraq, which are documents that are available 
for download on the Majdah Forum and are available online at www.majdah.com/vb.    
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It is not surprising to see Saudi Arabia as the country comprising most of AQI’s suicide 
attackers.846  Indeed, the Sinjar papers confirm Saudi Arabia as the country with the highest 
number of foreign fighters in the AQI organization.847  However, it is intriguing to note that the 
country with the second highest number of suicide attackers is Italy.  Even more surprising is to 
see suicide bombers coming from other Western countries including Belgium, France, Spain, and 
Great Britain, which account for roughly 14% of AQI’s suicide bombers during this time period.  
It must be said that the data presented here is far from comprehensive.  The 102 observations 
listed above undoubtedly represent a fraction of the total number of suicide bombers in Iraq.  A 
conservative estimate of the number of suicide attacks in Iraq made by this author places the total 
number of suicide attackers at around 1,500.848  Despite this, the data in the Sinjar papers 
demonstrates that the meta-narrative has attracted, and continues to attract, suicide attackers from 
                                                 
846 It should be noted that 3 of the 102 suicide bombers listed were women all hailing from Saudi Arabia.   
847 The Sinjar papers are a group of documents found by U.S. forces after a raid was conducted in the 
desert near Sinjar, which is situated next to the Syrian border.  According to analysis conducted by West Point’s 
Counter Terrorism Center of the Sinjar Records, Saudi Arabians comprised 41% of foreign fighters in the AQI 
organization.  See Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar 
Papers,” (West Point Counter Terrorism Center, Harmony Project, December 2007), 7-8.  Article available online at 
www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.  Accessed on 5/19/2010.  See also Richard 
Oppel, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq are Tied to Allies of U.S.,” (New York Times, November 22, 2007).  Article 
available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html?ref=todayspaper.  
Accessed on 5/19/2010.      
848 This is a rough estimate based on open source data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database and 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.  The major difficulty is that information regarding the suicide attacker’s 
country of origin is hard to obtain.  
  313 
both within and without the Islamic world.  As more information regarding the attacker’s country 
of origin is discovered, one can expect to see a variety of nationalities represented including 
higher concentrations from Western countries.  In much the same way as the war in Iraq attracts 
young men and women to become suicide attackers for AQI, the meta-narrative also inspires 
individuals to attack the U.S. and its allies.   
Two of the most recent and pertinent examples of this are the cases of Najibullah Zazi 
and Umar Farooq Abdulmutallab.  Zazi an Afghan immigrant and a legal permanent resident of 
the U.S. was “at the center of what the authorities described as one of the most serious threats to 
the United States since 9/11.”849  His plot involved a ‘martyrdom operation’ where Zazi would 
have detonated homemade bombs on the New York subway.  The attack was planned to coincide 
around the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.850  According to Zazi’s court confession, he was 
radicalized based on the injustices the U.S. was committing against Muslims in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This motivated Zazi to join the Taliban so that he could “fight alongside with the 
Taliban against the U.S.”851  Zazi left with a group of individuals bound for Pakistan where he 
joined a terrorist training camp in Peshawar.  As Zazi states,  
                                                 
849 A.G. Sulzberger and William Rashbaum, “A Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway,” 
(The New York Times, February 22, 2010).  Article available online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/nyregion/23terror.html.  Accessed on 5/19/2010.  
850 Ibid.   
851 “Najibullah Zazi Reveals Chilling Details on Al Qaeda Training and Terrorist Plot to Blow Up 
Subways,” (New York Daily News, February 23, 2010).  Article available online at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/02/23/2010-02-
23_najibullah_zazi_reveals_chilling_details_on_al_qaeda_training_and_terrorist_plot.html.  Accessed on 
5/19/2010.  
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“[w]hile we were in Peshawar, we were recruited by Al Qaeda [and] taken by Al Qaeda 
to [a] training camp in Waziristan where we received weapons training.  During the 
training, Al Qaeda leaders asked us to return to the United States and conduct [a] 
martyrdom operation.  We agreed to this plan.  I did so because of my feelings about 
what the United States was doing in Afghanistan.  Later, I received more training from Al 
Qaeda about how to construct the explosives for [an] attack in the United States [and] to 
carry [out the] martyrdom operation.  I arrived in New York City on Thursday, 
September 10.  And we intended to obtain and assemble the remaining components to 
build a bomb over the weekend.  The plan was to conduct [a] martyrdom operation on 
[the] subway lines in Manhattan as soon as the materials were ready.  [The planned] 
martyrdom operation meant that I would sacrifice myself to bring attention to what the 
United States was doing to civilian[s] in Afghanistan by sacrificing my soul for the sake 
of saving other souls.”852      
  
Zazi’s rationale for acting fits into AQ’s meta-narrative.  Zazi was radicalized because he 
believed that the U.S. was waging a war against Muslims.  Not only that he says that the U.S. 
intentionally was targeting Muslim civilians in Afghanistan.  This drove him, and a few others, 
into a training camp in Pakistan where he received explosives and weapons training.  What is 
interesting here is that Zazi calls the plan a ‘martyrdom operation.’  While Zazi does not speak at 
length about martyrdom in his court confession, there is little doubt that his AQ handlers 
reinforced the notion that Zazi would become a shahid if his suicide attack were a success. 
 Abdulmutallab is a Nigerian Muslim who earned a degree in mechanical engineering 
from the University College London and a master’s degree in international business at the 
University of Wollongong in Dubai.  On December 25, 2009, he attempted to ignite an explosive 
mixture of triacetone triperoxide with acid contained in a syringe while onboard a flight bound 
for Detroit.853  The son of a prominent and wealthy Nigerian banker, Abdulmutallab grew up a 
                                                 
852 Ibid.  Emphasis added.    
853 Kevin Krolicki and Jeremy Pelofsky, “Nigerian Charged with Trying to Blow Up US Airliner,” 
(Reuters, December 26, 2009).  Article available online at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFLDE5BP03M20091226.  Accessed on 5/19/2010. 
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devout Muslim but it is believed that he became radicalized while a student in London where he 
attended the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque and heard the incendiary sermons given by Anwar 
Al-Awlaki.854  After his arrest, Abdulmutallab told authorities he had received training from an 
Al Qaeda affiliate that operates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.855  He confessed that the Al Qaeda 
cell in Yemen had provided him with the device that was sown into his underwear.856 
Internet posts on Abdulmutallab’s Facebook page provide a glimpse into what motivated 
the young Nigerian.  According to one post, Abdulmutallab had ‘jihad fantasies’ in which “I 
imagine how the great jihad will take place, how the Muslims will win inshahallah [Allah 
willing] and rule the whole world, and establish the greatest empire once again!!!”857  He also 
displayed characteristics of sexual frustration and lamented that he could not marry.  In one post, 
                                                 
854 Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials: Cleric Had Role in Christmas Bomb Attempt,” (NPR, March 13, 
2010).  Article available online at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123894237.  Accessed on 
5/19/2010.  It is believed that Awlaki has links with three of the 9/11 hijackers, the 2005 London subway bombers, 
and the 2009 Fort Hood shooter.  The argument that Abdulmutallab was radicalized in London is debatable.  
Another theory is that he was radicalized during his first visit to Yemen in 2004-2005, which was before he became 
a student at University College London.    
855 Eric Schmitt and Eric Lipton, “Officials Point to Suspect’s Claim of Qaeda Ties in Yemen,” (New York 
Times, December 26, 2009).  Article available online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/27/us/27terror.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=bomber%20charged&st=cse.  Accessed on 
5/19/2010.   
856 Harry Siegel and Carol Lee, “High Explosive- U.S. Charges Abdulmutallab,” (Politico, December 25, 
2009).  Article available online at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30973.html.  Accessed on 5/19/2010.  
857 Guy Chazan, “Web Offers More Clues on Suspect,” (The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2009).  
Article available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126211655382209295.html.  Accessed on 5/19/2010.   
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he declared, “I seriously don’t want to wait for years before I get married.  But I am only 
18…[and] it would be difficult for me to get married due to social norms of getting to the late 
20’s when one has a degree, a job, a house, etc before getting married.”858  Additionally, he was 
‘incensed’ at the U.S. for its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and for incarcerating Muslims in 
Guntanamo Bay.859   
The Zazi and Abdulmutallab cases demonstrate the diffuse manner by which each level 
of analysis interacts with the others.  Both examples have individuals who came into contact with 
and were radicalized by the AQ meta-narrative.  The individuals then made the decision to seek 
out AQ training camps for further instruction.  At the camps, both men received explosives 
training and were given the resources needed to carry out a martyrdom operation.  What these 
examples demonstrate is that the new face of AQ fits neither into Marc Sageman’s ‘bunch of 
guys’ theory nor Bruce Hoffman’s centralized AQ structure.860  Both Hoffman and Sageman 
view suicide attacks from an organizational and collectivist perspective.  The difference between 
                                                 
858 Leonard Greene, “Sex Torment Drove Him Nuts,” (The New York Post, December 31, 2009).  Article 
available online at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/sex_torment_jiHq0SZCZ0zevbRKdpjEKM.  Accessed 
on 5/19/2010.  As the discussion of benefits of martyrdom in the previous section indicates, there are post-mortem 
sexual benefits reserved for the shahid.   
859 Sean O’Neill, “Al Qaeda Groomed Abdulmutallab in London,” (Times of London Online, December 
30, 2009).  Article available online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6971098.ece.  Accessed on 
5/19/2010.  
860 Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, “Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of Al 
Qaeda’s Leadership,” (Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008).  Article available online at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots.  
Accessed on 5/19/2010. 
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the two theories is a manner of degree.  For Sageman, the AQ organization is less important than 
the collective bond formed at the grass-roots amongst the ‘bunch of guys.’  For Hoffman, the AQ 
organizational hierarchy is more important because it arms, trains and funds future suicide 
attackers.  Both analyses are convincing.  Sageman is correct in saying that an important bond is 
developed at the grass-roots level with individuals who become radicalized.  Look no further 
than the London subway bombings and how four Britons formed a cell in the heart of the United 
Kingdom.  Likewise, Hoffman is correct in his estimation that the Al Qaeda organization still has 
the power to ‘call the shots’ as it trains and helps individuals plan for future suicide attacks.  
What both analysts overlook is that all three levels of analysis are at play.  Moreover, their focus 
on the organizational level, while warranted, may be misguided.  The AQ organization is 
becoming more diffuse yet it still serves a role in training individuals.  The ‘bunch of guys’ have 
to go somewhere for training so that they can prepare for a suicide attack.  However, what 
motivates the individual and why/how the person is radicalized to seek out Al Qaeda are critical 
questions that neither Hoffman nor Sageman adequately address.  These questions require 
moving beyond the organizational level towards an integration of the organizational, individual 
and societal levels of analysis. 
   
5.6 CONCUSION 
This chapter investigated AQ as a case study of an organization that used suicide attacks at the 
transnational level.  Through the extensive use of primary source texts, the chapter analyzed AQ 
at the organizational, individual and societal levels of analysis.   
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At the organizational level, AQ chose to use suicide attacks because the tactic fit within 
the defensive jihad framework developed largely by Azzam and later adopted by OBL.  Azzam 
framed the conflict for the future AQ organization as one between an aggressive West and a 
defensive Islamic ummah.  For Azzam, the Islamic community’s weakened state came as a result 
of its abandonment of faith.  To help the Islamic community repel its enemy, he argued that jihad 
became an individual duty incumbent upon all believing Muslims.  After Azzam’s death, OBL 
adopted this framework and used it to justify the use of suicide attacks.  Since AQ faced a 
militarily superior enemy, the only way it could be defeated was a reliance on faith through the 
use of its ‘martyrdom operations.’  The section also investigated how AQ has used suicide 
attacks in the pre and post-9/11 contexts.  The pre-9/11 context reveals an organization that was 
probing the weaknesses of its adversary and attempting to bait it into a conflict.  The post-9/11 
AQ is made up of disconnected cells brought together by AQ’s ideology that operate as a fifth 
column where cells can self-start, self-radicalize, and self-activate without the direct support of 
the AQ organization.   
At the individual level, the chapter analyzed AQ’s meta-narrative and how it motivates 
individual suicide attackers.  The sectioned identified the three pillars of the meta-narrative, 
which include an animosity towards the West, a belief in a clash of civilizations, and the allure of 
martyrdom.  The section argued that the individual suicide attackers tap into the meta-narrative 
and project their own grievances into it thus making it his or her own.  The wills, videos, and 
final testaments of AQ suicide attackers demonstrate the ability of the meta-narrative to provide 
the suicide attacker with a Manichean worldview that provides a religious justification for 
violence.   
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At the societal level, AQ is cognizant of its need to cultivate a global resonance for its 
methods and ideology. Using the writings of Al Suri, the section identified how AQ controls and 
distributes its message.  By focusing on U.S. action in the Middle East, especially Iraq and 
Pakistan, AQ propaganda is unrelenting in its presentation of the U.S. as a ‘Neo-Crusader’ force 
that seeks to conquer the entire Islamic world.  This propaganda has found a home in the virtual 
world.  Al Sahab was presented as an example of a website that allowed visitors to download 
ideological tracts and watch videos of AQ leaders and past AQ suicide attacks.  In addition, the 
use of online web forums is another way for supporters to spread AQ’s ideology on a global 
scale.  While a website can be shut down, the web forums can change online locations with 
relative ease making them difficult to monitor.  The internet is an asset that gives the AQ 
ideology a potentially transnational audience.  Perhaps even more important, the website and 
web forums may contribute to AQ recruitment efforts especially for the disaffected few who find 
themselves living in the West. 
For a post-9/11 Al Qaeda, the linkages between each level of analysis is hard to 
determine given the scope of the organization and lingering questions as to how much [or lack 
thereof] operational control Al Qaeda exerts over attempted suicide attacks.  Despite this, the 
operational structure is diffusive among the three levels of analysis.  It is useful to think of the 
interactions as an upside down triangle [∇].   
 
  Organization     Society 
 
 
     Individual 
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At the left point of the triangle is the Al Qaeda organization with the line going to the right 
connecting to the societal resonance level of analysis.  This interaction is perhaps the most 
important because this demonstrates the transmission of Al Qaeda’s meta-narrative to a global 
audience.  From the right side of the triangle, the line goes down to the individual.  Here is where 
the individual comes into contact with the meta-narrative and is able to project his or her 
grievances onto it.  Now the connection from the bottom of the triangle [the individual] to the 
left of the triangle [the organization] is represented by a dotted line because the connection is 
tenuous.   
The AQI discussion demonstrates clearly that Al Qaeda still has an organizational 
component even though it is a regional one.  Recent failed attempts by Najibullah Zazi and Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab demonstrate that the organizational control Al Qaeda has over suicide 
attackers is weaker than it was pre-9/11.  What matters more is that Al Qaeda radicalizes the 
individual through its meta-narrative prompting the individual to seek out the organization 
[usually in Pakistan and Yemen] to receive operational training usually for a short period of time.  
The critical component here is the meta-narrative, which resides at the societal level of analysis.  
It is the meta-narrative that radicalizes individuals, which prompts those individuals to seek out 
training at an Al Qaeda training camp.   
The next section concludes the dissertation as it presents the findings of the case studies, 
examines the circumstances by which organizations cease to use suicide attacks and investigates 
the policy options available to governments dealing with this tactic.  
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6.0  CONCLUSION  
“I am bound to shoot myself because the most important act of my self-will is to kill myself…I 
am killing myself to show my defiance and my new terrible freedom.” 
-Kirillov in Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Devils 
 
“When they stood him among the pillars, Samson said to the servant who held his hand, “Put me 
where I can feel the pillars that support the temple, so that I may lean against them.”  Now the 
temple was crowded with men and women; all the rulers of the Philistines were there, and on the 
roof were about three thousand men and women watching Samson perform.  Then Samson 
prayed to the Lord, “O Sovereign Lord, remember me. O God, please strengthen me just once 
more, and let me with one blow get revenge on the Philistines for my two eyes.”  Then Samson 
reached toward the two central pillars on which the temple stood.  Bracing himself against them, 
his right hand on the one and his left hand on the other, Samson said, “Let me die with the 
Philistines!”  Then he pushed with all his might, and down came the temple on the rulers and all 
the people in it.  Thus he killed many more when he died than while he lived.” 
-Judges 16: 25-30 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The impetus behind this dissertation was the realization that the research on suicide attacks 
tended to focus almost exclusively on one level of analysis.  Breaking from this tendency, the 
dissertation proposed a model that investigated suicide attacks at the organizational, individual 
and societal levels of analysis.  As such, the dissertation asked three primary research questions:  
why organizations use suicide attacks, why individuals become suicide attackers, and how the 
attack resonates in the target population.  The dissertation has argued that organizations use 
suicide attacks out of defensive necessity and for strategic purposes, individuals are motivated to 
become suicide attackers by a religo-nationalist liberation ideology that promises the attacker 
post-mortem incentives for the attacker’s death, and that societal resonance is achieved when the 
organization draws on religious, cultural and nationalistic narratives that enable the organization 
to present the tactic to the target population in a favorable light.  
In order to answer these questions, the dissertation used four carefully selected case 
studies where suicide attacks were employed.  Rather than focus on case studies that dealt 
exclusively with terrorism, the cases were selected at different points on a conflict continuum, 
which include suicide attacks in war, suicide attacks in irregular war, suicide attacks in domestic 
terrorism, and suicide attacks in transnational terrorism.  As a result, this dissertation is part of a 
growing research field that systematically analyzes the different variants of suicide attacks along 
multiple levels of analysis. 
The conclusion of the dissertation is divided into four sections.  The first is a discussion 
of the case studies where insights drawn from each are highlighted and compared.  The second 
probes possible reasons why suicide attacks have been abandoned by the organizations that 
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utilize them and the policy implications gleaned from these examples.  The third section 
addresses the implications for future research called for by this dissertation.  Finally, the last 
section investigates the instances of failed suicide attacks.     
 
6.2 COMPARISON OF CASE STUDIES 
The four cases examined in this dissertation demonstrate that suicide attacks have been used 
along different points of a conflict continuum.  Despite the constant media attention given to 
suicide terrorism since 9/11, the cases remind the researcher that suicide attacks have been used 
in warfare, irregular warfare and terrorism.  The model utilized by this dissertation presents an 
analytical framework that recognizes that suicide attacks are best studied along three-levels of 
analysis.  As a result, the model identifies the organizational interests, individual motivations and 
societal resonance as crucial factors that make the use of suicide attacks possible.  It should be 
reiterated here that this model is not a causal model and, as such, it does not seek to predict 
future instances of suicide attacks.  Such predictions, especially in the social sciences, are 
wrought with uncertainty mainly because of the large number of variables that contribute to the 
emergence of a phenomenon like suicide attacks.861  Instead of focusing on prediction, the 
dissertation seeks to uncover and analyze certain relationships and features that exist at each 
level of analysis. The findings of the dissertation will now be discussed.      
                                                 
861 Peter Medawar, “Some Follies of Quantification,” (Hospital Practice, July 1973), 179. 
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6.2.1 Organizational Motives:  Driven by Necessity 
The common thread at the organizational level of analysis is that suicide attacks are a tactic 
adopted out of defensive and strategic necessity.  In the kamikazes case study, the Japanese 
adopted the idea for the ‘special attacks’ because the Japanese Navy had been decimated at the 
Battle of Midway.  This defeat carried a number of consequences for Japan, the most important 
of which was the cutting off of Japan’s war materiel from the Philippines.  Without these natural 
resources, the Japanese war machine could not manufacture guns, ammunition, and other items 
necessary to win the war.  Additionally, the U.S. advance and occupation of Japanese territory 
violated the commonly held belief that Japan’s homeland was protected by the gods and was 
inviolate to outside forces.  As such, Takijiro Onishi sought a tactic that would turn the tide of 
the war.  The kamikazes were a last ditch effort by Onishi to halt the American advance toward 
Japan and to showcase the Japanese fighting spirit to intimidate the Americans and persuade 
them to discontinue fighting.   
In the Tamil Tigers case study, the LTTE faced a superior foe in the SLA.  As irregular 
warfare between the LTTE and the SLA intensified, LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirabakaran looked 
for a new weapon that could stop the SLA advance into the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna.  This 
new weapon came by way of the Captain Millar’s suicide attack when he drove a truck filled 
with explosives into a SLA camp thereby halting their advance.  This act of self-sacrifice made 
an impact on Pirabakaran.  He adopted the tactic and created a suicide squad dedicated solely to 
carrying out suicide attacks.  Pirabakaran and his Black Tigers turned the suicide attack into an 
offensive weapon that could target the SLA and assassinate heads of state.  The Black Tigers 
would go on to become main innovators of suicide attacks as they pioneered different ways to 
deliver the suicide attacker (via land, sea and air) as well as the use of female suicide attackers. 
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Hamas faced circumstances similar to the LTTE.  During the first intifada, it could not 
achieve a military victory against Israel’s well-trained and well-armed army.  Instead of 
confronting the Israeli military directly, Hamas turned to terrorism in an effort to sabotage the 
peace process that was unfolding between the Israeli government and Fatah.  In this way, Hamas 
used suicide attacks to achieve strategic goals.  During the first intifada, suicide attacks acted as a 
spoiler to disrupt and ultimately derail the Oslo Peace Process and the Declaration of Principles.  
In the second intifada, Hamas turned to suicide attacks again in order to prompt a unilateral 
Israeli withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.  By targeting buses, restaurants, 
malls and other public locations frequented by Jewish civilians, Hamas pressured Israel to 
abandon this territory.   
  Finally, AQ adopted suicide attacks because they fit well into the defensive jihad 
framework formulated by Azzam.  In this framework, the aggressive and imperialistic West, led 
by the United States, represented an existential threat to the health and vitality of the Islamic 
ummah.  AQ financier and co-founder OBL realized that AQ could not hope to engage the 
United States in military combat.  Instead, OBL believed that AQ had to rely on the faith of its 
members and harness it to attack the U.S.  As such, AQ weaponized its interpretation of the 
Islamic faith through the use of suicide attacks, which AQ dubbed ‘martyrdom operations.’  AQ 
has used a variety of suicide attacks to target the United States culminating in the deadly 9/11 
attacks.  AQ justifies the use of suicide attacks as appropriate responses to American aggression 
and atrocities committed in the Muslim world.  
It is interesting to note that in all four cases, the only one that achieved limited success 
was Hamas.  Japan failed to stop the U.S. advance in the Pacific, the LTTE was unable to 
achieve a separate Tamil state, and AQ thus far has been unable to make the U.S. withdraw from 
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the Middle East.  Hamas, on the other hand, was able to successfully disrupt the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace process and prompt Israel to withdraw from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.  
While it should be noted that Hamas has not realized their ultimate goal, which is the destruction 
of the Jewish state if one goes by the Hamas constitution, the achievement of this partial success 
increased Hamas’ popularity in the Palestinian territories and also contributed to its 
Parliamentary victory in 2006.  
6.2.2 The Individual:  Liberation Ideology and Post-Mortem Incentives for Death 
While the dissertation has reiterated that there is no single motivation that can be isolated as 
causing a person to become a suicide attacker, the case studies do reveal similar features that 
undoubtedly helped a person become a suicide attacker.  In all the cases what is most noticeable 
is the presence of an ideology that allows the individual to grapple with the harsh realities of the 
choice he or she makes.  This ideology is a combination of nationalism and/or religion that 
makes the individual feel as a liberator for the cause.  Additionally, in all the cases examined 
here there are certain post-mortem benefits that exist for the person who decides to become a 
suicide attacker.  It is no exaggeration to say that the ideological motivation and post-mortem 
benefits figure highly in the individual strategic calculus of the person weighing the decision to 
become a suicide attacker.  Simply put, the cases demonstrate that individual motivations play a 
crucial role for the person who becomes a suicide attacker. 
In the diaries of the kamikazes what emerges is the portrait of a young Japanese pilot who 
is motivated by nationalism and familial sentiments.  The pilots feared the conquest of their 
sacred homeland by the Americans.  They believed that the Americans were ruthless brigands 
who would kill their mothers, rape their sisters, and pillage Japan’s land.  The pilots did not die 
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for the emperor, but rather died for their families and the idea of an untarnished Japan.  The 
pilots believed they would be the force that would liberate Japan from the impending conquest of 
the Americans.  Moreover, the pilots tapped into the Bushido war ethic that taught them to 
embrace death with determination and fervor.  The Bushido war ethic was a mindset that idolized 
and extolled the noble death.  The kamikaze pilots believed they were following in the Bushido 
warrior tradition, which helped them to rationalize and make sense of their actions.  Finally, the 
kamikaze pilots believed that they would meet each other again at Yasukuni shrine.  Their deaths 
in defense of the sacred Japanese homeland meant they would become kamis and they would 
reside at Yasukuni shrine, the most holy location in all of Japan.  They would become spirits that 
would protect Japan as well as objects of worship by their own families and the nation. 
The LTTE Black Tiger is one who sees the liberation of Tamil Eelam as a cutantiram or 
a ‘holy aim.’  Despite some descriptions of the LTTE as a secular organization, there are strong 
religious elements operating in the ideology that motivate the Black Tigers.  Fashioned by LTTE 
leader Pirabakaran himself, this ideology focuses on the martyr’s role in the achievement of an 
independent Tamil state.  Drawing heavily from Hinduism, Pirabakaran adopts the notion that 
the Black Tiger is a tiyaki or ‘one who abandons.’  Thus, the tiyaki is the Tamil martyr who 
abandons his or her life in order to free the Tamil homeland from the shackles of Buddhist-
Sinhalese dominance.  Through rituals like the cyanide ceremony, the Black Tiger, as well as the 
rest of the LTTE, are desensitized from the fear of death.  Additionally, the LTTE tiyaki is buried 
in ‘martyr cemeteries’ where they become local deities.  Much like the kamikazes, the tiyakis 
become the object of familial worship, as they are believed to have the power to bring fortune to 
those who pray to them.   
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The written testaments and videos of the Hamas suicide attacker reveal the strong 
religious allure of becoming a shahid or martyr.  By becoming a shahid, the Hamas suicide 
attacker receives a number of post-mortem benefits among which are direct entry into Paradise, 
the comforts of the seventy-two black eyed virgins and the ability to save family members and 
friends from languishing in hell.  Aside from the post-mortem benefits for the attacker, the 
families of the martyr’s receive financial support and are elevated in social status.  Additionally, 
the written testaments and videos demonstrate an intense hatred that the suicide attacker harbors 
for the Israeli other.  This hatred enables the suicide attacker to dehumanize the target thus 
making it perfectly acceptable to target innocent Israeli civilians.  Finally, through the use of the 
written testament and final video, Hamas creates a martyrdom contract with the martyr-to-be.  
The martyr is promised the rewards if the attacker is willing to undertake the suicide attack.  This 
acts to cement the suicide attacker’s conviction so that he or she will not back out at the last 
moment. 
The case of AQ highlights the existence of a transnational meta-narrative that AQ seeks 
to export around the globe.  This meta-narrative is rooted in the belief that the West is taking 
control of the Muslim world.  As a result, the meta-narrative is comprised of a hatred toward the 
West, a belief in the inevitable clash between Islam and the West and martyrdom. What makes 
this meta-narrative unique is that it allows the AQ suicide attacker to project his or her 
grievances onto it.  Once this is done, the individual attacker makes the narrative his or her own, 
which provides a rationale for action.  At the heart of this is the belief that the liberation of the 
Muslim world will come through a reliance on faith.  For the AQ attacker, the suicide attack 
becomes an act of religious devotion.  Because the act takes on a religious significance, the AQ 
suicide attacker is also promised the post-mortem benefits of martyrdom.  Similar to the Hamas 
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suicide attacker, the AQ operative can look forward to the seven benefits of Paradise when he or 
she dies a martyr’s death.   
As the Hamas and AQ cases demonstrate, the promise of martyrdom for the individual 
suicide attacker is real.  While it is tempting to see the allure of martyrdom as just a ploy used by 
the organization to convince someone to carry out a suicide attack, this ignores the written 
testaments and videos left by AQ and Hamas suicide attackers.  Specifically, this mindset ignores 
the fact that these individuals are motivated by deeply held beliefs.  It is also interesting to note 
that in both the Hamas and AQ cases, a significant amount of effort has been invested in 
fashioning theological arguments that reject the act as ‘suicide.’  Since suicide is forbidden in 
Islam, theological justifications were needed to bypass this potentially damning fact.  Both 
Hamas and AQ ideologues would come to the conclusion that suicide is a matter of intent and 
that their martyrs do not intend to kill themselves out of despair, anguish, or hopelessness.  
Instead, the overriding intent is to follow in the tradition of martyrs who have died for the 
Islamic faith and to act as the liberators of Palestine from the Israelis or the Muslim world from 
the West.  
   
6.2.3 Societal Resonance:  Instilling the Message  
The third level of analysis looked at how the suicide attack was presented to its target audience.  
These attacks do not happen in a vacuum and, as the cases demonstrate, each organization that 
used suicide attacks employed a variety of methods to present and instill a narrative justifying 
the tactic to the target audience.  In the Japanese case, the kamikazes became an expression of 
the national will.  This did not happen overnight but rather through the propaganda and 
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indoctrinating efforts of the Japanese government.  Through the promotion of the Kokutai No 
Hongi following the Meji Restoration, the Japanese people were introduced to a state created 
ideology based on militarism and exceptionalism.  Through the efforts of the Ministry of 
Education, a nationalistic narrative was put forth to teach the individual to subvert his or her will 
to that of the national will.  The Japanese people believed that their homeland and their emperor 
were sacred and inviolate.  The emperor was hailed as hitogami or a ‘god man’ who was the 
direct descendent of the gods that created Japan.  Additionally, loyalty to lord and land was the 
highest virtue that a Japanese citizen could cultivate.  Consequently, when the kamikaze attacks 
were announced, the Japanese people hailed them as ‘warrior gods’ who nobly died for their 
country.  In this case, the attacks achieved resonance because the government utilized the 
narrative of a state-based and nationalistic ideology that it had propagated to its citizens since the 
Meji Restoration. 
In the Tamil case, resonance for the LTTE’s suicide attacks came primarily through the 
efforts of former LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirabakaran.  Pirabakaran created and fostered a 
narrative that developed and cultivated the cult of the martyr in northern Sri Lanka.  He achieved 
this by establishing events that linked the Tamil community with the sacrifices made by the 
Black Tigers.  One such event that is celebrated domestically and internationally is the Great 
Heroes Day celebration.  This celebration served to introduce and extol the sacrifices made by 
the Black Tigers toward the goal of achieving an independent Tamil state.  Additionally, the 
Great Heroes Day celebration prompted the societal veneration of the Black Tigers by the Tamil 
community.  The veneration of the martyrs increased when the LTTE began to bury their dead at 
the martyr cemeteries that exist in the north of Sri Lanka.   
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These martyr cemeteries, like the Yakusuni Shrine, housed the spirits of the martyrs who 
then became objects of worship by the Tamil people.  Additionally, the Tamil Tigers took their 
message to the internet in order to reach the Tamil diaspora living in Western Europe and North 
America.  With websites like tamilnet.com, eelamweb.com, tamilcanadian.org, tamilnation.org, 
the diaspora could learn about the sacrifices made by the Black Tigers.  Moreover, the websites 
became repositories for LTTE propaganda where videos and speeches given by LTTE leader 
Pirabakaran could be accessed.  The Tamils thus became the first organization that used suicide 
attacks to have an online presence.  This movement to the digital world is one that is being 
followed by organizations like Hamas and AQ and its affiliates. 
Hamas succeeded in making suicide attacks resonate through an aggressive campaign to 
market the martyrdom narrative to the Palestinian population using a variety of different 
mediums.  Perhaps the most ubiquitous medium during the first and second intifadas was the 
presence of martyr posters plastered on walls and billboards throughout the Gaza Strip.  These 
posters would be placed within hours of a suicide attack and served to call attention to the 
sacrifice made by the shahid.  During the second intifada, Hamas shifted tactics and focused on 
schools and television.  Hamas sponsored curriculum for students that unabashedly praised the 
sacrifice of the martyrs and demeaned the humanity of their Israeli neighbors.  By educating 
children with this mindset, Hamas was not only creating future sympathizers but also future 
martyrs.  Additionally, Hamas created the Al Aqsa television channel that has a variety of 
programming that extols the sacrifices of the martyrs.  From martyr music videos directed at 
young adults to children’s programs with Sesame-Street-like characters, the television gave 
Hamas unprecedented access to disseminate its religious narrative and build support for its 
martyrs during the second intifada.  Moreover, like the LTTE, Hamas has a presence on the 
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internet.  Through its al-fateh website, children and adults can access music videos, articles, and 
sermons that promote hatred toward Israelis and are sympathetic to the Hamas martyrs.   
The AQ case is a bit different from the others in that it seeks to create global resonance 
for their use of suicide attacks.  As advocated through the writings of Abu Musab al Suri, AQ 
fosters resonance for suicide attacks mainly by propagating a narrative that highlights U.S. action 
in the Middle East.  To this end, AQ is trying to fashion a narrative that depicts the U.S. as a 
‘neo-Crusader’ force that is attempting to subjugate the Muslim world.  Additionally, AQ draws 
upon potent symbols of U.S. oppression, which in the past has included the Abu Ghraib scandal, 
allegations of torture by those detained at the Guantanamo Bay prison facility and the increasing 
number of Predator drone attacks inside Pakistan.  This has proven a shrewd tactic, as AQ has 
tapped into a growing wellspring of anti-American sentiment that exists both within the Muslim 
world and in the West itself especially among various diaspora communities.    
Like the LTTE and Hamas, AQ is fashioning a formidable online presence giving it the 
ability to distribute its narrative to a large audience.  Through the use of websites like Al Sahab, 
AQ is able to dispense a vast amount of propaganda to those with access to the internet.  Before 
it was shut down, the Al Sahab website became a mouthpiece for ideologues like Ayman al 
Zawahiri and the former leader of AQ in Iraq Abu Musab al Zarqawi.  What is different from 
AQ affiliated websites as opposed to those sympathetic with Hamas or the LTTE is the amount 
of information that is available.  The AQ websites allow interested visitors to read selections of 
the jihadist ideologues, which are increasingly being translated into Western languages like 
English, Spanish and French, download manuals on how to make a bomb or a suicide vest, and 
watch the videos of martyrs from the jihadist battlefields in Iraq and Pakistan.  The websites are 
beginning to serve a social networking purpose as well.  With the emergence of chat rooms, 
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threads and blogs interested parties are able to share ideas and information online with one 
another. This allows for an unprecedented exchange of information and is potentially a powerful 
recruiting device for those interested in AQ’s ideology and goals.    
  What emerges at this level of analysis is the variety of measures that organizations use 
to make the suicide attack palatable to their target population.  Whether it is through the internet, 
state sponsored propaganda or theological tracts what is important is that the organization 
fashion a coherent narrative that can be presented easily and succinctly to the target population.  
As these cases demonstrate, this occurs when the organization draws from the historical, 
religious and cultural dynamics embedded within each society.  While there is no one factor that 
ensures that the tactic will be accepted, one common feature that emerges is the simplicity of the 
message.  In the Japanese case, the special attack pilots were heroes.  As for the Black Tigers, 
Hamas and AQ operatives, they were revered as martyrs.  The way the simple yet powerful 
message was packaged and presented to the audience helped to foster support for suicide attacks 
because it provided the target audience with a legitimating rationale for carrying out the attacks.  
 
6.2.4 Exploring Linkages at Each Level of Analysis  
Another feature that emerges in this dissertation is that the case studies represent different 
operational structures, which allow the researcher to view the interactions and linkages at each 
level of analysis.  Figure 2 demonstrates the differing operational structures and the linkages that 
exist in each case study. 
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Case Study Operational Structure Linkage at 
Organizational [O], 
Individual [I], Societal 
[S] Levels 
Points of Disruption 
Kamikazes 
 
 
Hierarchical Linkage is strong at O 
level and flows from 
top to bottom. 
Organizational level 
LTTE Lateral Linkage flows laterally 
from O to I and O to S.  
Linkage strongest at 
O-S level. 
Organizational level  
Hamas Triangular Strong and mutually 
reinforcing linkage at 
O, I, S levels. 
Organizational and 
Societal Level 
Al Qaeda Diffuse Weak linkage at O-I 
level.  Strong linkage 
at S-I and O-S level 
due to meta-narrative.  
Individual and Societal 
Level 
Figure 2. Operational Structure and Linkages 
 
The kamikaze case study was found to have a hierarchical structure where the most 
important entity was the organization.  The Japanese High Command made the decision to use 
the special attacks and it made its decision known to the individual pilots as well as Japanese 
society.  As a result, the linkages amongst each level of analysis subsequently flowed down from 
  335 
the organization, to the individual and to society.   There was a strong linkage between the 
organization and the individual because the special attack pilots came from the ranks of the 
Japanese military.  Indeed, becoming a kamikaze pilot was an honor and the Japanese High 
Command developed training programs in order to attract the best young pilots in Japan.  The 
linkage between the individual and society was also strong due to the fact that the Japanese 
populace had been sufficiently indoctrinated with the state’s ideology of militarism and 
exceptionalism, which allowed them to identify with the sacrifice the kamikaze pilots were 
making.  Indeed, the majority of the Japanese public did not question the state’s strategy but 
instead accepted it in full leading to an outpouring of support for the individual pilots.   
  The LTTE case study is an example of a lateral operational structure.  Like the Japanese 
High Command, the LTTE organization emerges as the most critical focal point.  The LTTE did 
not need to go outside of the organization to find recruits, but rather, like the Japanese case, the 
LTTE tapped Black Tigers from among its own ranks.  As such, the LTTE had its pick of only 
the most determined and committed recruits.  However, unlike the Japanese case, the LTTE did 
not have a population that had been fed state sponsored propaganda.  Instead, the LTTE, through 
the efforts of Pirabakaran, fashioned an ideology and presented it to the Tamil population so that 
the Black Tiger attacks would resonate in the Tamil community.  As a result, there is a strong 
linkage between the organization and the society because the LTTE created the conditions that 
prompted the Tamil population to support its use of suicide attacks.   
The Hamas case study is an example of triangular structure with strong linkages flowing 
out from each level of analysis.  Unlike the LTTE and the kamikazes, Hamas looked outside of 
its ranks for recruits.  This required the organization to fashion a narrative that could be used 
internally to attract suicide attackers as well as externally to prime the population to accept the 
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tactic.  The martyrdom ideology proved the perfect lure for individuals and it fit into the larger 
narrative of the Palestinian struggle against Israel.   
Another feature that distinguishes the Hamas case study is the way that each level of 
analysis interacts and reinforces each other.  Hamas created the narrative to attract the 
individuals, the individuals became suicide attackers to achieve martyrdom, and the attacks 
resonated in Palestinian society through the veneration and glorification of the martyrs’ sacrifice, 
which in turn prompted more individuals to want to become shahids.  While Hamas has 
abandoned suicide attacks for the time being, the attacks continue to retain resonance largely 
through continuing efforts to keep the Palestinian population martyrdom conscious.  As was 
argued in the Hamas chapter, the fact that suicide attacks continue to resonate with the 
population lays the groundwork for Hamas to return to this tactic in the future.     
The operational structure of Al Qaeda is more difficult to determine given its 
transnational nature.  However, in the aftermath of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan what 
emerges is a diffuse operational structure.  While the pre-9/11 AQ was centralized, the post-9/11 
AQ is less centralized and more diffuse.  As a result, the linkage between the AQ organization 
and the individual is weak.  However, the linkage between the AQ organization and its target 
audience is strong due to the AQ meta-narrative.  The meta-narrative has become the most 
critical point in this structure.  As such, the linkage between societal level and individual is of 
great importance.  It should be noted that this linkage is nowhere near as strong as the one that 
exists between the individual and society in the Hamas case.  This is due in part to population 
and geography since Hamas is dealing with a smaller number of people in a limited geographic 
space.  Al Qaeda’s meta-narrative, however, is broad, has a global reach and is not constrained 
by geography.  Also, it does not have the depth that Hamas’ martyrdom ideology has at the 
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societal level.862  Despite this, even if AQ’s meta-narrative attracts and radicalizes one percent of 
its target audience, this potentially provides an ample number of individuals who might be 
willing to become suicide attackers.   
 
 
6.3 PATHWAYS OUT OF SUICIDE ATTACKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY 
While it is important to examine why organizations use suicide attacks, what motivates 
individuals to become suicide attackers and how suicide attacks resonate in their target audience, 
it is equally important to analyze the reasons why organizations stop using this tactic.  There are 
four primary pathways for organizations to abandon the use of suicide attacks:  the organization 
is defeated militarily, the organization is co-opted by the political process, there is a failure of the 
tactic to resonate amongst the target population, and a counter-narrative develops that supplants 
and delegitimizes the organization’s operating ideology.  Each of these, and the policy 
implications they raise, will now be considered. 
 
 
 
Military Defeat 
                                                 
862 The author is indebted to Dr. Phil Williams for this point.   
  338 
    
The first reason an organization will abandon suicide attacks is if it is militarily defeated.  As the 
Japanese case highlighted, the kamikaze special attacks were adopted to prevent the American 
advance toward Japan.  The disastrous Leyte Gulf battle where much of the Japanese Navy was 
destroyed signaled both the beginning and the end for the Japanese special attack squad.  The 
Japanese turned to the kamikazes a final time in the Battle of Okinawa.  Although the attacks 
sank some thirty U.S. warships, they were unable to prevent the U.S. from taking Okinawa.  At 
this stage in the war, Japan had a shortage of planes and pilots who were capable enough to crash 
a plane into a moving target.  According to Admiral Matome Ugaki, Japan lacked the resources 
to produce kamikaze pilots and as he assessed the situation he declared that it had “become 
impossible for us to continue organized resistance.”863  However, he believed that the same spirit 
of self-sacrifice that motivated the kamikazes could be channeled into the remnants of the 
Japanese army as they prepared to make a final stand on the Japanese mainland.  This kamikaze 
inspired resistance would never materialize because two months after the U.S. took Okinawa, 
atomic bombs were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  On August 15, 1945 
Emperor Hirohito offered Japan’s unconditional surrender.864 
                                                 
863 Gordon Prange et al.  Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 659. 
864 Ugaki refused to accept Japan’s surrender so he made the decision to become the last kamikaze pilot.  
As he notes in his diary, “I’m going to follow in the footsteps of those many loyal officers and men who devoted 
themselves to the country, and I want to live in the noble spirit of the special attack…Believing that our empire will 
last forever and the special attack spirit of the Ten Air Force will never perish, I am going to proceed to Okinawa, 
where our men lost their lives like cherry blossoms, and ram into the arrogant American ships, displaying the real 
spirit of a Japanese warrior.” Ugaki quoted in Ibid., 664-665. 
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Like the kamikazes, the Tamil Tigers abandoned the tactic after the Sri Lankan Army 
issued the LTTE a major defeat.  Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa began a military 
counteroffensive in January 2009 in an attempt to weaken the LTTE.  Through the use of 
overwhelming force, the Army cornered a majority of the LTTE leadership in a coconut grove in 
Jaffna.865  In a last ditch effort, the LTTE unleashed a number of Black Tiger suicide attacks in 
an attempt to drive the Sri Lankan Army back so that LTTE leader Pirabakaran could escape.  As 
Sri Lankan military spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara said, “[s]uicide cadres are coming 
in front of the troops in the frontline and exploding themselves.”866  The attacks were unable to 
repel the Sri Lankan Army and a senior LTTE commander released a statement saying, “[w]e 
have decided to silence our guns.  Our only regrets are for the lives lost and that we could not 
hold out longer.”867   
Initially, there were fears that the LTTE would regroup in an attempt to retaliate but this 
did not materialize because LTTE leader Pirabakaran was found dead.  In order to quell rumors 
that Pirabakaran actually escaped the ambush alive, the Sri Lankan government released photos 
                                                 
865 C. Bryson Hull and Ranga Sirilal, “Sri Lanka’s Long War Reaches Climax, Tigers Concede,” (Reuters, 
May 17, 2009).  Article available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54D1GR20090517.  Accessed 
on 2/17/09.   
866 Ibid.  
867 “Tamil Tigers Admit Defeat After Battle Reaches ‘Bitter End,” (London Times Online, May 18, 2009).  
Article available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6305401.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1.  Accessed on 
2/17/10. 
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showing that he had been shot in the head.868  Following this announcement Selvarasa 
Pathmanathan, the LTTE’s Head of International Relations, released a statement saying that 
“Supreme Commander (Pirabakaran) attained martyrdom fighting the [Sri Lankan government’s] 
military oppression.”869  This ended the nearly twenty-six-year-long civil war that has claimed 
the lives of 70,000 people.870 
Although Rajapaksa is credited with defeating the LTTE, claims have surfaced that the 
Sri Lankan Army engaged in war crimes against the LTTE and Tamil civilian population.  A 
report published by Human Rights Watch accuses the Sri Lankan Army of indefinitely detaining, 
torturing and executing suspected LTTE members and sympathizers.871  While the Tigers have 
been dismantled, the way it was done should give all terrorism analysts pause.  As Sri Lankan 
Member of Parliament Mangala Samarweera notes, the carnage of the Sri Lankan assault against 
the Tamils “has fostered calls among formerly moderate Tamils to call for a separate state.  I fear 
hundreds of Pirabakaran’s have been created.”872  Even though the LTTE has surrendered, it will 
                                                 
868 C. Bryon Hull and Ranga Sirilal, “Tamil Tiger Founder Pirabakaran Dead at 54,” (Reuters, May 19, 
2009).  Article available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSCOL326349.  Accessed on 2/17/10.  
869 “Tamil Tigers Acknowledge Death of Pirabakaran,” (The Times of India, May 24, 2009). Article 
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Tamil-Tigers-acknowledge-death-of-
Prabhakaran/articleshow/4572635.cms.  Accessed on 2/17/2010.  
870 “Sri Lanka Timeline,” (BBC, February 10, 2010).  Article available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1166237.stm.  Accessed on 2/17/10. 
871 Peter Bouckaert, “Discovering Sri Lanka’s War Crimes,” (Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2010).  
Article available online at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/22/uncovering-sri-lankas-war-crimes.  Accessed on 
2/17/10.  
872 Mahinda Samarasinghe quoted in “Tamil Tigers Admit Defeat After Battle Reaches ‘Bitter End.” 
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be intriguing to see if another charismatic leader emerges and if the group returns to suicide 
attacks.  This may ultimately depend on how well President Rajapaksa and Tamil leaders handle 
the reconciliation process that is currently underway in Sri Lanka.  
This discussion raises an important policy question of whether organizations that utilize 
suicide attacks can be dealt with exclusively by means of force.  The Japanese example is out of 
the scope of this discussion because the kamikaze attacks occurred during a time of warfare.  
However, the Sri Lankan and Hamas cases are much more pertinent.  The Sri Lankan 
government consistently engaged in an offensive, military approach to dealing with the Tigers.  
The same can be said of the Israeli government, which adopted a policy of targeted assassination 
against Hamas leaders during the second intifada.  The benefit of the offensive strategy is that 
there is tangible success in eliminating terrorist or insurgent leaders.  However, this on its own is 
not enough to stop the group from using suicide attacks.  On the contrary, it can lead to a cycle of 
reciprocal violence in which government action provokes violent retaliation.  Additionally, such 
offensive strategies serve to cement and bolster the organization’s motivation for engaging in 
violent conflict.873   
 
                                                 
873 Critics of offensive measures to stop organizations from using suicide attacks propose defensive means.  
Robert Pape has argued that the solution to the problem is a policy of unilateral withdrawal.  Those countries 
targeted by organizations using suicide attacks should simply withdraw from the territory in question.  When applied 
to the United States this line of thinking would have the U.S. withdraw from those countries where it is perceived as 
a foreign occupier.  The major flaw with this argument is that withdrawing could be seen by the organization as an 
instance when suicide attacks compelled a foreign power to retreat, which could provide incentives for future use of 
the tactic.  
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Co-opted by the Political Process 
 
The second way an organization might discontinue the use of suicide attacks is if it is co-opted 
by the political process.  The January 26, 2006 Palestinian elections stunned observers when 
Hamas took 76 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative elections.874  For Hamas, this 
marked a shift as the organization moved into a governing type role once occupied almost 
exclusively by Fatah.  Since Hamas’ election in 2006, it has not utilized suicide attacks.  It 
should be noted, however, that before the elections Hamas was still attempting to use suicide 
attacks.  Indeed, in November 2005, only weeks before the parliamentary elections, Hamas 
engaged in two failed suicide attacks targeting public areas in Sderot, Israel.875  It appears that 
Hamas’ election changed the strategic calculus of the organization, which prompted it to suspend 
using the tactic.  This does not mean that Hamas will never return to using suicide attacks.  To 
the contrary, with Hamas’ potent ideology of martyrdom still deeply embedded in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip it is quite conceivable to imagine the organization returning to suicide attacks if it 
desires.876 
    
                                                 
874 Scott Wilson, “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,” 
(Washington Post, January 27, 2006).  Article available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html.  Accessed on 2/17/2010.   
875 GTD Database.  According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a total of 29 suicide attacks were 
foiled in 2005.  See “List of Hamas Suicide Attacks,” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  Available online at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/.  Accessed on 2/17/2010.  
876 Matthew Levitt, email correspondence with the author, October 6, 2009.  
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Failure of Resonance  
 
A third reason why an organization might stop using suicide attacks is due to a failure of the 
attacks to resonate with the target population.  A good example of this is the Irish Republican 
Army [IRA].  Although the IRA did not utilize suicide attacks per se, they did come very close 
with one tactic called ‘proxy bombing.’  The proxy bomb involved individuals, often branded as 
collaborators with British security forces, who were forced to drive into targets with cars 
carrying explosives.877  Although the IRA’s use of proxy bombs can hardly be considered a 
campaign since they used the tactic only three times in 1990, the response the attack generated is 
of interest.  The proxy bomb consisted of using a vehicle borne improvised explosive device 
(VBIED) in which the IRA would kidnap accused collaborators and force them to drive a vehicle 
into a pre-selected target.  The IRA coerced the driver by telling him that his family was being 
held hostage and that they would be killed if the person refused.  The first proxy bomb attack 
was a simultaneous attack that occurred on October 25, 1990 and involved Patrick Gillespie, a 
42-year-old cook who was forced to drive a vehicle packed with a 1,000 lb bomb into a military 
checkpoint near Derry, and John McEvoy, a 65-year-old cancer survivor who drove a VBIED 
into an army checkpoint at Cloghogue.  The first attack killed five British soldiers while the 
second killed one guard.878   
                                                 
877 A.R. Oppenheimer, IRA The Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity, (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 2009), 100.  
878 Ibid., 100.  Miraculously, McEvoy bailed out of the car before the bomb exploded but he would later 
die of cancer seven months after the attack.    
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The public fallout after the attacks was vocal and swift.  Leading the criticism was Irish 
Roman Catholic Bishop Edward Daly who said that the IRA’s use of proxy bombings 
represented “the complete contradiction of Christianity.”879  At the funeral of Patrick Gillespie, 
Bishop Daly publicly challenged the IRA and their use of the tactic when he said, “some say they 
[the IRA] are followers of Christ…some of them may even still engage in the hypocrisy of 
coming to church, bur their lives and their works proclaim clearly that they follow Satan.”880  As 
a result of the public outcry and pressure from the Catholic Church the IRA ceased using the 
tactic.  This is a pertinent example because it underscores the importance that societal resonance 
plays when an organization adopts such a controversial tactic.  
An essential policy implication flowing from this example is the importance of changing 
popular attitudes to reduce support for suicide attacks.  This requires that governments targeted 
by suicide attacks make a concerted effort to communicate clearly and effectively in order to 
rebut the narrative and ideology put forth by organizations using suicide attacks.  Additionally, 
the targeted government must identify and engage key public figures who are willing to publicly 
rebuke the organization’s use and legitimization of suicide attacks.  If the underlying ideology 
can be challenged and undermined, then public support for suicide attacks could begin to wane.   
 
 
 
                                                 
879 “Evolution in Europe; Bishop Rebukes IRA for Car Bomb Attacks,” (The New York Times, October 28, 
1990).  Article available online at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/28/world/evolution-in-europe-bishop-rebukes-
ira-for-car-bomb-attacks.html.  Accessed on 2/17/2010.   
880 Ibid.  
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Developing and Promoting a Counter-Narrative  
 
A final way that an organization might stop using suicide attacks is if the narrative that justifies 
the attack is called into question and undermined.  This is pertinent especially for the U.S. and its 
global struggle against AQ.  As J. Scott Carpenter argues, “there is a growing consensus that 
countering the narrative that drives this extremism is a critical element in the overall effort to 
prevent extremist acts of violence.”881  As such, the policy implication flowing from this 
example finds that delegitimizing the AQ narrative must be a critical requirement of any strategy 
the U.S. designs to confront AQ.882  In order to achieve this, the U.S. government must do the 
following:  understand the narrative, craft and promote a counter-narrative, and find the 
appropriate messengers within the Muslim world to carry the counter-narrative.   
 As William Casebeer and James Russell argue, in order to undermine AQ’s narrative one 
must be intimately familiar with the narrative it is exporting.883  This means the analyst must be 
well read in the jihadist canon, which include the writings of Hasan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
Ayman al Zawahiri, Abu Musab al Suri and many others.  The reading and analysis of primary 
sources is critical in this regard.  For too many, exposure to AQ ideologues comes through 
secondary sources as quotations found in scholarly research papers or books.  Instead, those in 
charge of creating counter-terrorism strategies would be well advised to consult the ideas that are 
                                                 
881 J. Scott Carpenter et al., "Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism," (Journal of National 
Security Law and Policy, Vol. 3, 2009), 303. 
882 William Casebeer and James Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-
Narrative Strategy.," (Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 3, 2005), 3.  
883 Ibid. 
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found in the writings of AQ ideologues.  If one does not know the genesis and the ideational 
composition of the narrative, then it will prove difficult to construct a counter-narrative that 
invalidates the one AQ is promoting.884 
 A counter-narrative against AQ is one that attacks the ideas propagated by AQ that the 
West and Islam are part of an epic struggle between good and evil, the notion that the West is 
inherently inimical to Islam and is warring against it, that jihadist icons like Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman Al Zawahiri are ‘heroes’ of the Islamic faith, and that those who die in suicide 
attacks are ‘martyrs.’  The U.S. must engage in a counter-propaganda campaign that refutes each 
of those points.  Additionally, the U.S. must foster a vigorous public relations campaign in a 
manner similar to AQ.  Indeed, AQ has grown adept at releasing videos and statements through 
various internet websites and television stations like Al Jazeera and the U.S. should follow suit.  
Indeed, in the global digital age one can easily find statements and videos released by AQ 
through public accessible websites like YouTube.  Frank Cilluffo suggests that the U.S. use 
graphic visuals released on the internet or broadcast via TV satellites that includes footage of 
dead men, women and children and interviews with those maimed by AQ suicide attackers.885  
For every video released by AQ glorifying a suicide attack, the U.S. should counter with its own 
video demonstrating the human cost of the suicide attack on innocent non-combatants.  More 
importantly, “85% of the casualties from all Al Qaeda attacks in 2004-2008 where Muslims, 
                                                 
884 In this regard, West Point’s Counter-Terrorism Center provides an indispensable service for academics 
and analysts interested in Al Qaeda as they have one of the largest collections of translated primary source 
documents on Al Qaeda ideologues in the United States.   
885 Frank Cilluffo, "The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism," (Testimony Before the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, May 3, 2007), 6. 
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compared with 15% Westerners.”886  AQ continues to kill many more fellow Muslims than 
Western targets, which is a fact that must be exploited by the U.S. 
Finally, the counter-narrative needs a legitimate messenger to deliver it.  One major 
hindrance to the U.S. in this regard is that it suffers from a lack of credibility in the Islamic 
world.  As Steven Kull notes, there is a general perception in the Islamic world that the United 
States “has entered a war against Islam itself” and that the United States seeks “to weaken and 
divide the Islamic world.”887  As such, attempts by the U.S. to promote a new counter-narrative 
will be met with skepticism and possibly resistance.  Instead, the U.S. needs to identify clerics, 
academics, journalists, civic leaders, and governmental leaders in the Islamic world who are 
opposed to AQ’s ideology and encourage them to promote the counter-narrative that “would 
work globally and locally to dismantle a number of ideas fundamental to the [Al Qaeda] 
worldview.”888   
Another part of this component requires that the U.S. seek out those individuals who have 
abandoned and renounced the jihadist narrative.  As Jarret Brachman notes, one such person is 
Sayyid Imam al Sharif [also known as Dr. Fadl], a former mentor of Al Zawahiri, who has since 
rejected AQ.  In a series of prison writings al Sharif has denounced AQ, OBL and Al Zawahiri 
                                                 
886 Peter Goodspeed, “Al-Qaeda Killing Mostly Muslims,” (The National Post, December 14, 2009).  
Article available online at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2340654.  Accessed on 5/19/10. 
887 Steven Kull, “Impact of Negative Attitudes Towards U.S. on Efforts Against Jihadist Groups,” 
(Testimony Given Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight, May 17, 2007).  Testimony available online at 
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/81.htm.  Accessed on 2/17/10.  
888 Jeffrey Cozzens, "Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter Radicalization." (Danish Institute for 
International Studies, Working Paper No. 2006/6), 20. 
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using shariah and Koranic based arguments.889  He also advocates for the establishment of a 
shariah court to prosecute OBL and Al Zawahiri for misrepresenting and distorting Islam.890  
The ideas propagated by al Sharif and others like him should be used as a counter-weight to 
AQ’s narrative. 
 It should be noted that developing a counter-narrative is a difficult task because it too 
must resonate with the target audience.  In order for this to occur, the U.S. must be 
knowledgeable of the narratives and stories at play in the Islamic culture.  This requires that the 
U.S. devote resources to developing cultural intelligence capabilities.  Cultural intelligence 
capabilities, which include Arabic linguists and personnel who have familiarity with and/or spent 
significant time in the Islamic world, must be cultivated at the diplomatic and military levels.  
This is of critical concern because creating a counter-narrative without “understanding the 
culture of the population you wish to influence is a recipe for ineffectiveness at best and in the 
worst of cases can backfire altogether.”891  
 
 
                                                 
889 Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind Questions Terrorism,” (The New 
Yorker, June 2, 2008).  Article available online at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all.  Accessed on 2/17/10.  
890 “Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al Qaeda’s Sharia Guide to Jihad,” (MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 
1785, December 14, 2007).  Article available online at http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2636.htm.  
Accessed on 2/18/10.  Al Sharif wrote the book while serving a life sentence in an Egyptian jail and it is entitled 
Document of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World. 
891 William Casebeer and James Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-
Narrative Strategy,'" 12.  
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6.4 LEARNING FROM FAILED SUICIDE ATTACKS  
One area in need of exploration is the collection and analysis of information obtained from failed 
suicide attackers and their dispatchers.  While these ex-post facto interviews are rare, there are a 
limited number available on the internet that could give the researcher a better understanding as 
to what drives individuals to carry out a suicide attack.  Based on the material available via open 
sources, this section presents a brief discussion of failed suicide attackers and their dispatchers. 
 
Failed Hamas Suicide Attackers 
 
Terrorism researcher Yoram Schweitzer has done extensive interviews with failed Hamas suicide 
attackers and their dispatchers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Schweitzer has interviewed 
some eighty failed suicide attackers and their dispatchers who are in Israeli prison.  Two 
interviews with the dispatchers of suicide attackers are most revealing.892  In a conversation with 
one dispatcher named Sarahne, Schweitzer asked if he felt any emotion when a suicide mission 
succeeded.  The dispatcher said that he felt an overwhelming joy when the mission was 
successful and was depressed when a mission failed.  Schweitzer then asked Sarahne what his 
goal was as a dispatcher.  Sarahne’s response was that his main goal was to kill as many people 
as possible and to help the suicide attacker achieve martyrdom.  The other interview was with a 
female dispatcher named Ahlam.  What is striking is that Ahlam laments that her suicide bomber 
did not kill more people.  She says she was angry and that “there should have been more [people] 
                                                 
892 Yoram Schweitzer, “Conversing with the Adversary,” (Interviews available via YouTube).  Available 
online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imx0AnNxUmY.  Accessed on 5/20/10. 
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killed.”893  What is interesting about these interviews is how unrepentant the dispatchers are.  
They speak with pride about the role they played in helping their suicide attacker achieve 
martyrdom.  Moreover, both Sarahne and Ahlam smile when they speak of their involvement 
with the suicide attack.  There is a sense of joy there that is unnerving for the viewer.  This 
speaks to the potency of Hamas’ martyrdom narrative that exists in Palestine. 
In Mohammed Hafez’s interviews with failed Hamas suicide attackers, a strict fatalism is 
found.  The suicide attackers declare that the suicide vest did not work because Allah did not 
want it to work.894  There is little talk about the technological failures of the suicide device.  
Instead, the reasons for failure are put in relation to the suicide attacker’s desire to become a 
martyr.  The explanation indicates the belief that it was not the attacker’s time to die.  The 
attackers remain unrepentant and are confident that the suicide vest failed to go off for a reason.  
These examples underscore the powerful individual drivers that prompt individuals and their 
handlers to agree to be part of a suicide attack.   
 
Failed Suicide Attackers in Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan has seen a dramatic rise in suicide attacks since 2004.  Additionally, Taliban and Al 
Qaeda forces are experimenting with new ways to dispatch suicide attackers.  Recent attempts 
have included attackers riding bicycles, the use of women, and people pretending to be vendors 
or injured to lure coalition forces close enough for detonation.  While interviews with failed 
                                                 
893 Ibid.   
894 Mohammed Hafez, “Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” (Presentation at the World Affairs Council).  Available 
online at http://fora.tv/2008/03/25/Mohammed_Hafez_on_Suicide_Bombings_in_Iraq.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.  
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suicide attackers in Afghanistan are rare, there are two interviews that are available via the 
internet.  The first involves two seventeen-year-old boys who were sent to kill a regional Afghani 
governor who began collaborating with coalition forces.895  Abdul Qubosh, the first attacker, 
argued that that the governor was a legitimate target because he was an “infidel collaborator with 
the Americans.”896  The second attacker, Farman Ullah, told the interviewer how the two young 
boys became suicide attackers.  He said that the Taliban came to their madrassa and spoke about 
how jihad was a compulsory duty for all able-bodied Muslims.  Ullah described how the recruiter 
promised martyrdom for those who would become suicide attackers.  Ullah was told that “virgins 
come to the site of the explosion and wait to take you to Paradise.”897  When he agreed to 
become a suicide attacker, his handler told him that “God was going to ignite the vest.”898  While 
Ullah appeared to believe this statement, it is likely that the handler would be the one to detonate 
the vest at a distance.  This is an interesting occurrence, which might signal a shift to the remote 
detonation of suicide vests.  
  The other failed suicide attacker is a male in his twenties who appeared on Jirga, an 
Afghan news program.899  He claims that he is from Waziristan and was sent to help the Taliban 
fight against the Americans.  The host asks if the young man ever considered that his action 
                                                 
895 “Interview with two failed Afghan Suicide Bombers.” Interview available online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDOQR4s7_DQ.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.   
896 Ibid. 
897 Ibid.  
898 Ibid. 
899 “Interview with a Suicide Bomber,” (Jirga, July 5, 2009).  Interview available online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qD-Nny3EP98&feature=related.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.  
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would have caused the deaths of many innocents.  The attacker responds by saying, “[w]e have 
no repentance, no sorrow for killing.  Our leader orders us to kill two people and hundreds are 
killed in this process even then we will do so.”900  The host then asks the young man if he 
obtained permission from his parents to wage jihad.  The young man responds by saying that 
“permission is not essential when jihad becomes obligatory.”901  Perhaps the most intriguing part 
of the interview is when the host asks the failed bomber if there has been any change in his 
thinking.  The young man declares that his thinking has not changed and that he would choose 
the path of a suicide attacker again.    
 
Failed Suicide Attacker in Iraq 
 
Perhaps the most infamous failed suicide attacker in Iraq is Ranya Ibrahim.  Ranya, a fifteen-
year-old girl, was sent by AQI in August 2008 to detonate a suicide vest at an Iraqi police station 
in Baqouba, the capital of Iraq’s Diyala province.902  Police claim that they spotted her moving 
awkwardly toward the station and told her to stop her advance.  This is when Ranya claimed that 
she was wearing a suicide vest.  Police handcuffed her to a nearby cart, removed parts of her 
clothing and detached the suicide vest.  In September 2008, Ranya gave an interview to Iraq’s 
                                                 
900 Ibid.  
901 Ibid.  
902 Natalia Atelava, “Iraq Suicide Bomber, 16 Jailed,” (BBC News, Baghdad).  Article available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8184478.stm.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.   
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Al-Baghdadiya television channel to discuss why she participated in the attack.903  Ranya claims 
that she was unaware that she was involved in a suicide attack.  She tells the interviewer that she 
had no idea that her mother and husband were fitting her with a suicide belt.  She also declares 
that she was given peach juice and bread that contained some sort of narcotic.  After eating the 
food, she said that she felt dizzy and was seeing double.  According to Ranya’s testimony, she 
was an unwilling participant in the suicide mission.  The implication here is that AQI is resorting 
to coercion in order to compel individuals to become suicide attackers.  If this is the case, then 
this could be a signal that individual allure to become a suicide attacker is weakening.  On the 
other hand, Ranya’s interview might be nothing more than an example of someone who ‘got cold 
feet’ and decided at the last minute to abandon the mission.904   
 
Failed Suicide Attackers against the United States:  Richard Reid and Saajid Badat 
 
The cases of Richard Reid and Saajid Badat merit attention because of how intertwined they are.  
They are also an example of two different outcomes from Al Qaeda recruits who wanted to 
detonate an explosive device on an American airline.  Reid and Badat first met in 1999 while 
both were attending an Al Qaeda training camp in Pakistan.  In November 2001, Badat and Reid 
                                                 
903 “15-Year-Old Iraqi Would-Be Suicide Bomber Tells Her Story on Iraq TV,” (MEMRI TV, Special 
Dispatch No. 2057, 9/22/2008).  Interview available online at http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/3120.htm.  
Accessed on 5/20/2010. Video of interview is available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnao-
vuCck8&feature=related.  
904 In Ranya’s case, this appears to be the most plausible explanation.  The reason being is that her vest 
was armed and that her thumb was on the detonator when police approached her. 
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made another trip to Pakistan where they were given shoe bombs containing plastic 
explosives.905  They returned to Britain in December and separated as they prepared for their 
missions.  Reid traveled to Belgium and then France where he purchased a round-trip ticket from 
Paris to Miami.906  Badat, on the other hand, returned to his home in Gloucester and purchased a 
ticket to Amsterdam where it was believed that he would board a flight bound for the U.S.907  
The two kept in contact via email in order to maintain the resolve to carry out the attack that they 
had acquired in Pakistan.  However, during his time at home, Badat began to lose interest in 
carrying out the suicide attack.  As Sean O’Neill and Steward Tendler argue, “Badat was back in 
Britain with the [shoe] bomb.  But, at home in Gloucester, removed from the fanatical dedication 
of his comrades, he was beginning to have second thoughts.”908  As a result, Badat sent an email 
to his handler indicating that he was wavering and would not participate in the attack.909   
The plans by Reid and Badat represent two different types of failures.  Reid succeeded in 
boarding the plane as well as staying in the ideological jihadi milieu, but his attack was foiled as 
                                                 
905 Michael Elliot, “The Shoe Bomber’s World,” (Time, February 16, 2002).  Article available online at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478-1,00.html.  Accessed on 5/20/2010. 
906 “Timeline: The Shoe Bomber Case,” (CNN, 1/7/2002).  Article available online at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/07/reid.timeline/index.html.  Accessed on 5/20/2010. 
907 “United States V. Sajid Mohammed Badat,” (Department of Justice, United States District Court of 
Massachusetts, September 1, 2004).  Article available via LexisNexis.  See also, “British National Indicted For 
Conspiring with ‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid,” (Department of Justice, October 4, 2004).   
908 Sean O’Neill and Stewart Tendler, “The Shoe Bomber from a Gloucester Grammar,” (London Times 
Online, March 1, 2005).  Article available online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article416746.ece.  
Accessed on 5/20/2010.  
909 Ibid.  
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a result of a technical failure.910  Through no fault of his own, Reid’s shoe bomb failed to 
detonate due to a technical misfire and his chance to achieve martyrdom disappeared.  Reid had 
the ideological drive and motivation to carry out the attack but the equipment given to him at the 
training camp failed to work.  Badat, on the other hand, experienced a failure of resonance.  
What is important for the analyst in the Badat case is to take note of what happens when a 
radicalized individual is removed from the ideological rich environment that Badat undoubtedly 
found at the training camp in Pakistan.   
Once away from the organization, Reid and Badat relied on one another to fortify their 
commitment to their mission.  While Reid and Badat emailed one another to keep their resolve 
strong, Badat’s commitment wavered after he left the training camp.  In order to prevent this, 
Reid and Badat had a handler who was tasked with sustaining and cultivating the desire for 
martyrdom they obtained while in Pakistan.  In Badat’s case, the ideology he had accepted began 
to lose its allure after being in his hometown and living in his parents’ house.  In the end, Badat’s 
failure was due to the inability of the ideology to make martyrdom appealing.  This theme 
appeared during Badat’s court hearing on February 28, 2005 as his lawyers argued that Badat 
had undergone a genuine metanoia away from the jihadi ideology.  They argued that Badat could 
not mentally accept being a “courier of death” in exchange for glorious martyrdom.911 
                                                 
910 The author is indebted to Phil Williams for this point.  
911 “Shoe bomb Plotter Given 13 Years,” (BBC, April 22, 2005).  Article available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4474307.stm.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.  Badat received a thirteen-year prison 
sentence for conspiracy to destroy a U.S. plane.  Judge Adrian Fulford justified the sentence by saying that “turning 
away from crime in circumstances such as these constitutes a powerful mitigating factor.” 
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This discussion demonstrates a possible weakness in the post-9/11 AQ.  While the meta-
narrative might radicalize and entice people to become suicide attackers, the Badat example 
demonstrates that once a person is removed from the organizational environment, in this case the 
training camp, it is possible for the individual to reject the ideology.  Al Qaeda depends on 
radicalized individuals who buy into the meta-narrative and who are willing to carry out suicide 
attacks.  Once the operative leaves the training camp, he or she is vulnerable to second thoughts 
and doubt.  As the Badat case demonstrates, being away from the ideological rich environment 
of the training camp can pose a problem.  This is why Al Qaeda and its affiliates task handlers to 
keep in contact with the operatives.  However, the simple fact is that the longer the time between 
the attendance of a training camp and a planned suicide attack could prove to be Al Qaeda’s 
greatest weakness in its war against the West.  If the individuals are kept from carrying out their 
attack, they might begin to doubt the ideology and, like Badat, abandon the desire to become a 
martyr.   
  
6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
2009 was a deadly year for suicide attacks.  The figure below shows that 149 suicide attacks 
killed 1,568 people and injured 6,670. 
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Figure 3. Suicide Attacks in 2009. 912 
 
Additionally, suicide attacks continue to be a deadly weapon killing 11 and wounding 45 people 
per attack.  The geographic breakdown of the attacks is listed in Figure 4. 
                                                 
912 Data obtained at the National Counter Terrorism Center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System.  
Available online at https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0.  Accessed on 5/20/2010.  
Month Attacks Dead Wounded 
January 8 48 107 
February 7 15 45 
March 12 32 112 
April 9 91 234 
May 19 131 605 
June 21 226 587 
July 11 24 135 
August 14 215 2,015 
September 17 164 491 
October 11 281 1,131 
November 12 113 350 
December 8 228 858 
Total 149 1,568 6,670 
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Country Attacks 
Afghanistan 56 
Iraq 45 
Pakistan 38 
Russia 5 
Somalia  5 
Figure 4. Suicide Attacks in 2009 By Country. 913 
 
Figure 4 shows that most suicide attacks continue to take place in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This is 
not surprising given the continued U.S. presence in these countries.  The occurrence of suicide 
attacks in Pakistan, Russia and Somalia would be important case studies to consider for future 
research.  Indeed, it would be useful to use the method of analysis proposed here for a systematic 
investigation of suicide attacks in Pakistan, Russia and Somalia.  Pakistan would be a worthy 
case study as it is the sight of a dramatic increase in suicide attacks especially in the last two 
years.  Moreover, Pakistan and its ungoverned tribal regions have become AQ havens where 
radicalized individuals such as Richard Reid and Saajid Badat are further radicalized and 
instructed in ways to carry out suicide attacks.   
                                                 
913 Ibid.  For a more detailed breakdown of the attacks see Appendix C. 
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Another area for research would be to use the model to address the growing phenomenon 
of female suicide attackers in Islamist groups.  It appears that Islamist groups, like the AQI, are 
turning to women because they offer certain advantages over male suicide attackers.  However, 
what motivates a female suicide attacker and how this new variant of the suicide attack would be 
perceived are questions that have not been adequately addressed.  
 A final general point that this dissertation highlights is the necessity of the political 
scientist to employ the methods and techniques used by the sociologist, theologian and 
anthropologist.  Indeed, this dissertation has found that narratives and ideologies comprised of 
religion and nationalism play large roles in convincing an individual to become a suicide attacker 
and help a society to accept the tactic.  Political scientists should not ignore these unquantifiable 
variables but rather should integrate them in their analyses.   
 
6.6 IN CONCLUSION  
Suicide attacks continue to claim the front pages of the world’s newspapers.  They are a potent 
and indiscriminate instrument of death that kills and maims men, women and children alike.  
They are a frightening tactic that contradicts the most inherent and basic biological instinct of 
self-preservation.  For those who witness suicide attacks, it is hard to imagine why such a tactic 
should be used.  They appear to be illogical, irreverent and irrational.  However, as this 
dissertation has demonstrated, suicide attacks are a form of deliberate death that serve multiple 
purposes.  For the organization, the attacks are a strategy used by the weak against the strong for 
strategic ends.  For the individual, the suicide attack is the ultimate expression of courage or faith 
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by a person who is motivated by an ideology of liberation who is also promised something in the 
hereafter in return for sacrificing his or her life in the present.  For the target population, suicide 
attacks must resonate and gain traction if the tactic is to be accepted.  As such, a more complete 
understanding of suicide attacks requires a model that integrates and utilizes the organizational, 
individual and societal levels of analysis.  With suicide attacks showing no signs of abating, it is 
hoped that this dissertation has contributed toward a type of integrated analysis that will help 
academics and policymakers understand and combat this troubling and vexing phenomenon. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUICIDE ATTACKS AT THREE-LEVELS OF ANALYSIS [SEE BELOW] 
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
Bhikkhus-a term used to describe Buddhist monks. 
Black Tigers-a secretive suicide squad utilized by the LTTE. 
Bushido-literally translates into ‘the way of the warrior.’  Founded as an ethical system in feudal 
Japan, it governed the behavior and etiquette of fighting nobles also known as samurai. 
 
Cutantiram-a Tamil term translated as the ‘holy aim’ and is used to describe the Tamil Tiger’s 
struggle against the Sri Lankan state.  
 
Dawa-an Islamic term used to denote charitable activities. 
 
Fatwa-an Islamic term that denotes a legal pronouncement issued by an Islamic religious 
authority. 
 
Great Heroes Day-an LTTE holiday created to remember the fallen martyrs that occurs every 
year on November 27. 
 
Hadith-narratives and stories that can be attributable to the words or actions of the Prophet 
Mohammed.  
 
Hitogami-literally translated as ‘god-man’ or ‘deity-incarnate’ and was a term used when 
speaking about the Japanese emperor. 
 
Houris-an Islamic term referring to a beautiful female companion that exists in Paradise. 
Jihad-an Islamic term used to denote either an inner struggle of self-improvement or an outward 
military struggle against an enemy. 
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Kami-spirits venerated in Shinto religious rituals that had the ability to bring good or bad fortune 
to those who prayed to it.  
 
Kupi-a small vial of cyanide that each Tamil Tiger wears around his or her neck. 
Kamikaze-literally translated as ‘divine wind.’ Refers to the special attack squad whose mission 
was to fly planes into US ships. 
 
Mahavasma-an ancient text depicting how Buddhism came to Sri Lanka. 
Suicide Attack-a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or 
individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along 
with his chosen target.  The perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of his 
mission. 
 
Shahada-an Islamic term used to describe the Muslim declaration of belief. 
 
Shahid-an Islamic term that is used to describe a martyr or one who dies for the Islamic faith. 
 
Tiyaki-a Tamil term that translates as ‘one who abandons.’ 
 
Tiyakam-a Tamil term that translates as ‘abandonment.’ 
 
Ummah-an Islamic term meaning the community of believers who make-up the Islamic faith. 
 
Waqf-an Islamic term denoting a plot of land endowed to the Muslim community. 
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APPENDIX C  
SUICIDE ATTACKS IN 2009 SORTED BY COUNTRY 
D=Dead, W=Wounded, T=Total, VBIED=Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device, 
IED=Improvised Explosive Device 
Incident 
Date Subject Country City D W T 
23-Jun-
09 
2 
civilians killed in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Ghazni, 
Ghazni, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Ghazni 2 0 2 
10-
May-09 
3 
civilians, 2 
soldiers, 2 police 
officers killed in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Now Zad, 
Helmand, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Now Zad 7 0 7 
19-
May-09 
2 police 
officers killed, 8 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Arghandab, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Arghandab 2 8 10 
12-Jun-
09 
4 drivers, 
4 civilians killed, 
20 civilians, 9 
drivers wounded 
in suicide VBIED Afghanistan Gereshk 8 29 37 
  366 
attack by Taliban 
in Gereshk, 
Helmand, 
Afghanistan 
1-Apr-
09 
6 police 
officers, 5 
bodyguards, 4 
government 
officials, 2 
civilians killed, 16 
people wounded 
in suicide VBIED, 
suicide IED and 
armed attacks by 
Taliban in 
Kandahar, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kandahar 17 16 33 
18-Jun-
09 
1 civilian 
killed in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Sheberghan, 
Jowzjan, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Sheberghan 1 0 1 
17-Jan-
09 
1 civilian 
killed, 3 children, 
3 police officers, 2 
civilians injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Chaparhar, 
Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Chaparhar 1 8 9 
6-Jul-09 
6 
civilians killed, 10 
others, 4 soldiers 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban in 
Kandahar, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kandahar 6 14 20 
3-Jun-
09 
6 private 
security guards 
killed in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban in Spin 
Buldak, Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Spin Buldak 6 0 6 
10-
May-09 
18 
civilians and 
children, 2 
soldiers, 2 police 
officers killed, 30 
civilians and Afghanistan Gereshk 22 30 52 
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children injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Gereshk, 
Helmand, 
Afghanistan 
11-Dec-
09 
3 
civilians, 2 police 
officers killed, 16 
civilians, 5 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Sharan, 
Paktika, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Sharan 5 21 26 
22-Jun-
09 
10 
civilians killed, 34 
civilians, 7 
children wounded 
in IED and suicide 
VBIED attack by 
suspected Taliban 
in Khowst, 
Khowst, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Khowst 10 41 51 
16-Jul-
09 
3 police 
officers killed, 4 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Khash 
Rud, Nimruz, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Khash Rud 3 4 7 
30-Oct-
09 
3 
government 
employees killed, 
3 others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Kandahar, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kandahar 3 3 6 
27-Nov-
09 
3 police 
officers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Balabolok, Farah, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Balabolok 0 3 3 
13-Nov-
09 
10 
contractors, 9 
soldiers, 3 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 0 22 22 
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18-Aug-
09 
5 
civilians, 2 UN 
workers, 1 soldier 
killed, 51 
civilians, many 
soldiers, 3 UN 
workers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 8 74 82 
4-Jul-09 
1 security 
guard killed, 5 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Lashkar Gah, 
Helmand, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Lashkar Gah 1 5 6 
13-
May-09 
7 
civilians killed, 21 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Khowst, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan None 7 21 28 
10-Jul-
09 
2 private 
security guards 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban near 
Ghazni, Ghazni, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Ghazni 0 2 2 
8-Sep-
09 
2 
civilians killed, 6 
civilians, 4 
soldiers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 2 10 12 
29-Aug-
09 
2 
civilians killed, 23 
others, 3 soldiers 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Shah Juy, 
Zabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Shah Juy 2 26 28 
3-Jul-09 
Several 
homes and shops 
damaged in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Mazar-e Afghanistan 
Mazar-e 
Sharif 0 0 0 
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Sharif, Balkh, 
Afghanistan 
6-Jun-
09 
3 
civilians, 1 child 
killed, 6 civilians, 
5 children 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected Taliban 
in Spin Buldak, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Spin Buldak 4 11 15 
1-Feb-
09 
4 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 0 4 4 
5-Nov-
09 
1 civilian 
killed in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Konduz, Kondoz, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Konduz 1 0 1 
12-
May-09 
5 
civilians, 4 police 
officers killed, 25 
civilians, 2 police 
officers, 1 soldier 
wounded, 20 
government 
employees taken 
hostage in suicide 
VBIED, suicide 
IED, and armed 
attacks by Taliban 
in Khowst, 
Khowst, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Khowst 9 28 57 
27-
May-09 
2 
civilians killed, 2 
soldiers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Gilan, 
Ghazni, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Gilan 2 2 4 
1-May-
09 
Airport 
targeted in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Guzara, Herat, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Guzara 0 0 0 
25-Apr-
09 
Police 
convoy targeted in 
suicide VBIED 
attack near Spin Afghanistan Spin Buldak 0 0 0 
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Buldak, Kandahar, 
Afghanistan 
1-Mar-
09 
1 child 
killed, 3 civilians, 
2 children 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Jalalabad, 
Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Jalalabad 1 5 6 
26-
May-09 
3 
soldiers, 3 
civilians killed, 1 
civilian, 1 child, 1 
soldier wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Hizb-i-
Islami in Kapisa, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan None 6 3 9 
20-Mar-
09 
1 police 
officer killed, 2 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Dilaram, Farah, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Dilaram 1 2 3 
2-Jun-
09 
2 
children, 4 
civilians killed, 1 
child wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Sayyadan, Parvan, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Sayyadan 6 1 7 
17-Jan-
09 
3 
civilians, 1 child, 
1 soldier killed, 14 
civilians, 6 
soldiers, 1 
contractor injured 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 5 21 26 
15-Dec-
09 
8 
civilians killed, 39 
civilians, 5 
security guards 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 8 44 52 
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4-Sep-
09 
3 security 
guards killed in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Delaram, 
Nimruz, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Delaram 3 0 3 
15-Aug-
09 
7 
civilians killed, 88 
civilians, 3 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 7 91 98 
4-Mar-
09 
3 
contractors 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Charikar, 
Parvan, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Charikar 0 3 3 
15-Mar-
09 
2 
civilians killed, 14 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Kabul, 
Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 2 14 16 
5-Jun-
09 
2 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Lashkar 
Gah, Helmand, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Lashkar Gah 0 2 2 
11-Nov-
09 
2 
civilians killed, 3 
civilians, 2 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Shah Juy, 
Zabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Shah Juy 2 5 7 
28-Jun-
09 
1 child 
killed, 4 police 
officers, 3 
children, 2 
civilians injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Behsud, 
Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Behsud 1 9 10 
9-Oct-
09 
5 private 
security guards Afghanistan 
Wazah 
Jadran 5 4 9 
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killed, 4 others 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban in Wazah 
Jadran, Paktia, 
Afghanistan 
20-Nov-
09 
18 
civilians, 2 police 
officers, 1 
government 
employee killed, 
22 civilians and 
police officers, 8 
children injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Farah, 
Farah, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Farah 21 30 51 
8-Oct-
09 
17 police 
officers and 
civilians killed, 83 
police officers and 
civilians injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Kabul, Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 17 83 100 
25-Jul-
09 
2 police 
officers, 1 
civilian, 1 child 
wounded in armed 
and suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban in 
Khowst, Khowst, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Khowst 0 4 4 
21-Mar-
09 
7 
civilians, 1 police 
officer killed, 3 
civilians, 3 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Chaparhar, 
Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Chaparhar 8 6 14 
19-Jan-
09 
1 child 
killed, 7 civilians, 
5 children, injured 
in suicide IED and 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban near 
Khowst, Khowst, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Khowst 1 12 13 
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13-Aug-
09 
1 police 
officer wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
and rocket attacks 
by suspected 
Taliban near 
Zaranj, Nimruz, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Zaranj 0 1 1 
15-Mar-
09 
2 
civilians killed, 7 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan None 2 7 9 
17-Sep-
09 
10 
civilians, 6 
soldiers killed, 55 
people, 4 soldiers 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
Taliban in Kabul, 
Kabol, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kabul 16 59 75 
14-
May-09 
1 police 
officer killed, 4 
police officers, 1 
civilian wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Spin Buldak, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Spin Buldak 1 5 6 
22-Jun-
09 
3 soldiers 
killed, 2 civilians 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Taliban 
in Zheray, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Zheray 3 2 5 
12-Sep-
09 
1 
government 
employee, 1 child 
killed, 3 
government 
employees 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Kandahar, 
Kandahar, 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Kandahar 2 3 5 
21-Jul-
09 
2 police 
officers, 3 
civilians killed, 4 Iraq Ar Ramadi 5 20 25 
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police officers, 16 
civilians including 
several children 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
and VBIED attack 
by suspected 
Sunni extremists 
in Ar Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq 
12-
May-09 
5 police 
officers killed, 11 
civilians, 4 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Kirkuk, 
At Ta'mim, Iraq Iraq Kirkuk 5 15 20 
30-Dec-
09 
29 
civilians and 
police officers, 1 
local government 
official killed, 102 
civilians and 
police officers, 3 
local government 
officials wounded 
in suicide IED and 
VBIED attacks by 
ISI in Ar Ramadi, 
Al Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 30 105 135 
6-Jan-
09 
5 police 
officers, 3 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 0 8 8 
20-Jun-
09 
4 police 
officers killed, 3 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Al 
Karmah, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Al Karmah 4 3 7 
7-Apr-
09 
1 police 
officer killed, 4 
civilians, 4 police 
officers, 1 tribal 
official wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Al 
Fallujah, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Al Fallujah 1 9 10 
8-Dec-
09 
3 police 
officers, 12 
students, 112 Iraq Baghdad 127 513 640 
  375 
government 
employees and 
civilians killed, 
513 civilians, 
government 
employees, and 
students wounded 
in multiple suicide 
VBIED attack by 
ISI in Baghdad, 
Iraq 
22-Nov-
09 
4 police 
officers, 3 
civilians killed, 6 
police officers, 5 
civilians, 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Al 
Karmah, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Al Karmah 7 11 18 
25-Feb-
09 
Police 
checkpoint 
targeted in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Mosul, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Mosul 0 0 0 
20-Nov-
09 
1 vehicle 
damaged in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Kirkuk, 
At Ta'mim, Iraq Iraq Kirkuk 0 0 0 
25-Oct-
09 
70 
government 
employees, 57 
civilians, 24 
children, 4 
soldiers killed, 
707 government 
employees and 
civilians, 10 
children, 3 private 
security 
contractors 
wounded in 
double suicide 
VBIED attack by 
ISI in Baghdad, 
Iraq Iraq Baghdad 155 720 875 
22-Apr-
09 
2 
paramilitary 
members, 1 
civilian wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Zummar, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Zummar 0 3 3 
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10-Sep-
09 
1 civilian 
killed, 8 civilians, 
4 bodyguards 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in As 
Sa'diyah, Diyala, 
Iraq Iraq As Sa'diyah 1 12 13 
29-Oct-
09 
1 civilian 
killed, 2 others 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Ba'qubah, Diyala, 
Iraq Iraq Ba'qubah 1 2 3 
17-Sep-
09 
2 police 
officers, 1 civilian 
killed, 3 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Tall 
'Afar, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Tall 'Afar 3 3 6 
28-Sep-
09 
7 police 
officers killed, 17 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack near Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 7 17 24 
15-Jul-
09 
4 
civilians, 2 police 
officers killed, 12 
civilians including 
children, 4 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 6 16 22 
24-Jan-
09 
5 police 
officers, 1 civilian 
killed, 6 police 
officers, 9 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Al 
Karmah, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Al Karmah 6 15 21 
30-Aug-
09 
1 soldier, 
1 civilian killed, 
10 civilians, 2 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Baghdad, Iraq Baghdad 2 12 14 
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Iraq 
19-Aug-
09 
101 
government 
employees, 
civilians, and 
children killed, 
1,203 government 
employees, 
civilians, and 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
and VBIED 
attacks by ISI in 
Baghdad, Iraq Iraq Baghdad 101 1203 1304 
1-Jun-
09 
1 child 
killed, 3 civilians 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Jalula', 
Diyala, Iraq Iraq Jalula' 1 3 4 
24-
May-09 
2 
civilians killed, 44 
civilians, 1 police 
officer wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected Sunni 
extremists in 
Mosul, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Mosul 2 45 47 
31-Mar-
09 
4 police 
officers, 4 
civilians killed, 29 
civilians, 9 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Mosul, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Mosul 8 38 46 
27-Sep-
09 
4 police 
officers killed, 8 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 4 8 12 
3-Aug-
09 
3 police 
officers, 2 
civilians killed, 6 
police officers, 4 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in As Iraq 
As 
Saqlawiyah 5 10 15 
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Saqlawiyah, Al 
Anbar, Iraq 
11-Oct-
09 
10 
civilians, 9 police 
officers killed, 77 
civilians, 4 police 
officers wounded 
in multiple 
VBIED and 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Ar Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 19 81 100 
10-Sep-
09 
24 
civilians and 
children, 1 
paramilitary 
member killed, 41 
civilians and 
children, 2 
paramilitary 
members 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Wardak, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Wardak 25 43 68 
19-Feb-
09 
1 police 
officer killed, 2 
others, 5 civilians 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 1 7 8 
7-Sep-
09 
5 police 
officers, 4 
civilians killed, 12 
civilians, 4 police 
officers, 3 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 9 19 28 
1-Jan-
09 
3 police 
officers killed, 1 
civilian wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 3 1 4 
6-Jun-
09 
3 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED Iraq Ar Ramadi 0 3 3 
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attack in Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq 
29-Aug-
09 
9 police 
officers, 5 
civilians, 1 child 
killed, 19 police 
officers, 9 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Ash Sharqat, 
Salah ad Din, Iraq Iraq Ash Sharqat 15 28 43 
24-Apr-
09 
1 civilian 
killed, 20 
civilians, 6 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Jalula', 
Diyala, Iraq Iraq Jalula' 1 26 27 
4-Mar-
09 
2 police 
officers killed, 13 
civilians, 8 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 2 21 23 
10-Apr-
09 
6 
soldiers, 2 police 
officers killed, 41 
police officers, 27 
civilians, 2 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by ISI in 
Mosul, Ninawa, 
Iraq Iraq Mosul 8 70 78 
12-Aug-
09 
4 police 
officers, 4 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Ar 
Ramadi, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq Ar Ramadi 0 8 8 
5-Oct-
09 
25 
paramilitary 
members 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Rabi'ah, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Rabi'ah 0 25 25 
18-Mar-
09 
1 police 
officer killed, 3 
others, 1 civilian Iraq Mosul 1 4 5 
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wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq 
30-Jul-
09 
2 
children, 1 civilian 
killed, 30 
civilians, 
including 
children, wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Al 
Qa'im, Al Anbar, 
Iraq Iraq Al Qa'im 3 30 33 
6-Mar-
09 
Police 
officers targeted 
in suicide VBIED 
attack near Tikrit, 
Salah ad Din, Iraq Iraq Tikrit 0 0 0 
20-Jun-
09 
47 
civilians, 35 
children killed, 
211 civilians 
including children 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Taza Khurmatu, 
At Ta'mim, Iraq Iraq 
Taza 
Khurmatu 82 211 293 
22-Jun-
09 
4 police 
officers, 3 
civilians killed, 6 
police officers, 4 
civilians, 3 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Abu 
Ghurayb, Al 
Anbar, Iraq Iraq 
Abu 
Ghurayb 7 13 20 
17-
May-09 
1 police 
officer killed, 3 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 1 3 4 
7-Aug-
09 
39 
civilians killed, 
276 others 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected ISI in 
Shirakhan, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Shirakhan 39 276 315 
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14-Jan-
09 
1 soldier, 
1 civilian killed, 5 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Mosul, 
Ninawa, Iraq Iraq Mosul 2 5 7 
14-Nov-
09 
7 
civilians, 4 
children, 1 police 
officer killed, 35 
police officers and 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 12 35 47 
5-May-
09 
3 
civilians, 3 
children, 1 soldier 
killed, 20 
civilians, 12 
children, 9 
soldiers, 4 police 
officers, 3 
government 
officials wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Bara, 
Federally 
Administered 
Tribal Areas, 
Pakistan Pakistan Bara 7 48 55 
9-Jun-
09 
14 
civilians, 5 NGO 
workers, 2 UN 
employees, 1 
journalist, 1 
security guard 
killed, 42 
civilians, 18 UN 
employees, 7 
security guards, 2 
NGO workers 
injured in armed 
and suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 23 69 92 
15-Dec-
09 
30 
civilians, several 
children killed, 90 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in Dera Pakistan 
Dera Ghazi 
Khan 33 90 123 
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Ghazi Khan, 
Punjab, Pakistan 
12-Mar-
09 
3 soldiers 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Charbagh, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Charbagh 0 3 3 
18-Dec-
09 
10 
civilians, 2 
children killed, 20 
civilians and 
children, 12 police 
officers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Timurgara, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Timurgara 12 32 44 
2-Jul-09 
40 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Rawalpindi, 
Punjab, Pakistan Pakistan Rawalpindi 0 40 40 
18-Jul-
09 
Unknown 
target in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 0 0 0 
13-Nov-
09 
7 
soldiers, 7 
government 
employees, 3 
civilians killed, 11 
government 
employees, 69 
soldiers and 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 17 80 97 
29-Sep-
09 
3 
civilians, 1 cleric 
killed, 1 civilian 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack by 
suspected TTP in 
Bannu, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Bannu 4 1 5 
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18-Apr-
09 
25 
soldiers, 2 police 
officers killed, 48 
soldiers, 7 police 
officers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Doaba, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Doaba 27 55 82 
6-Feb-
09 
3 
civilians, 3 
students, 1 soldier 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Jamrud, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Jamrud 0 7 7 
24-Oct-
09 
1 police 
officer killed in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Islamabad, 
Pakistan Pakistan None 1 0 1 
26-Sep-
09 
7 
civilians, 5 police 
officers, 1 child 
killed, 40 
civilians, 31 
police officers, 9 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Bannu, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Bannu 13 80 93 
18-Sep-
09 
40 
civilians killed, 80 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by Lashkar 
i Jhangvi in 
Kohat, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Kohat 40 80 120 
30-Jun-
09 
4 
civilians killed, 11 
others injured in 
suicide IED and 
VBIED attack in 
Kalat, 
Balochistan, 
Pakistan Pakistan Kalat 4 11 15 
29-Aug-
09 
3 police 
officers killed in Pakistan Qila 3 0 3 
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suicide VBIED 
attack in Qila, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan 
11-
May-09 
7 
civilians, 2 
soldiers, 1 child 
killed, 14 soldiers, 
13 civilians 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected TTP in 
Darra Adam Khel, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan 
Darra Adam 
Khel 10 27 37 
16-Nov-
09 
4 
civilians killed, 31 
others, 8 students, 
2 police officers, 2 
soldiers injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 4 43 47 
10-Nov-
09 
27 
civilians, 7 
children killed, 
100 civilians and 
children injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Charsadda, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Charsadda 34 100 134 
8-Dec-
09 
8 
civilians, 4 
soldiers killed, 30 
civilians, soldiers, 
and children 
injured in armed 
and suicide 
VBIED attacks by 
Taliban in Multan, 
Punjab, Pakistan Pakistan Multan 12 30 42 
18-Aug-
09 
4 
soldiers, 3 
civilians killed, 3 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack near Miram 
Shah, Federally 
Administered 
Tribal Areas, 
Pakistan Pakistan Miram Shah 7 3 10 
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15-Apr-
09 
10 police 
officers, 9 
civilians killed, 7 
police officers, 9 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Charsadda, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Charsadda 19 16 35 
12-Jun-
09 
3 
soldiers, 2 
civilians killed, 75 
soldiers, 30 
civilians and 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Nowshera, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Nowshera 5 105 110 
16-Oct-
09 
10 
civilians, 3 police 
officers, 2 
children killed, 25 
police officers, 
civilians, and 
children injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 15 25 40 
22-Jun-
09 
2 police 
officers killed, 4 
civilians, 3 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected Taliban 
in Batgaram, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan Batgaram 2 7 9 
28-
May-09 
3 police 
officers killed, 3 
others injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack near 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 3 3 6 
15-Oct-
09 
8 
civilians, 3 police 
officers killed, 15 
civilians, 4 police 
officers, several Pakistan Kohat 11 22 33 
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children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Kohat, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan 
13-Nov-
09 
9 police 
officers, 2 
soldiers, 3 
civilians, 1 child 
killed, 15 police 
officers, 2 
civilians, 4 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by TTP in 
Bannu, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Bannu 15 21 36 
28-
May-09 
2 
civilians, 1 police 
officer killed, 6 
police officers, 5 
civilians injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in Dera 
Ismail Khan, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan 
Dera Ismail 
Khan 3 11 14 
26-Sep-
09 
11 
civilians killed, 94 
others wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
and armed attack 
in Peshawar, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 11 94 105 
5-Feb-
09 
12 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
and armed attacks 
in Mingaora, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan Mingaora 0 12 12 
10-Aug-
09 
1 civilian 
killed, 3 others 
injured in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 1 3 4 
30-Mar-
09 
5 
soldiers, 2 
civilians killed, 5 
soldiers, 4 Pakistan Bannu 7 9 16 
  387 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack near Bannu, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan 
21-Feb-
09 
Police 
checkpoint 
targeted in suicide 
VBIED attack in 
Lakki Marwat, 
North-West 
Frontier, Pakistan Pakistan 
Lakki 
Marwat 0 0 0 
21-
May-09 
3 
children, 2 
civilians killed, 15 
soldiers, 6 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected TTP in 
Jandola, Federally 
Administered 
Tribal Areas, 
Pakistan Pakistan Jandola 5 21 26 
27-
May-09 
14 police 
officers, 9 
civilians, 5 
soldiers, 1 child 
killed, 326 people 
injured in suicide 
VBIED and armed 
attacks by TTP in 
Lahore, Punjab, 
Pakistan Pakistan Lahore 29 326 355 
9-Oct-
09 
46 
civilians, 8 
children killed, 
166 civilians and 
children injured in 
suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Peshawar, North-
West Frontier, 
Pakistan Pakistan Peshawar 54 166 220 
5-Apr-
09 
12 
civilians, 5 
children, 1 soldier 
killed, 21 
civilians, 12 
children, 6 
soldiers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
suspected Taliban 
in Miram Shah, 
Federally Pakistan Miram Shah 18 39 57 
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Administered 
Tribal Areas, 
Pakistan 
22-Jun-
09 
1 
bodyguard, 1 
police officer, 1 
civilian killed, 3 
bodyguards, 1 top 
government 
official, 1 civilian 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
attack by 
Caucasus Emirate 
in Nazran, 
Ingushetiya, 
Russia Russia Nazran 3 5 8 
1-Sep-
09 
1 
government 
employee killed, 8 
police officers, 6 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack in 
Makhachkala, 
Dagestan, Russia Russia Makhachkala 1 14 15 
17-Aug-
09 
20 police 
officers, 5 
civilians killed, 
194 civilians, 76 
police officers, 10 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
and armed attack 
by Caucasus 
Emirate in 
Nazran, 
Ingushetiya, 
Russia Russia Nazran 25 280 305 
17-Dec-
09 
1 person 
killed, 10 soldiers, 
7 civilians, 3 
children, 3 police 
officers wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attack by 
Caucasus Emirate 
in Nazran, 
Ingushetiya, 
Russia Russia Nazran 1 23 24 
11-Sep-
09 
1 police 
officer, 1 civilian 
killed, 6 police 
officers, 3 
civilians wounded Russia Nazran 2 9 11 
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in suicide VBIED 
attack in Nazran, 
Ingushetiya, 
Russia 
18-Jun-
09 
1 
government 
official, 16 
soldiers, 1 former 
ambassador, 
several tribal 
elders, 9 civilians, 
dozens of people 
killed, 2 
government 
officials, scores of 
people wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
by al-Shabaab al-
Islamiya in 
Beledweyne, 
Hiiraan, Somalia Somalia Beledweyne 54 62 116 
22-Feb-
09 
12 
peacekeepers, 2 
civilians killed, 15 
peacekeepers 
wounded in 
suicide VBIED 
and mortar attack 
by al-Shabaab al-
Islamiya in 
Mogadishu, 
Banaadir, Somalia Somalia Mogadishu 14 15 29 
24-
May-09 
7 soldiers 
and police 
officers, 3 
civilians killed, 4 
soldiers, 5 police 
officers and 
civilians wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
by al-Shabaab al-
Islamiya in 
Mogadishu, 
Banaadir, Somalia Somalia Mogadishu 10 9 19 
17-Sep-
09 
16 
peacekeepers, 1 
civilian, 1 police 
officer, several 
soldiers killed; 21 
peacekeepers, 3 
soldiers, 1 private 
security guard, 14 
people wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
attacks by al-
Shabaab al- Somalia Mogadishu 21 39 60 
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Islamiya in 
Mogadishu, 
Banaadir, Somalia 
24-Jan-
09 
29 
civilians, 1 police 
officer killed, 30 
civilians, 7 
children wounded 
in suicide VBIED 
and armed attacks 
by al-Shabaab al-
Islamiya in 
Mogadishu, 
Banaadir, Somalia Somalia Mogadishu 30 37 67 
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